Mr. G. Bala Reddy And Others vs Sebi
- CitationAppeal No. 509 of 2015
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Information that a company has been declared the lowest bidder (L1) in a tender, and that the Board has approved the bid after negotiation, is price sensitive information within Regulation 2(ha) of the PIT Regulations, 1992; a tenderer's lack of a right to the contract does not prevent L1 status from being price sensitive. Information is "unpublished" under Regulation 2(k) only if it has been published by the company or its agents; the opening of bids by a third party, which discloses the L1 position, does not amount to publication by the company or its agent, and the definition must be construed strictly. A person who is not a promoter or a member of the promoter group cannot be held liable under Regulation 8A of the Takeover Regulations, 1997, which imposes the disclosure obligation only on promoters and every person forming part of the promoter group as defined in Regulation 2(h); a promoter cannot be made liable under Regulation 8A for shares pledged in the name of non-promoters, however closely they acted on his instructions. Information sought by SEBI that is not explicit or clear cannot be treated as misleading where the reply is given in accordance with the Companies Act, 1956; a penalty for misleading information cannot be sustained on a reply that answers the question as framed. Where the statutory ceiling under sections 15G and 15HA of the SEBI Act is expressed as the higher of a fixed sum or three times the profits made, a penalty is not arbitrary merely because the adjudicating officer does not show how the figure was arrived at, if the penalty imposed is within three times the aggregate profits made from the violation. Persons found to be connected persons and insiders who traded on the basis of the same price sensitive information may be held jointly and severally liable for the penalty imposed on them.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI Bhavan, Plot No. C-4A, G-Block, Bandra-Kurla Complex, Bandra (East), Mumbai - 400 051 ...Respondent
Mr. Darius J. Khambatta, Senior Advocate with Mr. Pesi Modi, Senior Advocate, Mr. Joby Mathew, Mr. Neville Lashkari, Mr. Nikhil Shah and Mr. Tushar Hathiramani, Advocates i/b Joby Mathew & Associates for the Appellants.
Mr. Gaurav Joshi, Senior Advocate with Mr. Saurabh Pakale, Mr. Anubhav Ghosh and Ms. Rashi Dalmia, Advocates i/b The Law Point for the Respondent.
CORAM: Justice Tarun Agarwala, Presiding Officer Dr. C.K.G. Nair, Member Justice M. T. Joshi, Judicial Member
Per: Justice Tarun Agarwala
1. Appellants being aggrieved by the order of the
Adjudicating Officer ("AO" for short) of the Securities and
Exchange Board of India ("SEBI" for short) dated October 15,
2015 have filed the present appeal wherein the following
penalties were imposed namely:-
"a) Shri G. Bala Reddy, G Velangini Mary, Mary
Ashwini and Sravanthi Yakkanti violated
Regulation 3 and 4 of the PIT Regulations,
1992 read with sections 12A(d) and 12A(e) of 3
the SEBI Act. Further, Sahasra Investments
Pvt. Ltd. and BRG Energy Ltd. violated
Regulation 3, 3A and 4 of the PIT Regulations,
1992 and sections 12A(d) and section 12A(e) of
the SEBI Act, 1992. In addition to the same,
Shri G Bala Reddy, G Velangini Mary, APRG,
Sravanthi, Mary Ashwini and BRG have
violated Regulations 3(c) and (d) of the
PFUTP Regulations read alongside section
12A(b) and (c) of the SEBI Act. For the
aforesaid violations, I impose a penalty of
` 40,00,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Crore Only)
under section 15G and 15HA of the SEBI Act,
1992 on the aforenamed noticees, to be paid
jointly and severally by them.
b) Further, Bala Reddy, Mary Ashwini and
Sravanthi Yakkanti submitted misleading
information to SEBI regarding their
relationship with certain entities, and for the
same I impose a penalty of ` 20,00,000/-
(Rupees Twenty Lakh Only) on Bala Reddy, 4
Mary Ashwini and Sravanthi Yakkanti each,
under section 15A(a) of the SEBI Act.
c) Shri G. Bala Reddy and G Velangini Mary also
violated Regulation 8A(1) and (2) of the
Takeover Regulations, 1997, Regulations,
which attracts penalty under section 15HB of
the SEBI Act. For the same, I impose a penalty
of ` 26,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Six Lakh
Only) on Bala Reddy and ` 12,00,000/-
(Rupees Twelve Lakh Only) on G Velangini
Mary."
