N.S. Nandiesha Reddy vs Kavitha Mahesh

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4821 OF 2012

N.S. Nandiesha Reddy ……Appellant(s)

Versus

Kavitha Mahesh ….Respondent(s)

With Civil Appeal No. 6171/2012

JUDGMENT

A.S. Bopanna, J.

1. The appellants in both these appeals are assailing

the order dated 01.06.2012 passed by the learned Single

Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in

Election Petition No. 7/2008. By the said order, the

election of the appellant in C.A. No. 4821/2012 (Mr.

Nandiesha Reddy) from 151 K.R. Pura Legislative Signature Not Verified

Assembly constituency in Bangalore Urban District is Digitally signed by Neelam Gulati Date: 2021.08.03 18:07:07 IST Reason:

held to be void, in terms of Section 100 (1) (c) of the 2 Representation of People Act 1951. Further, in the course

of the said order the learned Judge has directed the

Registrar General of the High Court to register a

complaint against the appellant in C.A. No.6171/2012

(Mr. Ashok Mensinkai) before the Competent Court for

proceeding in accordance with law for the purpose of

provisions of Section 193 Indian Penal Code, 1860. The

said direction is issued since according to the learned

Judge, the appellant in the said appeal who was the

Returning Officer for the said election; on being examined

as PW.3 in the Election Petition had given false evidence

before the Court. In the above circumstance, the

appellant in C.A. No. 4821/2012 (Mr. Nandiesha Reddy)

has assailed the order in its entirety while the appellant

in C.A. No. 6171/2012 (Mr. Ashok Mensinkai) has

assailed the order insofar as directing prosecution

against the appellant.

2. In the above background, we have heard Mr. Jayant

Mohan, learned counsel for the appellant in C.A.

No.4821/2012 and Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for the

appellant in C.A. No.6171/2012. We have also heard the 3

respondent who had appeared as a party­in­person in

both these appeals and perused the relevant material, as

also the written submission filed on either side.

3. The issue arises from the election which was held in

April/May 2008 to the Karnataka State Legislative

Assembly. The present case as noted earlier, relates to

one of the constituencies, namely, 151 K.R. Pura

Legislative Assembly Constituency. The elections were

notified on 16.04.2008 and as per the calendar of events

the publication of result was fixed on 27.05.2008, soon

after which the Karnataka State Legislative Assembly for

that term was constituted. In that background, the term

of the Assembly was up to May, 2013 whereafter the

subsequent election to constitute the Karnataka State

Assembly afresh for the next term has taken place. In

that circumstance though by the order impugned dated

01.06.2012, the election of the appellant in C.A.

No.4821/2012 (Mr. Nandiesha Reddy) was held to be

void, immediately thereafter, the instant appeal was filed

and this Court had granted stay of the impugned order

while issuing notice on 11.06.2012. In that view, the 4

appellant has completed the term of the Assembly for

which he was elected. As such Mr. Jayant Mohan,

learned counsel for the appellant in C.A. No.4821/2012

(Mr. Nandiesha Reddy) has submitted that the grievance

put forth in the appeal does not survive for consideration.

Having noted the sequence it is evident that the prayer in

C.A. No.4821/2012 has rendered itself infructuous and

the appeal does not survive for consideration.

