Tejinder Pal Setia vs Sh. Arvind Kumar Resolution ...
- CitationCompany Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where a person has paid money to a real estate developer for the acquisition of units or given an advance, such person is an allottee who is a financial creditor under Section 5(8)(f) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and is entitled to file a claim under Section 3(6), irrespective of whether the agreement is labelled as a sale agreement, marketing arrangement or agreement to sell, and whether or not the allottee holds a specific unit. For the purposes of the Code, the terms "allottee" and "real estate project" are the only definitions imported from the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 through Explanation (ii) to Section 5(8); the definition of "promoter" under that Act is not imported, and the Code, being a self-contained enactment, cannot be supplemented by other RERA provisions absent express provision. A company struck off from the register of companies under the Companies Act, 2013 continues to exist for the purpose of realising amounts due to it and discharging its liabilities, and the struck-off status of a creditor is not a ground for rejecting its claim in insolvency. The speculative character of an allottee or investor is relevant only to the admission of an application under Section 7 and does not bar the allottee from filing a claim as a creditor in a class after admission; allotment of multiple units to one allottee does not by itself alter that status. A claim of a creditor in a class may be established under Regulation 8A of the CIRP Regulations, 2016 through an agreement for sale, letter of allotment, proof of payment or other document evidencing the debt, and non-reflection of the claimed amount in the corporate debtor's balance sheet is not, by itself, a cogent ground for rejecting the claim.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
[Arising out of the Impugned Order dated 02.07.2025 passed by the Adjudicating Authority, National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench in I.A. No.2105/2023 in C.P. (IB) No. 248/Chd/Hry/2019] In the matter of: TEJINDER PAL SETIA S/O LATE SH. B.K. SETIA SUSPENDED DIRECTOR OF THE CORPORATE DEBTOR I.E. CHANDIGARH OVERSEAS PVT. LTD. R/O 131, A- BLOCK, MEERA BAG, DELHI- 110087 .... Appellant Versus
1. SH. ARVIND KUMAR, RESOLUTION PROFESSIONAL CHANDIGARH OVERSEAS PVT. LTD. REGD. OFFICE AT: SCO NO. 249, BASEMENT, SECOTR 44-C, CHANDIGARH - 160047 EMAIL: irpcopl@gmail.com .... Respondent No.1 2. M/S. ACCORD INFRA DEVELOPER PVT. LTD. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR/ AR REGD. OFFICE AT: SHOP NO. P11, NEAR ESI, DISPENSARY MILAN CINEMA ROAD, KARAMPURA, DELHI WEST- 110015 EMAIL: accounts.axiom@gmail.com .... Respondent No.2 3. M/S. MOHALI HI-TECH BUILDERS AND PROMOTERS PVT. LTD. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR/ AR REGD OFFICE AT: HOUSE NO. 989, SECTOR 69, MOHALI EMAIL: pathaniaca@airtelmail.in .... Respondent No.3 4. DEPARTMENT OF INCOME TAX THROUGH ITS JOINT COMMISSIONER OFFICE AT: LIVE STOCK COMPLEX, SECTOR 63, MOHALI .... Respondent No.4 5. DEPARTMENT OF INCOOME TAX THROUGH ITS PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OFFICE AT PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI .... Respondent No.5 6. REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR OFFICE AT: CORPORATE BHAWAN, SECTOR-27, CHANDIGARH .... Respondent No.6 7. REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR OFFICE AT: 4TH FLOOR, IFCI TOWER, 61, NEHRU PLACE, NEW DEHI- 110019 .... Respondent No.7
Present: For Appellant : Mr. Paras Mithal, Mr. Prabhar Mithal and Mr. Arjun Katyal, Advocates.
For Respondent : Mr. Atul V. Sood, Advocate for RP. Mr. Abhijeet Sinha Sr. Advocate with Mr. Rajat Gautam, Advocates for R2 and R3. Mr. Sarjit Bhadu Sr. Advocate with Mr. Aditya Soni, Advocates for Homebuyer.
JUDGMENT
(Hybrid Mode)
Per: Barun Mitra, Member (Technical)
The present appeal filed under Section 61 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code 2016 ('IBC' in short) by the Appellant arises out of the Order dated
02.07.2025 (hereinafter referred to as 'Impugned Order') passed by the
Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench-I)
in I.A. No. 2105(CH)/2023 in C.P. (IB) No. 248/Chd/2019. By the impugned
order, the Adjudicating Authority has dismissed the I.A. No. 2105 of 2023 filed
Page 2 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 by Appellant- Suspended Director of Chandigarh Overseas Pvt. Ltd. Aggrieved by
the impugned order, the present appeal has been preferred by the Appellant.
