Shri Sant Eknath Co-Operative Sugar ... vs Sachin Ghayal Sugar Private Limited And ...

Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No.1767 of 2025 (Arising out of Order dated 25.09.2025 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench) in CP (IB)990(MB)2024.)

IN THE MATTER OF

Shri Sant Eknath Co-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. (Shri Sant Eknath Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana) Having its registered office at Eknathnagar, Taluka: Paithan, District: Aurangabad, Maharashtra - 431 148. ...Applicant/ Appellant

Versus 1. Sachin Ghayal Sugar Pvt. Ltd. Having its registered office at 3384, Pannalal Nagar, Taluka Paithan Aurangabad, Maharashtra - 431 007. ...Opposite party/ Respondent

2. Buldana Urban Cooperative Credit Society Limited Having its address at Yashwant 38/10B, Prabhat Road, Pune - 411 004 ...Petitioner/Respondent

Present: For Appellant : Mr. Prakhar Tandon, Advocate.

For Respondent : Mr. Atishay Jain and Mr. Kunal K., Advocates for R-1 Mr. Ninad Deshpande and Ms. Aishwarya Darda, Advocates for R-2.

JUDGEMENT

Per Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma, Member (Judicial)

1. The instant Company Appeal dwells upon its own peculiar facts.

2. The appellant herein is not a party to the proceedings of the Company

Petition (IB) 990(MB) of 2024 in the matters of M/s Buldana Urban

Cooperative Credit Society Limited, Buldana vs. Sachin Ghayal Sugar -2-

Private Limited. In concise, those proceedings were drawn by Respondent

No.2 under Section 7 of I&B Code, inter se between the parties. The

petitioner had claimed himself to be the financial creditor and had initiated

proceedings under Section 7 of the Code, but did not participate in the

proceedings with diligence, due to, which an Order was passed on

21.07.2025, owing to, which it was mentioned in the Order of 21.07.2025,

that subject to the payment of the cost, the respondent in the company

petition i.e. Respondent No.1, may upload the reply within two weeks.

Relevant extract of the order dated 21.07.2025 is given here under:-

"This is the Company Petition filed under Section 7 of the IBC. It

is seen that this Petition has been filed some time in 2024 and

thrice in the past notice have been issued. However, owing to

some confusion regarding placing on record the affidavit of

service, vide order dated 03.06.2025, Petitioner was directed to

serve upon the Respondent once again and place affidavit of

service. It is seen that the directions have been complied and

the Respondents have been served on 13.06.2025. In the order

dated 03.06.2025, the respondents were given time to file reply.

However, ld. Counsel for the Respondent who is present before

us submits that he has been instructed just Yesterday and

accordingly, seeks time to putting in his reply. Looking to the

history of the case and the facts that thrice such attempt of

service has been done to serve upon the Respondent and the

Respondent for one reason or the other has either been pleading

non-service of the Petition or seeking time to file reply. In this

background time as sought by the present counsel is granted for -3-

putting in reply of two weeks subject to a cost of Rs. 30,000/- to

be paid to "Prime Minister's Relief Fund". Subject to such

payment the Respondent herein may upload his reply within

two weeks and ensure that the same is reflected on the DMS.

Accordingly, list this CP for further consideration on

12.08.2025."

3. When the proceedings were taken up on 12.08.2025, it records the

finding that the respondent in the company petition i.e. the corporate debtor

had sought a pass over, which was initially granted, but taking into

consideration, that the reply by the respondent was not filed even till date,

despite the time having being granted by the Tribunal vide its order dated

21.07.2025, it was observed by the Ld. Tribunal, that the company petition

would be proceeded to be decided without waiting for the reply of the

corporate debtor i.e. Respondent No.1 in this Company Appeal. Relevant

extract of the order dated 12.08.2025 is given hereunder:-

"This matter was called in the morning. At that time Learned

Counsel for the respondent herein, sought a Passover, which

was granted. The matter was called again at 1:15 pm, still ld.

Counsel for the Respondent is before some other court and

seeks accommodation. Further, looking to the time being 1:15

pm and there is no sitting of the bench in the afternoon, we

deem it appropriate to adjourn the case for hearing on

25.09.2025.

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Reply of the respondent is yet not filed despite time given and

accordingly, the matter will be proceeded without the reply of

the respondent on record."

