Martin S.K. Golla vs Wig Associates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr
- CitationCompany Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Ineligibility under Section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code attaches at the point of submission of a resolution plan by a resolution applicant; the stage of ineligibility is therefore determined by the date of submission, not the date of commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process. A person who is ineligible under Section 29A at the time a resolution plan is submitted cannot have that plan treated as a valid resolution plan, and a one-time settlement offer by such a person cannot be converted into a resolution plan and placed before the Committee of Creditors or the Adjudicating Authority for approval. The subsequent enactment of Section 240A, or a later certificate of MSME status, does not cure ineligibility that existed at the time the offer was submitted.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
[Arising out of Orders dated 04.06.2018 passed by National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai in CP No.1214/IBC/NCLT/MB/ MAH/2017]
IN THE MATTER OF: Before NCLT Before NCLAT
Martin S.K.Golla ... Appellant Erstwhile Resolution Professional 1704, Tower-3, Raheja Tipco Heights, Rani Sati Marg, Malad (East), Mumbai - 400097 Maharastra
Vs.
1. Wig Associates Pvt. Applicant Respondent No.1 Ltd. 102, Amar Residency, Punjabwadi, Deonar Mumbai - 400088
2. Committee of Creditors .... Respondent No.2 Through Bank of Baroda, Meher Chambers, Ground Floor, Dr. Sunderlal Behl Marg, Opposite Petrol Pump, Balard Estate, Mumbai - 400001
3. Insolvency & Bankruptcy ... Respondent No.3 Board of India, Through its Secretary, 7th Floor, Mayur Bhawan, 2
Shankar Market, Connaught Circus, New Delhi, Delhi - 110001
For Appellant: Mr. Davesh Bhatia and Ms. Progoti Bose, Advocates Mr. Martin Golla (Party in person)
For Respondents: Mr. Rajendra Singhvi, Ms. Pooja Pandey and Ms. Ragini Singh, Advocates for R-1 Ms. Praveena Gautam and Mr. Pawan Shukla, Advocates for R-2, BOB Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Mr. Vikas Mehta and Mr. Apoorv Khator, Advocates for R-3, IBBI
JUDGEMENT
(04th June, 2021) A.I.S. Cheema, J. :
1. The Appellant is Resolution Professional who has filed this Appeal
claiming that the same is filed in view of the Order dated 1st August,
2018 and Order dated 11th January, 2019 passed by this Tribunal in
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.415 of 2018 vide which Order, this
Tribunal directed e-filing of the Appeal to clarify correct position of law.
2. The Appellant claims that he was Resolution Professional of "Wig
Associates Pvt. Ltd." - Corporate Debtor. The Adjudicating Authority
(National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai) had admitted
CP 1214/IBC/NCLT/MB/MAH/2017 under Section 10 of Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC - in short), on 24th August, 2017. The
Resolution Plan submitted by Mr. Mahendra Wig was approved by
Committee of Creditors (COC - in short) on 20.04.2018 and was placed
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 3
before the Adjudicating Authority for approval. The Adjudicating
Authority approved the Resolution Plan vide Impugned Order dated 4th
June, 2018 (Annexure - 1A - Page 39). The present Appeal is with regard
to such Impugned Order.
3. The Appellant claimed that after this Tribunal had given Orders
dated 1st August, 2018 he had sought clarification from IBBI (Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Board of India) and after the Orders were passed on 11 th
January, 2019, the present Appeal is filed in order to resolve the legal
controversy. The Appellant claims that the Impugned Order may be set
aside/affirmed.
4. It is stated that the earlier Appeal was filed by IBBI against the
Impugned Order dated 4th June, 2018 when this Tribunal passed Orders
dated 1st August, 2018 holding that the IBBI does not have locus to file
the Appeal and directed IBBI to ask the Resolution Professional to file the
Appeal. This Appeal has been filed claiming that the question of law is as
to whether Section 29A of IBC will be applicable with retrospective effect
in Section 10 proceedings which were initiated prior to Section 29A
coming into force and to decide the issue and any other question of law.
