State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. / ... vs Hira Lal Singh

State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. / Prin. Secy. Housing And Urban Planning Deptt. Lko.

.....Applicant(s)

Versus

Hira Lal Singh

.....Opposite Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)

:

C.S.C.

Counsel for Opposite Party(s)

:

Birendra Kumar Yadav

Court No. - 12

HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

Order on application for condonation of delay [C.M. Application No. 1 of 2026]

1. Heard Mr. Tushar Verma, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and Mr. Birendra Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for opposite party-writ petitioner.

2. Reply to objections filed today on behalf of State is taken on record.

3. Application for condonation of delay has been filed seeking challenge to the judgment and order dated 21.02.2024.

4. Learned counsel for review applicant submits that earlier, writ petitioner had filed Writ-A No.1809 of 2023 challenging inquiry proceedings. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 21.03.2023 directing the disciplinary authority to pass final orders in the disciplinary proceedings within a maximum period of two months from the date a certified copy of the order was produced before him.

5. It is submitted that due to certain serious objections being raised, disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded within time-span indicated in the order whereafter writ petitioner filed Writ-A No. 6708 of 2023 challenging disciplinary proceedings initiated vide charge-sheet dated 11.07.2017 on the ground that the same has not been concluded within the time-frame prescribed. The said petition was allowed by means of judgment and order dated 21.02.2024 placing reliance on Full Bench decision of this Court in Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. reported in 2014 (6) ADJ 641.

6. Office has reported a delay of 629 days in filing review application.

7. Learned counsel for review applicant submits that by means of judgment and order dated 21.02.2024, this Court while allowing the writ petition has held the charge-sheet dated 11.07.2017 as null and void with a further direction for ensuring payment of post-retiral benefits to writ petitioner within a period of two months from the date a certified copy of the order was produced before the authority concerned.

8. Learned counsel has adverted to the affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay and submits that detailed explanation has been furnished in the affidavit regarding delay in filing the review application. It is submitted that there is in fact no deliberate mala fide delay on the part of State in seeking review. It is further submitted that the length of delay is not the aspect requiring consideration but the cause for delay which is required to be considered. It is submitted that in the present case, serious lacuna was observed by the State Government at the time of deliberations which required to be corrected and therefore legal opinion was sought which led to the delay in filing review application.

9. It is further submitted that by means of judgment and order, the charge-sheet has been held to be null and void in view of disciplinary proceedings having not been concluded within the time-frame stipulated by this Court thereby depriving the State from seeking any extension of time to conclude the disciplinary proceedings. He has placed reliance on Full Bench decision of this Court rendered in Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) as well as judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh rendered in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891 to submit that there is no prohibition in seeking extension of time by the State or the disciplinary authority at any stage which now cannot be done since the charge-sheet itself has been declared to be null and void. It is therefore submitted that the import of judgment under challenge is not in consonance either with the judgment of Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) or with Ram Prakash Singh (supra).

10. Learned counsel for opposite party-writ petitioner has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for review applicant with the submission that there is no cogent explanation indicated in the affidavit filed in support of application for condonation of delay. It is submitted that the inquiry proceedings were initiated in the year 2017 and continued despite the fact that reply had been submitted by writ petitioner in 2017 itself whereafter the inquiry report was also submitted on 10.01.2019 but in the meantime, the writ petitioner had retired and therefore it was in view of the fact that the proceedings were kept pending for a period of six years even thereafter, that this Court had indicated conclusion of disciplinary proceedings within a maximum period of two months. It is submitted that no application for extension of time has been filed by the State till date.

11. Learned counsel has placed reliance on judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs v. Karnataka Housing Board and others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969 to submit that mere bureaucratic deliberations do not entitle the State for condonation of delay. It is submitted that in the present case, since only bureaucratic red-tapism has been indicated, delay is not liable to be condoned.

12. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, it appears that earlier Writ-A No.1809 of 2023 was disposed of vide order dated 21.03.2023. It was noticed that inquiry against writ petitioner was initiated by issuance of charge-sheet on 11.07.2017 which was replied to on 01.08.2017 with a consequent reply submitted on 09.09.2017 whereafter inquiry report was submitted on 10.01.2019. Show cause notice was issued on 12.02.2019 to which reply was also submitted on 11.03.2019 but in the meantime the writ petitioner superannuated on 31.01.2019. This Court indicated that proceedings were pending despite lapse of six years from its initiation and therefore directed the disciplinary authority to conclude proceedings within a period of two months from the date a certified copy of the order was produced.

13. When the inquiry proceedings were not concluded within the time-frame, writ petitioner filed Writ-A No.6708 of 2023 which has been allowed by means of judgment and order dated 21.02.2024 as indicated here-in-above placing reliance on judgment in Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra).

14. As indicated here-in-above, review application has been filed with a delay of 629 days. In the affidavit filed in support of application, it has been indicated that the department became aware of the aforesaid judgment only on 05.03.2024 when a certified copy of the order was served by the writ petitioner. The subsequent paragraphs of the affidavit indicate deliberations between the administrative department and the Law Department seeking legal opinion with regard to compliance or challenge to be raised to the judgment. In paragraph - 11 of the affidavit, it has been indicated that a conclusive decision was thereafter taken by the department to send the requisite file to the Law Department for issuance of necessary approvals for challenge being raised to the judgment on 16.07.2024 and 31.07.2024. It is further stated that subsequently, the Law Department again required the administrative department to send all the relevant details and file whereafter opinion of the learned Advocate General was required. In paragraph - 15, it has been stated that relevant permissions and approvals were issued on 14.05.2025 whereafter file was allotted for drafting of the review petition.

15. Although the delay in seeking review of judgment is substantial, but at the same time it is the cause for such delay which is required to be ascertained.

16. As per affidavit, it is therefore amply evident that necessary approvals had been issued by the Law Department on 14.05.2025 with regard to the challenge being raised to the impugned judgment but despite that, the review petition was in fact submitted only on 11.12.2025.

17. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid aspect clearly indicates deliberate inaction by bureaucratic red-tapism by the State in seeking review. The lethargy on the part of State is also evident from the fact that disciplinary proceedings were initiated way back on 11.7.2017. As noticed here-in-above, reply by writ petitioner was submitted on 01.08.2017 with the inquiry report also being submitted on January 10.01.2019. The writ petitioner superannuated on 31.01.2019 but the proceedings were kept pending even four years thereafter. It was in such circumstances that this Court had directed conclusion of disciplinary proceedings within a maximum period of two months from the date a certified copy of the order was produced.

18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (supra) had adjudicated the aspect regarding condonation of delay in the following manner:-

"140. However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ?sufficient cause? has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay.

141. Test of ?sufficient cause? cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain.

213. From a combined reading of State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors. reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would not only compromise the sanctity of limitation. The earlier view, insofar as it favoured a liberal approach towards the State or any of its instrumentality is no more the correct position of law. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ?sufficient cause? for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation.

214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of Postmaster General Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 is that while excuses premised solely on bureaucratic lethargy cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there may nonetheless be circumstances where the explanation offered, though involving bureaucratic procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause for the delay. In such instances, the true test is whether the explanation demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable diligence and whether the delay occurred despite efforts to act within time. Where such bona fides are established, the Court retains the discretion to condone the delay."

19. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgment in the present facts and circumstances, it is thus evident that no preferential treatment is required to be given to the State in matters concerning condonation of delay and the State must be judged on the same standards and parameters as any private litigant otherwise it would compromise the sanctity of limitation. As has been enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court, favouring liberal approach towards State or any of its instrumentality regarding condonation of delay is not correct position of law and habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tapism, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies has been deprecated.

20. In the present facts and circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, no cogent explanation has been furnished by the State Government for submitting review application after more than 629 days, particularly when initial approval had already been granted on 14.5.2025.

21. In view of aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that indolence on the part of the State is too great in the present case due to which there is no requirement for condonation of delay.

22. The application, therefore, stands rejected. Consequently, the review application also stands rejected.

(Manish Mathur,J.)

May 6, 2026

lakshman