Reserved On: 06.08.2025 vs Central Bureau Of Investigation

Cr. MMO No 297 of 2023.

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Reserved on: 06.08.2025

Date of Decision: 22.08.2025.

Kulbir Singh Dhaliwal ...Petitioner Versus

Central Bureau of Investigation ...Respondent

Coram

Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No

For the Petitioner : Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Sidharth, Advocate.

For the Respondent : Mr. Janesh Mahajan, Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

quashing of charge sheet dated 19.12.2014 arising out of FIR bearing

RC No. 0962012A0010 dated 18.10.2012, registered with CBI, Shimla

for the commission of offences punishable under Section 13(2) read

with Section 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act)

1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they

were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that an FIR was registered with CBI, Shimla against

Brigadier J.K. Narang, stating that Brigadier J.K. Narang joined the

Indian Army as a Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers on

14.03.1981. He served at various places. He acquired huge movable

and immovable assets in his name and in the name of his family

members, between 01.01.2007 and 23.02.2012. He was in possession

of assets worth ₹2,13,42,801/-. He was paid a salary of

₹42,14,191/-. He earned a profit of ₹50,00,000/- from the sale of

Plot No. C-1545 situated in Sushant Lok, Phase-I, Gurgaon, vide

sale agreement and general power of attorney. The income of

Brigadier J.K. Narang and his family members under all the heads

was ₹1,37,36,473/-. Their likely savings were ₹16,16,007/-. He was

found in possession of assets worth ₹1,84,79,943/-, and he

possessed ₹1,68,63,936/- disproportionate to his known sources of

income. The CBI registered the FIR and conducted the

investigation. CBI filed a charge sheet against Brigadier J.K.

Narang, his family members and the present petitioner. It was

asserted that the petitioner/accused Kulbir Singh Dhaliwal is

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practising as an Advocate in the High Court at Chandigarh. His

daughter, Ms. Loveleen Dhaliwal, is married to Amit Singla, an

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approved contractor of Border Road Organisation (BRO) who had

worked under the supervision of the accused J.K. Narang.

Petitioner/ accused Kulbir Singh Dhaliwal entered into a criminal

conspiracy with the accused, Sh. Sumant Narang & J.K. Narang.

They entered into an agreement dated 15.04.2011 with Sh. Sumant

Narang for the purchase of his plot No. A-403, Sector-6, Dwarka,

New Delhi for ₹75,00,000/-. It was mentioned in the agreement

that ₹15,00,000/- was paid in cash as an earnest money to Sumant

Narang on 15.04.2011. The agreement was executed on the stamp

paper No. S387853, which was released to Ms. Madhu, stamp

vendor, on 13.02.2012. Kulbir Singh Dhaliwal is shown to have given

₹15,00,000/- in cash to Sumant Narang on 15.04.2011 and

₹10,00,000/- in cash to Sumant Narang on 11.10.2011 as an advance

payment to purchase the flat. He had entered into a criminal

conspiracy with Sumant Narang and J.K. Narang to commit forgery

by preparing a false agreement dated 15.04.2011 and used this

document as genuine to conceal the disproportionate assets of

Brigadier J.K. Narang and his family members; hence, it was prayed

that action be taken against the accused.

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3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the

filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present

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petition for quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings.

It was asserted that no party to the agreement claimed that it was

forged. Only the CBI is claiming that the document is forged. No

sale deed was executed pursuant to the agreement, and the parties

entered into an agreement stipulating that the agreement to sell

would not be acted upon. ₹25,00,000/- would be returned by

Sumant Narang to the petitioner/accused with interest. As a result,

₹27,00,000/- was transferred by the petitioner to Sumant Narang

through a cheque. The basic ingredients of Sections 463, 464 and

467 of IPC are not satisfied. The petitioner is not a maker of the

document, and he cannot be held liable for its forgery. The

ingredients of the conspiracy were not satisfied. The petitioner is

being harassed because his son-in-law is a registered contractor

with the Border Security Organisation. He never worked with the

accused J.K. Narang. The petitioner cannot be held liable because

his son-in-law was associated with BRO. The allegations in the

charge sheet do not constitute the commission of any cognizable

offence; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be

allowed, the charge sheet and the FIR be ordered to be quashed.

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4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by the CBI

denying the contents of the petition and reproducing the contents

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of the charge sheet. It was asserted that the agreement was

executed on 15.04.2011 on the stamp paper No. S387853. An

addendum was executed on 11.10.2011. The stamp paper No.

S387853 was not in existence before 13.02.2012. It was issued to Ms.