2. The facts leading to the filing of the appeal is, that on
March 18, 2009 ICSA (India) Limited (hereinafter referred to as
"the Company") made a corporate announcement at National
Stock Exchange of India Limited ("NSE") and BSE Limited
("BSE") to the effect that the company had secured work orders
for a total contract value of ` 464.17 crore from Bihar State
Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as "BSEB"),
Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd.
("Mahavitaran" and M.P. Poorva Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran Co.
Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "MPPKVVCL"). Investigation 5
made by SEBI indicated that certain entities bought a large
number of shares in February 2009 a few days prior to the
announcement made by the company. It was found that
Sravanthi Yakkanti (hereinafter referred to as "Sravanthi"),
Appellant No. 4 and Mary Ashwini (hereinafter referred to as
"Mary") Appellant No. 3 had bought 3,93,683 shares at the rate
of ` 74.99 paisa per share and 11,92,000 shares at the rate of
` 75 per share respectively. Investigation further revealed that
all the appellants were somehow related in one way or the other
and indulged in insider trading based on the unpublished price
sensitive information ("UPSI"). Accordingly, a show cause
notice was issued to show cause as to why a penalty should not
be imposed for utilizing the UPSI under Regulation 2(ha) read
with Regulation 2(k) of SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading)
Regulations, 1992 ("PIT Regulations" for short). The show
cause notice further indicated that the appellants gave
misleading information with regard to the relationship between
the appellants. Further, some of the appellants did not declare
the shares pledged by them. In short, the show cause notice
stated:-
"i) You have funded the purchase of shares by
Sravanthi and Mary who are connected to you
and trade while in possession of price sensitive 6
information. Thus act of yours are alleged to
be violation of sections 12A(d) and 12A(e) of
the SEBI Act, 1992 read with Regulation 3 and
4 of the PIT Regulations, 1992. Further you
were the beneficiary of the funds received from
the sale proceeds of the shares acquired
through insider trading. Such act of you are
alleged to be in violation of sections 12(A)(b)
and 12A(c) of the SEBI Act read with
Regulation 3(c) and (d) of the SEBI
(Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade
Practice relating to Securities Market)
Regulations, 2003 ("PFUTP Regulations" for
short).
ii) You gave misleading information with regard
to the relationship with the entities who traded
in the scrip and those who were the
beneficiaries of the funds received from the
sale proceeds of the shares acquired through
alleged insider trading.
7
iii) You have given misleading declaration with
regard to shares pledged by you and thus
violated Regulation 8A(1) and (2) of the SEBI
(Substantial Acquisition of Shares and
Takeovers), Regulations, 1997 ("Takeover
Regulations, 1997" for short)."
3. The appellants contested the show cause notice and
submitted their replies denying the allegations and contended
that they have not violated any provisions of the SEBI Act, the
Takeover Regulations, the PIT Regulations, etc. The AO after
considering the replies of the appellants and, after giving them
an opportunity of hearing found that the appellants were guilty
of insider trading, etc. and consequently, imposed a penalty
which is reflected in the preceding paragraphs.
4. We have heard Shri D. J. Khambatta alongwith Shri Pesi
Modi, learned senior counsels assisted by Shri Joby Mathew
advocate for the appellants and Shri Gaurav Joshi the learned
senior counsel assisted by Shri Saurabh Pakale advocate on
behalf of the respondent at length.
8
5. The basic point which has been urged before this Tribunal
is, that the appellants have not violated the provisions of the PIT
Regulations, 1992 read with section 12A of the SEBI Act. It
was contended that the work orders which the company had
procured was in the ordinary course of business and, in any
case, when the shares were purchased, the company had not
bagged the contract and was only found to be the lowest price
bidder (L1). It was thus contended, that being the lowest price
bidder did not mean that the contract was issued in favour of the
company nor being (L1) could be considered as a price sensitive
information.