4. Though that be the position, Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned

counsel for the appellant in C.A. No.6171/2012 submits

that the said appeal needs consideration in view of the

direction issued by the learned Judge to prosecute the

appellant Mr. Ashok Mensinkai. In that regard, the

learned counsel has drawn our attention to the manner

of consideration made by the learned Judge presiding

over the election tribunal and contends that there is no

proper and definite conclusion reached by the learned

Judge as to the deliberate falsehood uttered in the

statement alleged to have been made by the appellant. It

is contended that the appellant in fact was cited as a

witness by the election petitioner herself and in the 5

course of the examination­in­chief; in answer to the

questions put by the learned Judge and in the cross­

examination, the appellant has been consistent in

narrating the facts sequentially as it had occurred on

that day. The appellant though was initially arrayed as

respondent No.4 to the election petition, he had been

deleted and as such the appellant did not have the

opportunity of putting forth his written

statement/objection statement to the Election Petition so

as to controvert the allegations made against the

appellant. In any event, the election petitioner had

examined the appellant and in respect of the statements

made by the appellant the election petitioner did not

choose to cross­examine the appellant after seeking to

treat him as a hostile witness if the allegation of

tendering false evidence was to be made. Further, the

learned Judge after noticing the two versions, one by the

election petitioner and the other by the appellant, though

was entitled to rely upon one of the versions as probable

to arrive at his conclusion on the merit of the case, that

by itself cannot be made the basis to order prosecution. 6

That apart no opportunity was granted to the appellant in

terms of Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code,

1973 before forming an opinion to direct the Registrar to

lodge a complaint. It is his further case that the action of

the present nature could not have been initiated unless

there was material to indicate that the witness had

uttered falsehood intentionally. The appellant could not

have gained either way if the election petitioner had

contested the election or not. In such situation no

purpose would have been served by not accepting her

nomination if she had actually complied with the

requirement and presented the nomination papers. The

appellant had accepted 30 nomination papers from 18

different candidates for the same election and on

23.04.2008 i.e., the last day itself the appellant had

received 18 nomination papers and one more would not

have made any difference. In that view he contends that

the order is not sustainable.

5. The respondent party­in­person however, contends

that the appellant had by not accepting the nomination,

denied an opportunity for the respondent to contest the 7

elections and in such circumstance the learned Judge

had noted the inconsistent statements made by the

appellant in the course of his evidence to justify his

illegal action. The learned Judge has therefore rightly

arrived at the conclusion to direct prosecution and such

order does not call for interference is her contention.

6. Having noticed the contentions put forth in C.A. No.

6171/2012 and also having noted that the dispute in

C.A. No.4821/2012 has rendered itself infructuous, we

restrict our consideration limited to the question as to

whether the appellant in C.A.No.6171/2012 (Mr. Ashok

Mensinkai) should be exposed to criminal prosecution

and whether it is expedient to do so in a matter of the

present nature. It is no doubt true that the election

petition itself is predicated on the allegation against the

appellant in C.A. No.6171/2012 to the effect that as a

Returning Officer for the said election he had wrongly

refused to accept the nomination papers sought to be

submitted by the election petitioner which amounts to

improper rejection of the nomination papers in terms of 8 Section 100 (1) (c) of the Act. The consequence of the

same has befallen on the elected candidate. However,

presently the ground of improper rejection of nomination

paper as alleged and the conclusion of the learned

Judge on that aspect fades into insignificance for the

reasons stated earlier.

7. Therefore, the limited aspect we are required to

notice in the present situation is only with regard to the

statements made by the appellant in his evidence as

PW.3 which are considered by the learned Judge to be

inconsistent and, therefore, stated to amount to perjury.

In that regard whether the action initiated by the learned

Judge on that aspect is justified is the issue, if not, it will

call for interference. As noted, the appellant was

examined as PW.3. In the course of his deposition, he

had stated that he can identify the election petitioner as

an intending candidate in 151 K.R. Pura Legislative

Assembly Constituency. He has further stated that he

does not remember if the election petitioner had met him

on three occasions on 23.04.2008 which was the last day 9

for filing nomination papers. He has however stated that

he remembers to have seen the election petitioner on two

occasions, on that day. He has also stated that he does

not remember the exact time of the election petitioner

meeting him for the first time, but it could be between

3.00 pm and 3.15 pm. On the second occasion he

recollects to have met the election petitioner on the same

day between 5.30 pm and 6.00 pm while he was going

out from office after work for the day. The request made

by the election petitioner at that stage to accept the

nomination paper was declined since the time for

acceptance was over. In that context he states that the

nomination paper which was marked as Exhibit P1 had

not been presented before him between 11.00 am and

3.00 pm on 23.04.2008 which was the permitted time for

filing. He also states that he did not refuse to accept

Exhibit P1(nomination paper) for the reason it was not

accompanied by other necessary documents but in fact it

was not presented before him.

8. As against what has been stated by the appellant,

the election petitioner who examined herself as PW1 has 10

stated that on 23.04.2008 she had submitted her

nomination paper before the appellant for the general

election. On delivering the nomination papers she had

requested the Returning Officer for extracting the new

part number and serial number of the ten proposers to

fill in column no. 2B. The Returning Officer is stated to

have told her that he did not have the electoral roll of

K.R. Pura State Assembly Constituency and that she

should approach the revenue officials working in the

ground floor of the building. She states that as per his

request she had entrusted the job to her husband and

supporters to collect the details from the ground floor

office. Later, she came to know from her husband and

her supporter that everybody in the revenue office were

having lunch break and the details could not be secured.