5. We have heard the parties to the Appeal. Before referring to the
submissions, a brief background needs to be kept in view.
It appears from the record that CP
1214/IBC/NCLT/MB/MAH/2017 was filed on 19th July, 2017 by the
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 4
Corporate Debtor - M/s. Wig Associates Pvt. Ltd. under Section 10 of IBC
against itself as there was debt of Rs.4,85,14,000 of Bank of Baroda. The
Petition was admitted on 24th August, 2017. After the CIRP started, there
was a COC comprising only of one Financial Creditor, that is, Bank of
Baroda. It appears that the sole Financial Creditor in third COC meeting
held on 6th April, 2018 informed the Resolution Professional that it had
sanctioned "One Time Settlement Offer" issued by Mr. Mahendra Wig.
The Bank asked the Resolution Professional the option of treating One
Time Settlement Offer as Resolution Plan. The Resolution Professional
had obtained Valuation Report stating average liquidation value as
Rs.87.60 Lakhs. The sole Financial Creditor had to recover Rs.1067.39
Lakhs. The Resolution Professional, it appears, placed such Resolution
Plan before COC on 20th April, 2018 and the Resolution Plan was
approved. With the approval of such Resolution Plan, it was placed before
the Adjudicating Authority which approved the same. The Order of the
Adjudicating Authority shows that there were some Operational Creditors
also which included sales tax and income tax authorities.
6. The Impugned Order shows that Adjudicating Authority was aware
of the Ordinance enacted by the Central Government on 23rd November,
2017 "The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance
2017 No.7 of 2017" (Ordinance - in short). The Ordinance inserted
Section 29A of IBC laying down law with regard to persons not eligible to
be Resolution Applicants. The Ordinance later on took shape of
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 5
Amendment in 2018 when "The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
(Amendment) Act, 2017 No.8 of 2018" (Amendment - in short) was
passed. The Adjudicating Authority was aware that the amendment
provided that the amended Act shall be deemed to have come into force
on 23rd November, 2017 (the date of the Ordinance). Impugned Order
shows that in spite of being aware of such Ordinance and Amendment,
the Adjudicating Authority went into an exercise of interpreting this
Section and went on to observe that Creditors/Stakeholders must be
aware of the Rules at the commencement of the game/proceedings. It
observed that "CIRP is a process and can be said to be that the process is
nothing but continuous of one proceeding, which commences from the
date of "Admission" of an Application Order either under Section 7, 9 or
10 and it ends till the Order is passed under Section 31 approving the
Resolution Plan or under Section 33 by initiating "Liquidation"." The
Adjudicating Authority recorded opinion that the CIRP had commenced
and Resolution Professional had invited expression of interest which
resulted into submission of Resolution Plan by the Resolution Applicant
and thus, according to Adjudicating Authority "the same is to be dealt
with as per the provisions which existed on the date when the petition
was "Admitted"." Adopting such reasonings, although the Adjudicating
Authority recorded that as per Section 29A, Mr. Wig would fall in the
category of "connected persons" under Section 29A of IBC, still
Adjudicating Authority went to examine the Resolution Plan which was
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 6
basically One Time Settlement and to accept the same. The Impugned
Order was passed accordingly.
7. The Appellant has filed the present Appeal in the background as
recorded earlier and the Appeal has sought that the Impugned Order may
be set aside or affirmed. It appears that Respondent No.3 - IBBI has
taken action against him and the Appellant has thus made averments in
Appeal and submissions so as to justify the actions taken by him in the
resolution process and is banking upon the fact that the Adjudicating
Authority did accept the Resolution Plan even in the face of Section 29A
of IBC. His arguments are on such basis.
8. The Respondent No.1 - Corporate Debtor - Wig Associates in view
of the acceptance of the Resolution Plan, has argued to support the
Orders passed by the Adjudicating Authority. According to the
Respondent No.1, the Appellant had published expression of interest on
4th April, 2018 in newspapers and nobody came forward except Mr.
