Pipal Singh vs State Of Punjab

114 CRM-M-10926-2025 (O&M) Date of decision: 16.10.2025

Pipal Singh ....Petitioner versus State of Punjab ....Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:- Mr. Sandeep Dhanda, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Gurpartap S. Bhullar, AAG, Punjab.

***** SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)

1. Present petition is the 2nd petition which has been filed under

Section 483 of BNSS, for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing

FIR No.143 dated 10.12.2023 registered for the offences punishable under

Sections 21C, 27-A and 29/61/85 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'NDPS Act'), at Police Station 'D' Division,

District Amritsar.

2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an

accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving 4 Kgs

of heroin and ₹9 lakhs of drug money, and the petitioner has been nominated,

in this case, on the disclosure of co-accused Rachhpal Singh.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner

was initially arrested on 12.12.2023. Learned counsel for the petitioner has

further submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not been

complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects.

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Learned counsel has further iterated that sole basis to array the petitioner as

an accused is the disclosure statement of co-accused, namely Rachhpal Singh.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that out of total 23 prosecution

witnesses only three have been examined till date. Learned counsel has further

iterated that the petitioner has suffered incarceration for about 1 year, 9 months

and 26 days. Thus, regular bail is prayed for.

4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by arguing

that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature and, thus,

he does not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned State counsel has

further submitted that the instant bail plea is barred by the rigors of Section 37

of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same ought to be dismissed. Learned State

counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate dated 14.10.2025 in Court,

which is taken on record.

5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through the

available records of the case.

6. The petitioner was arrested on 12.12.2023 whereinafter

investigation was carried out and challan qua the petitioner was presented on

10.04.2024. Total 23 prosecution witnesses have been cited and only three have

been examined till date. The petitioner has been implicated as an accused in

the FIR in question solely on the basis of disclosure statement of co-accused

Rachhpal Singh. The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues

shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it

appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it may

prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the

likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or interfering

with the prosecution evidence.

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6.1. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to a judgment

passed by this Court in Anshul Sardana versus State of Punjab, passed in

CRM-M-65094-2024 (2025: PHHC:004198), wherein, after relying upon the

ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tofan

Singh versus State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2020 Supreme Court 5592; Smt.

Najmunisha, Abdul Hamid Chandmiya @ Ladoo Bapu versus State of Gujrat,

Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 INSC 290; State by (NCB) Bengaluru vs.

Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta & Anr.', 2022 (1) RCR (Criminal) 762; and Vijay

Singh vs. The State of Haryana, bearing Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.(s)

1266/2023, decided on 17.05.2023, has held thus:

"6.3 It is a well established principle of law that a confession made by a co- accused under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is inherently a very weak piece of evidence. Such statement(s), by themselves, cannot form the sole basis for the conviction of an individual and must be scrutinized with utmost caution in conjunction with other substantive evidence. Moreover, no recovery has been effected from the possession of the petitioner, who has been subsequently implicated as an accused solely on the basis of disclosure statement of the co- accused. However, as regular bail pertains to life and liberty of individual, Courts are obligated to strike a balance between safeguarding personal liberty and ensuring the effective administration of justice as also investigation. The final evidentiary value and admissibility of the disclosure statement made by a co- accused fall within the domain of the trial Court and are to be adjudicated during the course of the trial in accordance with established principles of law. However, while adjudicating a plea for regular bail, this Court cannot remain oblivious to the circumstances under which the petitioner has been arraigned or implicated, including the nature of the allegations, the evidence linking the petitioner to the offence as well as the specific role attributed to the petitioner in the commission of the alleged offence. A prima facie examination of these factors is essential to ensure that the process of law is not misused, abused or misdirected."

6.2. Further, this Court in the case of Jaswinder Singh alias Kala

versus State of Punjab passed in CRM-M-33729-2025

(2025:PHHC:089161) has held thus:

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"14. As a sequitur to above-said rumination, the following postulates emerge:

(I) (i)A bail plea on merits; in respect of an FIR under NDPS Act of 1985 involving offence(s) under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A thereof and for offence(s) involving commercial quantity; is essentially required to meet with the rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act.

