Mrs. Lalremsiem vs Ifci Venture Capital Funds Limited & Anr ...

IN THE MATTER OF: Lalremsiem ...Appellants

Versus

IFCI Venture Capital Funds Ltd. & Anr. ...Respondents

Present:

For Appellant : Ms. Priyanka Das, Ms. Nishat Nafisa Ahmed, Ms. Sheena Taqui, Ms. Akansha, Ms. S. Ishwanya Advocates.

For Respondents : Mr. Ishan Roy Chowdhary, Ms. Muskan Khatana, Ms. Shrishti Mahana, Advocates.

Mr. Sannoyee Chakravarty, Advocate for R2

ORDER

(Hybrid Mode)

Per: Barun Mitra, Member (Technical)

Present is an appeal which has been filed by the Appellant under Section

61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, ('IBC' in short) challenging

the order dated 21.08.2025 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National

Company Law Tribunal, Guwahati Bench) in CP/IB/6/GB/2025.

2. This appeal has been e-filed before this Tribunal on 17.11.2025 and

physically filed on 19.11.2025. The Appeal has been accompanied with I.A No.

7084 of 2024 which is an application praying for condonation of 51 days delay

in filing of the appeal. The prayers contained in I.A No. 7084 of 2024 read as

follows:

"In view of the above facts and circumstances the Petitioner most respectfully prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to:-

a. Allow the present Application, condone the delay of 51 days in filing the captioned appeal and/or

b. Pass such further and other reliefs as this Hon'ble and/or; Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."

3. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant-Corporate Debtor submitted that the

present appeal has been filed assailing the impugned order passed ex-parte by

the Adjudicating Authority admitting Section 7 application filed by the Financial

Creditor-Respondent No.1. Admitting that there was delay in the filing of the

present appeal, it was however contended that it was not a case of simpliciter

routine delay but a delay which had been occasioned by the fact that the Section

7 proceedings had been conducted behind their back and that they acquired

knowledge of the said proceedings at a much later point of time after the passing

of the impugned order on 21.08.2025. Submission was pressed that there was

no proper service of notice upon the Corporate Debtor as no notice was ever

delivered unto them and in the absence of valid service or sufficient notice, there

is no substance in the assertion made by the Respondent No.1 that the

Appellant had intentionally abstained from appearing before the Adjudicating

2 of 11 I.A. No. 7084 of 2025 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1819 of 2025 Authority. It was submitted that the Appellant was completely unaware of the

filing, hearing and the admission of the Section 7 application. However, once

they learned about the impugned order, they acted with due alacrity and

applied for certified copy of the impugned order on 07.11.2025 before the NCLT

Registry. The certified copy was obtained on 10.11.2025 and thereafter the

appeal was filed on 17.11.2025 which demonstrated their bonafide intent of not

causing any delay in the conduct of the proceedings. It was therefore contended

that when the Section 7 proceedings had been conducted ex-parte by the

Adjudicating Authority without effective service and the Appellant was kept in

the dark about the Section 7 proceedings, in such circumstances, the limitation

must run from the date of knowledge of the impugned order and not from the

date of pronouncement of the impugned order so that the ends of justice is not

compromised. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has relied on the judgment of

the High Court of Allahabad in Pati Rakhan Vs Chandrani Devi 2021 SCC

Online All 143 to contend that rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the

right of the parties and the court has to see carefully that there is substance in

the explanation given in the delay condonation irrespective of the length of

delay.

4. Rebutting the arguments canvassed by the Appellant, it was submitted

by the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent No.1 that the present appeal has been

filed beyond the 30 days statutory limitation period under IBC and the 15 days

of discretionary extended period. Since the Appellant has sought condonation

of delay beyond the period of 45 days, the IA No. 7084 of 2025 seeking

3 of 11 I.A. No. 7084 of 2025 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1819 of 2025 condonation of delay was impermissible under law. It was also added that the

certified copy of the impugned order having been applied for by the Appellant

after the expiry of the limitation period of 30 days from the date of the

pronouncement of the order, the time taken in obtaining the certified copy also

cannot be excluded while computing the period of delay in terms of established

judicial precedent. It was also asserted that the Appellant had failed to

substantiate the allegation of improper service of the notice of Section 7

petition. Denying the Appellant's allegations regarding non-service of the

Section 7 application, it was contended that the said application was duly

served on 04.03.2025 at the registered email address of the Corporate Debtor

as reflected in the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) portal. It was strenuously

contended that the registered address and email of the Corporate Debtor

continue to remain unchanged in the MCA records and the Appellant had failed

to produce any material to prove the contrary. It is further submitted that the

Adjudicating Authority, by its order dated 24.03.2025, had directed service of

the notice through all possible modes and on 15.04.2025, the Adjudicating

Authority also recorded that the tracking report indicated successful delivery

of the notice on 04.04.2025. Despite this, the Adjudicating Authority had

granted the Appellant further opportunity to be heard and on 02.05.2025, on

being satisfied that due service of notice had been effected and yet the present

Appellant had absented themselves from the hearing, the Adjudicating

Authority proceeded to set the matter ex- parte. It was therefore contended that

the plea taken by the Appellant of lack of service and sufficient notice is a mere