2. Coming to the factual matrix of the present case at hand, the Corporate
Debtor-Chandigarh Overseas Pvt. Ltd. ("COPL" in short) was admitted into CIRP
on 27.02.2023 by the Adjudicating Authority. This admission order though
challenged before this Tribunal and the Hon'ble Supreme Court attained finality
on 06.09.2023. Basis the claims received, the Resolution Professional ("RP" in
short) constituted the Committee of Creditors ("CoC" in short) on 28.07.2023.
The present Appellant, suspended director of the Corporate Debtor filed IA No.
2105 of 2023 in November 2023 before the Adjudicating Authority inter-alia
challenging the constitution of the CoC and seeking exclusion of two entities
namely, M/s Accord Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd. ("Accord" in short) and M/s
Mohali Hitech Builders and Promoters Pvt. Ltd. ("Mohali Builders" in short)
from the CoC on the ground that they were neither Financial Creditors nor Class
of Creditors-Homebuyers/Allottees besides directing enquiry and investigations
into their affairs and declare all resolutions passed in the first CoC meeting by
the illegally constituted CoC to be illegal. The Adjudicating Authority on
02.07.2025 passed the impugned order dismissing IA No. 2105 of 2023.
Aggrieved by the impugned order, the present appeal has been preferred by
suspended director of the Corporate Debtor.
3. Making submissions on behalf of the Appellant, Shri Paras Mithal, Ld.
Counsel submitted that the Adjudicating Authority committed a mistake in
constituting the CoC with Respondent No.2-Accord and Respondent No.3-Mohali
Builders as members therein at a time when they were neither Financial Page 3 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 Creditors nor Allottees/Homebuyers in terms of the IBC framework. It was
contended that Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 were speculative
investors who had usurped creditor status in collusion with erstwhile
management and should be excluded from the CoC. It was emphatically
asserted that the Agreements dated 24.06.2011 and 26.02.2012 which was
relied upon by the Respondent No.2 and the Agreement dated 29.06.2009 by the
Respondent No.3 clearly show that the Respondents were not
allottees/homebuyers but were promoters and marketers of the housing projects
which were developed by the Corporate Debtor. It was vehemently contended
that the arrangements contained in these Agreements clearly show that the
Respondents were vested with the right to sell, advertise, rename the project and
even execute sale documents for third parties. The Respondents also failed to
demonstrate that they were allotted any specific unit in the housing project
under the said Agreements and had failed to establish themselves as 'allottees'
under the provisions of IBC or Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act,
2016 (hereinafter referred to as "RERA Act"). It was vehemently contended by
the Appellant that the Respondents No.2 and 3 were not allottees and keeping
in mind their conduct and actions as well as their status as defined under the
Agreements clearly bring them within the purview of a 'Promoter' of a real estate
project in terms of RERA Act. The agreement of marketing and reselling was
clothed with the colour of a builder-buyer agreement but in reality, the
Respondents were business partners and the agreements executed by them with
the Corporate Debtor were collusive agreements to defraud the Corporate
Debtor. In support of their contention, reliance has been placed on the judgment Page 4 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 of Madhya Pradesh Real Estate Appellate Tribunal in Bhopal Development
Authority vs. Roop Laxmi Singh (2026) ibclaw.in 13 REAT where it has been
held that a co-promoter cannot be considered an allottee, even if there is any
condition for any consideration amount to be received under the relevant
agreements. It was therefore clear that the collusive arrangement contemplated
under the Agreements was not for possession of units by Respondent No.2 and
3 as allottees but was a cover-up of their role as a promoter/speculative investor.
It was further submitted that the RP had admitted unverified and unaccounted
claims of the Respondents which were not supported by the financial statements
of the Corporate Debtor or Respondents. The claims of Respondents No.2 and 3
should have been rejected by the RP and they should have been denied a berth
on the CoC as a Financial Creditor. It was also asserted that Respondents No.2
and 3 misused their position in the CoC by controlling the decision-making
process of the CoC in a manner which prejudiced the interests of genuine
homebuyers and other stakeholders. Submission was also made that the RP did
not undertake any forensic audit despite allegations of collusion, diversion of
assets and fraudulent transactions having been made. That the conduct of the
RP was also doubtful is further substantiated by the fact that the RP has been
suspended by the IBBI for having made similar admission of inadmissible claims
of ineligible parties in another CIRP.