She thereafter, states that for the first time at 14.00

hours when she delivered nomination papers, the

Returning Officer directed her to collect the details but

she could not get the details of her ten proposers who

had signed the nomination papers. She states that on

realising the time factor that it was the last day for filing 11

nomination papers she submitted her nomination papers

by 15.00 hours before the Returning Officer once again

and stated that she would fill the column subsequently

as she has time upto 24 hours to fill the column. She

has further alleged that the appellant refused to receive

the nomination papers. What is relevant to be noted is

that the election petitioner in the course of her cross­

examination recorded in para 37 states that after

deputing her husband and supporter to get the details

and while she was waiting, she was outside the hall

where the Returning Officer was sitting. This would

indicate, what the election petitioner has stated is in tune

with the sequence stated by the appellant except for the

variance in the stand insofar as actually tendering the

nomination paper and pressing for acceptance and

according to election petitioner the same not being

accepted.

9. From the two sets of statements, one by the

appellant as PW.3 and the other by the election petitioner

as PW.1 in the course of adjudication, the reliability of

one of them was to be deduced. The crux of the matter 12

was to find out as to whether the election petitioner had

actually submitted her nomination paper and the

appellant had declined to receive the same. Insofar as

that aspect, if the conclusion was in favour of the election

petitioner it would be a case of an improper rejection and,

on that aspect, it is not necessary for us to pronounce

upon since the appeal on that question does not survive.

However, only issue for consideration is, from the nature

of the statements made above, can the Court come to a

conclusion that the appellant has uttered deliberate or

intentional falsehood in the course of Court proceedings.

In that regard, it is to be noted that the learned Judge

during the course of the proceedings had made certain

observations and had extracted the earlier order in the

final impugned order dated 01.06.2012, the same reads

as hereunder: ­

ORDER PASSED IN THE MORNING SESSION

“The witness is not very sure of what development took place and the manner of his deposition is inconsistent every second and minute keeps varying and to support his version that he had conducted in accordance with rules and regulations and in a proper manner states that a certain development had 13

taken place around some time, but goes back on the earlier version that the last nomination paper was received at 2.58 pm but later mentioned it was after 3 pm and on being cautioned by the court, goes back to the earlier version of 2.58 pm etc. This witness is obviously lying on oath, his deposition is inconsistent, varying by the second, different version each time. A person giving different version of the same incident is not merely uttering falsehood once or the other time, but also committing perjury.

This witness lacks credibility for deposing before the court on oath and requires to be dealt with in accordance with law and being a public servant who has taken oath to depose truth and only truth before this court has been attempting to depose incorrect and false statements which per se is not only perjury within the meaning of section 191 of Indian Penal Code but also committing contempt of court.

Therefore, no need or occasion for recording further evidence of this witness and if need be, can be summoned later by the court for questioning. As of now, the witness is discharged.

Witness is directed to remain present in the court hall. Call this matter again at 2.30 pm. ORDER PASSED IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION:

Further cross­examination of the witness is stopped at this stage to enable the witness to procure relevant necessary, official records throwing light on the developments that had taken place during his functioning as the returning officer in the K R Pura assembly constituency.

As the witness states that the records pertaining to conduct of elections etc. are all now available at the office of the district election officer, Mahadevapura Zone, BBMP, Bangalore, who is ex officio holding this post is otherwise functioning as joint commissioner, BBMP at Mahadevapura and as this officer has to part 14

with records. The witness to be enabled to secure these records and attend court for further cross examination with the records.

Sri Shashikanth, learned counsel for the respondent submits that for such purpose, it is necessary for the election petitioner to make an application listing the documents and records that are required to be summoned and summons may be issued on such applications to the officer who is having the custody of such records.