Madhu on 13.02.2012 and was taken on record by her on the same

day. Ms. Madhu also denied that the entry mentioned in the stamp

paper pertained to her. She stated that the licence No. 169 belongs

to Raj Kumar, another stamp vendor. Raj Kumar revealed that the

stamp paper was not issued to him, and it was not sold by him. The

witnesses to the agreement, Sh. Kashmir Singh and Sh. Dinesh

Prashad, were also interrogated. Kashmir Singh revealed that the

agreement already had the signatures of the petitioner and Sumant

Narang. No person had signed the document in his presence. He put

the signatures on the document on the petitioner's request. Dinesh

Parshad was also not present in the office. Dinesh Prashad stated

that he had put the signatures on the request of Smt. Loveleen Kaur

Dhaliwal, the petitioner's daughter. No transaction of money took

place in the presence of the witnesses. Petitioner's son-in-law,

Amit Singla and daughter Loveleen Dhaliwal Singla were the

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owners of LSR Logistics, Private Limited, which was engaged in

transportation and road work with BRO. Kamal Singh, Director of

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LSR Logistics, stated that he and Ravinder went to the petitioner's

office and put their signatures on the agreement as per the

directions of Ms. Loveleen Dhaliwal. No money was paid in his

presence. The petitioner actively participated in the creation of the

documents. The original sale agreement and the addendum were

never produced, even though the notices were served under Section

91 of the CrPC. The agreement and addendum were prepared with

the intention of screening the ill-got money of Brigadier J.K.

Narang. The income tax return for the year 2011-2012 and 2012-

2013 shows that Sumant Narang had filed 'Nil' ITR, which shows

that no money was paid to him. The agreement to sell and

addendum were prepared after the registration of the FIR against

Brigadier J.K. Narang. The statement of account of the petitioner

does not show any funds flow. Therefore, it was prayed that the

present petition be dismissed.

5. I have heard Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel,

assisted by Mr. Sidharth, learned counsel for the petitioner/

accused and Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned counsel for the

respondent/ CBI.

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6. Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioner/ accused, submitted that the allegations against the

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petitioner are false. The petitioner did not prepare any forged

document. The transaction between the parties was genuine. The

money was repaid to Sumant through cheques, which show the

bona fide nature of the transaction. Even if the plea of the CBI is

accepted as correct that the stamp paper was released in the year

2012, writing an agreement bearing the date of 2011 does not

constitute any forgery. There was no intention to cheat any person.

Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the

FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be

quashed.

7. Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned counsel for the

respondent/ CBI, submitted that the statement of stamp paper

vendors shows that the stamp paper was not sold to the petitioner/

accused in the year 2012. The agreement came into existence in the

year 2011, whereas the stamp paper was released in the year 2012.

The agreement was executed to inflate the income of co-accused

J.K. Narang. The contents of the agreement are false. No sale deed

was executed between the parties, which shows that the agreement

was a sham and was executed to avoid the inquiry pending against

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the co-accused. This Court should not enquire into the factual

aspects while exercising its inherent jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed

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that the present petition be dismissed.

8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.

9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was

2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

r to explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P.,

"7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan

Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the

following words:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series

of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list

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of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

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report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their

face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under

Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

r (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in

the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a

police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable

on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and

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with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would

be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such

a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the

concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."

10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High

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Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the

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course of several decades, has laid down the principles and

guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court.

The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the

dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).

11. It was held in Raghunath Sharma v. State of Haryana,

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1148, that the exercise of inherent jurisdiction is

the exception and not the rule. It was observed:

7. The scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr. P.C. has engaged

this Court on numerous occasions [Ref: State of Kar-

nataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699; Sunder Babu v. State

of Tamil Nadu (2009) 14 SCC 244; Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P. (2017) 13 SCC 369; Ahmad Ali Quraishi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 13 SCC 435.] The observations made in State of Kar-

nataka v. M. Devendrappa (2002) 3 SCC 89 by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges encapsulate the purpose of this power most aptly in the following terms:

"6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of

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court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with

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procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for the

proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether

civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the

principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere

videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or

revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the

tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial

justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority

so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the

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materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."

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12. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977)

2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash the

criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of

the Court. It was observed on page 703:

"7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require

that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the

High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a

criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High Court in

quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice

has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these

observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."

13. The term abuse of the process was explained in

Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740: (2014) 1

SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:

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33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-established and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established principles of law

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which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the process of the court.

34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions

[1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) "There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are

necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. ... A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of

its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process.