6. In order to understand the import of the submissions it
would be necessary to give a few facts and the findings given by
the AO.
7. Appellant No. 1 is the Promoter, Chairman and Managing
Director of the company as well as the Promoter, Chairman and
Director of Appellant Nos. 5 and 6. Appellant No. 2 is a
Promoter of the company and wife of Appellant No. 1 and is
Promoter and Managing director in Appellant No. 6 and
Promoter and Director in Appellant No. 5. Appellant No. 3 is
the wife of Appellant No. 7. Appellant No. 4 is an employee of 9
the company, Appellant Nos. 5 and 6 are companies promoted
by Appellant No. 1 in which Appellant Nos. 1 & 2 are also
Directors. Appellant No. 7 is the husband of Appellant No. 3
and is also a cousin of Appellant No. 2.
8. The AO after considering the evidence have found that the
aforesaid appellants are connected persons and are a
homogeneous group. The AO further found that a non-resident
investor Jeff Fineberg had 16,00,000 shares of the company
which amounted to 3.42% of the paid up capital of the company
and had contacted Appellant No. 1 for sale of his shares.
Appellant No. 1 instead of buying the shares directly from this
non-resident investor purchased these shares through a
circuitous route. The Appellant No. 1 arranged for a bulk
purchase of 15,85,683 shares through Appellant Nos. 3 and 4.
Appellant No. 1 provided funds to Appellant Nos. 3 and 4 to
purchase the shares. The funds were given from Appellant Nos.
5 and 6 in which Appellant No. 1 is a Promoter and Director.
9. Appellant No. 3 after purchasing the shares pledged these
shares in favour of Cholamandalam DBS from whom the
Appellant No. 1 had availed corporate finance facility. By
pledging these shares, Appellant No. 3 stood as a guarantor to 10
the facility availed by Appellant No. 1. Similarly, shares
purchased by Appellant No. 4 were transferred to Appellant No.
7 who pledged these shares to IDBI Bank Ltd. but subsequently
transferred a large portion of the shares in off-market in favour
of Appellant No. 2. Appellant No. 3 also transferred the shares
to her husband Appellant No. 7 in off-market and later on
Appellant No. 7 sold it in the off-market. The proceeds
eventually came in the hands of Appellant Nos. 1 & 2.
10. The AO found that Appellant Nos. 3 and 4 traded in large
quantities of the shares of the company simply on the request of
Appellant No. 1. The AO further found that the Appellant Nos.
3 and 4 had bought the shares from the funds arranged by
Appellant No. 1 and, on the sale of the shares, the proceeds
were transferred by them to the entities connected to Appellant
No. 1. The AO found that Appellant No. 7 acted as a conduit
for routing the funds arising out of the sale of the shares of the
company and that Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 were the ultimate
beneficiaries of the sale proceeds.
11. The AO consequently found that the appellants are
connected persons as per section 2(c) of the PIT Regulations,
1992. It was further found that the appellants were insiders 11
within the meaning of 2(e) of the PIT Regulations, 1992. The
AO further found that the company's lowest price bid was a
price sensitive information as per Regulation 2(ha)(iv) of the
PIT Regulations, 1992 and was also a price sensitive
information as per Regulation 2(a) of the PIT Regulations,
1992. The AO found that the appellants have violated
Regulations 3 and 4 of the PIT Regulations, 1992 and section
12A(d), 12A(e) of the SEBI Act as well as Regulations 3(c) and
(d) of the PFUTP Regulations, 2003.
12. The aforesaid findings have not been disputed by the
leaned senior counsel appearing for the appellants. What was
contested is, that being the lowest bidder of a contract in the
usual course of business does not amount to a price sensitive
information and, in any case, the lowest price bid being in the
public domain cannot be an unpublished price sensitive
information under the PIT Regulations, 1992.