4. Thereafter, the proceedings were taken up before the learned NCLT,

Mumbai Bench on 25.09.2025. The learned Counsel for the respondent in

the company petition stated that he has filed an I.A, in which he has given

the number of filing before the Registry. He submits that he has filed an

application for recall of the Order dated 12.08.2025, where by the order, the

matter was directed to be proceeded even without the reply of the

respondent/corporate debtor. When in the proceedings of 12.08.2025, the

statement was made by the respondent in the company petition i.e. Sachin

Ghayal Sugar Private Limited, the learned Tribunal while declining to accept

the prayer of placing the reply on record, observed, that there had been

persistent dereliction on the part of the respondent/ corporate debtor in

diligently participating in the proceedings, despite of the imposition of the

cost by the Order of 21.07.2025, hence the Tribunal proceeded in

accordance of the Order of 12.08.2025, its this Order which is under

challenge by the appellant.

5. This company appeal has got a chequered individualistic history of the

appellant. The facts, as it engages consideration, are that Sachin Ghayal

Sugar Private Limited, (hereinafter to be called as the corporate debtor) was

shown to have been incorporated under the provisions of the Companies

Act, 1956. The appellant claims, that it is a cooperative society, that has

been registered as such, as per the stipulations contained under the -5- Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act bearing Registration

No.AGR/PRG(A)/7(5), having been registered so ever since 17.04.1971.

6. The appellant's case had been that due to exclusive contribution of

about 18,000 farmers, who had invested their substantial hard earned

money towards building the capital of the appellant company i.e. Shri Sant

Eknath Co-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. (hereinafter to be called as the

appellant). After the hard earned money being put in by the 18,000 farmers,

the sugar factory of the appellant was being run on a cooperative basis, but

ultimately due to there being slump in business activities, the sugar factory

of the appellant faced financial crisis.

7. As the corporate debtor, i.e. Respondent No.1 herein this appeal,

which was the company registered under the provisions of Companies Act of

1956, and respondent No.2, who happens to be the financial creditor, being

a cooperative credit society, as registered under the Maharashtra Co-

operative Societies Act, claimed itself to be the financial creditor of

Respondent No.1.

8. It is the case of the appellant that the appellants sugar cooperative

mill, which was established on a contributory sum of monies that was

extended by the farmers was used for building up the capital of the

appellant, used for the establishment of the factory. A sugar manufacturing

plant was established on a land measuring 113.59 acres, along with

building plant and machinery, residential quarters, lease rights over the

land and accordingly, the company of the appellant stood registered with the

Government of Maharashtra and accordingly, the Sugar Commissioner -6-

issued a recognition on the registration of the company of the appellant,

subject to certain riders, those were attached to the order itself, the Order of

recognition i.e. of 11.09.2014. The capital investment in the cooperative

sugar mill of the appellant was also being partially contributed by the

Government of Maharashtra and hence, it is contended by the appellant

cooperative factory, that owing to the fact that the Government of

Maharashtra is a contributor to the capital of the appellant cooperative

factory, it will form to be a public entity.

9. The appellant's case is that, owing to managerial failure in exploitation

of the production capacity of the sugar factory of the appellant, and also due

to there being lack of viable sugar market available to the appellant, and

also because of various other uncalled for expenditures incurred by the

appellant under various unforeseen heads of expenditure, the company fell

into financial crisis. Since their being dearth of money and the appellant

was in immediate need of financial aid to maintain the cash flow in the

business of the appellant, the appellant is said to have approached the

corporate debtor i.e. Sachin Ghayal Sugar Private Limited, to enter into a

collaboration agreement so as to run and manage the company and to

conduct its affairs. For the purposes of venturing into such collaboration

agreement, it is stated by the appellant that the Maharashtra Cooperative

Societies and the Cooperative Department of the Government of

Maharashtra too have granted approval to the proposed collaboration vide

their correspondence of 11.09.2014, which further stood amended and

affirmed by its letter dated 29.01.2015.

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10. Accordingly, the appellant and the corporate debtor entered into a

Collaboration Agreement on 03.08.2015 (hereinafter to be called as a

"collaboration agreement"). As per the terms of the collaboration

agreement dated 03.08.2015, it was agreed that the working modalities

would be foundationed on principal of basis and the corporate debtor would

be undertaking to manage the entire business in terms of the said

agreement and had agreed to operate the appellant's cooperative sugar mill

for 18 crushing seasons, which as per the standing orders each crushing

season was to commence from October of every year ending in September of

the following year.