4. Refuting the contentions of the Appellant, Shri Abhijit Sinha, Ld. Sr.
Counsel on behalf of Respondents No.2 and 3 submitted that the Appellant,
being the erstwhile Director of the Corporate Debtor, lacked locus to assail the
impugned order with respect to the composition, constitution and functioning of Page 5 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 the CoC. It was contended that since the Agreements of 2009, 2010 and 2012
were all executed by the Respondents No.2 and 3 with the previous management
before the Appellant had become a director of the Corporate Debtor, the
Appellant did not have the benefit of first-hand knowledge of the circumstances
in which the Agreements were executed or aware of the purpose of execution of
the Agreements. In any case, the reliefs claimed in the present appeal
challenging the dismissal of I.A. No. 2105 of 2023 seeking exclusion of
Respondents No.2 and 3 from the CoC and denial of their treatment in the
category of homebuyers and declaration of all decisions of the CoC as illegal
cannot be pressed by the Appellant after having ceased to be in management of
the Corporate Debtor. It was also added that the ground taken by the Appellant
that the claim of Respondents No.2 and 3 was not reflected in the financial
records also lacked merit as it was not made on the basis of supporting
documents but premised on personal knowledge, the sanctity of which needs to
be discounted when dealing with the issue of claims. It was contended that
balance sheet is not the sole or conclusive basis for admission of claims as in
terms of Regulation 8A of the CIRP Regulations, 2016, the existence of debt due
to a creditor in a class can also be established through an agreement for sale,
letter of allotment, receipt of payment made, or any other document evidencing
the existence of a debt. It was also asserted that the present appeal is nothing
but an attempt to derail the CIRP process of the Corporate Debtor. It was also
asserted that the Appellant has tried to unnecessarily transpose the provisions
of the RERA Act to the IBC framework particularly in attempting to import the
definition of the term 'promoter' from the RERA Act, 2018 which cannot be Page 6 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 allowed since the IBC is self-contained legislative enactment and only permits
definition of two specific terms from the RERA Act. It was also pointed out that
the contention of the Appellant that since Respondents No.2 and 3 had been
allotted multiple units in the real estate project, they cannot be held as
homebuyer allottees is also a misplaced contention since there is no prohibition
under RERA against the allotment of multiple units to a single allottee.
Accordingly, any attempt by the Appellant to rely on the RERA definition of
"Promoter" to deny the status of a genuine allottee under the IBC to the two
Respondents No.2 and 3 is misconceived and contrary to the statutory
framework. It was emphatically asserted that there is no bar to the admission of
claims even if the allottee is treated as a speculative investor, so long as the
essential criteria of financial debt under Section 5(8)(f) of the IBC are satisfied.
Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Tribunal in Everlike Real Estate
& Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs Mr. Mohit Goyal in CA(AT)(Ins) No. 978 of 2024.
It was also contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgement in Mansi
Brar Fernandes Vs Subhha Sharma in Civil Appeal No.3826 of 2020 also
reinforces the position that that once the essential ingredients of a financial debt
are satisfied, the label of being a "speculative investor" is not sufficient to
disqualify an allottee from being treated as a financial creditor. These decisions
clearly support the inclusion of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the category of
allottees whose claims are based on valid agreements, payments made and
where transactions are backed by documentation.
5. Supporting the contentions raised on behalf of the Respondents No.2 and
3, similar arguments were canvassed by Shri Atul V. Sood, Ld. Counsel for the Page 7 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 RP. It was asserted that apart from the fact that the Appellant had no locus to
file the appeal being the suspended director of the Corporate Debtor, it was
submitted that the Appellant was a chronic and vexatious litigant who has been
persistently trying to disrupt the CIRP process at a time when the resolution
plan has already been approved by the CoC with 99.21% vote share. The RP
submitted that the claims of Respondents No.2 and 3 had been accepted by the
RP basis the documents provided by them because no other information/data
was available with the RP as the Appellant had been non-cooperative in sharing
relevant information. This non-cooperation is evident from the fact that they
provided the books of accounts of the Corporate Debtor on 17.09.2023 which
was more than six months after the admission of the Corporate Debtor into
insolvency. It was also contended that once a homebuyer/allottee pays money
for acquisition of units or tenders an advance, such a homebuyer/allottee
acquires the status of a Financial Creditor under Section 5(8)(f) of the IBC. The
status of such a homebuyer to be deemed as a speculative investor is relevant
only at the stage of admission of Section 7 application since a speculative
investor though precluded from filing a Section 7 application but is not
precluded from filing claims after the Section 7 application is admitted.
