Punjab State Coop Milk Producers ... vs Assessee

M/s Punjab State Coop Milk Producers vs The DC IT, Federation Ltd., Circle 4(1), Chandigarh Chandigarh

PAN No.AAAAP1208Q

(Appellant) (Respondent)

Appellant By : Shri M.R. Sharma Respondent By : Smt. J yoti Kumari

Date of hearing : 31.03.2015 Date of Pronouncement : 10.04.2015

ORDER

PER T.R.SOOD, A.M.

The appeal filed by the assessee is directed against the order dated

17.11.2014 of C IT(A), Chandigarh.

2. In this appeal assessee has raised the following grounds:-

1. That the order of the Assessing Officer as upheld by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) Chandigarh is bad in law and is beyond all the cannons of law and justice.

2. That the order of the Assessing Officer as upheld by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) Chandigarh attributing expenses to the income which is entitle to deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) amounting to Rs.

4,53,11,101/- against the gross interest income of Rs. 7,16,47,331/- by applying the provisions of section 14-A read with rule 8D is bad in lawand is against the judicial decisions including the decisions of Hon'ble Delhi Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. KRIBHCO 349 ITR Page 618 in this behalf.

3. That the order of the Assessing Officer as upheld by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) Chandigarh applying section 14A read with rule 8D to the deductions admissible under chapter VI-A more so when the SLP filed in the Supreme Court of India by the department has been dismissed meaning thereby that the Supreme Court has affirmed the 2

order of the Delhi High Court referred to above.

4. That the order of the Assessing Officer as upheld by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) Chandigarh not allowing deduction u/s 80P(2)(c) amounting to Rs. 50,000/- is bad in law and needs to be allowed.

5. That the appellant craves leave to add, amend or delete any of the grounds of appeal before the same is finally heard.

It is therefore humbly prayed that the order allocating expenses under section 14A read with rule 8D amounting to Rs. 4,53,11,101/- to the earning of interest income of Rs. 7,16,47,331/- may kindly be set-aside in view of the facts, circumstances and judicial decisions

3. Ground No.1 is of general nature and does not require separate

adjudication.

4. Ground Nos. 2 & 3:- After hearing both the parties we find that assessee

had claimed deduction u/s 80-P(2)(d) in respect of income earned from members

of societ y. While computing deduction the assessee had not reduced the

expenditure attributable to earning of such interest. The Assessing Officer

noticed that in the earlier years this issue was decided by the Tribunal against

the assessee from assessment years 2002-03 to 2006-07. Further, the appeals

filed by the assessee before the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court were

also dismissed, therefore, Assessing Officer allowed deduction onl y after

reducing the expenditure.

5. On appeal, the action of the Assessing Officer was confirmed by Ld.

CIT(A) because of the order of the Tribunal.

6. Before us Ld. Counsel for the assessee fairl y admitted that this issue is

covered against the assessee by the order of the Tribunal in ITA No.

869/Chd/2013. However, in the case the Assessing Officer had already applied

the Rule 8D and the calculation made while computing the disallowance u/s

14A were not correct.

7. On the other hand Ld. DR strongl y relied on the order of the Tribunal.

3 8. After considering the rival submissions we find that identical issue was

adjudicated by the Tribunal in assessee's own case in ITA No. 869/Chd/2013 in

assessment year 2010-11 vide paras 9 to 14 which reads as under:-

"9. We have considered the rival submissions carefully and we find that admittedly the issue is covered against the assessee by the earlier decision of Tribunal which has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in ITA No. 530 of 2006 vide order dt. 28/03/2011. Now the only question is whether this decision has to be followed or the decision of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in case of CIT Vs. Kribhco has to be followed. The issue regarding effect of dismissal of SLP was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of V.M. Salgaocar And Bros. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CIT, 243 ITR 383 the court pointed out following observations which is as under:

1. " Di ff er e nt c ons i d er a t i ons a pp ly wh e n a s p ec ia l l eav e pe t it i on un d er ar t ic l e 1 3 6 o f t he C ons t it ut i o n is s i m p ly d is m is s e d by s ay i ng "

d is m is s e d ", an d an a pp e a l pr ov id e d u n d er ar t ic l e 1 3 3 is d is m is s ed a ls o w it h th e w or ds " th e ap p e al is d is m is s ed . " In t he f or me r c a s e it has b ee n l a id d ow n b y th is c ou r t th at w he n a s p ec i al l e av e p et i ti on is d is m is s e d th is c o ur t do es n ot c o m m en t on t he c or r ec t nes s or ot h er w is e of t he or d er fr om w h ic h l e av e t o a pp e a l is s ou g ht . B ut w ha t th e c o ur t m ea ns is t h at it do es no t c o ns id er i t t o b e a fi t c as e for ex er c is e o f i ts j ur is d ic ti o n u nd er ar t ic l e 1 36 of t he Co ns t i tu t io n . Th at c er t a in ly c ou l d n ot b e s o wh en an a p pe a l i s dis m is s e d t ho u gh b y a no n- s p eak i ng or d er . H er e t he d oc tr i n e o f me r ge r a p p li es . I n t h at c as e , th e Su pr em e Co ur t u ph o l ds t he dec is i o n of t h e H i gh Co ur t or th e Tr i b un a l fr om wh ic h t h e a pp e a l is pr ov i de d u nd er c la us e ( 3) o f ar t i c l e 13 3 . Th is doc tr in e o f me r g er d o es n ot a pp ly in th e c as e of d is m is s a l of a s pec i a l l eav e p et i ti o n un d er ar t ic l e 1 36 . W h en a n a pp e a l is d is m is s e d th e or d er of t h e Hi g h Co ur t is mer ge d w it h t ha t o f the S upr e me C ou r t. W e q uo t e t he f o ll o wi n g par agr a p h fr o m t he j u dg me n t of t h is c ou r t i n t he c as e of S upr e me Co ur t E mp l oy ees ' W e lf ar e As s oc i a ti o n v . U n i on of I nd i a, AI R 19 9 0 H o n' bl e S u pr e m e Co ur t 33 4 ; [1 9 89 ] 4 S CC 18 7 ( a t pa g e 3 44 o f A IR 19 9 0 S. C) :

" 22 . It h as be e n a lr e a dy no t ic e t ha t th e s p e c i al l e av e p e ti t i on f i le d on be h a lf o f t he Un i on o f In d i a a ga i ns t t h e s a i d j ud g m en ts o f th e D e lh i Hi g h C o ur t we r e s u m ma r i ly d is mis s e d by t h is c o ur t. It is no w a we l l s et t le d pr i nc ip l e o f l a w th at wh e n a s p ec ia l l eav e p et i t io n is s um m ar ily d is m is s e d u n de r ar t ic l e 13 6 of t he C ons t it ut i on , by s uc h d is m is s a l th is c our t do es n o t l ay do wn any l aw , as e nv is ag e d by ar t ic l e 1 4 1 o f t he Co ns t i tu t io n , as c on t e nd e d by th e le ar n ed A tt or n ey - G e ne r a l . I n I n d ia n O i l C or p or a t io n Lt d. v . S t at e of B i har [ 19 8 7] 1 67 IT R 8 9 7; [1 9 8 6] 4 SC C 1 4 6; AI R 19 8 6 H on 'b l e S u pr e m e C our t 17 8 0, it h as b e en he l d by th is c o ur t t ha t t he dis m is s a l of a s pec i a l l e av e pe t it i on i n l i m in e by a no n- s p eak i ng or de r d oes n ot jus t ify a ny i nf er e nc e t h at , by nec es s ar y i mp l ic at i on , t h e c on te nt i ons r a is ed i n th e s p ec ia l l eav e p et it i o n o n th e me r i ts of th e c as e ha v e be e n r e j ec t e d by t he S u pr em e Co ur t. It has be e n fur t her he l d th a t t he e ff ec t of a no n- s pe ak i ng or d er o f d is m is s al of a s p ec ia l l e av e pe t it i on w i th o ut a ny t h in g m or e in d ic a t in g th e gr o u n ds or r e as ons o f i ts d is m is s al m us t , by n ec es s ar y i mp l ic at i o n , b e tak e n to be t h at t h e S upr e m e Co ur t h ad d ec i de d o n ly th a t i t was n ot a fi t c as e wh er e s p ec ia l l eav e s h ou l d b e gr a nt ed .