11. As per the conditions of Article D of the Collaboration Agreement, it

prescribed for that all business activities and internal management of the

appellant's sugar factory and even non-business activities, were to be

treated to have been vested with the corporate debtor, and it is argued by

the Ld. Counsel for the appellant, that in the light of the provisions

contained under Article D that, no business activities were permitted to be

ventured by the appellant, nor any power of decision making processes with

regards to the affairs of the appellant company was vested with the

appellant. Article F Clause (oo) of the Collaboration Agreement, had rather

casted a duty upon the appellant to provide all help to the corporate debtor

for conducting the business affairs of the appellant, and for entering into all

business transactions, signing the required papers, authorization, etc.

Besides the above, a very important aspect that too was covered by the

collaboration Agreement, was that, all the members of the appellant's

cooperative society i.e. the farmers, had undertaken to supply their total -8-

produce of sugarcane, during the period of the agreement and as per the

Clause (ss), it would bind the appellant, along with its members to the terms

and conditions in order to ensure that there happens to be a smooth supply

of raw material i.e. the sugarcane for the agreed 18 crushing seasons. In lieu

thereof, and on the basis of the terms of the Collaboration Agreement, the

corporate debtor ensured to remit the financial liabilities of the appellant

then assessed to the tune of Rs.57.31 crores, as was expressly detailed in

the agreement and an additional amount of Rs.7 lakhs was agreed to be

paid towards the management fees.

12. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that, if we take

into consideration the collaboration agreement in its totality, it

unrestrictively subscribes that the corporate debtor alone would be

responsible for all additional funds by taking advances, loans, etc. and

according to the appellant, owing to the aforesaid Article 1 Clause 1 of the

Collaboration Agreement, the appellant had no role in taking any of the

advances from the respondent No.2.

13. It is an admitted case that because of certain differences that stood

germinated between the appellant and the corporate debtor, after execution

of the Collaboration Agreement, in order to bridge over the aforesaid

controversial situation, they further entered into execution of additional

agreement of 28.10.2016, but still despite of the two agreements i.e.

Collaboration Agreement dated 03.08.2015 and additional agreement of

28.10.2016, the dispute persisted between the corporate debtor and the

appellant, it is because of which, the parties to the agreement invoked the -9-

arbitration clause as it was contemplated under Article P of the

Collaboration Agreement, which prescribe for as under:-

"a) This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the Indian Law.

b) The parties hereby agree that in the event of there being any dispute by and between the parties hereto in respect of interpretation of any of the terms and conditions herein or in respect of any matter arising out of and/or touching upon these presents and/or in regard to the intends of this agreement, the business carried on by THE PARTY OF THE OTHER PART shall be continued as per the terms of this agreement without any restrictions or stoppage.

c) It is an essential term of this agreement that under no circumstances the business be jeopardized nor THE PARTY OF THE FIRST PART compel THE PARTY OF THE OTHER PART to suspend work or jeopardize the reputation of the business or the parties or compel THE PARTY OF THE OTHER PART to stop its operation of manufacturing sugar or any other business or non-business activity carried out by THE PARTY OF THE OTHER PART.

d) Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to or in connection with this agreement, or the breach thereof shall be finally settled by an arbitrator in accordance with The Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 1996, as in force at the time such arbitration is commenced. The commissioner shall act as an arbitrator for the purposes of this agreement.

e) The place of the arbitration shall be Pune, India.

f) The language of the arbitration and award shall be English."

14. Owing to the fact that the parties to the agreement were bound by the

terms and conditions of the Collaboration Agreement, and since there had

chanced a dispute, falling within the ambit of dispute clause covered by the -10-

Collaboration Agreement, the parties invoked an Arbitration Clause by filing

an application before the Hon'ble Commissioners of Sugar, who under the

collaboration agreement was to act as an Arbitrator. The aforesaid

proceedings before the Arbitrator was numbered as M.A.R.J.I. (ARB)

No.384/2017-Sant Eknath Sahkari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. vs. M/s. Sachin

Ghayal Sugar Private Limited.