Mahendra Wig who was guarantor of Respondent No.1. Mr. Mahendra
Wig is guarantor of Respondent No.1 and he is also father of Mr. Puneet
Wig and Mrs. Dolly Wig. In the third meeting of COC, it is claimed that
the COC considered previous efforts of the Corporate Debtor and the
guarantor of the Corporate Debtor to resolve the matter as per proposals
and counter proposals submitted by the parties from time to time and
the COC settled the whole matter of the bank qua Corporate Debtor for a
sum of Rs.3.55 Crores which, it is claimed, have been repaid to the Bank
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 7
long back i.e. on 29th June, 2018. It is also claimed by Respondent No.1
regarding dues of Unsecured Creditors that almost all dues have been
settled by the Corporate Debtor. The Respondent No.2 - Bank of Baroda
which constituted the Committee of Creditors, has issued No Dues
Certificate in favour of Corporate Debtor on 29th June, 2018. Thus,
according to Respondent No.1, it is a matter of fait accompli. The
Respondent No.1 has argued that it has received Certificate dated 21st
April, 2021 of being Small Scale Industries and thus Mr. Mahendra Wig
was entitled to file the Resolution Plan in view of Section 240A of IBC
which was brought into force with effect from 6th June, 2018 "while the
Impugned Order was passed on 4th June, 2018". The Respondent No.1 is
also arguing that acceptance of the Resolution Plan was discretion of the
COC and thus, the same cannot be interfered with.
9. The Respondent No.3 - IBBI has strongly opposed the process
adopted by the Appellant while conducting the CIRP. According to the
Respondent No.3, the Resolution Applicant - Mr. Mahendra Wig was
barred under Section 29A of the IBC to even propose Resolution Plan. It
is to be stated that the scheme of IBC does not contemplate treating One
Time Settlement offers as Resolution Plan and thus the OTS as offered by
Mr. Mahendra Wig could not have been accepted. According to the
Respondent No.3, the Appellant has conducted the CIRP against the
provisions of IBC and the Regulations and thus the Resolution Plan
deserves to be set aside.
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 8
10. Respondent No.3 claims that Mr. Mahendra Wig who proposed the
OTS was a personal guarantor for the loan taken by the Respondent No.1
Company. He was not eligible to be Resolution Applicant. According to
Respondent No.3, Section 29A needs to be read with Proviso below
Section 30(4) and the legislative intent becomes clear that the Resolution
Plan which is not approved before commencement of the Ordinance, if it
cannot pass the muster under Section 29A, the Resolution Professional
was required to invite fresh Resolution Plans. Section 29A was
introduced by way of amendment in the Code and in this regard the
Ordinance was promulgated on 23rd November, 2017 and was replaced
by the Act bringing into force the provision with effect from 23 rd
November, 2017. Respondent No.3 has referred to the objects and
reasons for introduction of such provision in law which is that the
promoters who are themselves responsible for the NPAs should not be
allowed to take advantage of the process under IBC. Section 29A has
been enacted in larger public interest. On the date of approval of the
Resolution Plan, Mr. Mahendra Wig was barred from being Resolution
Applicant and the Appellant allowed Mr. Wig to be Resolution Applicant
and also wrongly treated OTS as a Resolution Plan and placed the same
before the Adjudicating Authority. In the written arguments, Respondent
No.3 has submitted as under:-
"24. At this stage, it is pertinent to refer to the landmark judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Arcelormittal India (P) Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2019) 2
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 9
SCC 1, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed, "46....The opening words of Section 29-A state: "a person shall not be eligible to submit a resolution plan....". It is clear therefore that the stage of ineligibility attaches when the resolution plan is submitted by a resolution applicant. The contrary view expressed by Shri Rohatgi is obviously incorrect, as the date of commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process is only relevant for the purpose of calculating whether one year has lapsed from the date of classification of a person as a non-performing asset"
The view was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swiss Ribbons vs. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17."