It is said that procedure is the handmaid of justice and procedure should be given only such importance as is warranted to ensure fair play, equal opportunity and practical possibilities of adhering to the procedure. An election petition though is a creature of the Representation of People Act 1951 and being a petition at the instance of an aggrieved persons with regard to the validity of the declaration of election result, and for questioning a correctness or otherwise of the declaration of results and may have the characteristics of an adversary litigation, it nevertheless has a flavour of public interest imbedded into it as the conduct of free and fair election is the ‘sine qua non’ of any healthy democratic process. Records relating to the conduct of elections in a general election either to an assembly or to the parliament are not private documents but are public documents or records and if any such record can throw light on the manner of conduct of elections in any particular assembly segment, while it is a relevant record, familiarity or ignorance of such a record on the part of the election petitioner cannot come in the way of court scrutinizing the record for being satisfied or even for being apprised about the manner of conduct of election.

It is therefore, hereby ordered and the witness who has appeared before the Court as PW3 today and who had functioned as the returning officer of the K R Pura assembly constituency is hereby directed to contact the district election officer with this order secure 15

the relevant records to enable him to depose before this court correctly with precision, unambiguity and then appear with such records before this court on 28.6.2011 as the witness states that he requires at least seven days’ time to complete this exercise. The district election officer who is also the joint commissioner, BBMP, Mahadevapura, is hereby directed to ensure compliance with this order and to hand over such records which are in his custody relating to the conduct of K R Pura assembly election to enable the witness to depose further before this court in a proper and precise manner as the then returning officer of the constituency by identifying the record. The Registrar General of this Court is directed to ensure a copy of this order is served on the district election officer, Mahadevapura zone, BBMP, Mahadevapura, Bangalore­48. The witness also be furnished with a copy of this order.

List the petition for further cross­ examination of PW3 on 28.6.2011.”

10. As per the version of the election petitioner she had

met the Returning Officer at 2 pm on 23.04.2008 when

certain requirements were indicated due to which she

made an effort to secure the same from the ground floor

and after about 45 minutes her husband and the

supporter came back with the information that they were

unable to get the same. She has also stated that at that

point she waiting outside the room where the Returning

Officer was seated. If that version of the election 16

petitioner herself is kept in view, it is not the case of the

election petitioner herself that at 2 pm when she had

come, she had met the Returning Officer and insisted for

receiving the nomination paper even without the details

to be filled in column 2B. On the other hand, if the case

that she made efforts to get the details of the proposers

due to which some time lapsed and then she presented

the nomination paper without the details and if the time

spent in that regard as stated by her is about 45 minutes

which is a rough estimate and not precise, the version of

the appellant that he had met the election petitioner

around 3.00 pm to 3.15 pm on that day is a probable

version. This is more so when the fact remains that the

appellant was taking note of the nomination papers

presented by another independent candidate Smt.

Ambujakshi. If in that context he has stated that the

election petitioner had met him between 3.00 pm and

3.15 pm, it could only mean that it was after the process

of receiving the nomination paper of Smt. Ambujakshi. In

fact, it is in her own deposition the election petitioner has

stated that when she was unable to get the details and 17

realising the time factor that it was the last day for filing

nomination papers, she submitted her nomination papers

by 15.00 hours (i.e. 3 pm) before the Returning Officer.

Even in that situation, if the learned Judge were to come

to a conclusion that the election petitioner having already

entered the office of the Returning Officer prior to the

closing hours for receipt of the nomination papers at 3.00

pm and in that context due to the guidelines the

nomination papers were to be received, notwithstanding

the same being incomplete, it could be an aspect on the

question of improper rejection. But certainly, the same

could not have been made the basis to conclude that the

appellant was not truthful.

11. The extracted portion of the earlier order dated

15.06.2011 indicates an observation made by the learned

Judge to indicate that he has gone back on the version

wherein he had stated that the last nomination paper

was received at 2.58 pm but later mentioned it was after

3.00 pm and on being cautioned by the court he goes

back to the earlier version of 2.58 pm etc. On this aspect

also we do not see any deliberate falsehood uttered by the 18

appellant, much less is there any inconsistency. The

statement made by the appellant was that he received the

nomination paper of Smt. Ambujakshi i.e. the last

candidate at 2.58 pm and it had taken him about 7­8

minutes to go through the papers, after which she had to

take an oath as stated in para­40 of his further cross­

examination. If that be the position, the statement would

mean that the last nomination paper of Smt. Ambujakshi

was presented at 2.58 pm and when the process was over

it was past 3.00 pm. Only after that he had met the

election petitioner that is between 3 pm and 3.15 pm.

