M/S. Videocon Industries Pvt. Ltd vs Commissioner Of Customs (Appeals), ...

(Arising out of Order-in-Appeal No. 217/MCH/DC/BOND/2013 dated 18.3.2013 passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) Mumbai Zone-I )

For approval and signature: Honble Mr. P.S.Pruthi, Member (Technical)

Honble Mr. Ramesh Nair, Member (Judicial)

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1. Whether Press Reporters may be allowed to see : No the Order for publication as per Rule 27 of the CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982?

2. Whether it should be released under Rule 27 of the : No CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982 for publication in any authoritative report or not?

3. Whether Their Lordships wish to see the fair copy : Seen of the Order?

4. Whether Order is to be circulated to the Departmental : Yes authorities?

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M/s. Videocon Industries Pvt. Ltd. : Appellant

VS

Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), Mumbai : Respondent

Appearance

Shri K. R. Bulchandani, Advocate for Appellant

Shri M.K. Sarangi, Joint Commissioner (A.R) for respondent

CORAM:

Mr. P.S.Pruthi, Member (Technical) Mr. Ramesh Nair, Member (Judicial)

Date of hearing : 29/7/2015 Date of decision : 27/8/2015

ORDER NO.

Per : P.S. Pruthi

This case arises out of Order-in-Appeal dt. 18.3.2013 under which the Commissioner(Appeals) upheld the order of the adjudicating authority confirming demand of duty of Rs.3,61,21,722/- under Section 72(1) of the Customs Act 1962 on goods remaining in the warehouse beyond the expiry of Bond period. Penalty of Rs.1 lakh was also imposed under Section 117 and the request for relinquishment of title to the goods under Section 68 was rejected.

Miscellaneous application is also filed praying for restraining Customs from initiating any recovery proceedings pending the hearing and final disposal of the appeal. An application for stay of penalty pending hearing of the appeal was also filed. These applications are also taken up along with the main appeal.

2. The appellant and their Associate companies stored goods imported by them in their Private bonded warehouse at Vashi. On 21.6.2001 they requested for extension of 28 time expired bonds which had expired between 16.7.1996 and 29.6.2001 along with a request to transfer these goods to their 100% EOU at Aurangabad. Later, on 6.9.2001 the request was modified for extension of bond in respect of 25 bonds and their re-export instead of transferring to EOU. The duty involved in respect of 25 bonds is stated to be Rs. 3.46 Crores. Another revised request was made on 23.10.2001 for bond extension and re-export in respect of 16 bonds (expired between June 2000 and May 2001) involving duty of Rs.2.1crores plus interest. As the 100% EOU at Aurangabad was given permission in 2000 and all the bonds had expired prior to that, the request was not considered. Appellants were directed to clear the goods on payment of Customs dues vide departments letter dt. 30.1.2002. The appellants request for re-export of the goods under Section 69 vide Shipping Bill dt. 25.7.2002 was not allowed.

2.1 The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 2238/2002 challenging the action of the department on their various request letters. The Honble High Court rejected the permission to re-export on 24.9.2002 on the ground that Section 69 operates only within the validity of bond period. The SLP filed by them against the Order of the High Court was dismissed as withdrawn. Their subsequent requests on 21.6.2007 and 12.7.2007 for extension of bond period for re-export were rejected by the Chief Commissioner and they were directed to pay duty and interest. The appeal against this rejection was rejected by Commissioner (Appeals) vide Order-in-Appeal dt. 17.3.2008 for want of jurisdiction. Against this order they went in appeal before CESTAT which was dismissed as withdrawn vide Order dt. 18.8.2009. On being sent a notice on 15.10.2009 for payment of duty, the appellant vide letter dt. 28.10.2009 sought relinquishment of the title to the goods in respect of 24 bonds, relying on the Honble High Court of Karnataka decision in the case of Commissioner of Customs Bangalore Vs. i2 Technology Software Ltd. 2007 (217) ELT 176 (KAR). Finally a show cause notice for recovery of duty was issued by the Assistant Commissioner on 1.10.2010 demanding duty under Section 72, interest under Section 47 and penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act. Under Order-in-Original dt. 28.6.2011, the duty of Rs. 3.61 Crores was confirmed. In appeal the Commissioner (Appeals) directed them to make pre-deposit of 60% of the entire demand. The appellant challenged this order before Mumbai High Court which disposed the case vide order dt. 8.5.2012 asking the Commissioner to hear the case. Finally the Commissioner passed impugned Order dt 18-03-2013 against which the Appellant are in appeal before us.