13. In order to examine this aspect we need to consider what
is "price sensitive information" and what is "unpublished" price
sensitive information. In this regard, Regulation 2(ha) defines
price sensitive information as:
12
"2(ha) "price sensitive information" means any information which relates directly or indirectly to a company and which if published is likely to materially affect the price of securities of company.
Explanation.--The following shall be deemed to be price sensitive information :--
(i) ...... (ii) ...... (iii) (iv) any major expansion plans or execution of new projects. (v) ...... (vi) ...... (vii) ......"
A perusal of the aforesaid definition indicates that any
information which relates directly or indirectly to a company
and which if published is likely to affect the price of the
securities then such information would be deemed to be a price
sensitive information. Further clause (iv) of the explanation to
Regulation 2(ha) of the PIT Regulations, 1992 provides that
execution of new projects would be deemed to be a price
sensitive information.
13
14. Regulations 2(k) defines "unpublished" as:
"2(k) "unpublished" means information which is not
published by the company or its agents and is
not specific in nature."
A perusal of the aforesaid definition clearly indicates that an
information which is not published by the company or its agents
is an unpublished price sensitive information.
15. In Shri E. Sudhir Reddy v/s SEBI in Appeal No. 138 of
2011 decided on 16.12.2011 this Tribunal held that tendering
process is a long drawn procedure involving various stages and
it would be difficult to lay down any parameter namely, at what
stage the information in a tendering process would become price
sensitive for the purpose of Insider Trading Regulations and that
such information would depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case.
16. In Gujarat NRE Mineral Resources Ltd. v/s SEBI in
Appeal No. 207 of 2010 decided on 18.11.2011 this Tribunal
held that a decision taken by a listed investment company to
dispose of a part of its investment was not a price sensitive
information in the facts and circumstances of that case. 14
17. In Anil Harish v/s SEBI in Appeal No. 217 of 2011
decided on 22.06.2012 this Tribunal held that a company which
is in the business of infrastructure projects, bags an order in the
normal course of its business, such information was not
necessarily a price sensitive information. The Tribunal further
held that whether the information is price sensitive or not and on
what date it became price sensitive would depend on the facts
and circumstances of the case.
18. In Piramal Enterprises Limited in Appeal No. 466 of
2016 decided on 15.05.2019 it was held by this Tribunal that in
the absence of any direct or clinching evidence a reasonable
benefit of doubt should be extended to the company instead of
mechanically imposing a penalty.
19. It was urged that L1 became known on various dates and,
such information came in the public domain. It was thus urged
that it was not an unpublished price sensitive information. In
our opinion, this contention is patently misconceived and cannot
be accepted. The definition of "unpublished" as defined under
Regulation 2(k) has a definite connotation under Insider Trading
Regulations and has to be construed strictly. Regulation 2(k)
defines "unpublished" to mean information which has not been 15
published by the company or its agent and is not specific in
nature. Admittedly, the bagging of the contract was announced
by the company only on the stock exchange platform on March
18, 2019. Prior to that the company had not published nor made
any corporate announcements of this information. The opening
of the bids by a third party does not amount to an information
being published by the company or its agent under Regulation
2(k). Thus, the contention that the opening of the bids in which
the company was found to be the lowest bidder came in the
public domain is incorrect and cannot be construed as being
published.
20. The Appellant No. 1 had specific information about the
company's bid being the lowest. Being L1, the company
through Appellant No. 1 was called for further negotiation. It
has come on record that in two out of three contracts, the Board
approved the L1 after negotiation around the time when the
shares were purchased. Thus, being L1 coupled with the fact
that the bids were approved by the Board was a price sensitive
information in so far as Appellant No. 1 is concerned in relation
to its shareholders and investors and it was thus incumbent upon
him not to deal in the scrips of the company and not to purchase
the shares of the company given by a non-resident investor. 16
The Appellant No. 1 admits that he purchased the shares
through a circuitous measure by funding the amount to
Appellant Nos. 3 and 4 from the Appellant Nos. 5 and 6 in
which he was a Promoter. The Appellant No. 1 eventually
benefitted from the sale of these shares. The Appellant No. 1
was thus an insider and it was incumbent upon him not to deal
in the scrip of the company so long as the information about the
contract remained unpublished. Thus, in the facts and
circumstances of this case, even though the contract was not
awarded nor the letter of intent was given at the time of
purchase of the shares, nonetheless, being L1, the same was a
price sensitive information in so far as the Appellant No. 1 was
concerned. Since the Appellant No. 1 traded in these scrips
through Appellant Nos. 3 and 4 he is guilty of insider trading.
