Wpil Limited vs Gammon India Limited
- CitationCompany Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where the period of limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 expires on a day on which the Tribunal is closed, the application may be instituted on the day the Tribunal reopens under Section 4 of that Act only if it is in fact filed on that day; where the application is filed after the reopening date, the benefit of Section 4 is not available and the application is time-barred. The period of ten days allowed for a corporate debtor to respond to a demand notice under Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is not excludable in computing the three-year limitation period for an application under Section 9, because Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies only to suits of which notice has been given, and an application under Section 9 is not a suit.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
the resolution of an amount of Rs. 77 20, 941/- as on 25.08.2018,
has been dismissed on the ground of limitation.
2. In brief, Respondent vide its two letters of intent dated
19.01.2010 entered with the Appellant appointed it as
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 subcontractor for one of the works under the main contract
entered between VISA Steel Limited and the Respondent. The
Appellant agreed to provide certain materials alongwith the
necessary services to Respondent. The parties were performing
their obligations as per the terms and conditions mentioned in the
LOIs and the Appellant was issuing running invoices from time to
time but it is alleged that only part payment was made. The rn
Appellant reconciled the accounts of the Respondent and found a
sum of Rs. 50,13,602 payable. The last invoice was raised on
31.11.2012 and it is alleged by the Appellant that the debt was
admitted by email by the Respondent on 07.10.2016. The
Appellant issued notice of demand on 07.08.2018 and ultimately
on 27.09.2019 issued demand notice under Section 8 of the Code
to Respondent. According to the Appellant the petition under
Section 9 was filed before the Tribunal on 09.10.2019 because the
Tribunal was closed because of Holiday from 02.10.2019 till
08.10.2019 (Dusshera Holiday). The application filed by the
Appellant was contested by the Respondent before the Tribunal on
the ground that even if the acknowledgment of debt is considered
from the email dated 07.10.2016, the petition having been filed on
09.10.2019 is barred by limitation. It was also contended that the
email exchanged between the parties cannot be treated as
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 3
acknowledgement on the part of the Respondent and reliance was
placed on a decision of this Court in the case of M/s G.L. Shoes
Vs. M/s Action Udhyog Pvt. Ltd., CA (AT) (Ins) No. 846 of 2022
decided on 24.05.2023 alleging that Section 18 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 (in short 'Act') provides that acknowledgement should be
in writing and signed by the party against whom such right is
claimed. The Tribunal while dealing with the contention of the
Appellant that the petition has been filed on 09.10.2019 is within•
the period of limitation made the following observations which are
reproduced as under:-
"Having perused the record, we are of the considered view that admittedly the last invoice was issued on 31.11.2012. Even if the email dated 07.10.2016 is taken into consideration the present petition cannot be said to have been filed within the period of limitation. The present petition was filed on 09.10.2019 which is beyond period of three years even from the so-called acknowledgement through email dated 07.10.2016."
3. It was also contended by the Appellant that the period of 10
days of the notice issued under Section 8 of the Code has to be
excluded from the total period of limitation of three years as
envisaged under Article 137 of the Act and relied upon a decision
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Disha Constructions
And Ors. Vs. State of Goa and Ors., Manu/SC/ 1489/2011 but the
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 4
said contention was repelled by the Tribunal on the ground that in
the case of Disha Constructions (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme
Court was dealing with Section 80 of the CPC which is not
applicable to the present case because the Code is complete in
itself and there is no provision in it that the period spent in
issuance of demand notice (10 days) has to be excluded while
reckoning the period of limitation for filing the petition under
Section 9 of the Code.
4. Aggrieved against the impugned order, the present appeal
has been filed under Section 61 of the Code.
5. The first contention raised by the Appellant is that the
application having been filed on 0910.2019 is within the period of
limitation of three years if the limitation is to be counted from the
email dated 07.10.2016. In this regard, it is submitted that since
there were Holidays from 02.10.2019 till 08.10.2019 in the
Tribunal in which the application under Sectign 9 was filed and in
support the calendar of the year 2019 of NCLT, Mumbai is
appended as Ann.exure A3 in which 02.10.2019 has been shown
as the Holiday on account of Mahatma Gandhi Birthday,
03.10.2019 and 04.10.2019 have been shown as local holidays,
05.10.2019 and 06.10.2019 being the Saturday and Sunday and
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 07.10.2019 and 08.10.2019 have been shown as Additional
Dussehra and Dussehra Holidays. Counsel for the Appellant has
submitted that as per Section 4 of the Act if the period of limitation
expires during the Holiday and the suit, appeal or application is
filed on the date when the court reopens then the period during
which the court remained closed has to be excluded.