3. Heard both sides.

4. The Ld. Advocate appearing for the appellant raised some preliminary objections. He stated that Section 122 of the Customs Act limits the powers of Assistant Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner to adjudicate only where the value of goods does not exceed Rs.2,00,000/- whereas in this case the value is in Crores. Secondly, copies of Demand notices under Section 72(1) and 72(2) of the Customs Act, as mentioned in the relied upon documents in Annexure to the show cause notice dt. 1.10.2010 were never supplied to them at any stage resulting in breach of principles of natural justice. The demand notice under Section 71(1) & 72(2) was received in respect of only one Bond bearing No. GB/VIL/I-33 dt. 15.6.2004. He also objected that the show cause notice was issued under Section 124 which falls under Chapter XIV of the Act and contemplates SCN only for confiscation and penalty, whereas in the SCN issued, duties have been demanded under Section 72 falling under Chapter IX, which is beyond the scope of Section 124 of the Act. Further, the demand of interest under Section 47 can be raised only on filing of ex-bond Bills of Entries and in any case Section 47 too does not fall under Chapter XIV. Penalty is provided in Section 72(1) which is also under chapter IX and therefore no show cause notice can be issued under Section 124 invoking provisions of Chapter IX. Therefore SCN under Section 124 falling under Chapter XIV cannot demand penalty. He added that there is no demand of penalty under the notice issued for demand of duty issued in respect of one Bond. Lastly, adjudication on relinquishment under Section 68 falling under Chapter IX cannot be conducted under a show cause notice issued under Section 124 of the Act.

4.1. On merits it was emphasised that the show cause notice under Section 72 is a pre-requisite; otherwise no liability accrues. He relied on Sanjay Dhanuka Vs. Commissioner of Customs 1993 (66) ELT 361 (Cal.). He distinguished the case of Indo Pacific Polyfibres Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Belapur 2012 (280) ELT 97 (Tri. Mumbai) relied upon by department stating that in the instant case no notices were issued under Section 72.

4.2 It was argued that the appellant exercised their right of relinquishment under letters dt. 28.10.2009 and 6.11.2009 before an order for clearance for home consumption is made, as allowed under the first proviso to Section 68. The appellants never lost their title to the subject goods and consequently have not lost their right to relinquish their title to such warehoused goods because the department had not exercised its rights under Section 72(1) or under Section 72(2) when the title was relinquished. He relied on the Karnataka High Court judgment in the case of Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore Vs. i2 Technology Software Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Countering the reliance placed by Revenue on the case of Kesoram Rayon Vs. Commissioner of Customs 1996 (86) ELT 464-SC., he stated that the Apex Court considered deemed removal only in the context of determination of rate of duties under Section 15(1) (b) of the Act and did not hold that deemed improper removal is an offence. Deeming provisions have to be strictly construed. He relied on K.S. Dharma Data Vs. Central Government 1997 (4) SCC 204. Arguing strongly that no offence has been committed in terms of second proviso to Section 68 he stated that Sections 132 to 135A of the Act (Chapter XVI) categorized the various offences under the Act. In these provisions deemed removal of bonded goods is not categorized as an offence. Deemed removal cannot be construed as an offence because the custody of goods remains with the department. Therefore second proviso to Section 68 will not apply their case so as to prevent them from relinquishing the title to the goods.

4.3 Ld counsel distinguished the case of Commissioner of Central Excise Mysore-II Vs. Decorative Laminates (I) Pvt. Ltd. 2010 ((257) E.L.T. 61 (Kar.) relied upon by the Ld A.R. He contended that this case was dealing with Remission of duty under Section 23 and not with the relinquishment of title under Section 68. He also distinguished the case of Equipment Vs. Union of India 2004 (163) ELT 303 (Kar.) in which the Karnataka High Court held that once steps had been taken to auction the goods, question of relinquishment of the goods does not arise. But in their case notices were never served under Section 72 and therefore, the question of department having taken steps to auction the goods did not arise at all. Further he relied on the i2 Technology Software Pvt. Ltd. (supra) which held that there is no prohibition on relinquishment of the title to the goods after expiry of warehouse period. According to him the Department cannot rely on PSI Data System Vs. CC, Bangalore 2004 (163) ELT 302 (Kar.) because it was held that relinquishment of title is not permissible once the Customs authorities determine the duty. He contended that in the instant case for want of notice under Section 72(1), it cannot be said that duties have been determined Lastly, he stated that notices under Section 72(1) and 72(2) of the Act were issued for the first time on 27.5.2013 and received by the appellants on 11.6.2013 after the impugned order-in-appeal dt. 18.3.2013. Therefore, the entire false case of the department stands exposed.

