Sanghvi Movers Ltd vs Tech Sharp Engineers Pvt. Ltd
- CitationCompany Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 118 of 2019
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Part II, Third Division), which governs an application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 for which no other period is prescribed, the limitation period is three years from when the right to apply accrues; for an operational creditor's application under Section 9 this right accrued on the date the I&B Code came into force, 1st December 2016, and an application filed within three years of that date is within time. Where a winding-up petition under Sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 was pending on the date the I&B Code came into force and was transferred to the Tribunal by operation of the substituted Section 434, the petition becomes infructuous by operation of law, and a fresh demand notice under Section 8(1) of the I&B Code issued during that continuing cause of action keeps the claim within limitation, so that the claim is not barred merely because the underlying default occurred more than three years before the application. An adjudicating authority that rejects a Section 9 application as time-barred without considering the facts pleaded in Part IV of Form 5, including the acknowledgments of debt, the continuing dealings and the pendency of the winding-up proceedings, has failed to decide the question of limitation on the facts and law, and its order is liable to be set aside and the matter remitted for admission after notice.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
(Arising out of Order dated 2nd January, 2019 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal), Single Bench Chennai in CP/724/IB/2018)
IN THE MATTER OF:
Sanghvi Movers Ltd. ...Appellant
Vs.
M/s. Tech Sharp Engineers Pvt. Ltd. ...Respondent
Present: For Appellant: - Mr. Shikhil Suri, Mr. Shiv Kumar Suri, Ms. Vinishma Kaul and Ms. Shilpa Saini, Advocates.
For Respondent:- Mr. R. Chandrachud, Mr. J.B. Dahia, Mr. Karan Sharma, Mr. Nitin Thukral and Ms. Geetanjali, Advocates.
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
The Appellant- 'Sanghvi Movers Ltd.' filed application under
Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("I&B Code" for
short) against 'Tech Sharp Engineers Pvt. Ltd.'- ('Corporate Debtor')
claiming that a sum of Rs.38,84,709/- has become due and payable on
28th February, 2013. The Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law
Tribunal), Single Bench, Chennai, by impugned order dated 2nd January,
2019 rejected the same on the ground that the claim is time barred with
following observations:
2
"Counsels for both the parties are present. As
seen from the Order dated 18.12.2018, last the
final opportunity was granted to the Operational
Creditor for seeking instruction from his client.
However, the counsel for the Operational Creditor
again prayed for time for seeking instruction from
his client. It appears that the Operational Creditor
is derailing the proceeded of adjudicating,
therefore, I proceeded to decide the matter on
merits.
On perusal of the Application filed under
Section 9 of the I&B Code, 2016, it appears that
the claim amounting to Rs.38,84,709/- has
become due and payable on 28.02.2013. There is
a single confirmation of the claim by the Corporate
Debtor on 07.11.2013 as reflects from the
document placed at page 60 of the typed set filed
with the Application. Thereafter, there is nothing
on record to suggest that at any point of time the
Corporate Debtor confirmed/ acknowledged the
debt.
In the circumstances, the claim has become
time barred and in view of the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 118 of 2019 3
B.K.Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. -vs- Parag
Gupta and Associates (2018 SCC Online SC
1921), the Petition stands dismissed."
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant submitted
that the claim is not barred by limitation, the Adjudicating Authority
without citing the relevant facts and reasons referred to the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. v.
Parag Gupta and Associates─ (2018) SCC OnLine SC 1921" and
rejected the application.
3. It was submitted that the Adjudicating Authority neither noticed
nor discussed the relevant fact, as reflected in Form-6 which the
application under Section 9 of the 'I&B Code' filed by the Appellant.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent placed
reliance on decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "B.K. Educational
Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Parag Gupta and Associates─ (2018) SCC
OnLine SC 1921", wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed and
held:
"48. It is thus clear that since the Limitation Act
is applicable to applications filed under Sections 7
and 9 of the Code from the inception of the Code,
Article 137 of the Limitation Act gets attracted. "The
right to sue", therefore, accrues when a default
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 118 of 2019 4
occurs. If the default has occurred over three years
prior to the date of filing of the application, the
application would be barred under Article 137 of
the Limitation Act, save and except in those cases
where, in the facts of the case, Section 5 of the
Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay
in filing such application."
5. The question arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the
claim is barred by limitation as observed by the Adjudicating Authority.
6. The aforesaid issue is mixed question of facts and law for which it
is necessary to notice the relevant facts and the law.
7. For filing an application under Section 9, no period of limitation
has been prescribed in any of the Division or part of Schedule of the
'Limitation Act, 1963', therefore, Article 137 of Part II of 3rd Division of
Schedule to the 'Limitation Act, 1963' will be applicable, which reads as
follows:
Part II-OTHER APPLICATION Description of application Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run
137. Any other application for which Three years When the right to no period of limitation is provided apply accrues elsewhere in this division.
8. In the present case, it is not in dispute that right to apply under
Section 9 accrued to the Appellant on 1st December, 2016, when 'I&B
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 118 of 2019 5
Code' came into force. Therefore, we find that the application under
Section 9 filed by the Appellant is within the period of three years from
the date of right to apply accrued.