11. It is also argued by the Respondent No.3 that Section 240A was
enacted with effect from 6th June, 2018 and thus the Resolution
Applicant cannot take benefit of Section 240A to claim that it is MSME
when Impugned Order was passed on 4th June, 2018. It is argued that
OTS which was already approved by the Bank could not have been
converted into a Resolution Plan and thus the whole process was vitiated.
12. Section 29A deals with persons not eligible to be Resolution
Applicants. There is no dispute that earlier an Ordinance was issued on
23rd November, 2017 to stop such ineligible persons (as under Section
29A) from becoming Resolution Applicants and subsequently, the Act
came to be passed in this regard and 29A of IBC has become part of the
Code.
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 10
13. Annexure - 14 (Page - 240) Minutes of the third COC dated 5th
April, 2018, shows Mr. Mahendra Wig and Mr. Puneet Wig as
representing Corporate Debtor - Wig Associates. Item 7 of the Minutes
shows the Secured Financial Creditor - Bank of Baroda asking the
Appellant to explore possibility of treating OTS proposal (which it had
already accepted) as Resolution Plan. This was subsequent to the passing
of the Ordinance and even the Amendment Act which inserted Section
29A on 18th January, 2018. The Resolution Plan of Mr. Wig who was
undisputedly a related party, was accepted on 20.04.2018 in the 4 th COC
(Annexure - 16 - Page 248). Section 29A hits the eligibility of the persons
to submit a Resolution Plan if a person falls in any of the categories as
mentioned in the Section. Appellant informed the Meeting that based on
the OTS dated 27.03.2018, the Resolution Plan was being put up.
14. It is now settled law that ineligibility attaches at the time when the
Resolution Plan is submitted by Resolution Applicant. The Respondent
No.3 has rightly placed reliance on Judgement in the matter of
"Arcelormittal India (P) Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta" (referred supra) and
Judgement in the matter of "Swiss Ribbons" (referred supra).
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of "Arcelormittal India
Private Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others- (2019) 2 SCC 1"
observed in para 46, as under:-
"46. According to us, it is clear that the opening words of Section 29-A furnish a clue as to the time at
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 11
which sub-clause (c) is to operate. The opening words of Section 29A state: "a person shall not be eligible to submit a resolution plan...". It is clear therefore that the stage of ineligibility attaches when the resolution plan is submitted by a resolution applicant. The contrary view expressed by Shri Rohatgi is obviously incorrect, as the date of commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process is only relevant for the purpose of calculating whether one year has lapsed from the date of classification of a person as a non- performing asset. Further, the expression used is "has", which as Dr.Singhvi has correctly argued, is in praesenti. This is to be contrasted with the expression "has been", which is used in sub- clauses (d) and (g), which refers to an anterior point of time. Consequently, the amendment of 2018 introducing the words "at the time of submission of the resolution plan" is clarificatory, as this was always the correct interpretation as to the point of time at which the disqualification in sub- clause (c) of Section 29-A will attach. In fact, the amendment was made pursuant to the Insolvency Law Committee Report of March, 2018. That report clearly stated:
"In relation to applicability of section 29-A(c), the Committee also discussed that it must be clarified that the disqualification pursuant to section 29-A(c) shall be applicable if such NPA accounts are held by the resolution applicant or its connected persons at the time of submission of the resolution plan to the RP."
In the matter of "Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and Another vs.