I n Un i o n of I n di a v . A l l In d ia S er v ic es P ens i o ner s ' As s oc i a ti o n [ 19 88 ] 2 SC C 5 8 0; AI R 19 8 8 Ho n' b le S u pr e m e C o ur t 5 01 , t h is c o ur t has g iv e n r eas o ns for d is m is s i ng t h e s pec i a l l e av e p e ti t io n . W he n s uc h r e as o ns ar e g iv en , th e d ec is i o n bec o m es on e w hic h a ttr a c ts ar t ic le 1 4 1 of t he Co ns t i tu t io n wh ic h pr ov id es t h at th e la w dec l ar ed by t h e Su pr em e Co ur t s h a ll b e b i n di n g on a l l t he c o ur ts wi t hi n t he t er r it or y o f I n di a . It , th er ef or e, f o l lo ws t h at wh en n o r e as on is g iv en , b ut a s pec i a l l e av e pe t it i on is d is m is s e d s i mp l ic it er , i t c a nn o t b e s ai d t ha t t h er e has b ee n a d ec l ar a t io n of l a w by t his c o ur t u nd er ar t ic l e 14 1 of th e Co ns t i tu t io n . "

4 It was , th er ef or e, c o n te n de d th a t o nc e th is c o ur t i n C iv il Ap p ea l No . 42 4 o f 19 9 9, h as d is m is s e d t he a p pe a l i t has u p he l d t he or d er of t he Hi g h Co ur t i n t h e c as e of t h e as s es s m en t y ear 19 8 0- 8 1 a n d it c a nn o t tak e a d if fer e nt v ie w f or t he as s es s m e nt y e ar 1 9 79- 8 0. T h er e ap p ear s to b e s u bs t a nc e in t h e s u b mis s i o n of t h e as s es s e e .

This issue was again considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Kunhayammed And Others Vs. State of Kerala and Another (supra). In that case this is how the question arose :

" A q ue st i on of f re q u en t r ec ur ren ce a n d of s om e si gn i fi can ce i n vol vi n g t h e l egal i m p li cati on s an d t h e i m p act of an o rde r rej ect i n g a p et i ti on seek i n g gr an t of sp eci al l eav e t o ap p eal un der a rt i cl e 1 36 o f t h e C on st i t uti on of In di a h a s a ri s en f or deci si on i n t h i s ap p e al ."

10. The Hon'ble Court discussed at page 368 to 370 the provisions of Article 132 to 136 of the constitution and noted the procedure of deciding Special Leave Petition. Thereafter at page 372 it was observed as under:

" It i s n ot t h e p ol i cy of t h i s c o urt t o en t ert ai n sp eci al l eav e p et i ti on an d gran t l eav e u n de r a rt i cl e 13 6 of t h e Con st i t ut i on sav e i n t h os e ca s es wh e re s om e s u b st a n t i al q uest i on of l a w of gen eral o r p ub l i c i m p ort an c e i s i n vol v ed or t h er e i s m an i f est i n just i ce r es ul t i n g f r om t h e i m p ug n ed or de r or j ud gm en t . Th e di sm i ssal of a s p eci a l l eav e p et i t i on i n li m i n e b y a n o n sp ea k i n g or de r d oe s n ot , t h er ef or e, ju st i f y an y i n fere n ce t hat b y n ece ss a r y i m p li cati on t h e c on t en t i on s rai se d i n t h e s p eci al le av e p et i t i on on t h e m e ri t s of t h e ca s e h av e b een r e ject e d b y t h i s co urt . It m ay al s o b e ob se r ved t h at h avi n g r e ga r d t o t h e v er y h eav y b ack l og of wo rk i n t h i s co urt an d t h e n ece s si t y t o re st ri ct t h e i n t ak e of f re sh ca s es b y st ri ct l y f ol l o wi n g t h e c ri t eri a af or em en t i on ed, i t h a s ve r y of t en b e en t h e p r act i ce of t h i s c o urt n ot t o g ran t sp eci al l eav e ex cep t i n ca se s wh e re t he p a rt y can n ot cl ai m eff ect i ve rel i ef b y ap p r oac h i n g t h e con c e rn ed Hi gh C o u rt un d er a r t i cl e 226 of t en di sm i ss ed on l y b y p a s si n g a n on - sp eak i n g o rd er esp eci al l y i n vi e w of t h e rul i n g s al re ad y gi ven b y t h i s co u rt , i n t h e t wo d eci si on s af or ec i t ed, t h at such di sm i ss al of t h e s p eci al l ea v e p et i ti on wi l l n ot p recl u de t h e p a rt y f rom m ovi n g t h e Hi gh C o urt f o r se ek i n g rel i ef un de r a rt i cl e 2 26 of t h e C on st i t ut i on . In s u ch ca s es, i t wo ul d wo r k ext r em e h a r d sh i p an d ref u s e h i m rel i ef un d er a rt i cl e 22 6 of t h e C on st i t ut i on on t h e s ol e gr o un d of di sm i ssal o f t h e sp eci al l e av e p et i ti on ."