6. The second contention of the Appellant is in regard to
exclusion of period of 10 days spent by the Appellant while
issuance of notice under Section 8 which is a pre-requisite for filing
the application under Section 9 of the Code and in this regard she
has relied upon a decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the
case of Disha Constructions (Supra) and also Section 15(2) of the
Act as per which the period of limitation for any suit of which, notice
has been given has to be excluded.
7. During the pendency of this appeal, Counsel for the Appellant
has also filed an additional affidavit of Sunil A Vyas who is
associated with M/ s Fox Mandal 85 Associates (law firm) in which
he has averred that the NCLT was closed for vacation from
02.10.2019 till 08.10.2019, therefore, the Appellant was unable to
file CP until 09.10.2019. It is further averred that on 09.10.2019
he approached the registry of the NCLT to file the CP, accompanied
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 6
with a pay order for the payment of Court fees but he was informed Th that vide notification dated 27.09.2019, issued by the NCLT,
payment of the Court fee was required to be made through
Bharatkosh Web based portal system and the pay order was not
accepted by the registry. Consequently, he obtained Bharatkosh
payment receipt on 09.10.2019 only by 04:24 PM. In this regard,
he has annexed notification dated 27.09.2019 and certified copy
of the bharatkosh receipt dated 09.10.2019 which are reproduced
for a ready reference:-
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Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 7
Port
Dated; Oct 2019
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8. It is also averred that the application under Section 9 was
filed on 09.10.2019 on which the registry raised objection
on10.10.2019 which were duly rectified by on 11.10.2019 but the
NCLT web portal erroneously reflected the date of filing and the
date of registration of the CP as 14.10.2019. He has also averred
that the registry has confirmed that this discrepancy is due to
technical error on the web portal of the NCLT.
9. Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent has firstly denied
that the email dated 07.10.2016 is the acknowledgement of debt
• in terms of Section 18 of the Code and relied upon a decision of
this court in the case M/s G.L Shoes (Supra) contending that the
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 8
acknowledgement has to be in writing and signed. It is further
submitted that even if it is presumed that email dated 07.10.2016
is the acknowledgement of debt, for the sake of argument, and the
NCLT was closed as per calendar for the year 2019 attached as
Annexure A3 from 02.10.2019 till 08.10.2019 yet the application
has not been filed by the Appellant on 09.10.2019. He has filed an
affidavit of Jaysingh Ashar, Power of attorney holder of the
Respondent Company dated 03.01.2025 in which he has averred
that the petition under Section 9 was filed on 10.10.2019 vide
diary no. 7074 of 2019 issued by the registry of the Tribunal. He
•has further averred that the defects were raised on 10.10.2019 by
the registry which was alleged to have been rectified by the
Appellant on 11.01.2019, it is thus therefore, submitted that the
appellants cannot take the recourse to Section 4 of the Act as the
petition was not filed on 09.10.2019 and in this regard, the
Tribunal has also committed an error in recording in its order that
the petition was filed on 09.10.2019. In support of his
submissions, he has also attached annexure A i.e. certified copy of
the petition filed by the Appellant before the Tribunal bearing
stamp of registry in which the date of filing is mentioned as•
10.10.2019 and the diary no. has been mentioned as 7074.
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 9
10 It is next argued by the Respondent that though a notice
under Section 8 is required as pre-requisite to be served for a
period of 10 days on the CD but the said period cannot be
excluded. It is submitted that in the case of Dish Constructions
(Supra) is of no avail to the Appellant because in that case there
was an agreement between the parties for construction of a'school
auditorium for Rs. 24 Laks approximately but the Respondent paid
only 18 Lakhs and remaining amount was to be paid by
30.09.2006. The suit was filed on 24.10.2009 but the Appellants
in that case already sent a notice in February, 2009 and prayed
for exclusion of time period under Section 15(2) of the Act. It was
held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if the notice has been sent
within the period of limitation then the exclusion can be granted.
