Renu Lalit Agarwal vs Small Industries Development Bank Of ...

(Arising out of Impugned Order dated 30.10.2024 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench in CP NO. IB-21/KB/2024)

IN THE MATTER OF: RENU LALIT AGARWAL Suspended Director of AS Infracon Pvt. Ltd. Having Address At: Flat No. E/412, 4th Floor, E Tower, Shripal Residency, City Light Road, Appellant Surat - 345 007

VERSUS

SMALL INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT BANK OF INDIA Having its headquarters at SIDBI Tower, Respondent No.1 15, Ashok Marg, Lucknow - 226001, Uttar Pradesh

MR. AJIT GYANCHAND JAIN Interim Resolution Professional of AS Infracon Pvt. Ltd. Having address at: 204, Wall Street-I, Ellisbridge, Respondent No.2 Near Gujarat College, Ahmadabad, Gujarat 380006

PRESENT

For Appellant Mr. Arpit Singhvi, Advocate

For Respondents Mr. Amit Dayal, Advocate for R-1 Ms. Nikita Gupta, Ms. Yashna Ahuja, Mr. Vaibhav Kumar, Mr. Milind Garg & Mr. Yaksh Garg, Advocates for R-2

Page 1 of 20 JUDGEMENT

(21.08.2026)

NARESH SALECHA, MEMBER (TECHNICAL)

1. The present appeal is filed by the Appellant i.e., Renu Lalit Agarwal, who

is the Suspended Director of AS Infracon Private Limited under Section 61 of the

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, ("Code") arising out of Impugned Order

dated 30.10.2024 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench

("Adjudicating Authority") in CP No. IB 21/KB/2024.

Small Industries Development Bank of India is the Respondent No.1

herein.

Mr. Ajit Gyanchand Jain, who is the Interim Resolution Professional of AS

Infracon Pvt. Ltd. is the Respondent No.2 herein.

2. The Appellant submitted that the Appellant is the suspended Director of

AS Infracon Pvt. Ltd. ("Corporate Debtor"), which was incorporated on

17.08.1998. The Appellant stated that no business activities have been carried on

from the registered office of the Corporate Debtor for more than five years, a fact

that was well within the knowledge of Respondent No. 1. The Appellant

contended that despite such knowledge, Respondent No. 1 deliberately failed to

effect proper service of notices and proceeded against the Corporate Debtor in

violation of the principles of natural justice.

Page 2 of 20

3. The Appellant submitted that Respondent No. 1 had sanctioned financial

assistance of Rs. 7,00,00,000/- under a Secured Business Loan to MSMEs in

favour of Kosas Exports Ltd. vide Sanction Letter dated 24.02.2014 for meeting

various business requirements, including capital expenditure, servicing new

orders, renovation of assets, reimbursement of self-financed assets, funding of

intangibles, brand building, research and development, inorganic business

growth, and other bona fide business needs. The Appellant stated that a Loan

Agreement dated 26.02.2014 was executed between Respondent No. 1 and Kosas

Exports Ltd. for availing the said financial assistance, and on the same date the

Corporate Debtor executed an unconditional and irrevocable Deed of Guarantee

securing the loan advanced to the Borrower.

4. The Appellant contended that although Respondent No. 1 disbursed the

entire loan amount of Rs. 7 Crores to the Borrower and subsequently classified

the loan account as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) with effect from 08.11.2015,

followed by issuance of a recall notice dated 08.03.2016, the alleged invocation

of the Corporate Debtor's guarantee vide notice dated 27.07.2016 was never

served upon the Corporate Debtor. The Appellant submitted that the Corporate

Debtor had never received the alleged notice invoking the guarantee demanding

payment of Rs. 7,28,75,463/- together with further interest. The Appellant stated

that Respondent No. 1 has failed to establish valid service of the said notice and

is put to strict proof thereof. Consequently, the Appellant contended that the

initiation of proceedings under Section 7 of the Code, is barred by limitation since

Page 3 of 20 the alleged invocation notice, forming the very basis of the claim against the

Corporate Debtor as guarantor, was never served.

5. The Appellant further submitted that even after the alleged default, the

Borrower along with Kosas Industries Private Limited made sincere efforts to

settle the outstanding dues by submitting One Time Settlement (OTS) proposals

dated 08.06.2019 offering Rs. 12 Crores and again on 05.11.2020 offering Rs.

