Manish Mittal & Ors. vs Sebi
- CitationAppeal No.144 of 2020
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where the Tribunal finds no sufficient cause shown for an inordinate delay, the discretion to condone delay under the limitation provision must be exercised judicially on the facts of each case, and cannot be extended on equitable grounds beyond what the statute expressly permits; a party's want of bona fides or unexplained inaction defeats the claim of sufficient cause, and an appeal filed in such circumstances, after a conscious choice of an alternative forum, is liable to be dismissed as a case of forum hunting. Where the limitation period under the statute is 45 days and the delay is unexplained, an explanation that is an afterthought, or that is contradicted by the record showing the appellants' awareness of the available forum, does not constitute sufficient cause, and the application for condonation is rejected on the ground of laches. An investor whose complaint has been disposed of without resolving the issues raised is not barred from filing a fresh complaint on the SCORES platform, and the regulator is obliged to decide such a fresh complaint in accordance with law.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
2020. Justification given by the appellants for not preferring an
appeal before this Tribunal was that the Tribunal was not
properly functioning on account of non-availability of a judicial
member and, on that account, had preferred a Writ Petition
before Delhi High Court on October 10, 2018.
4. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel Sri Fredun
De Vitre for SEBI as well as the learned senior counsel Sri
Venkatesh Dhond appearing for respondent no. 4 and Sri
Gyanendra Kumar for respondent no. 3 have vehemently
opposed the application for condonation of delay contending
that no sufficient cause has been shown by the appellants for
condoning the delay. It was contended that there is an
inordinate delay which has not been explained and the appeal
filed is neither bonafide nor filed in good faith. It was also
urged that the appellants are in a habit of forum hunting as and
when it suits them. No explanation has been given as to why
the appeal could not be preferred before the Tribunal after
passing of the impugned order when admittedly the Tribunal
was functioning.
6
5. Sri Gaurav Joshi the learned senior counsel for the
appellants urged that an identical order was set aside by this
Tribunal in the matter of Ashok Dayabhai Shah & Ors Vs.
SEBI & Ors. In Appeal No. 428 of 2019 decided on 14.11.2019
and therefore contended that the impugned order may be set
aside and SEBI may be directed to reconsider their complaint
against the private respondents. The learned senior counsel Sri
Gaurav Joshi further submitted that SEBI had challenged the
order of this Tribunal dated 14.11.2019 by filing Civil Appeal
No. 363 of 2020 which was dismissed by the Supreme Court by
an order dated 27.01.2020 and that the order of this Tribunal
was affirmed. Learned senior counsel Sri Joshi thus contended
that a similar order may be passed in the present appeal.
6. In this regard Sri Kaushik Chatterjee learned counsel for
Calcutta Stock Exchange Limited submitted that SEBI had
directed the Calcutta Stock Exchange to investigate the
companies which included the private companies arrayed in the
present appeal and, in this regard, the Calcutta Stock Exchange
(CSE) after investigating the matter has submitted a report to
SEBI in December 2019.
7
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some
length. We find that there is an inordinate delay of 834 days in
filing the present appeal. The impugned order is dated
December 20, 2017 and the appeal has been preferred after
more than 2 and ½ years on February 20, 2020. The limitation
for filing the appeal under Section 15T of the SEBI Act is 45
days from the date of the order. The contention that the
Tribunal was not functioning properly as the members were not
available is erroneous in as much as the Presiding Officer who
was a Judicial Member along with the Technical Member were
functioning till July 10, 2018 and thereafter the Tribunal was
entertaining the appeals which continued till December 2018
and thereafter on January 01, 2019 a new Presiding Officer took
charge. Thus, the appeal could have been filed during this
period. The explanation given is clearly an afterthought
especially when we find that some of the present respondents
had filed an Appeal No. 233 of 2017 against some order of the
Calcutta Stock Exchange wherein the appellants had filed an
intervention application during the same period. Thus it is clear
that the appellants were aware that they could have filed an
appeal against the impugned order before this Tribunal but for
the reasons best known the appellants chose the forum of a Writ
Jurisdiction before the Delhi High Court. 8
8. We also find that in an identical matter in the case of
Ashok Dayabhai Shah (supra) the Tribunal had set aside the
order of SEBI on the SCORES platform by judgement dated
14.11.2019. Considering this judgement, the appellants
withdrew the writ petition from the Delhi High Court on
29.11.2019 and has now filed present appeal seeking a similar
relief. The conduct of the appellants makes it clear that they are
only interested in forum shopping to suit their convenience.