*** The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its procedure

must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice."

In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings

constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.

35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 :

(1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word "abuse of process" as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case.

36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the

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stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances:

(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair

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trial; or

(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the

circumstances of the particular case.

37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:

"It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a

technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the

defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable."

38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94:

1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:

"The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many

different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the

court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried."

What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case.

14. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC

488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are

frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.

However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while exercising

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jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was observed at page

498:

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13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the

averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, try to read in between the lines. The Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of a

case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take, for instance, the case at hand. Multiple

FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the

background of such circumstances that the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge, as alleged.

14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the

types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR.

The Court drew a fine distinction between the consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and the appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that

manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : (Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7) "5. ... Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers court would be justified in quashing any

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proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the

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court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and

whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court

summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of

sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there

is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal

evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect

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and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta

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to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden

death." (emphasis supplied)

15. The present petition is to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

16.

The statement of Madhu reads that each stamp vendor

is required to enter the date, serial number of the register, serial

number of the stamp paper sold, denominations of the stamp

paper, address of the purchaser and signatures of the purchaser in

the register. The entry number is to be endorsed on the back of the

stamp paper with date, name and address of the purchaser and the

purpose of purchase. Stamp paper bearing the serial No. S387853

was issued to her on 13.02.2012 and was taken on record in the

register on 13.02.2012. Serial No. 398 dated 01.04.2011 was recorded

on behalf of Raj Kumar, stamp vendor, and the licence No. 169 did

not pertain to her. The sale of stamp paper was not possible on

01.04.2011.

17. This statement clearly shows that the stamp paper used

for writing the document was issued on 13.02.2012, and no

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agreement could have been executed on it on 01.04.2011. Hence, the

agreement was ante-dated.

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18. Statement of Raj Kumar, stamp vendor, reads that he

has not sold stamp paper No. S387853. The entry on the back of the

photocopy of the stamp paper was not in his hand, and serial No.

398 was entered in the register on 04.04.2011. The stamp available

on the back of the photocopy of the stamp paper did not bear his

stamp. The license number was distorted, and the entry no. 398

was not made by him.

19. The statement of this witness shows that the entry on

the back of the stamp paper was not made by him, and he had not

put his stamp. Therefore, prima facie, a false entry was made on the

back of the stamp paper showing the sale of the stamp paper on

01.04.2011 vide entry No. 398 pertaining to this witness. This

witness specifically denied that he had made the entry and put the

stamp; hence, his statement prima facie shows a forgery of the

entry made on the reverse of the stamp paper.

20. There is no explanation for executing the document on

01.04.2011 on a stamp paper issued on 13.02.2012. The ante dating of

the agreement to sell prima facie supports the version of the CBI

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that this was done to help the co-accused by providing the source

of income when no source of income existed.

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21. The CBI mentioned in the charge sheet that no funds

were transferred from the account of the petitioner. The income tax

return filed by Sumant Narang was also 'Nil', suggesting that no

money was received by him. Therefore, the recitals in the

agreement to sell that the amount of ₹15,00,000/- was paid by the

petitioner and was received by Sumant Narang are prima facie

incorrect.

22. It was submitted that, as per the FIR, the check period

was between 01.01.2007 and 23.02.2012, and the execution of the

agreement on 11.04.2012 was beyond the check period, which would

not have helped the co-accused. This submission overlooks the fact

that the advance payment of ₹25,00,000/- in cash was shown to

have been made on 15.04.2011 and 10.11.2011 to Sumant Narang,

within the check period. This prima facie corroborates the version

of the CBI that the payment of ₹25,00,000/- was shown to have

been made within the check period to inflate the income of Sumant

Narang, a family member of J.K. Narang.

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23. A heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that the

petitioner returned ₹27,00,000/- to Sumant Narang when it was

.

found that execution of the sale deed was not possible, which

shows the bona fide nature of the transaction. This submission is

not acceptable. The CBI registered the FIR on 18.10.2012. The

agreement between the petitioner and Sumant Narang to cancel the

agreement to sell was executed on 10.10.2013 after the registration

of the FIR. Hence, it was a post-litem transaction and does not show

any bona fide.

24. It was submitted that there is a distinction between a

false document as understood in law and a document whose

contents are false. A document is not a false document because it

contains false recitals. There can be no dispute with this

preposition of law. However, in the present case, the falsity of the

contents was with a view to help the co-accused regarding the

money received by him during the check period, and prima facie

shows that it was done pursuant to a conspiracy entered with the

petitioner.

