Htc Impex Private Limited vs M/S Santipara Tea Company Limited
- CitationComp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where the Corporate Debtor's liability in respect of a claim was confirmed only through a winding-up petition later disposed of on the ground that it was not maintainable without the Central Government's consent, the limitation period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for an application under Section 9 of the IBC is not extended by the pendency of that petition, where the creditor, though given liberty to take steps in accordance with law, did not seek that consent. A decision of the Supreme Court in a case to which neither the operational creditor nor the corporate debtor was a party has no bearing on the computation of limitation for the operational creditor's application under Section 9 of the IBC.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022 & I.A. No.4948 of 2022 IN THE MATTER OF: HTC Impex Pvt. Ltd. ....Appellant Vs. Santipara Tea Company Ltd. ....Respondent
Present: For Appellant: Ms. Sonal Shah, Advocate For Respondent: Mr. Manish Paliwal and Ms. Megha Yadav, Advocates
JUDGMENT
Per: Justice Rakesh Kumar Jain:
This appeal is directed against the order dated 21.09.2022 by
which an application bearing C.P. No. 166/KB/2020 filed by the
Appellant as Operational Creditor under Section 9 of the IBC, 2016
(In short 'Code') to initiate the Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process against the Corporate Debtor (M/s Santipara Tea
Company Limited) has been dismissed on the ground of limitation.
2. The case set up by the Appellant is that it was engaged in the
business of Agrochemicals, Insecticides, Herbicides and Pesticides
etc. Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022 2
3. Pursuant to various purchase orders placed in the year 2012
by the Corporate Debtor, the Appellant supplied the goods and
raised invoices upon each delivery.
4. It is alleged that the Corporate Debtor received the goods
without any protest about its quality, quantity or branding and
against the goods supplied, the Corporate Debtor used to make on
account payment, making the account of the Corporate Debtor a
running and continuous one.
5. It is alleged that the first default occurred 90 days after the
date of the first bill raised by the Appellant on 31.01.2012 whereas
the last supply was made on 15.05.2012. It is further alleged that
the last on account payment was made against the supplies made
was on 05.08.2014 for a sum of Rs. 20,000/-.
6. The Appellant has claimed a sum of Rs. 7,24,530/- with
interest @ 14% p.a. and has alleged that this amount has been
confirmed by the Corporate Debtor vide its letter dated
09.03.2015.
7. It is further alleged that the Appellant filed a winding up
proceeding under Section 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956
(in short 'Act') before the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta bearing
Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022 3
C.P. No. 161 of 2016 but the said petition was disposed of on
29.03.2016 by the Hon'ble High Court in view of Tea Act, 1953 and
notification dated 28.01.2016 with liberty to the Appellant to take
necessary steps in accordance with law. The order dated
29.03.2016 passed by the Hon'ble High Court is reproduced as
under:-
"The Court: This winding up application arises out of certain claims of the petitioning creditor relating to supplies made on diverse dates to Demdima Tea Estate/ Garden, which, admittedly, is owned by the company. At the time of hearing of the matter, learned advocate representing the company refers to a notification issued by the Central Government on 28th January, 2016, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 16E of the Tea Act, 1953 whereby the Central Government has authorised the Tea Board to take immediate steps to take over the management or the control of Demdima Tea Estate and six other tea gardens as per the provisions of Chapter IIIA of the Tea Act, 1953. He submits that in view of the embargo under sub- section (1)(c) of section 16G of the Tea Act, 1953, no proceeding for winding up of the company, being the owner of the tea garden, shall lie before this Court except with the consent of the Central Government. Upon perusing the relevant provision of law, as cited by the learned advocate representing the company, and upon taking into consideration the notification dated 28th January, 2016, it is clear that a proceeding for winding up of the company cannot lie before this Court in the facts and circumstances of the instant case except with the consent of the Central Government, particularly,
Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022 4
because of the reason that the instant winding up petition has been filed on 19th February, 2016,i.e., after the relevant notification dated 28th January, 2016 has come into effect.