Union of India and Others- (2019) 4 SCC 17", the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the context of retrospectivity of Section 29A of the IBC observed
in para 98, as under:-
"98. This being the case, it is clear that no vested right is taken away by application of Section 29A. However, Shri Viswanathan pointed out the judgments in Ritesh Agarwal and Anr. v. SEBI and
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 12 Ors., (at paragraph 25), K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala (at paragraphs 60-66),Darshan Singh v. Ram Pal Singh (at paragraph 35), Pyare Lal Sharma v. Jammu & Kashmir Industries Ltd. (at paragraph
21),P.D. Aggarwal v. State of U.P (at paragraph 18), and Govind Das v. CIT (at paragraphs 6 and 11), to argue that if a Section operates on an antecedent set of facts, but affects a vested right, it can be held to be retrospective, and unless the legislature clearly intends such retrospectivity, the Section should not be construed as such. Each of these judgments deals with different situations in which penal and other enactments interfere with vested rights, as a result of which, they were held to be prospective in nature.
However, in our judgment in ArcelorMittal, we have already held that resolution applicants have no vested right to be considered as such in the resolution process. Shri MukulRohatgi, however, argued that this judgment is distinguishable as no question of constitutional validity arose in this case, and no issue as to the vested right of a promoter fell for consideration. We are of the view that the observations made in ArcelorMittal directly arose on the facts of the case in order to oust the Ruias as promoters from the pale of consideration of their resolution plan, in which context, this Court held that they had no vested right to be considered as resolution applicants. Accordingly, we follow the aforesaid judgment. Since a resolution applicant who applies Under Section 29A(c) has no vested right to apply for being considered as a resolution applicant, this point is of no avail."
For reasons recorded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above
Judgments, the reasons recorded by the Adjudicating Authority to
stretch the interpretations so as to hold that once CIRP is commenced,
provisions as existing on the day of admission of the Petition would
continue to apply even in the face of amendment brought about by way of
Section 29A, the reasons cannot be maintained. Even the Respondent
No.2 - Bank of Baroda in its arguments (Diary No.25967) accepts that
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 13 Section 29A of IBC was with effect from 23rd November, 2017 and the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Swiss Ribbons vs. Union of India" (referred
supra) has upheld the insertion of Section 29A with retrospective effect.
16. From the above discussion, there is no doubt that at the time when
Mr. Wig submitted the One Time Settlement to the Bank, which was
converted by Respondent No.2 with the help of Appellant as a Resolution
Plan, he could not have done so. The arguments of Respondent No.2
show that it had already approved the OTS of Mr. Wig on 27th March,
2018. It also appears that Mr. Wig had already paid Rs.103 Lakhs to the
Bank. This can be seen from the Impugned Order where it has referred to
the compliance with Regulation 38 of CIRP Regulations in Para 14.1 of
the Impugned Order. Thus, what appears is that the OTS was already
approved by the Respondent No.2 Bank, which was the only Financial
Creditor and thus the actions taken on 5th April, 2018 in third COC and
20th April, 2018 were only completion of formalities. The subsequent
introduction of Section 240A of IBC and subsequent taking of certificate
of being MSME will not cure the ineligibility at the time of submitting
OTS-cum-Resolution Plan which was not permissible.
17. Considering the provisions of law and the fact as appearing from
the record, we find that the said Resolution Plan submitted by Mr. Wig
could not have been acted upon and the Appellant erred in presenting
the same before COC.
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019 14
18. For above reasons, the Impugned Order is required to be set aside.
We pass the following Order:-
ORDER
The Appeal is allowed. The Impugned Order
approving Resolution Plan is quashed and set
aside. The alleged Resolution Plan submitted by
Mr. Mahendra Wig is rejected.
The matter is remitted back to the
Adjudicating Authority. The Adjudicating Authority
is required to pass Orders of liquidation of the
Corporate Debtor under Section 33 of the IBC.
The Appeal is disposed accordingly. No
Orders as to costs.
[Justice A.I.S. Cheema] The Officiating Chairperson
[Kanthi Narahari] Member (Technical rs
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No.121 of 2019
This page reproduces a public judgment and a summary of it. It is research material, not legal advice, and it is no substitute for advice from an advocate on your own facts.
Research this judgment with Miss Lucy
Ask what it holds, what has followed it, and what it means for your matter — in plain English, with the citations.
Try Miss Lucy free