9. The next question arises for consideration is whether the claim of
the Appellant is barred by limitation? If it is barred by limitation, then
the Respondent has right to take plea that there is no debt payable by
him in law. In such case, the application under Sections 9 cannot be
entertained.
10. To decide the aforesaid issue, we have noticed the facts which were
also brought to the notice of the Adjudicating Authority by the Appellant-
('Operational Creditor') and recorded in Part IV- 'Particulars of
Operational Debt' of Form-5, as noticed below.
11. The 'Corporate Debtor' placed work orders on 24th October, 2011
with the 'Operational Creditor' for 150 MT Manitowoe M 400 C Crane.
After execution of the work at the designated site on the designated date,
the Appellant- ('Operational Creditor') raised different invoices from time
to time for the services rendered by it.
12. According to the Appellant, a sum of Rs.88,87,900/- was payable,
out of which, the 'Corporate Debtor' paid only a sum of Rs.41,76,493/-
and subsequently a sum of Rs.8,26,698/-. As the 'Corporate Debtor'
stopped payment, the Appellant- ('Operational Creditor'), issued legal
notice on 6th May, 2013 to the 'Corporate Debtor' calling upon it to pay
the outstanding amount. The 'Corporate Debtor' by reply dated 17th May, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 118 of 2019 6
2013, admitted the outstanding dues and agreed to pay the same within
six months.
13. According to the Appellant, on considering the business
relationship and relying on assurance of the 'Corporate Debtor' to clear
its dues in instalments, the 'Operational Creditor' vide letter dated 21st
May, 2013 offered discount of 10% on the outstanding amount. The offer
given by the 'Corporate Debtor' was also accepted by the 'Operational
Creditor' as it was informed that the amount will be paid in five monthly
instalments commencing from 1st June, 2013.
14. Further the case of the Appellant is that the 'Corporate Debtor'
having failed to honour its commitments, the 'Operational Creditor'
issued a statutory notice dated 14th October, 2013 to the 'Corporate
Debtor' to which the 'Corporate Debtor' replied on 7th November, 2013
and admitted the default. In the said reply, the 'Corporate Debtor'
informed that they would write a letter to the principal employer i.e.
'IOCL' to make direct payment to the 'Operational Creditor'. A copy of the
said letter was also sent to the 'IOCL' and also enclosed with Form-5.
15. There being no progress of payment either from the 'Corporate
Debtor' or from the 'IOCL' in clearing the outstanding dues of the
'Operational Creditor', the Appellant issued a statutory notice under
Sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 on 24th May, 2014 to
the 'Corporate Debtor' calling upon to pay a sum of Rs.38,84,709/-
together with interest. The amount having not paid, the Appellant filed a
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 118 of 2019 7
winding up petition/ Company Petition before the Hon'ble High Court of
Judicature at Madras on 4th July, 2015 which was registered and
numbered.
16. During the pendency of the winding-up petition before the Hon'ble
High Court of Judicature at Madras, the 'I&B Code' came into force since
1st December, 2016. Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013 was
substituted by Eleventh Schedule of the 'I&B Code'. As per substituted
Section 434 (c) of the Companies Act, 2013, all proceeding including
winding up proceeding pending before the Hon'ble High Courts stood
transferred to the Tribunal. In this background, the notice was issued by
the 'Operational Creditor' under Section 8(1) calling upon the 'Corporate
Debtor' to pay a sum of Rs.38,84,709/- with interest at the rate of 24%
p.a. Thereafter, the 'Corporate Debtor' having failed to pay the amount,
the application under Section 9 was filed by the Appellant- ('Operational
Creditor').
17. The aforesaid facts brought to the notice of the Adjudicating
Authority in Part IV of Form-5 (application under Section 9) have not been
considered by the Adjudicating Authority nor discussed and without
going into the facts and law, the Adjudicating Authority held that the
claim is barred by limitation.
18. From the facts as narrated above, it will be evident that the winding
up petition was filed before the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at
Madras which had not reached finality and in the meantime, as the 'I&B
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 118 of 2019 8
Code' came into force, the demand notice under Section 8(1) was issued
on 14th November, 2017 for payment of outstanding amount along with
the interest. Thus, as we find that there is continuous cause of action the
claim is within the period of limitation. The Appellant had moved before
an appropriate forum for appropriate relief in time, in accordance with
law and so we hold that the claim of the Appellant is not barred by
limitation as the petition under Section 433 & 434 of the Companies Act,
1956 become infructuous, by operation of law.
19. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned order dated
2nd January, 2019 passed by the Adjudicating Authority and remit the
case to the Adjudicating Authority for admission of the case after notice
to the parties. Before admission of the case, it will be open to the
Respondent to settle the matter with the Appellant.
The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observations. No costs.
(Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya) Chairperson
(Justice A.I.S. Cheema) Member(Judicial)
(Kanthi Narahari) Member(Technical)
NEW DELHI 23rd July, 2019 AR
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 118 of 2019
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