Submission was pressed by the RP that the Appellant had filed Civil Appeal No.
5533-34 of 2023 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in which similar grievances
had been raised which was rejected by the Hon'ble Apex Court. This shows that
the Appellant is trying to frustrate the CIRP process by indulging in forum
shopping. On the issue that Respondents No.2 and 3 are related parties of the
Corporate Debtor, it was contended that the test of related party is laid down in Page 8 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. Vs Spade
Financial Services Ltd. & Ors in Civil Appeal No. 2842 of 2020 wherein it
has been held that if a Financial Creditor is not a related party in praesenti, he
would not be debarred from being a member of CoC. Since the Respondents No.2
and 3 have ceased to be a related party from 2014, and CIRP was initiated after
2014, there is no substance in the contention of the Appellant. It was vehemently
contended that the Adjudicating Authority having considered all the issues
raised by the Appellant before passing a well-reasoned impugned order, it did
not warrant any interference by the Appellate Tribunal.
6. An Intervention Application No. 6574 of 2025 has been filed by the
Authorised Representative of the homebuyers in the CIRP of the Corporate
Debtor contending that they may be allowed to intervene in the matter opposing
the contentions of the Appellant for obstructing the CIRP process of the
Corporate Debtor.
7. We have duly considered the arguments advanced by the Learned Counsel
for the parties and perused the records carefully. The short question which
requires to be answered is whether there exists sufficient basis for exclusion of
Respondents No.2 and 3 from the CoC on the ground that they were neither
Financial Creditors nor Class of Creditors-Homebuyers/Allottees.
8. It is the case of the Appellant that a perusal of the recital clauses and the
terms of the Agreements of 2011 and 2012 executed between the Corporate
Debtor and Respondent No.2 and the Agreement of 2009 with Respondent No.3
clearly demonstrate that both the Respondents were promoters and marketers
of the project and not genuine homebuyers/allottees. By virtue of the Agreement Page 9 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 of 2011 executed by the Respondent No.2 with the Corporate Debtor, this entity
had made block purchase of large office spaces, commercial units and residential
units besides rebranding portions of the project of the Corporate Debtor in their
own name for onward sale by them independently. The Respondents had
undertaken independent sale of units from their allocated share for which they
executed sale deeds, entered into Buyer-Developer agreements, issued allotment
letters to third parties besides collected consideration directly from the ultimate
homebuyers which effectively rendered their status as that of a
partner/promoter and not that of an allottee. It was also added that though the
Agreement of 2011 was later re-nomenclated in 2012 from 'Agreement' to
'Agreement to Sell', in the case of Respondent No.2, this was collusively done so
as to fraudulently secure them the status of an allottee/financial creditor in
class though in reality they still continued as promoters. This is substantiated
by the fact that the subject matter as well as the consideration amount involved
in the Agreements of 2011 and 2012 remained more or less identical. The
Agreement to Sell of 2012 was thus a smoke screen to cover up the fact that the
Respondent No.2 was not an allottee but was a promoter engaged in the
marketing of the real estate project units. The Respondent No.2 continued to
remain a promoter, developer and marketer of the project who had executed
collusive agreements with the erstwhile management to hide their status. It was
asserted that both from the terms of the Agreement as well as the conduct of the
Respondent No.2, it emerges that Respondent No.2 was a promoter and not an
allottee. It was also added that the case of Respondent No.3-Mohali Builders for
claiming the status of an allottee was still weaker. The transaction between Page 10 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 Mohali Builders and the Corporate Debtor was that of a business partner who
had made speculative investment for marketing and reselling of units. The
Agreement of 2009 clearly showed that the Corporate Debtor was depicted
therein as 'Developer' while Mohali Builders has been defined as 'Promoter'. Even
the clauses of the Agreement gave liberty to the Mohali Builders to fix resale
prices, retain margins and control third-party agreements.