15. In the arbitration proceedings, that was held, it came to notice, that

the respondent to the arbitration proceeding, i.e. the corporate debtor, had

filed a Civil Miscellaneous Application No.372 of 2017,under Section 9 of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the District Judge in those

arbitration proceedings the Sugar Commissioner had proceeded to pass a

final Order on 27.11.2017, which has been later made as a subject matter to

the proceedings of Application No. 131 of 2018, Application No. 86 of 2018

and Application No. 383 of 2018, in relation to the imposition of the

penalties and issue pertaining to the grant of licenses as per provisions

contained under Section 89A and Section 78A of the Maharashtra

Cooperative Societies Act of 1960. However, in relation to the subjects:-

i. The duration of the Collaboration Agreement under which the factory

was to be operated within 18 crushing seasons;

ii. The liability of payment of tax and duties including the excise duties

etc.;

iii. The amount payable to the employees of the applicant i.e. the

appellant herein, more particularly, pertaining to the salary of the

seasonal employees of the applicant for the Month of January, 2016 -11-

and salary of permanent employees of the applicant for the month of

February and March, 2016 totalling to Rs.104.02 lakhs.

16. The learned Arbitrator, while considering the corresponding liability,

which was payable to the Government of Maharashtra, the Arbitrator

proceeded to pass a compromise Order and as a consequence thereto, the

following decisions were taken:-

"9. The Applicant is a Sugar Factory, a resolution is passed in the meeting of Board of Directors, dated 28.07.2018 deciding to enter into this compromise and chairman of the applicant factory Shri. Tushar Kashinathrao Shisode is authorized to enter into present terms of compromise. Copy of the resolution dated 28.07.2018 is enclosed herewith. Same maybe considered as part of this Award. Present Terms compromise are signed by the chairman of the Applicant sugar factory on behalf of applicant in respect of appeal pending before this Hon'ble Court.

The respondent is a Private Limited Company, in the meeting of its Directors, it is resolved to enter into such terms of compromise. The Respondent company has authorised Mr. Sachin Vikramrao Ghayal to present and sign the compromise deed. Copy of the Resolution passed by the Respondent Company on 26.07.2018 is enclosed herewith."

17. The resultant effect of the compromise order dated 31.07.2018, had

been that the principle arbitration award dated 27.11.2017 stood modified

to the extent it was covered by the compromise order.

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18. In the arbitration proceedings and the consequentially modified award

based on the compromise i.e. 30.07.2018, which was modifying the final

award of 27.11.2017, it is contended by the appellant that as per clause 8F

of the compromise, since the corporate debtor had obligated itself to repay

the amount to various banks and it undertook to pay the same in 8

crushing seasons, as per the demand of the bank and further because the

corporate debtor had assured that if any action is taken by the bank as

against the appellant due to non-payment of the amount, the appellant

contends that it was agreed that corporate debtor was supposed to

indemnify the appellant for the losses suffered and for the aforesaid

purpose, the reference has been made by the appellant to the Clause F of

the compromise award, which is reproduced as under:

"F) Bank Dues: The respondent reiterates its obligation to repay the amount to various banks, as per the terms of agreement. The respondent will repay the amount payable to the Banks in 8 crushing seasons starting from crushing season 2018-19 and as per the demand by the banks. The applicant will have no say in the said repayment. In case action is taken by any bank due to non-payment of amounts, as agreed by the respondent in the agreement, respondent will indemnify the claimant for the losses caused due to such action."

19. The financial creditor i.e. respondent No.2, herein drew an

independent proceedings under section 7 of the Code as against the

corporate debtor i.e. Respondent No.1. It is argued by the appellant, that it

was a collusive proceedings, so as to deprive the appellants of its legitimate

legally enforceable right particularly under the award, when the compromise

order was containing an indemnification Clause 8F that has been extracted -13-

above. The appellant submitted, that filing of Section 7 application under

the Code, was with an oblique motive to deprive the rights of 18,000 farmers

who had interested and had invested their hard earned money in

establishing the factory of the appellant. Hence, it was contended by the

appellant that if section 7 proceedings filed by the respondent No.2, as

against respondent No.1 to the company appeal, and if any orders are

passed on the same, the appellant's rights would be affected, as it would be

having a direct and dire consequences as against the appellant and such

other stakeholders. Because of the fact, that the corporate debtor by virtue

of the Collaboration Agreement does not become the owner of the sugar

factory of the appellant and because of that, since the corporate debtor in

itself does not have any other asset, in all probability its indirectly, the asset

of the appellant maybe taken over treating it as to be the asset of the

corporate debtor for the purposes of the process of CIRP, in pursuance of

the Section 7 proceedings.