7.50 Crores towards full and final settlement of the loan account. The Appellant

contended that Respondent No. 1 failed to respond to these settlement proposals,

thereby demonstrating that negotiations were continuing even after the alleged

invocation of guarantee.

6. The Appellant submitted that Respondent No. 1 was throughout aware that

the registered office of the Corporate Debtor had remained closed and non-

functional for more than five years. The Appellant contended that despite having

complete knowledge of this fact, and despite being in regular contact with the

Directors of the Borrower Company who had personally met the officials of

Respondent No. 1 on several occasions, Respondent No. 1 deliberately refrained

from serving the alleged notice of invocation of guarantee dated 27.07.2016 either

upon the Directors of the Corporate Debtor or at the address of the Borrower. The

Appellant stated that this deliberate omission clearly establishes the mala fide

conduct of Respondent No. 1 in depriving the Corporate Debtor of an opportunity

to contest the proceedings.

Page 4 of 20

7. The Appellant further submitted that Respondent No. 1 thereafter instituted

Company Petition No. 21 of 2024 before the Adjudicating Authority without

ensuring service of the petition upon the Corporate Debtor. The Appellant

contended that no notice of the insolvency petition was ever served either upon

the Corporate Debtor or upon any of its Directors, and as reflected from the orders

of the Adjudicating Authority itself, the entire proceedings were conducted ex

parte. The Appellant stated that the complete absence of notice resulted in denial

of any effective opportunity of hearing and constitutes a gross violation of the

principles of natural justice.

8. The Appellant submitted that the Appellant remained completely unaware

of the filing and pendency of the insolvency proceedings and acquired knowledge

of the impugned order dated 30.10.2024 only when Respondent No. 2, by

communication dated 12.11.2024, forwarded a copy of the impugned order. The

Appellant contended that immediately upon becoming aware of the order

admitting the Section 7 application, the present appeal was preferred before this

Appellate Tribunal challenging the legality and correctness of the impugned

order.

9. The Appellant submitted that the principal issues arising for consideration

are whether the Corporate Debtor was ever served with the alleged notice

invoking the guarantee dated 27.07.2016, whether the Corporate Debtor received

notice of CP (IB) No. 21 of 2024, whether the proceedings before the

Adjudicating Authority were conducted in violation of the principles of natural

Page 5 of 20 justice by proceeding ex parte, whether Respondent No. 1 was fully aware that

the registered office of the Corporate Debtor was non-functional, and whether

Respondent No. 1 was under an obligation to serve the notices upon the Directors

of the Corporate Debtor and/or the Borrower.

10. The Appellant contended that the impugned order suffers from serious

legal infirmities as it has been passed in complete violation of the principles of

natural justice. The Appellant submitted that the insolvency proceedings are

barred by limitation inasmuch as the alleged invocation notice dated 27.07.2016

was never served upon the Corporate Debtor. The Appellant further stated that

Respondent No. 1 acted with mala fide intention by intentionally avoiding service

upon the Directors despite having full knowledge that the registered office was

non-functional. The Appellant also contended that the ex parte admission of the

Section 7 petition without proper service of notice has caused grave prejudice to

the Corporate Debtor and renders the impugned order dated 30.10.2024

unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside.

11. Concluding the arguments, the Appellant requested this Appellate Tribunal

to set aside the Impugned Order and allow the appeal.

12. Per contra, the Respondent No.2 denied all the averments made by the

Appellant as misleading and baseless.

13. The Respondent No. 2 submitted, by way of preliminary objections, that

the entire grievance raised by the Appellant pertains to the period prior to the

Page 6 of 20 commencement of the CIRP and in any case are misleading and without any

substance.

14. The Respondent No. 2 submitted that CIRP Form-I was filed on

06.11.2024 and thereafter communications were sent through e-mails to statutory

auditors, creditors, the Registrar of Companies and related parties informing them

about the initiation of CIRP and inviting claims. The Respondent No. 2 stated

that further communications dated 08.11.2024 and 22.11.2024 were issued

requesting the Suspended Management to furnish all relevant records, books of

account, financial statements and statutory documents necessary for carrying out

the CIRP. It was further submitted that on 18.12.2024 a claim was received from

Respondent No. 1, being the Financial Creditor, which was duly verified and

admitted in accordance with law.

