K.D. Deshmukh vs Amritlal Jayaswal
- SCC1993 Supp (1) SCC 50
- AIRAIR 1992 SC 164
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
An amendment to an election petition cannot introduce an entirely new ground of challenge that falls outside the 45-day period prescribed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 for filing an election petition, and the High Court errs in allowing such an amendment on the basis that the limitation objection will be decided on the merits at the final hearing of the petition.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
1. This Appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 4-4-1991. The parties filed nomination papers for election to Legislative Assembly Madhya Pradesh for Constituency No. 180 Waraseoni, District Balaghat (Madhya Pradesh). 3rd February, 1990 was the date for filing nomination papers and 5th February, 90 for scrutiny. Election was held on 27th February, 1990 and the appellant before us was declared elected on 28th February, 1990.
2. The respondent having lost in the election by a margin of 1476 votes filed an election petition on 12th April, 1990. The petition was filed under Section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The only ground taken in the election petition was that the nomination papers of 3 candidates were wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer. During the proceedings of the election petition statement of Returning Officer Shri S. R. Mohanti was recorded on 6th March, 1991 and the Returning Officer in his cross-examination made the following statement :
Respondent K. D. Deshmukh did not read out the particular line in the oath.
3. The respondent who had filed the election petition then submitted an application for amendment in the original election petition to add a ground that the oath administered to the appellant was not in proper form. This amendment application submitted on 8th March, 1991 was allowed by the High Court by the impugned order dated 4th April, 1991. The appellant took time on 5th April, 1991 to file the amended written statement.
4. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and we are inclined to allow this appeal. It is an admitted position that the result of the election was declared on 28-2-1990 and the election petition could have been filed within 45 days of such result. It is also an admitted position that on 8-3-91 when the amendment application was filed, the said period of 45 days had expired long back. The ground now sought to be raised by way of amendment is totally a new ground falling under Section 100(1)(d) of the Act. The original petition was filed on the ground of improper rejection of nomination papers of 3 candidates under Section 100(1)(c) of the Act, and the ground now sought to be raised by amendment is of improper acceptance of nomination paper of the appellant himself under Section 100(1)(d) of the Act. In our view the High Court was wrong in allowing the amendment application and in taking the view that the objection regarding limitation shall be decided while disposing of the election petition on merits finally. This approach of the High Court is totally wrong inasmuch as no amendment could have been allowed by which totally a new ground was sought to be taken and which was clearly beyond limitation on 8-3-91, the date of filing the amendment application.
5. In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court dated 4-4-91 and as a result of which the amendment application filed by the respondent stands dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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