9. Submission was pressed by the Appellant that when both Respondents
had failed to establish that specific units were allotted to them, these entities
could not have been ascribed the status of Financial Creditor in Class. However,
the RP classified the Respondents No. 2 and 3 as Financial Creditors in a Class
without proper examination of the essence of these Agreements in question and
entertained the claims filed by them and erroneously included them in the CoC.
By admitting their claims and allowing them a berth in the CoC, this has led to
irregularities in the constitution of the CoC and led to consequential compromise
of critical commercial decisions of the Corporate Debtor. This inclusion was
therefore challenged by way of IA No. 2105 of 2023 but was erroneously rejected
by the impugned order.
10. To buttress the contention further that the Respondents were not allottees
but promoters, the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant invoked the definition of
'Promoter' in terms of the RERA Act. It was submitted that the IBC imports the
meaning of 'allottee' from the RERA Act and when Section 2(d) of the RERA Act
which defines the term 'allottee' is seen, it becomes clear that this term has been
used in contra-distinction to that of a 'promoter' which term has been defined
under Section 2(zk) of the RERA Act. It was contended that the scheme of RERA Page 11 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 provides for a mechanism to an 'allottee' to fight for their rights against the
'promoters' before the competent authority. Thus, the two terms 'allottee' and
'promoter' are mutually exclusive and hence an allottee cannot be viewed as a
promoter and vice versa. It was contended that in terms of the Agreements
executed by the Respondent No.2 and 3, both of them get squarely covered by
the definition of a 'promoter' of a real estate project and cannot be treated as an
allottee.
11. Per contra it is the case of the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that the Appellant
cannot claim privy to the purpose and intent behind the arrangement drawn
under the Agreements of 2009, 2011 and 2012 as it is clear from the Agreements
placed on record that the Appellant was not a party or a signatory at the time of
execution of these Agreements since they became part of the management much
later in 2014. Their understanding of the context of the Agreements was
misplaced based as it was on their own contrived assumptions and
presumptions of collusive arrangements at a time when the Agreements were
signed by the previous management. Furthermore, when the existence of the
Agreements entered into between the Corporate Debtor and Respondent Nos.2
and 3 had been in the knowledge of the Appellant since their induction as
Director of the Corporate Debtor in October 2014 and these Agreements had
never been challenged by them before any judicial or statutory forum, they
cannot be seen to raise these issues now that they have ceased to hold that
position now.
12. The over-emphasis placed by the Appellant to harp on the terms of the
2011 Agreement of Respondent No.2 to claim that the said Agreement was a Page 12 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 marketing/service arrangement which substantiated that Respondent No.2 was
not an allottee is misplaced because it is indisputable that the subsequent
Agreement of 2012 clearly records an absolute sale of property with the right to
further sell. Further, the Agreement with Respondent No.3-Mohali Builders was
also clearly an Agreement to Sell and mere nomenclature of "Promoter" in the
recital of parties cannot override the substance of the transaction. Further the
reference to Respondent No.3 as promoter in the Agreement of 2009 is
immaterial and irrelevant as the Corporate Debtor was registered as a promoter
with the RERA authorities. Further, there is no denial of the fact that the
Respondents had made payments for the allotments, even if they were multiple
allotments, and payments having been made by them, they cannot be denied the
right to lodge their claims and become members of the CoC.
13. It was also asserted that the Appellant has tried to unnecessarily
transpose provisions of the RERA Act to the IBC framework beyond the confines
laid down in specific terms by explanation (ii) to Section 5(8) of the IBC. It was
also contended that the judgment of Madhya Pradesh Real Estate Appellate
Tribunal in Bhopal Development Authority supra relied upon by the Appellant
is inapplicable as the facts in that case are distinguishable in that it related to a
dispute between co-promoters in a Joint Venture Agreement concerning
development rights over land which had been taken up under the provisions of
the RERA Act and did not deal with any issue relating to insolvency, financial
debt, determination of status as a financial creditor or the CIRP process under
the statutory framework of IBC.