Similarly, in the same fashion, the other appellants are also
guilty of insider trading.
21. The learned senior counsel submitted that a tenderer does
not have any right for award of a contract even where he is
found to be L1. In support of his submission, he has placed
reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Air India Ltd.
v/s Cochin International Airport Ltd. and Ors. (2000) 2 SCC
617, Food Corporation of India v/s M/s Kamdhenu Cattle 17
Feed Industries (1993) 1 SCC 71 and Trilochan Mishra, Etc.
v/s State of Orissa and Ors. (1971) 3 SCC 153.
22. There is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition of law
but the same is not applicable in the instant case. An L1 may not
get the contract. The contract specifically says so. However, in
the instant case, we find that L1 became a price sensitive
information and therefore the Appellant No. 1 could not have
traded in the scrips of the company through a circuitous method.
23. The learned senior counsel contended that Appellant Nos.
3 and 4 are not promoters of the company nor were part of the
promoter group of the company and therefore the shares
pledged by them as collateral for the loans availed by them
could not have been disclosed under Regulation 8A of the
Takeover Regulations, 1997. It was contended that the
requirement of disclosure under Regulation 8A of the Takeover
Regulations, 1997 is on the promoter or the promoter group.
The learned senior counsel urged that in the light of the
aforesaid the imposition of penalty for non disclosure under
Regulation 8A was wholly illegal and without any authority of
law.
18
24. Regulation 8A(1) and (2) of the Takeover Regulations,
1997 provides as under:
"8A. Disclosure of pledged shares.
(1) A promoter or every person forming part of the promoter group of any company shall, within seven working days of commencement of Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) (Amendment) Regulations, 2009, disclose details of shares of that company pledged by him, if any, to that company.
(2) A promoter or every person forming part of the promoter group of any company shall, within 7 working days from the date of creation of pledge on shares of that company held by him, inform the details of such pledge of shares to that company."
Promoter and promoter group is defined under Regulation 2(h)
of the Takeover Regulations as under:
2.(h) promoter means--
(a) any person who is in control of the target company;
(b) any person named as promoter in any offer document of the target company or any shareholding pattern filed by the target 19
company with the stock exchanges pursuant to the Listing Agreement, whichever is later; and includes any person belonging to the promoter group as mentioned in
Explanation I: Provided that a director or officer of the target company or any other person shall not be a promoter, if he is acting as such merely in his professional capacity.
Explanation I.─ For the purpose of this clause, "promoter group" shall include:
(a) in case promoter is a body corporate-
(i) a subsidiary or holding company of that body corporate;
(ii) any company in which the promoter holds 10 % or more of the equity capital or which holds 10 % or more of the equity capital of the promoter;
(iii) any company in which a group of individuals or companies or combinations thereof who holds 20 % or more of the equity capital in that company also holds 20 % or more of the equity capital of the target company; and
(b) in case the promoter is an individual-
(i) the spouse of that person, or any parent, brother, sister or child of that person or of his spouse;
20
(ii) any company in which 10 % or more of the share capital is held by the promoter or an immediate relative of the promoter or a firm or HUF in which the promoter or any one or more of his immediate relative is a member;
(iii) any company in which a company specified in (i) above, holds 10 % or more, of the share capital; and Page 9 of 75
(iv) any HUF or firm in which the aggregate share of the promoter and his immediate relatives is equal to or more than 10 per cent of the total.