4.4. On interest he stated that Section 47 is applicable only on clearance of goods for home consumption which has not taken place. On penalty he stated that invocation under Section 117 is not maintainable there being specific provisions under Section 72(1)&(2) of the Act.

5. Ld. A.R. appearing for the department stated that the appellant received letters dt. 19.11.2007 (for 10 bonds) and dt. 5.12.2007 (for 14 bonds) in which they were directed to pay duty and interest while the permission for re-export was denied. Thereafter a few reminders were sent. Hence it is not correct to say that they (appellant) have not received any demand notice. Further the impugned Order is passed with reference to Section 72(1) and it not necessary to exhaust the option under Section 72(2) till the importer files an ex-bond Bill of Entry. As regards non-supply of documents he stated that the full facts were brought to the knowledge of the High Court of Mumbai in Writ Petition No. 2238/2002 filed by the appellant. However, the High Court rejected the permission to re-export on the ground that Section 69 operates only within the validity of the Bond period. According to him, the provisions of Section 122 regarding value limits apply only to confiscation. And for penalty, Section 117 is rightly invoked.

5.1 On the merits of the case, he relied on Videocon International Ltd. Vs. Union of India 2003 (155) ELT 25 (Bom.). As regards reliance placed by the appellant on the case of i2 Technology Software Pvt. Ltd. (supra) it was stated that a similar argument ( as made in that case) was made by the counsel in the case of Videocon International Ltd. (supra) which was not accepted by the Honble Mumbai High Court. According to him, the views of jurisdictional High Court will prevail. The Kartanaka High Court in i2 Technology Software Pvt. Ltd. (supra) distinguished the Apex Court decision in Kesoram Rayon case by observing that in the said case the demand notice was issued by the department after the request of the company for extension of bond. In the present case, the relinquishment has been sought after the issue of demand notice. The Ld. AR relied on the case of U.K. Paint Industries Vs. CC 2014 (306) ELT 284 (Del.) which held that, by deeming fiction, the Customs duty becomes immediately payable under Section 72 even when the Bill of Entry for home consumption has not been filed and the goods have not been actually removed from the bonded warehouse. He referred to the case of PSI Data Systems (supra) which held that abandonment/relinquishment of title of goods under Section 23(2) after lapse of many years is not allowed. In the case of Commissioner Vs. Decorative Laminates (I) Pvt. Ltd.(supra) it was held that the expression at any time before clearance for home consumption in Section 23 means permitted time period of warehousing and not any period after expiry of warehousing period. In this case, the decisions of Videocon International Ltd. (supra) and i2 Technology Software Pvt. Ltd. (supra) were brought to the knowledge of the Karnataka High Court. Finally, he referred to the case of Allied Fibres Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai 2014 (309) E.L.T. 535 (Tri. Mumbai) wherein after considering all judgments it was held that once the warehousing period has expired the goods are deemed to be improperly removed and the appellants are required to pay duty under Section 72(1) irrespective of the fact that the appellant wanted to abandon or relinquish the title to the goods.