It is submitted that Section 15(2) of the Act only confined, to the
suits and not to the applications whereas proceedings under
Section 9 is triggered by filing an application for which the
limitation has been provided under Article 137 of the Act. He has
also submitted that Section 15(1) also deals with computation of
period of any suit or application for the execution of a decree.
Meaning thereby that the legislature has specifically provided the
exclusion of period of limitation for specific nature of litigation i.e.
suit or application for execution of a decree and not for all §orts of
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 10
applications. In the end, it is submitted that the Code is complete
in itself in which there is no provision for excluding the period
spent on sending demand notice under Section 8 of the Code for
the purpose of computing the period of limitation in an application
filed under Section 9 of the Code.
11. We have heard Counsel for the parties and perused the record
with their able assistance.
12. The present application has been filed under Section 9 of the
Code. The limitation to file the application under Section 9 is
governed by Article 137 of the Act which is reproduced as under:-
Description of Period of limitation Time from which period
application begins to run
137. Any other Three years. When the right to apply
application for which no accrues.
period of limitation is
provided elsewhere in
this Division.
13. The Appellant has taken the limitation from the email dated
07.10.2016 purported to be an acknowledgement of debt by the
Respondent in terms of Section 18 of the Act. In such
circumstances, considering the period of limitation of three years
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 11
as provided under Article 137, the petition under Section 9 should
have been filed by 07.10.2019. The case set up by the Appellant is
that the petition could not be filed on 07.10.2019 f)ecause of
holidays commencing from 02.10.2019 till 08.10.2019 and could
have been filed only on 09.10.2019 The case of the Appellant is
that in view of Section 4 of the Act the period during which the
court was closed has to be excluded. Section 4 of the Act is
reproduced as under:-
"4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.-- Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court re-opens.
Explanation.--A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day."
14. There is no dispute that when the period provided for suit,
appeal or application expire on a day when the court is closed then
the suit appeal or application can be instituted on the date when
the court reopens.
15. As per Section 4 of the Act, the Appellant deserves the
protection of Section 4 of the Act but the fact is otherwise as has
been conveyed by the Respondent that the application has been
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 12
filed on 10.10.2019 instead of 09.10.2019. The very fact that the
Appellant purchased court fee from bharatkosh on 09.10.2019 at
04:24PM and at that time there was no procedure for online filing
and all the applications were required to be filed by presenting the
same before the registry of the Tribunal by way of a hard copy, the
application could not have been filed on 09.10.2019 itself. It is
otherwise clear from the certified copy attached by the Respondent
with its affidavit dated 03.01.2025 that the petition was filed by
the Appellant on 10.10.2019 vide diary no. 7074 of 2019 which
was examined by the registry on the same day and objection was
raised which was alleged to have been removed by the Appellant
on 11.10.2019 for the purpose of refiling.
16. Thus, in view of the aforesaid factual circumstances the
application having been filed on 10.10.2019 was beyond the period
of limitation as envisaged under Article 137 of the Act and was
clearly time barred.
17. Now the second question would arise as to whether the
Appellant can exclude the period of 10 days out of the total period
of three years on account of sending the notice under Section 8 of
the Code and rely upon Section ,15(2) of the Act and the decision
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 13
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Disha Constructions
(Supra)?
18. In this regard, Section 8 86 9(1) of the Code deserves to be
referred to which are reproduced as under:-
"Section 8: Insolvency resolution by operational creditor.
*8. (1) An operational creditor may, on the occurrence of a default, deliver a demand notice of unpaid operational debtJ2 or copy of an invoice demanding payment of the amount involved in the default to the corporate debtor in such form and manner as may be prescribed. (2)The corporate debtor shall, within a period of ten days of the receipt of the demand notice or copy of the invoice mentioned in sub-section (1) bring to the notice of the operational creditor--
(a) existence of a dispute, [if any, or] record of the pendency of the suit or arbitration proceedings filed before the receipt of such notice or invoice in relation to such dispute;
(b) the [payment] of unpaid operational debt--
(i) by sending an attested copy of the record of electronic transfer of the unpaid amount from the bank account of the corporate debtor; or
(ii) by sending an attested copy of record that the operational creditor has encashed a cheque issued by the corporate debtor.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, a "demand notice" means a notice served by an operational creditor to the corporate debtor demanding 2[payment] of the operational debt in respect of which the default has occurred.