Page 13 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025
14. Coming to our analysis and findings, having heard the rival contentions
of the parties herein and having perused the Agreements of 2009, 2011 and
2012, we are inclined to agree with the Respondents No.2 and 3 that the
Appellant has inordinately preened too much into the recital and clauses of the
Agreements to deliberately obfuscate the status of the Respondents No.2 and 3
from that of allottees to that of a non-allottee and a non-Financial Creditor in
Class. The existence of debt due to a creditor in a class can be established
through an agreement for sale, letter of allotment, receipt of payment made, or
any other document evidencing the existence of a debt and in the present case
the Respondents No. 2 and 3 have clearly established the same as has been
noted by the Adjudicating Authority in the tabular chart at page 120 of the
impugned order. In all fairness, the Ld. Counsel for Appellant while making his
submissions submitted that the Appellant would not like to press the point made
by them earlier that the claims of the Respondents were unsupported by
financial statements/books of the Corporate Debtor. As along as an allottee pays
consideration and puts in money for purchase of units, this will have the effect
of commercial borrowing and consequently such unit purchaser is clearly
entitled to be treated as Financial Creditor in terms of Section 5(8)(f) of the IBC
which would entitle him to make a "claim" in terms of Section 3(6) of the IBC.
Seen from this perspective, we are of the considered view that the Adjudicating
Authority has not committed any error in holding that it did not find any
impediment in holding the Respondents No.2 and 3 to be allottees who were
entitled to file their claims.
Page 14 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025
15. On the contention of the Appellant that viewed from the prism of RERA
Act, the Respondents No.2 and 3 cannot be viewed as allottees but have to be
treated as promoters, we are of the considered view that the Appellant has tried
to unnecessarily transpose the provisions of the RERA Act to the IBC framework
particularly when the legislature has consciously limited the applicability of
RERA Act specifically in respect of the definition of the terms 'allottee' and 'real
estate project' as inserted in Explanation (ii) to Section 5(8) by the IBC (Second
Amendment) Act, 2018. This limited adoption of RERA Act is evident from the
text of Section 5(8)(f) read with the explanation therein, which defines financial
debt in the context of real estate transactions. The deliberate inclusion of only
these two definitions- 'allottee' and 'real estate project'- implies a conscious
legislative intent not to import any other definition from RERA, such as
'promoter' or 'agent'. On the contrary, the Appellant has tried to import the
definition of the term 'promoter' also from the RERA Act, 2018 which cannot be
countenanced since the IBC is self-contained Code and in the absence of express
provision made therein, we cannot accept the stand-point of the Appellant to
transpose other provisions of the RERA Act on the IBC. We cannot be oblivious
of the fact that the role and rights of various stakeholders under RERA are
distinct as it serves a different regulatory purpose whereas in the given factual
matrix, we are concerned solely with admission of claims by RP in terms of
Section 3(6) of IBC and in determining the existence of financial debt in terms of
Section 5(8) of the IBC. We therefore do not find any infirmity on the part of the
Adjudicating Authority to have upheld the decision of the RP to have admitted
Page 15 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 the claims of the Respondents No.2 and 3 after treating them as allottees and
making them a part of the CoC.
16. The Appellant in their pleadings also raised the plea that the RP had acted
in violation of law by admitting the claims of the Respondents No.2 and 3 as
Financial Creditors in the CoC inspite of having been declared dissolved entities
and struck off from the ROC. Assertion was made that in the absence of
revival/restoration of the Company under Section 252 of the Companies Act, the
Respondents No.2 and 3 could not have maintained and enforced any claim in
the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor. This plea of the Appellant was held to be
devoid of merit by Respondent No.2 and 3 as well as the RP. It was contended
that in terms of Section 250 of the Companies Act, 2013, even when a company
is struck off the register of companies, it continues to exist for the purpose of
realizing amounts due to the company and for the payment or discharge of its
liabilities or obligations. Hence, even if Respondents No.2 and 3 were struck off
from the register of ROC, that does not preclude them from asserting their rights
as creditors or from participating in the CIRP as their claims were otherwise valid
and legally admissible.
17. We find substance in the above contention made by Respondents No.2 and
3. The law as it stands today does not prohibit admission of any claim filed by
companies struck off from the register of companies, the Adjudicating Authority
has not erred in holding that there was nothing wrong on the part of the RP to
admit the claims of Respondents No.2 and 3. We also find that the Adjudicating
Authority has relied on the judgement of the High Court of Delhi in the matter
of A.B. Creations and Anr. Vs Bhan Textiles Pvt. Ltd., (2024) ibclw.in 1155 Page 16 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 HC in holding that even if a company is dissolved under Section 248 of the
Companies Act, there is no bar on them for pursuing their legal remedies from
realizing the amount due to the company, whether crystallised or not, as much
as they are liable to be subjected for the payment or discharge of the liabilities
or obligations of the company arising from any contract or statutory
implications. We are of the considered view that the provisions of the Companies
Act has been wrongly relied upon by the Appellant to deny the claims of
Respondents No.2 and 3 and make this a ground to seek their exclusion from
the CoC.