Even with regard to the statement that he had met the

General Observer on three occasions and later stated it

was on two occasions are to be noted in the context that

the evidence was being tendered after more than three

years and all inconsequential events cannot be recalled

with precision. The further evidence of the appellant is

referred in para 81 to 87 of the order, but learned Judge

has not pointed out any deliberate or intentional

falsehood arising therefrom. Mere reference to

inconsistent statements alone is not sufficient to take 19

action unless a definite finding is given that they are

irreconcilable; one is opposed to the other so as to make

one of them deliberately false.

12. Therefore, as noticed from the evidence recorded,

the appellant had stated that the nomination papers had

not been presented to him before the closing hours and

had sought to justify his action. He had also stated about

the procedure followed in all cases and the presence of

observers in his office. On the other hand, the election

petitioner had contended that she had made an attempt

to submit the nomination paper which was not received

by the appellant who was the Returning Officer. When he

had received 18 nomination papers on that day there was

no particular reason to refuse the election petitioner’s

nomination, nor has motive been suggested or

established. The learned Judge has no doubt accepted

the version put forth by the election petitioner. That by

itself does not indicate that appellant had uttered

falsehood intentionally and deliberately before the court

so as to initiate action under Section 193 Indian Penal

Code. The proceedings of the day in the office of the 20

Returning Officer, namely, the appellant was video­

recorded and the same was marked as Exhibit P21 to P24

in the proceedings. The learned Judge did not choose to

refer to the same to come to a definite conclusion as to

whether the election petitioner had actually met the

Returning Officer, if so, the actual time and in that

context a finding was not recorded that the depiction in

the video­recording is quite contrary to the statement of

the Returning Officer so as to indicate that he had

uttered deliberate falsehood.

13. Apart from the factual aspect noted above relating

to the evidence tendered in the instant case, it is not a

case where the appellant was a party­respondent to the

election petition where his written version was available.

On the other hand, he was examined as a witness by the

election petitioner as PW3. No doubt the learned Judge

has chosen to call him as a court witness by interrupting

the cross­examination and posing questions to him. Be

that as it may, it was also not a situation where the

petitioner had filed an application under Section 340 of

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 seeking action. If that 21

was the case the appellant would have had an

opportunity to file his version in reply to the application.

That apart, the learned Judge also had not put the

appellant on notice on the allegation of committing

perjury and provided him an opportunity nor has the

learned Judge come to the conclusion that one of the

versions is deliberate or intentional falsehood and that

therefore, action is necessary to be taken against him. On

the other hand, the learned Judge during the course of

passing the final order has made certain observations

and directed that the Registrar General shall file a

complaint.

14. It is apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in

the case of KTMS Mohammad and Another vs. Union

of India, 1992 3 SCC 178 wherein it is observed as

hereunder: ­ “37. The mere fact that a deponent has made contradictory statements at two different stages in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution for perjury under Section 193 IPC but it must be established that the deponent has intentionally given a false statement in any stage of the ‘judicial proceeding’ or fabricated false evidence for 22

the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceeding. Further, such a prosecution for perjury should be taken only if it is expedient in the interest of justice.”

Further, in the case of Amarsang Nathaji vs.

Hardik Harshadbhai Patel & Ors., 2017 1 SCC 113

relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, this

Court on referring to the case of KTMS Mohammad vs.

Union of India (supra) has held as hereunder: ­

“6. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred to in Section 340 (1) CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. The court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interests of 23

justice and appropriate in the facts of the case.”

15. The respondent­election petitioner has referred to

the decisions in the case of Mahavir Singh and Ors. vs.

Naresh Chandra & Anr. (AIR 2001 SC 134) and the

case of Jagan Nath vs. Jaswant Singh & Ors. (AIR

1954 SC 210) in her written submission. We however, do

not find any assistance from the same as they are not

relevant.

16. In the light of the above stated facts, we are of the

opinion that notwithstanding the conclusion reached by

the learned Judge on the aspect of improper rejection of

the nomination paper, the correctness of which was not

required to be gone into for the reasons stated supra, the

manner in which the learned Judge has concluded that

the appellant in C.A. No.6171/2012 was inconsistent in

his statements in the course of his evidence tendered by

him as PW3 is not justified. Further the conclusion

reached that he is to be prosecuted, without the findings

being recorded regarding deliberate or intentional 24

falsehood cannot be sustained. Hence the direction

issued to the Registrar General of the High Court to

initiate the proceedings by lodging a criminal complaint

also cannot be sustained in the facts and circumstances

arising in this case.