6. We have considered the submissions made by both sides. There are some preliminary objections raised by the appellant which may be addressed first before coming to the core issue of this case. The first objection is that notices were never issued under Sections 72(1) and 72 (2) of the Customs Act. We find that the appellant were issued a letter dt. 30.1.2002 asking the appellants to clear the goods on payment of duty. Non mentioning of Section 72 in this letter does not make it null and void especially when the terms and conditions of the Bond are that the goods remain warehoused till the time of expiry of the Bond or Warehousing period under Section 61 and duty is payable thereafter. The appellant is well aware that on failure to undertake clearance within warehousing period, the duty becomes payable under Section 72(1). Thus the argument that Demand Notices were not issued is merely, in a manner of speaking, an effort in raising technicalities which have no substance. In our view this letter can be taken to be a notice under Section 72. Our view is supported by the facts stated in the Writ Petition No. 2238/2202. In this petition the entire history of the case up till that time was brought to the knowledge of the Honble High Court including their request for permission to re-export the goods under Shipping Bill No. 12373 dt. 25.7.2002. The Honble High Court found the plea untenable in their Order dt. 24.9.2002. Therefore to raise such a plea after 12 years of the High Court decision is a feeble attempt to rake up a matter on flimsy grounds and an attempt to somehow bypass the High Court Order. It is an unnecessary attempt to delay the judicial process. We firmly believe that this objection is to be rejected.

6.1 Another objection raised is that the show cause notice dt 1.10.2010 which has led to the present Appeal was issued under Section 124 whereas the demands were confirmed under Section 72(1) of the Act. We find that Section 124 is merely mentioned in the caption of the show cause notice. The body of the show cause notice clearly refers to duty payable under Section 72(1) of the Act. Even in the final para of the SCN where the demand is actually raised, duty is demanded only under Section 72(1). Therefore we find the objection has no force.

6.2 Another objection raised is that the show cause notice was made answerable to the Commissioner but was adjudicated by the Deputy Commissioner. We find that the Deputy Commissioner can adjudicate cases of confiscation where the value of goods is less than Rs. 2 lakhs in terms of Section 122, as it stood before 28-05-2012. We observe that the value limits prescribed in Section 122 apply only to cases where goods are to be confiscated. A plain reading of Section 122 shows that the limitations clearly do not apply to cases where penalty is to be imposed and in the case at hand only penalty is proposed and not confiscation.

6.3 Another issue raised is that adjudication of relinquishment cannot be conducted under Section 124 of the Act. We find that the body and the final para of the SCN involve demand of duty under Section 72(1) and consideration of request of relinquishment under Section 68. And this is precisely what has been done. We find this objection frivolous.

7. To facilitate the examination of the issue on merits, the relevant provisions which are also referred in various judgments cited by both sides are reproduced for convenience of discussion.

SECTION 23. Remission of duty on lost, destroyed or abandonedgoods. 

(2) The owner of any imported goods may, at any time before an order for clearance of goods for home consumption under section 47 or an order for permitting the deposit of goods in a warehouse under section 60 has been made, relinquish his title to the goods and thereupon he shall not be liable to pay the duty thereon.

SECTION 68. Clearance of warehoused goods for home consumption.  The importer of any warehoused goods may clear them for home consumption, if 

(a) a bill of entry for home consumption in respect of such goods has been presented in the prescribed form;

(b) the import duty leviable on such goods and all penalties, rent, interest and other charges payable in respect of such goods have been paid; and

(c) an order for clearance of such goods for home consumption has been made by the proper officer.

Provided that the owner of any warehoused goods may, at any time before an order for clearance of goods for home consumption has been made in respect of such goods, relinquish his title to the goods upon payment of rent, interest, other charges and penalties that may be payable in respect of the goods and upon such relinquishment, he shall not be liable to pay duty thereon.

Provided further that the owner of any such warehoused goods shall not be allowed to relinquish his title to such goods regarding which an offence appears to have been committed under this Act or any other law for the time being in force.

SECTION 69. Clearance of warehoused goods for exportation.  (1) Any warehoused goods may be exported to a place outside India without payment of import duty if 

(a) a shipping bill or a bill of export has been presented in respect of such goods in the prescribed form;

(b) the export duty, penalties, rent, interest and other charges payable in respect of such goods have been paid; and

(c) an order for clearance of such goods for exportation has been made by the proper officer.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if the Central Government is of opinion that warehoused goods of any specified description are likely to be smuggled back into India, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that such goods shall not be exported to any place outside India without payment of duty or may be allowed to be so exported subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be specified in the notification.