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 14 Section 9: Application for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process by operational creditor.
*9. (1) After the expiry of the period of ten days from the date of delivery of the notice or invoice demanding payment under sub-section (1) of section 8, if the operational creditor does not receive payment from the corporate debtor or notice of the dispute under sub- section (2) of section 8, the operational creditors' may file an application before the Adjudicating Authority for initiating a corporate insolvency resolution process."
19. Section 8(1) provides that the OC may issue a notice
demanding payment which may be replied within a period of 10
days of the receipt by the CD but Section 9(1) provides that
application under Section 9 can only be filed after the expiry period
of notice of 10 days under Section 8(1) of the Code. The Appellant
has relied upon Section 15 of the Act to contend that the appellant
had given notice as prescribed under the Code which is sine qua
non for filing the application under Section 9 of the code,
therefore, the Appellant was required to await the expiry of 10 days
from the date of delivery of the notice to file the application under
Section 9 of the code which has to be excluded in terms of Section
15(2) of the Act. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer to • Section 15 of the Act as well which is reproduced as under:-
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 15
"15. Exclusion of time in certain other cases.--(1) In computing the period of limitation of any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has been given, or for which the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required, in accordance with the requirements of any law for the time being in force, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded.
Explanation.--In excluding the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority, the date on which the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the Government or other authority shall both be counted.
(3) In computing the period of limitation for any suit or application for execution of a decree by any receiver or interim receiver appointed in proceedings for the adjudication of a person as an insolvent or by any liquidator or provisional liquidator appointed in proceedings for the winding up of a company, the period beginning with the date of institution of such proceeding and ending with the expiry of three months from the date of appointment of such receiver or liquidator, as the case may be, shall be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation for a suit for possession by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, the time during which a proceeding to set aside the sale has been prosecuted shall be excluded.
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 16
(5) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the defendant has been absent from India and from the territories outside India under the administration of the Central Government, shall be excluded."
20. Section 15 has two parts. Section 15(1) deals with
computation of period of limitation for any suit or application for
the execution of a decree. Whereas Section 15(2) deals with
computation of period of limitation for any suit of which notice has
been given. In this regard, it would be relevant to mentiOn that
Section 2(j) defines period of limitation which means the period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the
schedule and prescribed period means the period of limitation
computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The
schedule appended with the Act has three divisions in which first
division deals with the suit having 10 parts in which the
description of suit, the period of limitation and time from which
period begins to run has been provided. Second division of the
schedule deals with appeals in which the same has been provided
and the 3rd division is regarding applications in which part 1 deals
with applications in specified cases and part II deals with other
applications. The purpose of explaining the schedule is to highlight
that there are different period of limitation prescribed for different
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 17
kind of suits, appeals and different applications but where no
limitation is prescribed for any other application then the period of
three years has been provided for such type of application when
the right to apply accrues. This is Article 137 of the Act which
applies to the cases arising of the Code for the purpose of filing an
application under Section 7, 9 or 10 of the Code.
21. Since, Section 15(1) only confines to the suit or an application
for the execution of a decree and 15(2) is confined to only suit
which requires issuance of notice and the said period of notice has
to be excluded whereas the present case it is only an application
under Section 9 of the Code and not a suit and is not covered by
Section 15(2) of the Act.
22. In this regard reference may be had to the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave
Vs. Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. 86 Anr., (2019) 10
SCC 572 and the decision of this Court in the case of Rourkela
Steel Syndicate Vs. Metistech Fabricators Pvt. Ltd. 2023 SCC
•Online NCLAT 1101 in which it has been held that the application
under Section 7 or 9 is not a suit.
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024 18
23. Hence, the argument of the appellant in this regard is not acceptable
and the decision in the case of Disha Constructions (Supra) is also not
applicable.
24. No other point has been raised.
25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any error in the
impugned order and the same is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Pending IAs, if any, are hereby closed.
[Justice Rakesh Kumar Jain] Member (Judicial)
[Mr. Naresh Salecha] Member (Technical)
[Mr. Indevar Pandey] Member (Technical)
New Delhi 21st January, 2025 sheetal
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 12 of 2024
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