15. The Respondent No. 2 submitted that since the Suspended Management

was not cooperating and had failed to provide crucial books, records and statutory

documents necessary for conducting the CIRP, an application under Section 19(2)

of the Code was filed on 19.12.2024 before the Adjudicating Authority against

the Appellant, other members of the Suspended Management and the Statutory

Auditor seeking appropriate directions for production of all essential records.

16. The Respondent No. 2 contended, that the allegations of the Appellant are

baseless in view of the findings recorded by the Adjudicating Authority in

Paragraph 8 of the Impugned Order, wherein it has been observed that the

Corporate Debtor failed to appear despite service of notice.

Page 7 of 20

17. The Respondent No. 2 reiterated that the allegations of the Appellant relate

entirely to the period prior to commencement of the CIRP and concern

proceedings in which the Respondent No. 2 had no participation whatsoever. It

was contended that those allegations cannot be attributed in any manner. The

Respondent No. 2 also further reiterated that the Adjudicating Authority had

specifically recorded that the Corporate Debtor did not appear despite service of

notice.

18. Concluding the arguments, the Respondent No.2 requested this Appellate

Tribunal to set aside the present appeal.

Findings

19. We have considered the Appeal together with the annexures thereto, and

have perused the impugned order dated 30.10.2024, as well as the Attendance-

cum-Order Sheets recording the proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority

between 07.02.2024 and 18.09.2024.

20. By the impugned order, the Adjudicating Authority admitted the application

filed by SIDBI/Respondent No. 1 under Section 7 of the Code, against Corporate

Debtor, initiated CIRP against the Corporate Debtor, and appointed Respondent

No. 2 as the IRP. The Corporate Debtor stood as a corporate guarantor, having

executed a Deed of Corporate Guarantee dated 26.02.2014 in favour of SIDBI,

securing a term loan of Rs. 7,00,00,000/- sanctioned by SIDBI in favour of Kosas

Exports Limited ("Principal Borrower").

Page 8 of 20

21. The following issues arise for determination:

(I)Whether the impugned order is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural

justice;

(II)Whether the petition under Section 7 of the Code was barred by limitation;

(III)Whether the Appellant has disclosed any bona fide defence on the merits of

debt and default?

We address each of these issues in turn.

ISSUE I: Whether the impugned order is vitiated by violation of the

principles of natural justice;

22. The principal grievance of the Appellant is that the Corporate Debtor was

never served with notice of CP (IB) No. 21/KB/2024, and the entire proceedings

before the Adjudicating Authority were conducted ex-parte, and that the

Appellant learnt of the impugned order only on 12.11.2024, when Respondent

No. 2 issued a communication in that regard.

23. We are unable to accept this contention, for the following reasons.

A) (i) First, the record of proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority discloses

a sustained and repeated effort, spanning more than seven months, to effect

service upon the Corporate Debtor:

(a)By order dated 07.02.2024, the Registry was directed to issue notice to the

Corporate Debtor by speed post and e-mail;

(b)By order dated 12.03.2024, it was recorded that the notice sent by the Registry

had been returned with the endorsement "Item returned, Addressee cannot be

Page 9 of 20 located." Learned Counsel for the Financial Creditor thereupon sought, and was

granted, one week's time to file fresh particulars of the Corporate Debtor with the

Registry, and the Registry was directed to issue fresh notice thereafter;

(c)By order dated 19.04.2024, it was recorded that fresh particulars had been

furnished, and the Registry was directed to issue fresh notice to the Corporate

Debtor on that basis, again by speed post and e-mail, with tracking information

to be placed on record;

(d)By order dated 10.06.2024, it was recorded that, despite service of notice, none

appeared for the Corporate Debtor and no reply-affidavit had been filed; a last

chance was given to file a reply-affidavit, failing which appropriate orders would

follow;

(e)The matter was adjourned on 10.07.2024 for want of time;

(f)By order dated 21.08.2024, notwithstanding the last chance already afforded,

the Adjudicating Authority directed the Registry to issue notice to the Corporate

Debtor once again, by speed post and e-mail, and further directed that the

Corporate Debtor would have two weeks from receipt of that notice within which

to file a reply; and

(g)By order dated 18.09.2024, it was recorded that "despite repeated notice, none

appears for the Corporate Debtor," and the matter was reserved for orders,

culminating in the impugned order dated 30.10.2024.