SECTION 72. Goods improperly removed from warehouse, etc.  (1) In any of the following cases, that is to say, -

(a) where any warehoused goods are removed from a warehouse in contravention of section 71;

(b) where any warehoused goods have not been removed from a warehouse at the expiration of the period during which such goods are permitted under section 61 to remain in a warehouse;

(c) where any warehoused goods have been taken under section 64 as samples without payment of duty;

(d) where any goods in respect of which a bond has been executed under section 59 and which have not been cleared for home consumption or exportation are not duly accounted for to the satisfaction of the proper officer, the proper officer may demand, and the owner of such goods shall forthwith pay, the full amount of duty chargeable on account of such goods together with all penalties, rent, interest and other charges payable in respect of such goods

(2) If any owner fails to pay any amount demanded under sub-section (1), the proper officer may, without prejudice to any other remedy, cause to be detained and sold, after notice to the owner (any transfer of the goods notwithstanding) such sufficient portion of his goods, if any, in the warehouse, as the said officer may select.

The central issue to be decided is whether in terms of Section 68 proviso, the appellant have a right to relinquish their title to the time expired warehoused goods in respect of which a demand of duty has been raised under Section 72(1) and the duty demand confirmed in the terms of the Order-in-Original dt. 28.6.2011. The appellant are taking the plea that they had relinquished the title to the goods by letters dt. 28.10.2009, 6.11.2009 and 15.12.2009, whereas the show cause notice demanding duty was issued on 1.10.2010. We have already observed that the department had addressed letters to the appellant as far back as 2002 asking them to deposit duty. The entire facts regarding notices issued, whether in the form of letters or otherwise, were in the knowledge of the High Court when it passed its Order dated 24-09-2002 rejecting the prayer of the appellant to allow the re-export. Therefore, raking up the same issue at this stage has no meaning. Reliance on the case of Sanjay Dhanuka (supra) also does not help because in that case no demand was issued under Section 72 of the Act whereas in the present case letter was issued followed by reminders demanding duty under Section 72 of the Act. That the warehouse goods were not cleared from the warehouse within the stipulated time period laid down in Section 61 is an undisputed fact. It is also seen that the Courts have held that the goods which are not removed from a warehouse within the permissible period are treated as goods improperly removed from the warehouse under the provisions of Section 72. Thus in the present case the goods have to be treated as improperly removed. In such circumstances the proper officer may demand the full amount of duty chargeable on account of such goods together with all penalties, rent, interest and other charges payable. There is no doubt about this legal provision in the Act.

7.1 But the contention of the appellant is that even in respect of such goods which have outlived their warehousing period in terms of the Bond executed, the appellant are still entitled to relinquish their title to the goods upon payment of rent, interest and other charges. And that on payment of such charges they are not liable to pay duty thereon. According to the appellant, the first proviso to Section 68 states that they may relinquish the title to the goods at any time before the order for clearance of goods for home consumption has been made. The argument is that in terms of the definitions of warehouse and warehouse goods in Sections 2 (43) and 2(44) respectively, read with the provisions of Section 68, it is clear that the goods remain warehouse goods even after the expiry of the period prescribed under Section 61. As such, since no order for clearance for home consumption was made in respect of the warehoused goods, they are entitled to relinquish the title to the goods in terms of the first proviso to Section 68. We find that the arguments raised by the Ld. Counsel now were also raised by them in Writ Petition 2238/2002 filed in the Mumbai High Court when they sought to re-export the warehoused goods in terms of Section 69 of the Act. The Honble High Court held that This contention canvassed,, is devoid of any substance in view of the specific provision made in Section 72(b) of the Act to meet this contingency Section 72 (b) specifically lays down that where an warehoused goods have not been removed form warehouse at the expiration of the period during which such godos are permitted to remain warehouse under Section 61 of the Act, then the proper officer may demand, and on such demand the owner of duty chargeable on account of such goods together with all penalties, rent, interest and other charges payable in respect of such goods.

In our view, Section 69 of the Act will operate only during the validity period of the warehousing under Section 61 of theAct and not thereafter. Once the period has expired, then Section 72 of the Act will operate and in the facts of this case Section 72(b) in particular will operate.

Although the Honble High Court was concerned with Section 69, we find that in line with the reasons given by the High Court, the same reasoning will apply to the present case which is concerned with relinquishment under Section 68.

