Pravez Tyagi vs State Of U.P. And Another

1. Shri Santosh Kumar Sigh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Devesh Kumar Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State are present.

2. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed with the following main prayer :-

"i. to set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 29.9.2025 passed by Additional District and Session Judge Muzaffar Nagar in Criminal Revision No.520 of 2024 CNR UPMZ010134692024, Pravez Tyagi Vs. Majid Ali, and summoning order dated 7.10.2024 passed by Presiding Officer Additional Court, Muzaffar Nagar in Complaint Case No.14149 of 2024 Majid Ali Vs. Pravez U/s 138 of N.I. Act P.S. Shahpur, Muzaffar Nagar."

3. Learned Counsel submitted that the summoning order dated 07-10-2024 is legally unsustainable as the learned court below failed to consider the mandatory requirement of limitation under the proviso to Section 138 of the N.I. Act. A bare perusal of the complaint shows that the respondent/complainant has not disclosed the essential particulars, namely the date of service of statutory notice or the date on which cause of action arose. In absence of these foundational facts, it could not have been presumed that the complaint was within limitation.It is contended that filing of complaint within the prescribed period is a condition precedent for taking cognizance, and such omission goes to the root of the matter. It is further submitted that the revisional court, while dismissing Criminal Revision No. 520/2024 (Parvej Ali vs. Majid Ali) on 29-09-2025, also failed to consider this vital aspect and did not return any finding as to how the complaint was within time. It was contended that continuation of proceedings on a complaint which is ex facie time barred amounts to abuse of process of court. Hence both orders are liable to be set aside.

4. Learned AGA submitted that the impugned orders are legal and justified and do not call for any interference. It is argued that at the stage of summoning under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the court is only required to see whether a prima facie case is made out, which is clearly reflected from the complaint and accompanying documents. So far as the objection of the petitioner regarding non-disclosure of the date of service of notice and accrual of cause of action is concerned, it is submitted that such pleas pertain to matters of evidence and cannot be adjudicated at the threshold. It is contended that once issuance of notice and non-payment within the statutory period have been asserted, the complaint cannot be thrown out at the summoning stage on technical grounds.

5. Heard learned counsels and perused the record. It is apparent that the objection with regard to limitation, now sought to be raised by the petitioner, was not urged before the revisional court in Criminal Revision No. 520/2024. In absence of any such ground having been taken earlier, it can safely be inferred that the issue of limitation was not considered to be a material infirmity at that stage, and the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the same now as a fresh ground. It is settled law that once the basic ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are prima facie made out, a statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Act arises in favour of the complainant that the cheque was issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability, and the burden shifts upon the accused to rebut the said presumption during trial.

6. In this regard, it will be relevant to refer the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Renuka Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Anr, 2026 INSC 327 wherein it has been held that pre-trial quashing of a complaint under Section 138 of the Act is impermissible once the foundational ingredients are satisfied and the statutory presumption under Section 139 comes into operation.

7. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed and impugned orders are upheld.

(Anil Kumar-X,J.)

May 6, 2026

SK