Explanation II-
Financial Institutions, Scheduled Banks, Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) and Mutual Funds shall not be deemed to be a promoter or promoter group merely by virtue of their shareholding:
Provided that the Financial Institutions, Scheduled Banks and Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) shall be treated as promoters or promoter group for the subsidiaries or companies promoted by them or mutual funds sponsored by them;]"
21
From a perusal of the definition of promoter and promoter
group it is apparently clear that Appellant Nos. 3 and 4 do not
fall in the category of promoter or promoter group. Regulation
8A specifically requires a promoter or every person forming
part of the promoter group of the company to disclose the
details of the pledging of their shares of the company. The
mandate under Regulation 8A for disclosure is upon the
promoter or every person forming part of the promoter group.
Since the Appellant Nos. 3 and 4 admittedly are not promoters
of the company nor are part of the promoter group, they cannot
be held liable for violation of Regulation 8A of the Takeover
Regulations.
25. However, in the instant case, Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 who
are admittedly promoters of the company have been held liable
for non-disclosure under Regulation 8A of the Takeover
Regulations on the ground that Appellant Nos. 3 & 4 had traded
on the instructions of Appellant No. 1 and that Appellant No. 1
had funded the said trades through his other companies coupled
with the fact that eventually the sale proceeds of these shares
were eventually received by Appellant No. 1. Be that as it may.
The fact remains that the shares which were purchased were not
in the name of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2. If the shares were 22
purchased in the name of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 then it would
have become the responsibility of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, as
promoters of the company, to make the necessary disclosures
under Regulation 8A. Since the shares were initially purchased
by Appellant Nos. 3 and 4 inspite of the instructions from
Appellant No. 1 and inspite of the funding of the purchase of
shares by Appellant No. 1, nonetheless, the requirement of law
is, that only a promoter or every person forming part of the
promoters group of the company is required to make necessary
disclosure under Regulation 8A. There cannot be any deemed
promoter or "related to the promoter". Since Appellant Nos. 3
and 4 were not promoters and were not part of the promoter
group the imposition of penalty under Regulation 8A upon the
Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be sustained.
26. Appellant No. 1 has been charged for providing misleading
information in respect of his relationship with the other entities,
namely, the appellants. The information provided by Appellant
No. 1 was that he does not have any relationship with Appellant
Nos. 3 and 4 and was not covered within the list of "relatives"
set out in Scheduled 1A of the Companies Act, 1956. The AO
found that Appellant No. 1 gave misleading information to SEBI
in respect of his connection with other entities and thereby 23
imposed a penalty for submitting misleading information to
SEBI under section 15A(a) of the SEBI Act.
27. In this regard, the learned senior counsel submitted that the
information sought by SEBI by letter dated September 15, 2010
was duly supplied by Appellant No. 1 vide its letter dated
September 24, 2010. The learned senior counsel asserted that
the relationship of Appellant No. 1 with the other entities as
depicted in the letter dated September 15, 2010 was given,
taking into consideration the provisions of "relatives" set out in
Scheduled 1A of the Companies Act, 1956. It was asserted that
no false or misleading information was supplied and that the
information supplied was in accordance with the Companies Act,
1956.
28. Having perused the letter dated September 15, 2010 given
by SEBI and the reply dated September 24, 2010 given by the
appellant we find that the information sought was the
relationship of the appellant with the other entities. A perusal of
the said letter would indicate that the information sought was as
to what was the relationship of the appellant with other entities,
namely, whether they were relatives or not. Information was
supplied by the appellant in accordance with the provisions of 24
the Companies Act, 1956. The letter of SEBI does not explicitly
states that the appellant was required to furnish the information
with regard to his professional or working relationship with the
other entities. Thus, even though the Appellant No. 1 may have
professional or working relationship with the other entities, we
are of the opinion that since there was no explicit clarity in the
information sought the reply given by the appellant, being in
accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, was
not misleading. SEBI ought to have been more professional and
should have asked clear cut information which is explicit and is
not vague. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the
imposition of penalty in so far as providing misleading
information cannot be sustained.
29. A penalty of ` 40,00,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Crore Only)
has been imposed upon the appellants for insider trading
violating Regulations 3 and 4 of the PIT Regulations, 1992 read
with section 12A(d) and (e) of the SEBI Act, 1992. Further
direction is that the said penalty would be paid by the appellants
jointly and severally.