In o ur op i n i on , wh at h a s b e en st at ed b y t h i s co u rt ap p l i es al s o t o a ca s e wh er e a s p e ci al l eave p et i ti on h avi n g b ee n di sm i sse d b y a n on - sp eak i n g o rd er t h e ap p l i can t ap p ro ach es t h e Hi gh C o urt b y m ovi n g a p et i ti on f or re vi e w. Ma y b e t h at t h e S up rem e C o urt wa s n ot i n cl i n ed t o exe rci se i t s di sc r et i on a r y j uri s di cti on u n der a rt i cl e 13 6 p ro b ab l y b eca u se i t f el t t h at i t wa s sai d sp e ci fi cal l y i n t h e o rd er di sm i ssi n g t h e sp eci al l e av e p et i ti on on e i s l ef t m erel y gu e ssi n g. We d o n ot t h i n k i t wo ul d b e ju st t o dep ri ve t h e aggri e ved p er s on of t h e st at ut or y ri gh t of seek i n g rel i ef i n revi e w ju ri sdi ct i on of t h e Hi gh C o u rt i f a ca se f o r rel i ef i n t h at juri sdi ct i on co ul d b e m ade o ut m erel y b eca u s e a sp eci al l eav e p et i ti on un der a rt i cl e 13 6 of t h e Co n st i t ut i on h ad al re ad y st oo d rej ec t ed b y t h e S up rem e C o ur t b y a n on - sp eak i n g or de r.

11. The court totally agreed with the decision of two Judges bench in case of V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 383 which is as under :

5 "We ma y r e fer to a r ec en t de cis io n, by a tw o-j u dg e B en ch of this co ur t in V .M . S alg a oc ar a nd Br os . P vt . L td. V . C IT[ 2 0 0 0] 2 4 3 IT R 3 8 3 ; [ 2 0 0 0] 9 7 FI R 1 9 2 ; [ 2 0 0 0] 3 S cal e 2 4 0 , h old ing tha t w h en a s pe cia l l ea v e p eti ti o n is dis mis s ed , th is c our t do es n ot c om m ent on th e c or r ec tn es s o r oth er wis e o f th e or der fr o m w hi ch l ea v e to app eal is s o ugh t. What th e c our t m e ans is th at i t d oes not co ns id er it to b e a fit c as e f or e x er c is i ng i ts j ur is di ct io n u nder ar ti cl e 1 3 6 o f th e Cons tit uti on . Th at c er ta inl y co uld n ot be s o wh en a pp eal is dis m is s ed t ho ugh t by a n on-s pe ak ing or d er . H er e the d o ctr i ne of mer ger ap pli es . In t hat cas e, t he Supr e me Cour t uph olds t he d ec is i o n of th e Hig h C our t or o f th e Trib una l. This do ctr i ne of m er g er do es no t ap pl y in th e cas e of d is m is s al of a s pe cia l l ea v e pe titi on und er ar ti cl e 1 3 6 . W he n a n ap pe al is dis m is s e d, th e or d er o f t he Hi gh Co ur t mer ges wit h t hat o f th e Supr e me C our t . W e fin d our s el v es in e n tir e agr e em en t wit h th e la w s o s t at ed . W e ar e cl ear in our m ind t hat an or d er dis mis s i ng a s pe cia l l ea v e pe tit i on , mor e s o w he n i t is by a no n-s p ea kin g or d er , do es n ot r es u lt in mer ger o f th e or d er i mpu gn ed in to the or d er o f th e Su pr e m e C our t ."

The above very clearly shows that even in the decision quoted by Ld. Counsel for the assessee i.e; Kunhayammed And Others Vs. State of Kerala and Another(supra) also very clearly holds that if an SLP is dismissed in lemine then it would been that court has not commented on the merits of the case but it has merely found the same not to be a fit case for hearing.