The winding up application is, therefore, disposed of with liberty to the petitioning creditor to take necessary steps in accordance with law.
Urgent photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities."
8. The notification dated 28.01.2016 is also reproduced as
under:-
"MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (Department of Commerce) NOTIFICATION New Delhi, the 28th January,2016 S.O. 260(E).-Whereas attention of the Central Government has been drawn through various representations to the deteriorating condition of the tea gardens of West Bengal, in particular the tea gardens owned and managed by M/s Duncan Industries Ltd. And whereas, the Tea Board under direction of the Central Government caused inspection of all the fourteen gardens owned by M/s Dunca Industries Ltd. and submitted a report; And whereas, a report on the status of stressed tea gardens in West Bengal was also received from the State Government of West Bengal; And whereas, the situation of the said tea gardens has been assessed by the Central Government on the basis of the report of the Tea Board and the State Government of West Bengal and consultations with the stakeholders of Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022 5
tea sector; And whereas, the Central Government is of the considered opinion that the tea gardens as listed below are being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the tea industry and to public interest:
(i) Birpara Tea Estate
(ii) Garganda Tea Estate
(iii)Lankapara Tea Estate
(iv)Tulsipara Tea Estate
(v) Huntapara Tea Estate (vi) Dhumchipara Tea Estate
(vii) Demadima Tea Estate Now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section(1) of section 16E of the Tea Act, 1953 (29 of 1953), the Central Government hereby authorises the Tea Board to take immediate steps to take over the management or the control of the above seven tea estates as per the provisions of Chapter IIIA of the Tea Act, 1953 (29 of 1953).
F. No. T-22015/1/2016-Plant(A)] RAJANI RANJAN RASHMI, Addl. Secy."
9. It is the case of the Appellant that limitation would start to
run from August, 2014 when last payment was made and stopped
whereas the winding up proceedings were continued till
04.10.2019 when the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court came
in the case of Duncans Industries Limited Vs. A.J. Agrochem,
(2019) 4 SCC 17.
Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022 6
10. On the other hand, the case set up by the Corporate Debtor
is that the first supply was made on 31.01.2012 and the last
supply was made on 15.05.2012. It is also the case of the
Respondent that the last payment was made on 05.08.2014. The
petition under Section 9, having been filed in January, 2020, is
clearly barred by limitation and the limitation would not stop
running on account of filing of CP No. 161 of 2016 before the High
Court under Section 433 and 434 of the Act, 1956. It is also the
case of the Respondent that the decision in the case of Duncans
Industries Limited (Supra) has nothing to do with the extension of
limitation in view of Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
11. Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that the last date of
supply of goods to the Respondent was 15.05.2012, the last on
account payment made by the Respondent was on 05.08.2014 and
the confirmation of accounts was done on 09.03.2015. The period
of limitation is three years in terms of Article 137 of the Act, 1963.
Winding up petition under Sections 433 and 434 of the Act, 1956
was filed on 19.02.2016 within the period of limitation but before
the said petition, a notification came on 28.01.2016 and vide order
dated 29.03.2016 the Hon'ble High Court, while disposing of the
petition, filed by the Appellant, held that because of the notification
Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022 7
dated 28.01.2016, which came prior to the filing of petition under
Section 433 and 434 of the Act, 1956 on 19.02.2016, it was
necessary for the Appellant to have taken the permission from the
Central Government to file the application for winding up,
therefore, said petition was disposed of with the liberty to take
necessary steps in accordance with law. It is submitted that
notification dated 28.01.2016 by which the Tea garden belonging
to Duncans were taken over by the State Government was
challenged by way of a Writ Petition before the Hon'ble High Court
of Calcutta which was dismissed on 15.03.2016 and ultimately the
matter was taken up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was
decided on 04.10.2019 and is reported as such. It is therefore
submitted that the limitation stopped from 2016 till 2019 and the
application under Section 9 having been filed in December, 2019
and numbered in January, 2020 is within the period of limitation.