4 of 11 I.A. No. 7084 of 2025 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1819 of 2025 eye-wash and this cannot be a justifiable ground for condonation of delay in

filing the present appeal beyond the statutory limitation period. In support of

their contention, reliance has been placed on the recent decision of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court of India in Tata Steel Ltd. Vs. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.

in Civil Appeal No. 408 of 2023 wherein it has been categorically held that

NCLAT does not have powers to condone delay beyond the period stipulated

under the IBC.

5. We have duly considered the arguments advanced by the Ld. Counsel for

both parties and perused the records carefully.

6. The Appellant has submitted that they are aware that delay condonation

is not a matter of right and have therefore approached this Tribunal with full

disclosure of the reasons behind the 59 days delay pointed out by the NCLAT

Registry. The Appellant asserted that the delay had occurred due to complete

absence of knowledge of the proceedings owing to non-service of the Section 7

petition on them. It was contended that the service of notice of the Section 7

proceedings upon them as claimed by the Respondent No. 1 was not valid,

lawful and effective. It is submitted that one of the notices purportedly sent to

them was delivered to the Financial Creditor itself, while another notice which

was sent to strife-torn Manipur was also not received by them due to paralysis

of communication infrastructure while another notice got redirected to Kolkata

GPO which when seen together adequately demonstrates non-delivery of any

notice upon the Corporate Debtor. It is further submitted that the registered

office and email which have been relied upon were non-functional for years and

5 of 11 I.A. No. 7084 of 2025 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1819 of 2025 the Respondent No.1 despite being aware of these facts deliberately relied on

outdated MCA particulars to create an illusory record of service. Mere

mechanical dispatch of notices or postal tracking entries by them, without

proof of actual and effective delivery, did not satisfy the requirement of service

in law. This denied the Appellant the opportunity to contest the Section 7

proceedings. The Corporate Debtor eventually became aware of the impugned

order only after the Interim Resolution Professional had contacted an ex-

auditor of the Corporate Debtor's team. In such peculiar circumstances, where

the Appellant remained thoroughly unaware of the Section 7 proceedings even

after the pronouncement of the ex-parte order, hence, the limitation period

should be counted from the date of acquiring knowledge of the impugned order

by them. Any denial of condonation of delay in such circumstances would

amount to giving precedence to procedural limitation over substantive justice.

7. Per contra, it is the case of the Respondent No.1 that the limitation period

commences from the date of pronouncement of the impugned order and that

any delay beyond the statutory outer limit of 45 days cannot be condoned

under Section 61(2) of the IBC. In support of their contention, reliance has been

placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Safire Technologies

Pvt. Ltd. Vs Regional Provident Fund Commissioner in Civil Appeal No.

2212 of 2021, wherein it has been held that the date of knowledge of the

impugned order is not relevant for purposes of computation of limitation in

terms of the statutory provisions of IBC. It was also contended that the Section

7 application was duly served on the Appellant at their registered address and

6 of 11 I.A. No. 7084 of 2025 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1819 of 2025 on their email as reflected on the MCA portal and even the postal tracking

reports show successful delivery. It is contended that the Appellant has failed

to establish that the registered particulars of the address were incorrect.

Furthermore, not only was sufficient opportunity granted by the Adjudicating

Authority to the Appellant to be present before them but only after being

satisfied that due service of notice had been effected that the Adjudicating

Authority decided to proceed ex-parte. The Respondent No.1 also submitted

that the application for certified copy must be made within the limitation period

of 30 days, and only the time consumed between application and receipt can

be excluded. It is also contended that the Appellant cannot claim exclusion of

time prior to the application for certified copy as settled by judicial precedents.

8. To arrive at our findings, we would like to first notice the relevant orders

passed by the Adjudicating Authority while dealing with the Section 7

application from the perspective of service of notice. The first order is of

24.03.2025 which is as extracted below:

ORDER

1. Ms. Z. Khan, Adv. appearing on behalf of the Petitioner.

2. None for the Respondent.

3. Registry is directed to issue notice to the Respondent by all mode including speed post and by email and keep tracking record on file.