12. The Ld. Counsel has specifically referred to the conclusion reached by the court which are as under:

(i) " Wh e re an ap p eal o r r evi si on i s p r ovi ded agai n st an o rd er p a s se d b y a co u rt , Tri b u n al or a n y ot h er a ut h ori t y b ef or e a s up e ri or f or um an d suc h s up e ri or f o r u m m odi fi es, reve rs e s or af fi rm s t h e d eci si on p ut i n i ss u e b ef or e i t, t h e deci si on b y t h e s ub or di n at e f or um m erge s i n t h e deci si on b y t h e s up eri or f or um an d i t i s t h e l att er wh i ch s ub si st s, re m ai n s op er at i ve an d i s cap ab l e of e n f or ce m en t i n t h e e ye of l a w.

(ii) Th e j u ri sdi ct i on con f err ed b y a rt i cl e 1 36 of t h e C on st i t ut i on i s di vi si b l e i nt o t wo s t ages . Th e f i rst st ag e i s up t o t h e di sp o sa l of t h e p ra ye r s f or sp e ci al l eav e t o f i l e an a p p eal . Th e s ec on d st age com m en c es i f an d wh en t h e l ea ve t o a p p eal i s gr an t ed an d t h e sp e ci al l ea ve p et i ti on i s c on vert e d i n t o a n ap p eal .

(iii) Th e d oct ri n e of m e rge r i s n ot a do ct ri n e of u n i ver sal o r un l i m i t ed ap p l i cat i on . It wi l l dep en d on t h e n at ur e of ju ri sdi ct i on exe rci se d b y t h e s up eri or f o r um an d t h e con t en t o r s ub ject m at t er of ch al l en g e l ai d o r c ap ab l e of b ei n g l ai d sh al l b e det erm i n at i ve of th e ap p l i cab i l i t y of m erger . Th e s up eri or ju ri sdi ct i on sh o ul d b e c ap ab l e of rev er si n g, m odi f yi n g or af fi rmi n g t h e or de r p ut i n i ss u e b ef or e i t . Un d er art i cl e 13 6 of t h e C on st i t ut i on , t h e S u p rem e C o urt m a y r ev er se, m o di f y or a f fi rm t h e ju dgm en t d ec r e e o r ord er a p p e al e d agai n st wh i l e ex erci si n g its ap p el l at e j uri s di cti on an d n ot wh i l e exe rci si n g the di sc ret i on a r y j uri s di ct i on di sp o si n g of a p et i ti on f or sp eci al l e ave t o ap p eal . Th e d oct r i n e of m erge r ca n , t h er ef or e, be ap p l i ed t o t h e f orm e r an d n ot t o t h e l at t er .

( i v) An ord er r ef u si n g sp eci al l eave t o ap p e al m ay b e a n on - sp e ak i n g or de r or a s p ea k i n g on e . In ei t h er c a s e i t d oe s n ot at t ract t h e doct ri n e of m erge r. An ord er r ef u si n g sp e ci al l eav e t o ap p eal d oe s n ot st an d s ub st i t ut ed i n p l ace of t h e ord er u n der ch al l en ge . Al l t h at i t m ean s i s t h at t h e c o urt wa s n ot i n cl i n ed t o exe rci se i t s di sc r et i on s o a s t o al l o w t h e ap p eal bei n g f i l ed.

6 (v) If t h e ord er r ef u si n g l ea ve t o ap p eal i s a s p eak i n g o rd er, i .e., gi ves r ea s on s f o r ref usi n g t h e gran t of l ea ve, t h en t h e o rde r h a s t wo i m p l i cati on s . Fi rst l y, t h e st at em e n t of l a w co n t ai n ed i n t h e ord er i s a d ecl a r at i on of l a w b y t h e S up rem e C o urt wi t h i n t h e m ean i n g of a rt i cl e 141 of t h e Co n st i t ut i on . Se c on dl y, ot h e r t h an t h e de cl a r at i on of l a w, wh at ev er i s st at ed i n t h e or der a r e t h e f i n di n gs rec o rd ed b y t h e S up rem e C o ur t wh i ch wo u l d b i n d t h e p a rt i es t h e ret o an d al s o t h e c o u rt , t ri bun al or a ut h o ri t y i n an y p ro ce edi n gs s ub se q ue n t t h eret o b y wa y of j udi ci al di sci p li n e, t h e S up r em e Co u rt b ei n g t h e ap ex c o urt o f t h e coun t r y . B ut , t h i s do e s n ot am o un t t o sa yi n g t h at t h e or de r of t h e co urt , t ri b un al or aut h ori t y b el o w h a s st o o d m e rge d i n t h e or der of t he S up r em e C o urt re ject i n g t h e s p eci al l eav e p et i ti on or t h at t h e ord er of t h e S up r em e C o urt i s th e on l y o rde r b i n di n g a s re s j udi cat a i n s ub seq u en t p r o ce edi n gs b et we en t h e p a r t i es.