12. Counsel for the Respondent has vehemently opposed the
argument raised by the Appellant and submitted that the cause of
action to the Appellant as per its own showing started when the
goods were last supplied on 15.05.2012 and then when the last
payment was made on 05.08.2014 and then when the account was
confirmed on 09.03.2015. If the limitation of period of 3 years is to
Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022 8
be counted from any of the dates mentioned hereinabove, the
petition filed in Jan, 2020 under Section 9 is clearly barred by
limitation. In so far as the case set up by the Appellant regarding
the winding up petition filed on 19.02.2016 is concerned, it is
argued that the said petition was not dismissed but disposed of on
29.03.2016 by the Hon'ble High Court in terms of the notification
dated 28.01.2016 which came prior to the filing of petition by the
Appellant in which the High Court has held that the petition for
winding up is not maintainable without the consent of the Central
Government and while disposing of winding up petition liberty was
granted to the Appellant to take necessary steps in accordance
with law.
13. It is argued that neither the consent was taken nor the
application under Section 9 was filed though the IBC came into
being from 2016 itself. It is submitted that the Appellant cannot
take advantage of its own wrong for not taking the consent of the
Government for the purpose of winding up petition filed under
Section 433 and 434 of the Act, 1956 or for the purpose of filing
an application under Section 9 of the Code. It is also submitted
that the decision in the case of Duncans Industries Limited (Supra)
Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022 9
does not extend the time limit for filing the petition under Section
9 of the Code because it was not an intraparty proceeding.
14. We have heard Counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
15. From the resume of the facts narrated hereinabove, it is clear
that the application under Section 9 was filed in the year 2020 as
it was registered as CP (IB) No. 166/KB/2020. The petition was
filed for resolution of Rs. 7,24,530/- with interest @ 14%. Notice
under Section 8 was issued on 03.12.2019. According to the
Appellant, the last supply of goods was made by the Operational
Creditor on 15.05.2012, the last on account payment was made by
the Corporate Debtor on 05.08.2014 and the CD confirmed the
accounts on 09.03.2015.
16. There is no dispute about the fact that the limitation for filing
an application under Section 9 is three years in terms of Article
137 of the Act, 1963. If the limitation is to be counted from the
above three dates then it had already expired even before the notice
of demand was issued on 03.12.2019 and the petition was filed in
the year 2020. The only aspect which requires to be considered is
as to whether limitation would come to a hold on account of the
order passed on 29.03.2016 by the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022 10
in a petition under Section 433 and 434 of the Act, 1965 filed by
the Appellant on 19.02.2016 and it would start to run again on
account of order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on
04.10.2019 in the case of Duncans Industries Limited (Supra).
17. As we have mentioned in the earlier part of this order, while
referring to the facts of this case, that the petition for winding up
was disposed of by the Hon'ble High Court vide its order dated
29.03.2016 only on the ground that by virtue of notification dated
28.01.2016 which came prior to the filing of petition under Section
433 and 434 of the Act, 1956 on 19.02.2016, it was required that
in order to take any legal action against the Respondent, the
consent of the central government was necessary. However,
despite the order dated 29.03.2016 in which the liberty was
granted to the Appellant to take recourse in accordance with law,
no such application was filed by the Appellant to the Central
Government for the purpose of taking its consent to pursue its
remedy or recovery of the debt against the Respondent. The
Respondent has solely relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Duncans Industries Ltd. (Supra) in
which the Appellant and the Respondent were not a party,
therefore, it has no bearing at all.
Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022 11
18. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid discussion, there is
hardly any error in the impugned order for the purpose of
interference because the Adjudicating Authority has also held that
there was ample time with the Appellant to seek prior consent of
the Central Government for the purpose of taking action against
the Respondent in accordance with law.
19. Thus, in view of the facts and circumstances, we do not find
any error in the impugned order which requires any interference.
Hence, the present appeal is held to be without any merit and the
same is hereby dismissed. No costs.
[Justice Rakesh Kumar Jain] Member (Judicial)
[Ajai Das Mehrotra] Member (Technical)
New Delhi
02nd July, 2024
Sheetal
Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.1547 of 2022
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