(ii) This chronology does not, in our view, disclose an Adjudicating Authority

proceeding in haste or without affording adequate opportunity. To the contrary, it

Page 10 of 20 discloses that the Adjudicating Authority, on encountering an initial failure of

postal service, called for fresh particulars, issued a second round of notice on that

basis, and thereafter extended not one but two further opportunities, on

10.06.2024 and again on 21.08.2024, expressly cautioning that appropriate orders

would follow in default. It was only after this cumulative and repeated exercise,

extending from 07.02.2024 to 18.09.2024, that the Adjudicating Authority

proceeded to reserve, and thereafter pronounce, its order. We find no infirmity in

this course.

B) Second, and in any event, the postal returns relied upon by the Appellant

must be viewed in light of the Appellant's own case. The Appellant's own

pleadings (Memorandum of Appeal, paragraphs 7.1 and 7.7) admit, in terms, that

the registered office of the Corporate Debtor "was closed since more than 5

years." The maintenance of a registered office, at all times capable of receiving

communications, is a continuing statutory obligation under Section 12 of the

Companies Act, 2013, for the compliance of which the directors of a company

including a suspended director in office during the relevant period, who carries

personal responsibility. It is a well-settled principle that a party cannot be

permitted to found a grievance of denial of natural justice on a default of its own

making. Having admittedly allowed its registered office to remain non-functional

for several years in breach of its statutory obligations, it is not open to the

Corporate Debtor, through the Appellant, to contend that notice sent to that very

address, the address recorded with the Registrar of Companies, and the address Page 11 of 20 of record available to Respondent No. 1 and the Registry amounted to inadequate

service.

C) Third, we note that on each occasion notice was directed to be issued not

merely by post but also by e-mail. The Appellant's pleadings are conspicuously

silent on the e-mail mode of service: there is no averment, still less any material,

to show that the e-mail address used was incorrect, that it was inaccessible to the

Corporate Debtor or its directors, or that any e-mail notice failed to reach its

destination. Service by e-mail, at the address furnished in the application, is a

recognised and independent mode of service under Rule 38(1) of the National

Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 ("NCLT Rules"). Where service has been

attempted through more than one mode, it does not suffice for a party to impugn

service by demonstrating the failure of one mode while remaining silent as to the

other.

D) Fourth, sub-rule (4) of Rule 38 of the NCLT Rules empowers the Adjudicating

Authority, where service in the ordinary modes proves impossible, to direct

service "in any other manner, including any manner of substituted service, as it

appears to the Tribunal just and convenient." The Adjudicating Authority, on

encountering the initial failure of postal service, did not mechanically persist with

the same defective particulars; it called for, and thereafter acted upon, fresh

particulars furnished by the Financial Creditor. In the absence of any material

placed by the Appellant to show that these fresh particulars were themselves

incorrect, or that the Corporate Debtor remained undiscoverable notwithstanding

Page 12 of 20 due diligence, we see no reason to hold that the Adjudicating Authority fell short

of the standard contemplated by Rule 38.

E) Fifth, Rule 37(2) of the NCLT Rules provides that where a respondent does

not appear on the date fixed for hearing, the Tribunal, after according reasonable

opportunity to the respondent, "shall forthwith proceed ex-parte to dispose of the

application." On the facts before us, an opportunity extending to seven hearings

over more than seven months, including two express grants of a further/last

opportunity, satisfies and indeed exceeds the standard of "reasonable

opportunity" contemplated by this Rule.

F) Sixth, we have considered the specific allegation, at paragraph 7.7 of the

Memorandum of Appeal, that Respondent No. 1 was at all times aware that the

registered office was non-functional and, with a mala fide intention, omitted to

serve the Directors or the Principal Borrower at any alternative address. An

allegation of mala fide is a serious one, and the burden of establishing it rests

squarely on the party making it; it cannot rest on bare assertion. The Appellant

has placed no material before us -- no correspondence, no record of the meetings

referred to, no proof that Respondent No. 1 was in fact in possession of any

alternative address which it consciously chose not to use to substantiate this

allegation. We are accordingly unable to accept it.