17. As noted from the decision in the case of Amarsang

Nathaji (supra) and the position of law which is well

established is that even in a case where the Court comes

to the conclusion on the aspect of intentional false

evidence, still the Court has to form an opinion whether

it is expedient in the interest of justice to initiate an

inquiry into the offences of false evidence, having regard

to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable

consequences of such prosecution. The Court must be

satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interest

of justice and is appropriate in the facts of the case. In

that backdrop, insofar as the observation made by the

learned Judge of the election tribunal relating to the need

for maintaining purity of the election process which is the

heart and soul of democracy and in that situation the 25

role of the Returning Officer being pivotal, we fully concur

with the same. However, it is also to be noted, merely

because of that position the Returning Officer in the

instant case need not be exposed to prosecution.

18. Firstly, from the evidence as tendered, we did not

see reason to permit the prosecution since in our opinion

there is no intentional falsehood uttered. The other

relevant facts also indicate that the factual matrix herein

does not indicate that it is expedient in the interest of

justice to initiate an inquiry and expose the appellant to

criminal prosecution. On this aspect it is to be noted

that the instant case is not a case where the nomination

paper which was complete in all respect was filed and it

had been improperly rejected in the scrutiny stage. The

allegation of the election petitioner is that the Returning

Officer had refused to receive the nomination paper,

which the learned Judge in the ultimate analysis has

accepted and termed the same as an improper rejection.

Even that be so, to indicate that the non­acceptance

alleged by the election petitioner was a deliberate action

by the Returning Officer with a specific purpose, it has 26

neither been pleaded nor proved in the course of the

proceedings so as to penalise the appellant to face yet

another proceeding. The Assembly Constituency

concerned is a vast constituency which had nearly four

lakh voters on the electoral rolls. The election petitioner

had not placed material to indicate that she had

contested in any earlier election or had wide support base

in the election concerned and it is in that view she had

been shut out from the contest. Further there is no

allegation that the Returning Officer was acting at the

instance or behest of any other candidate who was feeling

threatened by the participation of the election petitioner

in the election process.

19. On the other hand, the election petitioner, as per

her own case was seeking to present the nomination

paper which was incomplete and even in that

circumstance, she had come to the office of the Returning

Officer only at 2.00 pm on the last day for filing

nomination which was to close at 3.00 pm. Thereafter

she made attempts to complete the formalities in filling

up the nomination paper and having failed had still 27

presented the nomination paper since according to her

the needful could have been done within 24 hours. In

such a case it cannot be said that the Returning Officer

with an ulterior motive had declined to receive the

nomination paper and to cover up his folly was seeking to

tender false evidence before the Court and thereby to

justify his illegal action. In fact, the appellant had

received the other nomination papers submitted to him

on the last day even as late as 2.58 pm. It is also the

consistent view of this Court that the success of a

candidate who has won at an election should not be

lightly interfered with. In any event it ought not to have

been made the basis to initiate prosecution by terming

the appellant as unreliable witness. Further, we notice

that the appellant was aged 59 years as on 15.06.2011

while recording his deposition and a decade has passed

by and now would be 69 years. As pointed out by the

learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant has

retired from service about eight years back. For all these

reasons also, we find that any proceeding against the 28

appellant is also not expedient apart from not being

justified.

In the result, the following order: ­

(i) Civil Appeal No. 4821/2012 is disposed of as

infructuous.

(ii) Civil Appeal No. 6171/2012 is allowed.

Consequently, the direction contained in para

175 of the impugned order to the Registrar

General of the High Court to register the

complaint against the appellant, the then

Returning Officer before the competent court

for proceeding in accordance with law for the

purpose of provisions of Section 193 of the

Indian Penal Code is set aside.

(iii) Parties to bear their own costs.

(iv) Pending applications, if any, shall stand

disposed of.

………….…………CJI (N.V. RAMANA) ………….…………….J. (A.S. BOPANNA)

………….…………….J. (HRISHIKESH ROY) New Delhi, August 03, 2021