30. It was urged by the learned senior counsel that the quantum
of penalty is arbitrary in as much as there is no discussion by the 25
AO as to how this figure of ` 40,00,00,000/- (Rupees Forty
Crore Only) has been arrived at.
31. There is no doubt that the mechanics of imposition of
penalty of ` 40,00,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Crore Only) has not
been disclosed in the impugned order but we find that on this
ground the amount of penalty cannot be set aside for the
following reasons:
(i) The AO has found that Appellant No. 3 had made a
profit of ` 11,23,88,739/- and Appellant No. 7 made a
profit of ` 2,81,16,267/-. The total profit thus comes
to ` 14,05,05,006/-. Under section 15G and 15HA of
the SEBI Act, 1992 a penalty upto a maximum of
twenty five crore rupees or three times the amount of
profits whichever is higher can be imposed.
(ii) For facility, section 15G and 15HA as it stood at the
relevant point is extracted hereunder:
"15G Penalty for insider trading. -If any insider who,--
(i) either on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person, deals in securities of a body corporate listed on any stock exchange on the basis of 26
any unpublished price-sensitive information; or
(ii) communicates any unpublished price-
sensitive information to any person, with or without his request for such information except as required in the ordinary course of business or under any law; or
(iii) counsels, or procures for any other person to deal in any securities of any body corporate on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive information, shall be liable to a penalty [which shall not be less than ten lakh rupees but which may extend to twenty-five crore rupees or three times the amount of profits made out of insider trading, whichever is higher.]"
"15HA. Penalty for fraudulent and unfair trade practices:-
If any person indulges in fraudulent and unfair trade practices relating to securities, he shall be liable to a penalty [which shall not be less than five lakh rupees but which may extend to twenty- five crore rupees or three times the amount of profits made out of such practices, whichever is higher]."
27 (iii) In the instant case, the profits earned through insider
trading was ` 14,05,05,006/-. Three times the profit
amounts to ` 42,15,15,018 which is more than the
penalty awarded by the AO. Thus, we do not find
any error in the quantum of penalty imposed by the
AO.
32. It was urged that the direction to pay penalty jointly and
severally by the appellants is arbitrary. It was urged that if the
Appellant No. 7 had only made a profit of ` 2,81,16,267/- then
the penalty should be accordingly quantified to a maximum of
three times the profit instead of directing the said appellant to
pay the entire amount of penalty of ` 40,00,00,000/- (Rupees
Forty Crore Only).
33. The submission of the learned senior counsel appears to be
attractive in the first instance but on a closer scrutiny we find
that the contention cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the
appellants have been found to be connected persons under
section 2(c) of the PIT Regulations and were also found to be
deemed to be connected persons under section 2(h). The
appellants were also found to be insiders under section 2(e) of
the PIT Regulations and were found to have traded in the shares
having knowledge of the price sensitive information. 28
Consequently, all the appellants being connected persons have
been held to be equally liable to pay the amount of penalty
jointly and severally. We thus do not find any error in this
regard.
34. For the reasons stated aforesaid the appeal is partly
allowed. The order of the AO imposing a penalty of
` 40,00,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Crore Only) under section 15G
and section 15HA of the SEBI Act against the appellants for
violation of Regulation 3 and 4 of the PIT Regulations read with
section 12A(d) and (e) of the SEBI Act is affirmed. The
imposition of penalty of ` 20 lakhs (Rupees Twenty Lakhs Only)
under section 15A(a) of the SEBI Act for submitting misleading
information to SEBI and penalty of ` 38 lakhs (Rupees Thirty
Eight Lakhs Only) upon Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 for violation of
Regulation 8A(1) and (2) of the Takeover Regulations, 1997 are
quashed. In view of the partial success, parties shall bear their
own costs.
Sd/-
Justice Tarun Agarwala Presiding Officer Sd/-
Dr. C.K.G. Nair Member Sd/-
Justice M. T. Joshi Judicial Member 12.07.2019 Prepared & Compared By: PK
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