18. This brings us to the contention of the Appellant that Respondents No.2
and 3 are speculative investors and co-developers who were interested only in
the profit of the project and were not homebuyers/allottees. It is the case of the
Appellant that in order to be a genuine allottee, the homebuyer must be a
purchaser of a specific unit with clear intention to take possession of such a
unit. In support of their contention, the Appellant has relied on the judgment of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. Vs
UOI (2019) IBClaw.in 13SC which held that speculative investors seeking
profit through resale rather than possession are not allottees and that in the
present case since both the Respondents failed to establish that specific units
had been allotted to them which they had taken possession of, it reinforces that
they were mere speculative investors.
19. We find that the Adjudicating Authority has also considered this
contention of the Appellant as to whether the claim of the Respondents can be
rejected on the grounds of holding them to be speculative investors. In doing so, Page 17 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 the Adjudicating Authority has relied on the judgement of this Tribunal in
Everlike Real Estate judgment supra which has also kept in mind the Pioneer
Urban Land and Infrastructure judgment supra to hold that IBC does not
discriminate between a homebuyer who purchases a unit for self-use or
purchases multiple units for commercial purposes. The relevant excerpts of the
judgement are as reproduced below:
"47. The word 'allottee' as contained in explanation 1 of Section 5(8)(f) of the Code is by nature is quite exhaustive and illustrative and may include Homebuyer or unit owner or any commercial property owner.
48. The Code or the RERA Act, 2016 do not differentiate anywhere between the Homebuyers who purchase units for his own consumption or the Homebuyers or unit purchaser who purchase the multiple units for commercial purposes.
49. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Pioneer Urban Land (2019) ibclaw.in 13 SC held that the allottee, who has given advance or paid money to the Real Estate Developers is a Financial Creditor. The issue regarding the genuine Homebuyers v/s Speculative Homebuyers is relevant only at the stage for the admission of CIRP under Section 7 of the Code. Thus, it becomes clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held the position of speculative investors only for seeking unnecessary insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that any allottee who paid for purchasing units will be treated as having effect of commercial borrowing and consequently such unit purchaser will be treated as Financial Creditors.
50. Thus, it becomes clear that whether the homebuyer/ allottee is genuine homebuyer or genuine allottee or speculative homebuyers/allottee but if he has paid the money for acquisition of such properties or given the advance, such allottee/ homebuyer shall be treated as Financial Creditor in terms of Section 5(8)(f) of the Code. Hence, the pleadings of the Respondent No. 2 in this regard that the Appellant is speculative investor will not affect the rights of the Appellant to be treated as the Financial Creditors."
20. When we look at the ratio of the above judgment, we find that the same is
squarely applicable in the present case and the claims of Respondents No.2 and
3 could not have been extinguished merely because of being a speculative
Page 18 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 investor. Thus, judgement clearly holds that even if an allottee falls under the
category of speculative investor, as has been claimed by the Appellant, the bar
on such a speculative investor allottee is only for initiation of CIRP and not for
purposes of filing their claim as creditor in class. Furthermore, Section 15 of the
RERA Act expressly contemplates that a single allottee may book multiple
apartments or plots in a project, and there is no restriction on third-party sales
or multiple bookings by the same entity. The mere fact of multiple allotments
does not alter the status of the Respondents as allottees and hence the RP did
not commit any error in admitting the claims of the Respondents as allottees
and in assigning them a berth in the CoC.
21. This brings us to the submission made by the Appellant that as per the
books of accounts of Respondent No.2 an amount of Rs. 9.965 Cr. had been
purportedly paid for the sale and transfer of certain properties, while the
Corporate Debtor had transferred properties worth 15.37 Cr. to the Respondent
No.2 and to other persons on its behalf. As such no amount was therefore
recoverable by Respondent No.2. Instead, it was Respondent No.2 who owed
money to the Corporate Debtor. It was also added that similarly in the case of
Respondent No.3-Mohali Builders, a claim of Rs 7.78 Cr. was accepted by the
RP whereas the books of account showed only a receipt of Rs 3.80 Cr. This clearly
shows that the RP had acted in a non-transparent manner in admitting non-
existent claims of Respondents No.2 and 3. It was contended that the RP had
admitted claims without proper claim collation or verification. The claims filed
by Respondents No.2 and 3 were in excess of the amount recorded in the books
of account. Moreover, the claims were based on unaccounted cash receipts Page 19 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025 issued by the management prior to the taking over by the suspended directors.