4. On receipt, respondent shall file their reply within ten days under copy to the opposite party.

5. List the matter on 14.04.2025.

7 of 11 I.A. No. 7084 of 2025 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1819 of 2025 The matter was again heard by them on 15.04.2025 and next hearing date was

fixed on again on 02.05.2025 on which date the following order was passed:

ORDER

1. Ms. Zeba Khan, Advocate, appears on behalf of the Petitioner.

2. None appears for the Respondent.

3. On perusal of the proof of service report, it appears that the item was delivered on 04.04.2025. Despite the service of notice, the Respondent has failed to appear.

4. It appears that the Respondent is intentionally abstaining from appearing in the matter.

5. Accordingly, the Respondent is hereby set ex-parte.

6. List the matter on 16.05.2025 for hearing.

9. When we look at the above two orders, we find that the Adjudicating

Authority has taken care that notice was served upon the Appellant by all

modes and even perused the proof of service report to satisfy itself. There is no

material placed on record by the Appellant to show that the registered address

and email id of the Corporate Debtor as available on the MCA portal had

undergone any change. Though an assertion was made by the Appellant before

us that they were in the process of changing such information, the Appellant

had no clear answer to the fact as to why and how the MCA database still

reflected the same registered address and email- id even after the passing of

the impugned order which the Respondent No. 1 has placed at Annexure R-3

in their reply to the delay condonation application filed by the Appellant. We

therefore find the stand of the Appellant on change in their address and email

to be rather nebulous and do not feel convinced with the credibility of their

argument.

8 of 11 I.A. No. 7084 of 2025 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1819 of 2025

10. Now coming to the statutory construct of the IBC, the limitation for filing

an appeal under Section 61(2) of the IBC is 30 days which period is extendable

for a further period of 15 days if the Tribunal is satisfied that there was

sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within limitation. Section 61(2) reads

to the effect:

"61. Appeals and Appellate Authority.

(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal:

Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days."

11. We are also guided by the recent judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Tata Steel Ltd. Vs. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 408 of

2023 which reads to the effect:

"11. As indicated above, the IBC prescribes strict timelines for filing appeals and taking legal action so as to ensure that insolvency proceedings are not misused to recover time-barred debts. The proviso to Section 61(2) clearly limits the NCLAT's jurisdiction to condone delay only up to 15 days beyond the initial 30-day period. Where a statute expressly limits the period within which delay may be condoned, an Appellate Tribunal cannot exceed that limit. In other words, the NCLAT being a creature of statute, operates strictly within the powers conferred upon it. Unlike a civil suit, it lacks inherent jurisdiction to extend time on equitable grounds.

11.1. Once the prescribed and condonable periods (i.e., 30 + 15 days) expire, the NCLAT has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals, regardless of the reason for the delay. In Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited, while interpreting Section 9 IBC, this Court underscores the IBC's strict procedural discipline i.e., only

9 of 11 I.A. No. 7084 of 2025 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1819 of 2025 applications strictly conforming to statutory requirements can be entertained. This principle is also applicable to limitation issues under section 61(2), as it supports the idea that tribunals must operate within the bounds of the Code, without adding equitable or discretionary powers not conferred by statute. This Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Another has categorically held that the NCLAT cannot condone any delay beyond 15 days even on equitable grounds; and that the appellate mechanism under IBC is strictly time-bound by design to preserve the speed and certainty of the insolvency resolution process.

11.2. Thus, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute. Accordingly, the second issue is answered by us."

12. Coming to the chronology of the filing in the present case, we find that

the impugned order was passed on 21.08.2025. For counting the statutory

period of 30 days for filing the appeal, the same is to be counted from the day

after the date of pronouncement of the impugned order. The date of knowledge

of impugned order is immaterial for limitation computation. Calculated

accordingly, the statutory period of 30 days for filing the appeal in the present

case came to an end on 20.09.2025. The further extendable period of 15 days

in terms of proviso to Section 60(2) of the IBC ended on 05.10.2025. However,

the present appeal has been e-filed by the Appellant on 17.11.2025 which date

prima facie lies beyond the outer limit of thirty plus fifteen days provided under

Section 61(2) of the IBC and therefore beyond the condonable jurisdiction of

this Appellate Tribunal as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Tata Steel

judgement supra.

10 of 11 I.A. No. 7084 of 2025 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1819 of 2025

13. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that the

Appeal has been filed beyond the condonable period of 15 days. The jurisdiction

of this Appellate Tribunal to condone delay being strictly limited by statute, we

are unable to condone the delay in the filing of this Appeal. Accordingly, the

delay condonation application is dismissed. Consequently, the Memo of Appeal

and other I.A.s are all rejected.

[Justice Ashok Bhushan] Chairperson

[Barun Mitra] Member (Technical)

Place: New Delhi Date: 05.02.2026 Abdul

11 of 11 I.A. No. 7084 of 2025 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1819 of 2025