25. The statements of the attesting witnesses to the

agreement to sell and the addendum also show that the documents

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were not executed in their presence, and money was also not

exchanged in their presence. They were presented with a document

.

and were asked to sign it. Kamal Singh stated that he and Ravinder

went to the petitioner's office and signed an agreement between

Sumant Narang and the petitioner as per the directions of Loveleen

Dhaliwal, the daughter of the petitioner. Kashmir Singh also stated

that the petitioner asked him to sign some papers as a witness.

Dinesh Prashad, another witness, was also not present. No persons

had put their signatures in his presence. The agreement was duly

signed by K.S. Dhaliwal and Sumant Narang. Dinesh Prashad also

stated that he was asked by the daughter of the petitioner to put his

signatures on the agreement. Kashmir Singh, another witness, was

not present in the office.

26. These statements prima facie show that the documents

were not executed in the presence of the attesting witnesses. There

is no requirement that the signatures should be put in the presence

of attesting witnesses because as per Section 3 of Transfer of

Property Act an acknowledgement of the signature is sufficient but

in the present case the fact that the attesting witnesses were asked

by the petitioner and his daughter and not by the petitioner and

Sumant to put the signatures prima facie show that the petitioner

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and his daughter were responsible for the preparation of the

document. Hence, the submission that the petitioner is not the

.

maker of the document and cannot be held liable is not acceptable.

27. It was submitted that no person had made any

complaint regarding the falsity of the documents. Only the CBI has

come up with a plea that the document contained false recitals.

This submission will not help the petitioner. As per the CBI, the

documents were brought into existence to help the co-accused J.K.

Narang and mislead the CBI. It was a consensual transaction

between the petitioner and Sumant Narang; therefore, no person

would have complained about the same, and only CBI, which was

intended to be misled by the execution of the agreement, would

have made the complaint.

28. Reference was made to the various documents annexed

to the petition. However, it is impermissible for the Court

exercising inherent jurisdiction to look into the documents

forming part of the charge sheet, especially when the authenticity

of the documents is not established. It was laid down by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC

1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed on the face

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of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no

offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract

.

anything. It was observed:

"10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings

against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if, on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are,

without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code."

29. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram,

1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the

fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding

under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. It was observed:

"Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed

a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present

petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr. P.C."

30. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in

Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K.

Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:

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"9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements of the witnesses, if any, recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the

.

documents, which were not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court from looking into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the

Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

"The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears

that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala

fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be

no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the

material collected during the investigation and the evidence presented in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides

against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the

proceedings".

31. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of

Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it was

observed on page 142:

"16. ... the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint, as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would,

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based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial."

32. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of

.

Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it was

held:

13. All these documents, which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial, but the same are not material at the stage of deciding

whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents.

33. A

similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus

Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC

86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was

observed:

"63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the

offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the

High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under

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Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the

.

complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that

proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This, too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand." (Emphasis supplied).

34. It was submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. are

false. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down

in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the

Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go

into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was

observed:-

"13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the

reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of

the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

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14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

.

"14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of

the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this

submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of

Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police

during the pendency of the Section 482 petition,

observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) "16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being

charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet

had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj

365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the

complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not."

35. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:

2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial

while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was

observed on page 397:

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"17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be

.

made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted

hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

6. ... As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the

Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. ...

7. ... At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited

jurisdiction and is required to consider 'whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against

the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not'."

36. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025

SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising the inherent

jurisdiction should treat the contents of the FIR as correct. It was

observed: -

"29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a

complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice."

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37. This position was reiterated in Vinod Bihari Lal v. State of

U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1216, wherein it was observed:

.

37. This Court, in a catena of decisions, has observed that it is not for the courts to embark upon an enquiry into the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR

at the stage of quashing of the proceedings. However, it is of paramount importance that the allegations made against the accused, if taken at face value, must disclose the commission of an offence, whether from the FIR, the chargesheet, or

other relevant materials. It is incumbent upon the courts to exercise their discretionary powers where the materials on record indicate that the criminal proceedings are being misused as instruments of oppression or harassment.

38. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to

determine the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in

it.

39. It is undisputed that the CBI has filed the charge-sheet

before the learned Trial Court. Hence, the learned Trial Court is

seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial

Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

"At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge

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application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court.

.

In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such

discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not."

40. No other point was urged.

41.

dismissed. to Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is

42. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the

miscellaneous applications, if any.

43. The observations made herein before shall remain

confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,

whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

22nd August 2025 (Anurag)

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