The acceptance of unaccounted cash transactions as claims of Respondent No.2
by the RP without proper verification and reconciliation demonstrates a
deliberate design on the part of RP to unfairly help the Respondents No.2 and 3
to secure their entry into the CoC and establish control the decision-making
process of the CoC. It was further contended that even if it was admitted that
money had been disbursed by the Respondents No.2 & 3 to the Corporate
Debtor, the disbursement did not have the character of time value for money
and hence cannot be treated as a financial debt and in support of their
contention, reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Tribunal in Sugan
Choudhary Vs Arun Enterprises in CA(AT)(Ins) No. 746 of 2022.
22. Countering the contention of the Appellant, it was submitted by the
Respondent No.2 and 3 that the liability to pay the debt owed to Respondent
Nos. 2 and 3 had been admitted by the Corporate Debtor in their own reply in
the Company Petition No. 210/Chd/Chd/2020 filed by various homebuyers. It
was also asserted that the contention that the amounts claimed by the
Respondents No.2 and 3 did not exist in the financial record and balance sheet
of the Corporate Debtor does not carry sufficient basis since in terms of
Regulation 8A of the CIRP Regulations, the existence of debt which due to a
creditor in class could also be proved on the basis of Agreement for Sale, Letter
of Allotment etc. and hence balance sheets cannot be relied upon to be the sole
criteria for admission of claims. Hence, it was asserted that there was no
discrepancy in the admission of claims of Respondents No.2 and 3.
Page 20 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025
23. When we look at the impugned order, we notice that the Adjudicating
Authority after noticing CIRP Regulation 8A of CIRP Regulations also took the
view that creditors in class are entitled to submit their claims basis certain
specified documents other than audited balance sheets. The Adjudicating
Authority has rightly noticed the relevant CIRP Regulations while returning its
findings. We do not find any error in this finding returned by the Adjudicating
Authority since non-reflection of claim amount in the balance sheet cannot be a
cogent ground for rejection of the claim. In such circumstances, the relief sought
by the Appellant for exclusion of Respondents No.2 and 3 from the CoC is devoid
of merit. Furthermore, the judgment in Sugan Choudhary supra relied upon
by the Appellant is inapplicable as it pertained to a private Agreement to Sell
having no connection to a real estate project or rights of an allottee under the
IBC. It neither involved CIRP nor dealt with claims by homebuyers as financial
creditors. Hence, the reliance placed on it is misplaced.
24. During the oral submissions made in the course of the hearing, the Ld.
Counsel for the Appellant informed that it does not wish to press their contention
of Respondents No.2 and 3 being related parties of the Corporate Debtor at the
time of initiation of CIRP. Hence, we do not propose to dilate on this issue any
further when the Appellant does not wish to pursue this limb of argument.
25. In sum, we are of the considered view that the Appellant has failed to
produce cogent grounds and proof to substantiate the exclusion of Respondent
No. 2 and 3 from the CoC on the grounds if having filed inadmissible claims.
Page 21 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025
26. Given the above backdrop, we are of the considered view that the
impugned order of the Adjudicating Authority rejecting the IA No 2105 of 2023
filed by the Appellant cannot be said to be beyond the jurisdiction of the
Adjudicating Authority. We do not find sufficient basis made out by the Appellant
to interfere with the order of the Adjudicating Authority in exercise of our
appellate jurisdiction. Having noticed the sequence of events and the protracted
nature of litigation, we are constrained to add that we do not countenance the
conduct of the Appellant, being suspended management of the Corporate
Debtor, in making repeated forays at litigation by rehashing the same issues
before different fora of law and hence while dismissing the Appeal, we also
impose costs on the Appellant of Rs 5 lakhs to be paid to the Prime Minister's
Relief Fund within 15 days from the date of this order for putting unnecessary
roadblocks and causing delay in the consideration of the resolution plan by the
Adjudicating Authority. All other IAs are also disposed of with the above
directions.
[Justice Ashok Bhushan] Chairperson
[Barun Mitra] Member (Technical) Place: New Delhi Date: 10.03.2026 Abdul
Page 22 of 22 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1330 of 2025
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