20. It was because of this reason, the appellant, while representing the

cause of 18,000 farmers contended that since the sugarcane produce by the

farmers was attached in the supply, to the factory of the appellant, which

has been portrayed by the appellant, that the factory of theirs, under the

Collaboration Agreement, which according to the appellant, has been

attempted to be misled. They submitted that the endeavour of the financial

creditor for initiation of proceedings is concocted and not tenable. The

appellant submitted that the collusive proceedings between respondent No.1

and 2 may not be tenable for the reason being that its the company of the

appellant, since being in operation, it should not be forced to face the -14-

rigours of the CIRP, which will be divergence to the object of the IBC, and for

the aforesaid purposes, it was contended by the appellant that the valuation

of land and building of the factory of the appellant itself is of Rs. 272 Crores

and the valuation of factory itself is of Rs. 38 Crores, which itself shows that

the appellant company was solvent company and that cannot be forced to

face the CIRP, because of the drawing of the proceedings under Section 7 by

respondent No.2; as against the respondent No.1, the corporate debtor, its

rather the assets of the appellant company, which has been put to stake.

Besides that, it will also affect the 700 workmen and employees working

with the appellant company.

21. Another issue that has crept in for consideration was that, there had

been a civil proceeding in the shape of Civil Suit No.188/2025 and

190/2025, which had been drawn by the petitioner as against one Mr.

Tushar being a Suit for recovery of the amount. The said Suit was for a

Decree of recovery of Rs.78,65,280/- and similarly, another Suit preferred

by Sachin Vikramrao Ghayal Vs. Tushar Kashinath Sisodia was once again

a Suit for a Decree of recovery of the amount mentioned therein, which was

shown to have been instituted on 17.04.2025. The Order, which has been

impugned by the instant Company Appeal, which has been put to challenge

by the appellant, is because of the fact that the corporate debtor was trying

to take the advantage of the Collaboration Agreement and was trying to use

the property of the appellant by treating it as to be the property of the

corporate debtor by placing it to the proceedings under Section 7 of the

Code, as drawn by respondent No.2. It was contended that the corporate

debtor in fact had rather colluded, because despite of various opportunities -15-

granted by the learned Tribunal, on as many as on 9 dates, the corporate

debtor had deliberately not filed the reply and had avoided to contest the

proceeding on merits and this avoidance of contest to the proceedings, by

corporate debtor in itself would lead to a situation where the appellant's

property is likely to be taken for the purposes of satisfying the dues under

default of Respondent No.2, in a proceeding under Section 7 of the code.

22. In fact, by virtue of the impugned order, what could be seen is that

the entire proceedings had been intentionally not contested by the corporate

debtor, attempting to maliciously permit the initiation of CIRP Process to

succeed as against the corporate debtor, so as to prejudice the rights of the

appellant, so far it relates to its establishment of the sugar factory and its

probable usurpation, the proceedings are apparently seem to be malicious

for the reason being, that it has been carried in a manner to eliminate the

appellant whose rights and properties are at stake, without any knowledge

to the appellant as they were not made as party to the proceedings, which

means the entire proceedings to be apprehensively collusive. Admittedly, the

appellant is not a party to the proceedings of Section 7 of the Code, that was

drawn in the shape of C.P.(IB) No.990(MB)2024 before the NCLT, Mumbai.

Owing to an ineffective assistance given by the corporate debtor i.e.

respondent No.1 herein, Section 7 proceedings have been permitted to be

carried to be proceeded ex parte as against the corporate debtor because as

a matter of fact, the corporate debtor had got no stakes in the factory of

appellant if Section 7 proceedings were permitted to be carried. -16-

23. Owing to the aforesaid circumstances, the records reveal that after

passing of the Order on 25.09.2025, on that day itself the appellant is said

to have filed an interlocutory application, bearing filing

No.2709138/09442/2025. In the application thus preferred by the

appellant, the appellant had thereby invoked Section 60(5) to be read with

Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules wherein the relief sought was, to quash the