24. We take into account the Impugned Order dated 10.06.2024 which proceeds

on the express finding that "despite service of notice, none appears" a finding of

fact recorded upon the material before it, which this Appellate Tribunal has no

Page 13 of 20 reason to disturb in the absence of any material to the contrary placed by the

Appellant. We note further that, upon commencement of CIRP, Respondent No.

2 was able to trace and address correspondence to a Director of the Corporate

Debtor at a Surat residential address within a matter of days of the impugned

order a circumstance which, if anything, suggests that the Directors' whereabouts

were, with reasonable diligence, ascertainable, and that the difficulty in securing

appearance before the Adjudicating Authority lay in the Corporate Debtor's own

default in responding to repeated notice, rather than in any want of diligence on

the part of Respondent No. 1 or the Registry.

For the foregoing reasons, we find no violation of the principles of natural justice.

Issue I is answered against the Appellant.

ISSUE II: Whether the petition under Section 7 of the Code was barred by

limitation;

25. It is not in dispute that:

(a)SIDBI sanctioned a term loan of Rs. 7,00,00,000/- to the Principal Borrower

vide sanction letter dated 24.02.2014;

(b)the Corporate Debtor executed a Deed of Corporate Guarantee dated

26.02.2014 in favour of SIDBI, securing the said facility;

(c)the loan was disbursed on 11.03.2014;

(d)the account of the Principal Borrower was classified as a Non-Performing

Asset with effect from 08.11.2015, and a recall notice was issued to the Principal

Borrower on 08.03.2016;

Page 14 of 20

(e)SIDBI issued a notice dated 27.07.2016 purporting to invoke the guarantee and

demanding Rs. 7,28,75,463/- from the Corporate Debtor -- a notice which the

Appellant contends was never served on, or received by, the Corporate Debtor;

(f)the Principal Borrower, jointly with an associate entity, addressed a OTS

proposal to SIDBI dated 08.06.2019, offering Rs. 12,00,00,000/- in full and final

settlement of both loan accounts; and

(g)the Principal Borrower again addressed an OTS proposal to SIDBI dated

05.11.2020, offering Rs. 7,50,00,000/- in full and final settlement.

Clause 3 of the Deed of Corporate Guarantee dated 26.02.2014 provides that "In

the event of any default on the part of the borrower ... the guarantor shall, upon

demand forthwith pay to SIDBI ... all the accounts payable by the borrower."

This is, in substance, a guarantee payable on demand. In Syndicate Bank v.

Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors., [(2006) 11 SCC 506], the Supreme Court held

that, in the case of such a guarantee, the guarantor's liability to pay arises, and

limitation begins to run, upon a demand being made (and refused), provided the

claim against the principal debtor is not itself, at that point, time-barred.

Clause 22 of the Deed of Corporate Guarantee further provides that "A balance

confirmation and/or acknowledgment of debt and security execute[d] by the

borrower shall be treated as balance confirmation and/or acknowledgment of

debt or security ... by the guarantor(s) for the purpose of this guarantee." This

is a valid and specific contractual stipulation, freely entered into between the

Corporate Debtor and SIDBI, by which the Corporate Debtor agreed in advance

Page 15 of 20 that an acknowledgment of the debt made by the Principal Borrower would enure

to bind the Corporate Debtor, as guarantor, for limitation purposes as well. We

see no reason to treat this clause as anything other than fully binding on the

Corporate Debtor and, in these proceedings, on the Appellant.

Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides that where an acknowledgment

of liability, in writing signed by the party against whom the right is claimed (or

its duly authorised agent), is made before expiry of the prescribed period, a fresh

period of limitation is computed from the date of such acknowledgment. This

principle has been held by the Supreme Court, in Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union

Bank of India, [(2021) 8 SCC 481], to apply to applications under Section 7 of

the Code, including as against a corporate guarantor, whose liability is

coextensive with that of the principal borrower under Section 128 of the Indian

Contract Act, 1872, by virtue of the definition of "corporate guarantor" under

Section 5(5A) of the Code.

26. Applying these principles:

(a)Even taking 27.07.2016 as the date from which limitation is to be computed

(being the date of the notice alleged to invoke the guarantee), the prescribed

period of three years under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applicable to

applications under Section 7 of the Code, as held in B.K. Educational Services

(P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633 would ordinarily have

expired on or about 27.07.2019.