(ii) The rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act do not apply to a bail plea(s) on medical ground(s), interim bail on account of any exigency including the reason of demise of a close family relative etc.

(iii)The rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act pale into oblivion when bail is sought for on account of long incarceration in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India i.e. where the bail-applicant has suffered long under-

trial custody, the trial is procrastinating and folly thereof is not attributable to such bail-applicant.

II. The twin conditions contained in Section 37(1)(b) of NDPS Act are in addition to the conditions/parameters contained in Cr.P.C./BNSS or any other applicable extant law.

III. The twin conditions contained in Section 37(1)(b) of NDPS Act are cumulative in nature and not alternative i.e. both the conditions are required to be satisfied for a bail-plea to be successful.

IV. For consideration by bail Court of the condition stipulated in Section 37(1)(b)(i) of NDPS Act i.e. "there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence":

(i) The bail Court ought to sift through all relevant material, including case-dairy, exclusively for the limited purpose of adjudicating such bail plea.

(ii) Such consideration, concerning the assessment of guilt or innocence, should not mirror the same degree of scrutiny required for an acquittal of the accused at the final adjudication & culmination of trial.

(iii) Plea(s) of defence by applicant-accused, if any, including material/documents in support thereof, may be looked into by the bail-Court while adjudicating such bail plea.

V. For consideration of the condition stipulated in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) i.e. 'he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail':

(i) The word 'likely' ought to be interpreted as requiring a demonstrable and substantial probability of re-offending by the bail-applicant, rather than a mere theoretical one, as no Court can predict future conduct of the bail-applicant.

(ii) The entire factual matrix of a given case including the antecedents of the bail-applicant, role ascribed to him, and the nature of offence are required to be delved into. However, the involvement of bail-applicant in another NDPS/other offence cannot ipso facto result in the conclusion of his propensity for committing offence in the future.

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(iii) The bail-Court may, at the time of granting bail, impose upon the applicant-accused a condition that he would submit, at such regular time period/interval as may stipulated by the Court granting bail, an affidavit before concerned Special Judge of NDPS Court/Illaqa (Jurisdictional) Judicial Magistrate/concerned Police Station, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In the facts of a given case, imposition of such condition may be considered to be sufficient for satisfaction of condition enumerated in Section 37(1)(b)(ii).

VI. There is no gainsaying that the nature, mode and extent of exercise of power by a Court; while satisfying itself regarding the conditions stipulated in Section 37 of NDPS Act; shall depend upon the judicial discretion exercised by such Court in the facts and circumstances of a given case. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute parameters for satisfaction of requirement under Section 37 (ibid) as every case has its own unique facts/circumstances. Making such an attempt is nothing but a utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such matter."

6.3. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of

the NDPS Act stands diluted.

6.4. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be

saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 14.10.2025 filed by

the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a

period of 01 year, 9 months and 26 days & is not shown to be involved in any

other FIR. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the

NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of

Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying

upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul

Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh

vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd

Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311;

Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as "Chitta Biswas Alias

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Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal"; "Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State

of West Bengal", Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated

22.08.2022 titled as "Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of

Gujarat"; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal

Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State

of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:

"7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court's judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre- trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.

There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates

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that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson's eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not become complicit in violation of an individual's fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.

Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985."

6.5. Indubitably, the present petition is the second attempt on behalf

of the petitioner for securing regular bail. The first one bearing no. CRM-M-

31365-2024 was dismissed as withdrawn on 22.10.2024. However, keeping

in view the entirety of facts and circumstance of the case in hand, especially

keeping in view the extended custody and pace of trial, this Court is inclined

to favourably consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this

regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA-S-2332-2023

titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another; relevant whereof

reads as under:

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"10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles emerge:

I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.

II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.

III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential change in circumstances.

IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail petition(s).

V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said order passed."

Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is

not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is

ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the

satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in

addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned trial Court/Duty

Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:

(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.

(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial.

(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial.

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(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.

(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial Court.

(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.

(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.

(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.

8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those which

may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed

hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant

shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner.

9. Ordered accordingly.

10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of

opinion on the merits of the case.

11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous

application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.

(SUMEET GOEL) JUDGE 16.10.2025 Naveen

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No

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