9. In the light of the aforesaid, we are of the opinion that
there is an inordinate delay in filing the appeal. No valid or
bonafide explanation has been given by the appellants as to why
they could not prefer the appeal between January 2018 to
October 2018. In the absence of any plausible explanation, we
are of the opinion the appellants have not shown any sufficient
cause for condoning the delay. The appeal is neither bonafide
nor has been filed in good faith and is a clear case of forum
hunting.
10. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 the Supreme Court held that the
discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judicially
based on facts and circumstances of each case and that 9
sufficient cause cannot be given a liberal interpretation if lack of
bonafide is attributed to a party. The Supreme Court further
held that delay cannot be condoned on equitable ground beyond
the limits permitted expressly by statute.
11. The Supreme Court in Ram Nath Sao and Ors. (supra)
held that the expression „sufficient cause‟ should receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence or inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to
a party. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court
in Madanlal vs. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535.
12. In Balwant Singh (Dead) vs Jagdish Singh & Ors,
(2010) 8 SCC 685 Supreme Court held that the expression
"sufficient cause" means the presence of legal and adequate
reasons. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the
appellant are of no avail and, in any case, not applicable in
the present circumstance of the case.
13. This Tribunal is possessed with the exercise of judicial
discretion in condoning the delay if sufficient or adequate
reason is given. It is also a settled proposition of law that the
law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it 10
has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of
limitation on equitable grounds as held by the Supreme Court
in Basawaraj and Anr. (supra).In the instant case we do find
any legal or adequate reasons to condone the delay.
14. Thus for the reasons stated aforesaid, we do not find any
reason to condone the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. The
Misc. Application No. 153 of 2020 for condoning the delay is
rejected on the ground of laches as a result of which Appeal No.
144 of 2020 is also dismissed with no order as to costs.
15. We had made a query to the learned senior counsel for the
respondents as to whether there is a bar for an investor to file a
fresh complaint on the SCORES platform. We find that there is
no bar. Further, the impugned order did not resolve the issues
raised by the appellants. The respondent no. 1 disposed of the
complaint in a mechanical manner. Thus it is always open to the
appellants to file a fresh complaint for resolution of its
complaints. Thus, while dismissing the appeal, we direct that in
the event the appellants files a fresh complaint within four
weeks from today before SEBI the same shall be tagged with
the complaint of Ashok Dayabhai Shah and others which is 11
under investigation and SEBI will be under an obligation to
decide the complaint of the appellants in accordance with law.
16. The present matter was heard through video conference
due to Covid-19 pandemic. At this stage it is not possible to sign
a copy of this order nor a certified copy of this order could be
issued by the Registry. In these circumstances, this order will be
digitally signed by the Presiding Officer on behalf of the bench
and all concerned parties are directed to act on the digitally
signed copy of this order. Parties will act on production of a
digitally signed copy sent by fax and/or email.
TARUN Digitally signed by TARUN AGARWAL DN: c=IN, st=Uttar Pradesh, 2.5.4.20=a0e08b2d80e9d23c2c2aa Justice Tarun Agarwala AGAR 3e16780d684adad6bc9e810de2d7 b0c28efd35557c9, postalCode=211001, street=B/ A,NYAYA MARG ALLAHABAD, Presiding Officer serialNumber=095f8b286bb0b1cd
WAL 07ff676611f4f5e7999727d404aa38 ca422f9d3529bdb8a3, o=Personal, cn=TARUN AGARWAL Date: 2020.06.26 11:48:15 +05'30'
Dr. C.K.G. Nair Member
Justice M. T. Joshi Judicial Member 25.06.2020 PK
This page reproduces a public judgment and a summary of it. It is research material, not legal advice, and it is no substitute for advice from an advocate on your own facts.
Research this judgment with Miss Lucy
Ask what it holds, what has followed it, and what it means for your matter — in plain English, with the citations.
Try Miss Lucy free