Page 16 of 20

(b)However, before expiry of that period, the Principal Borrower addressed a

written OTS proposal dated 08.06.2019, acknowledging and offering to settle the

outstanding liability. By operation of Clause 22 of the Deed read with Section 18

of the Limitation Act, this acknowledgment, though made by the Principal

Borrower, is deemed, by the Corporate Debtor's own contractual undertaking, to

be an acknowledgment by the Corporate Debtor as guarantor, and a fresh period

of three years accordingly commenced from 08.06.2019.

(c)Before expiry of that fresh period, the Principal Borrower addressed a further

written OTS proposal dated 05.11.2020, again acknowledging the outstanding

liability. This, for the same reasons, extended limitation by a further period of

three years, expiring on or about 05.11.2023.

(d)The petition under Section 7 of the Code was filed on 12.05.2023, as recorded

in paragraph 2 of the impugned order which is well within limitation period.

27. We have separately considered the Appellant's specific grievance that the

notice dated 27.07.2016 was never served on, or received by, the Corporate

Debtor, and that proof of such service is wanting. Even proceeding on the footing

most favourable to the Appellant, namely, that service of the 27.07.2016 notice is

not established, this does not, in our view, assist the Appellant's case on limitation,

because the subsequent acknowledgments of 08.06.2019 and 05.11.2020 furnish

an independent and sufficient basis for computing limitation, without reference

to whether the earlier notice was served. Indeed, were the 27.07.2016 notice to

Page 17 of 20 be left out of account altogether, the position would, if anything, be more

favourable to Respondent No. 1: the three-year period would then fall to be

reckoned from the recall notice (08.03.2016) or the date of NPA classification

(08.11.2015), both of which were, in any event, overtaken by the

acknowledgments of 2019 and 2020 for the same reasons set out above.

28. Nor is it open to the Appellant to contend, on the one hand, that the debt

became time-barred for want of service of the 27.07.2016 notice, while remaining

silent on the effect of the two subsequent, undisputed, written OTS proposals --

themselves placed on the record by the Appellant as Annexure A-4 (Colly) -- by

which the Principal Borrower, in terms binding on the Corporate Debtor under

Clause 22 of the Deed, unequivocally acknowledged a subsisting liability

considerably in excess of the amount now sought to be recovered. A party cannot

rely on documents evidencing a live and acknowledged debt for one purpose (to

demonstrate bona fide settlement efforts) while disowning the same documents'

legal consequence (extension of limitation) for another.

29. We accordingly find, in agreement with the Adjudicating Authority, that the

application under Section 7 of the Code was not barred by limitation. Issue II is

answered against the Appellant.

ISSUE III: Whether the Appellant has disclosed any bona fide defence on

the merits of debt and default?

30. It is well settled that an Adjudicating Authority, on an application under

Section 7 of the Code, is required to satisfy itself only of the existence of a

Page 18 of 20 financial debt and a default in respect thereof; it is not a recovery forum, and

disputed questions going beyond this limited inquiry do not, ordinarily, arise for

consideration. We nonetheless record, that the Appeal does not deny: (a) the

sanction and disbursement of the term loan of Rs. 7,00,00,000/- to the Principal

Borrower; (b) the due execution of the Deed of Corporate Guarantee dated

26.02.2014 by the Corporate Debtor, which bears the signature of a Director for

and on behalf of the Corporate Debtor; (c) the classification of the account as a

Non-Performing Asset; or (d) the two subsequent OTS proposals acknowledging

the outstanding liability. The Appeal, in substance, is confined entirely to

procedural objections going to service and limitation; no defence is taken that the

debt has been discharged, that the guarantee stood revoked or was otherwise

unenforceable, or that the amount claimed is incorrect. In these circumstances,

we find no error in the Adjudicating Authority's satisfaction, on the material

before it, that a financial debt and a default in respect thereof, within the meaning

of Sections 5(8) and 3(12) of the Code, stood established.

Page 19 of 20

Conclusion

31. For the reasons recorded above, we find no merit in the Appeal. The

impugned order dated 30.10.2024 does not call for any interference by this

Appellate Tribunal. The Appeal fails, is accordingly dismissed. No order as to

costs. IA, if any, stand closed.

[Justice Mohammad Faiz Alam Khan] Member (Judicial)

[Naresh Salecha] Member (Technical) Sim

Page 20 of 20