( vi ) On c e l ea ve t o a p p eal h a s b e en gran t e d an d t h e ap p el l at e j u ri sdi ct i on of t h e Su p rem e C o urt h a s b ee n i n vok e d t h e or de r p a ss ed i n ap p eal wo u l d at t ract t h e d oct ri n e of m er ge r ; t h e or de r m a y b e re ve rs al , m odi fi cat i on or m erel y af f i rm ati on .

( vi i ) On an ap p eal h a vi n g b een p ref e rre d o r a p et i ti on seek i n g l eav e t o a p p e al h a vi n g b e en co n v ert e d i n t o an ap p eal b ef or e t h e S up rem e C o u rt t h e j uri sdi ct i on of t h e Hi gh C o urt t o en t er t ai n a re vi e w p et i t i on i s lo st t h ere af t er a s p r ovi de d b y s ub - r ul e( 1 ) of rul e 1 of Or de r X L VII of t h e C o de of Ci vi l Pr oc ed u re.

In fact he has invited our attention to Clause (iii) of the above portion and clause were clearly shows that the Hon'ble Court can reverse, modify or affirm the judgment decree or order appealed, against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction in that case the doctrine of merger would apply while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction in disposing of a petition for special leave to appeal. When Supreme Court passed an non speaking order then that will not lead to merger.

13. From the above it become absolutely clear that if the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the SLP decides an issue in lemine then such order would not lead to the conclusion that the Hon'ble Court has considered the merits of the case and would not lead to merger of such order with the order of the High Court. In the present case SLP filed by the Revenue in case of CIT Vs. M/s Kribhco in Income Tax Appeal No. 444 of 2011 the following order has been passed:

"Heard Learned Solicitor f o r I n di a Del a y C on d on ed .

Th e Sp e ci al L eav e P et i ti on i s di sm i ssed ."

Thus it is clear that the court has passed an order in lemine and dismissed the SLP which cannot lead to the conclusion that this order has merged with the order of Delhi High Court. Therefore, when an order of the Jurisdictional High Court is available in the case of assessee we have no option but to follow the same. Therefore following the order of the Hon'ble High Court in ITA No. 444 of 2011 and we decide this issue against the assessee. It was also contended that in any case Rule 8D has become applicable from assessment year 2008-09 and therefore for computing the disallowance under Rule 8D read with section 14-A, disallowance should be calculated as per this Rule.

14. We find merit in this contention and therefore set aside the order of Ld. CIT(A) and remit the matter back to the file of AO for re- computing the disallowance U/s 14-A read with Rule 8P(2)(d)."

7 9. Following the above order, we decide this issue principall y against the

assessee. However, the Assessing Officer should re-compute the disallowance

after verifying the calculation of disallowance u/s 14A read with Rule 8D after

verification of the figures submitted by the Assessee.

10. Ground No.4 : After hearing both the parties we find that assessee had

claimed deduction u/s 80P(2)(c)for Rs. 50,000/-. This deduction was denied b y

the Assessing Officer because the same was allowable to the cooperative societ y

engaged in the activities of other than marketing of agricultural produce of

members, purchase of agriculture implements etc, cottage industries and

engaged in business of banking or a federal cooperative societ y engaged in

suppl ying milk, oil seeds, fruits and vegetables. The activities carried out by the

assessee societ y are within the aforementioned activities and, therefore, then

deduction was not allowable.

11. The action of the Assessing Officer was confirmed by Ld. CIT(A).

12. Both the parties were heard.

13. After considering the rival submissions we find that though some

sunmissions have been made but no evidence was brought before us to show

that activities of the societ y was not within the activities mentioned in section

80P(2)(a) & (b), therefore, we find nothing wrong with the order of Ld. C IT(A)

and confirm the same.

14. In the result, appeal of the assessee is partl y allowed for statistical

purposes.

Order pronounced in the Open Court on 10.04.2015

Sd/- Sd/- (BHAVNESH SAINI) (T.R. SOOD) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Dated : 10 t h April, 2015 rkk

Copy to: The Appellant, The Respondent, The C IT, The CIT(A), The DR 8