proceedings under Section 7 of the Code, that has been initiated by

respondent No.2, as being collusive and malicious and would lead to a

depreciation of 18,000 farmers, who are members of the appellate

cooperative society. In the application thus preferred by the appellant, on

25.09.2025, he had prayed for the following reliefs:-

"

a. That this Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to allow the present application;

b. That this Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to reject the Company Petition No. 990 of 2024 and after perusing the material on record, penalize the Respondents under Section 65 of IBC for fraudulent and malicious initiation of proceedings;

c. That pending the hearing and final disposal of the captioned Company Petition No. 990 of 2024, this Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to permit the Applicant to intervene in Company Petition No. 990 of 2024 and direct the Respondents to serve all pleadings upon the Applicant;

d. That this Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to pass such order(s)/directions as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."

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24. As per the case of the appellant that the day when the matter was

listed on 25.09.2025 before the learned Tribunal, the appellant did point out

to the about filing of an application under Section 60(5) of Code, and seeking

for an opportunity to be heard before considering the company petition, but

it is submitted that, by the Impugned Order, the learned Tribunal in utter

violation of the principal of natural justice, has even without considering the

appellant's application despite of the request being made of filing of the I.A.

for dropping the proceedings of Section 7 of Code, had proceeded to hear the

company petition on merits.

25. Looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case,

we feel that an exception is required to carved out in the instant case before

any material prejudice is caused to the parties to the proceedings due to

final determination of the proceedings under Section 7 of the Code, if at all

the apprehension expressed by the appellant that the proceedings under

Section 7 of the Code was drawn by respondent No.2 as against respondent

No.1 was collusive. In all judicial fairness, it was expected that the Tribunal

by virtue of the Impugned Order, before closing the proceedings of CP No.

990/2024, it ought to have taken into consideration the application

preferred by the appellant invoking provision contained under Section 60(5)

of the Code, so that at least the appellant may be able to avail a fairer

opportunity before the learned Tribunal itself before a final call is taken in

CP (IB)/990/2024. There was no compelling urgency for the learned

Tribunal to have avoided to pass an Order on the application preferred by

the appellant under Section 60(5) of the Code and the final decision on the -18-

application on Section 7 of the Code, the proceedings ought to have been

deferred by the learned Tribunal.

26. Though so far as the Impugned Order is concerned, since it is

exclusively an Order against respondent No.1 to the company appeal, owing

to its own dereliction due to not effectively participating in the proceedings

of the company petition, but the facts which has been highlighted by the

appellant supported by the documents, it required an adjudication of the

application preferred by the appellant under Section 60(5) of the Code before

a final call is taken on the company petition. Keeping application of the

appellant under Section 60(5) of the Code pending, itself will nullify the

purpose of filing of an application by the appellant in which he has pleaded

that there has been a collusive proceeding under Section 7 of the Code,

drawn by respondent No.2 as against respondent No.1. In order to highlight

the manner, in which the proceedings have been carried, the learned

Tribunal ought to have considered the application and should have passed

an appropriate order on the same before proceeding to call for the parties to

file their written notes for deciding the company petition on its own merits.

In these peculiar circumstances, we pass the following directions:-

i. That the learned Tribunal would defer passing of the final Order on CP

(IB)990(MB)2024 till the learned Tribunal decides the appellant's

application being Interlocutory Application filing

No.2709138/09442/2025 under Section 60(5) of the Code and then

only to proceed to decide the company petition on its merits based

upon the impugned order.

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ii. So far as the interference called for by the appellant in the impugned

order, as against the calling for written submissions after conclusion

of the argument, we feel that since the appellant is not party to the

proceedings and his rights, which are likely to be affected and which

have been protected by his application preferred under Section 60(5)

of the Code, it would serve the purpose of justice in case his

application is directed to be decided prior to final decision to be taken

on Section 7 application.

27. Hence, the company appeals are disposed of with the following

directions:

That the learned Tribunal would first ensure to decide the

appellant's Interlocutory Application bearing filing

No.2709138/09442/2025 within a period of 3 months from today,

if not already decided and it is hoped and trusted that the learned

Tribunal would decide the said I.A. first before passing any final

Order on the company petition on merits.

All pending interlocutory applications stand closed.

[Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma] Member (Judicial)

[ArunBaroka] Member (Technical)

[Indevar Pandey] Member (Technical) 17.09.2026 rs/sa