7.2. A similar issue came up before the Honble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Decorative Laminates (supra). In this case the High Court was concerned with the issue of remission of duty under Section 23 of the Act. It was held that  Therefore the expression at any time before clearance for home consumption would mean the time period as per the initial order during which the goods are warehoused or before the expiry of the extended date for clearance and not any period after the lapse of the afore said periods. The said expression cannot extend to a period after the lapse of the extended period merely because the licence holder has not cleared the goods within the stipulated time.When the goods are not cleared within the period or extended period as given by the authorities, their continuance in the warehouse will not attract Section 23 of the Act.  In this context the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Videocon International Ltd. is applicable and therefore the authorities concerned were justified in making demand for payment of customs duty. Whereas the decision of this Court in i2 Technologies Software Private Ltd. are not applicable considering the facts of the present case. We find the provisions of Section 23 and Section 69 are similar. Both provide that the title to the goods may be relinquished before an order for clearance of goods for home consumption has been made. In these circumstances, the decision of the High Court leads to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 68 regarding relinquishment will not be attracted when the goods are not cleared within the permitted period of warehousing. The Honble High Court having considered the judgement in the case of i2 Technology Software Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) before arriving at its decision, therefore the reliance placed by the Ld. Counsel on the latter judgment ( i2 Technology) does not help the cause of the appellant.

7.3. The Ld. AR also relied on the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of PSI System (supra) which held that the relinquishment of title of goods is not permissible after a lapse of number of years. In the present case we note that although the warehousing period expired in the years 1996 to 2001, the request for relinquishment came in the year 2009 i.e. after 8 years, that too when the judgment in the case of i2 Technology Software was delivered. It certainly appears that the appellant have tried to delay the payment of duties on some pretext or the other. As we have noted above, the judgments in the case of Videocon (supra), Decorative Laminate (supra) and PSI System (supra) have sealed their fate. The Tribunal in the case of Allied Fibers Ltd. (supra) also took this view.

7.4. The Ld. Counsel strongly argued that the judgment in the case of Kesoram Rayon Vs. Collector (supra) did not decide the issue at hand. It only decided the date which is to be considered as relevant for determining the rate of duty. However, we note that the Honble Apex Court certainly decided that the Goods which are not removed from a warehouse within the permissible period are treated as goods improperly removed from the warehouse. Such improper removal takes place when the goods remain in the warehouse beyond the permitted period or its permitted extension. The importer of the goods may be called upon to pay Customs duty on them and, necessarily, it would be payable at the rate applicable on the date of their deemed removal from the warehouse, that is, the date on which the permitted period or its permitted extension came to an end . Therefore, the principle in this issue stands decided as above.

8. We would like to point out that the first proviso to Section 68, which allowed relinquishment, was introduced on 14.5.2003, that is well after the expiry of warehousing periods in respect of all Bonds in the present case. However, we are not passing any decision on this aspect, having already come to a conclusion in preceding paragraphs. An argument taken by the Ld. Counsel is that no offence is committed in terms of the second proviso to Section 68 which provides that the owner of warehouse goods shall not be allowed to relinquish the title to such goods regarding which an offence has been committed. We do not think it necessary to discuss this aspect when we have already decided the issue in terms of the first proviso, basing our decision on various judgements of the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

9. The Ld. Counsel argued that interest has been demanded under Section 47 of the Act and not under Section 72(1). We find from the body of the show cause notice at para 13 that interest and penalty have been demanded under Section 72(1). In these circumstances, therefore the plea that interest and penalty have been wrongly demanded under Section 47 and 117 is unacceptable. Mere quoting of another Section in the show cause notice when the appropriate Section has also been quoted does not make the confirmation of interest and penalty illegal.

10. In view of the above discussion, the demand of duty in respect of time expired warehoused goods is confirmed. The penalty is also upheld. And the claim for relinquishment of the title of the goods is rejected in terms of various Court decisions discussed in preceding paras. However we note that in the long history of the case various letters were issued in respect of the bonds whose validity period had expired. The exact amount of duty that must be paid by the appellant may be worked out by the adjudicating authority corresponding to the amount mentioned in the time expired bonds.

11. The appeal is disposed in the above terms.

12. Miscellaneous application and stay application also stand disposed.

(Pronounced in court on 27/08/2015)

(Ramesh Nair) Member (Judicial)

(P.S.Pruthi) Member (Technical)

SM.

21 Application No. C/MA(ORS)95445/2013 & Application No. C/S/95444/2013 In Appeal No. C/87027/2013