Harti Venkataravanppa Dharmesh vs Kamalapuri Narasimaih Jayalakshmi & ...

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 1 of 21 MR. SRINIVASA SEETARAM HEBBAR Director and Erstwhile Shareholder and Promoter of M/s. Vistara Media Private Limited Residing at 71 /1, Subhadra Vidya Nagar, 5th Cross Maratikoppa Sirsi, Karnataka 581402 ...RESPONDENT NO.4

MR. HARIPRAKASH KONEMANE Director and Erstwhile Shareholder and Promoter of M/s, Vistara Media Private Limited Residing at F. No. 008, Pyramid Platina Apartment, D.K. Sandra, Karnataka 560 062. ...RESPONDENT NO.5

M/S MYSORE MERCANTILE CO. LTD. Having its office at Mysore Mercantile House, No. 46, Ill & IV floor, 36th Cross, Jayanagar 4th T Block, Bengaluru Karnataka -560 041

Through its Managing Director Mr. Halady Srinivasa Shetty Managing Director of MMCL Aged about 65 years, S/o Sri. Halady Rajiv Shetty Residing at #571, 2lst Main, 4th Block. Bengaluru Kamataka-560041 ...RESPONDENT NO.6

MR. VARADAHALLI THIMMAPPA SRIDHARA S/o Thimmappa Varadahalli Aged 44 years, Residing at no.1623,1st Floor, 1st Block, Sir M.V. Layout, Vishwavidhyalaya, Bangalore - 560056 ...RESPONDENT NO.7

DIVYA NITEEN MALU The Company Secretary Vistara Media Private Limited,

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 2 of 21 Having its registered office at No. 1, 2nd and 4th Floor, Indian Express Building, Queens Road, Bangalore-560007l Also at H-No. 8-315, Kirana Bazaar, Kalburngi, 585101 ...RESPONDENT NO.8 Present : For Appellants : Mr. Arunava Mukherjee & Mr. Nisarg P. Khatri, Advocates For Respondents : Mr. Chethan Kumar, Advocate for R1 & R2 Mr. K. Gaurav Kumar, Advocate for R6 & R7

JUDGMENT

(Hybrid Mode) [Per: Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma, Member (Judicial)] The Appellant happens to be Respondent No. 2, in the proceedings of

C.P. No. 74/BB/2025, in the matters of Smt. Kamalapuri Narasimaih

Jayalakshimi and Anr. v. M/s. Vistara Media Private Limited and Ors, who

has expressed his grievances against the impugned order rendered by the Ld.

Tribunal in the Company Application C.A. No. 103/2025 filed in

CP/74/2025.

2. CA No. 103/2025 was preferred by the Petitioners to the company

petition, wherein they had sought a condonation of 36 days of delay that has

chanced in preferring the petition under Section 58 of the Companies Act,

2013. By the virtue of the impugned order dated 06.02.2026, the delay that

was sought to be condoned, has been condoned. It is the aspect of

condonation of delay that is subject matter of challenge in the instant

company appeal.

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 3 of 21

3. The Appellant / Respondent No. 2 in the company petition, questions

the impugned order of condoning the delay of 36 days on grounds, that

condonation of delay is not permissible within the ambit of the provisions

contained under Section 58 (3) of the Companies Act and that the delay ought

not to have been condoned by the Ld. Tribunal, while exercising its inherent

powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules. Further, it has been submitted by

the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, that since the condone delay application

did not accompany the company petition itself, the same ought not to have

been entertained at a later stage to condone the delay, in the light of the

provisions contained under Section 58 (3) of the Companies Act.

4. It is contended that despite the objection having been raised by the

Appellant / Respondent No. 2, the delay has been condoned without

providing an opportunity him to controvert the pleadings of the condone

delay application. At this stage it is relevant to point out and which has been

argued by the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 & 2 to the instant

company appeal, who were the petitioners, to the condone delay application

that when the condone delay application came up for consideration before

the Ld. NCLT, Bengaluru bench, the Appellant was granted several

opportunities to file objection to the condone delay application, but "no

objection was filed by the Appellant" herein.

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 4 of 21

5. In that eventuality, the facts and the grounds that were taken in the

condone delay application by Respondent No. 1 & 2 remained

uncontroverted at the behest of the Appellant. In fact, the written objection

was raised to the condone delay application only by Respondent No. 6 & 7

to the company appeal.

6. Section 58 of the Companies Act, prescribes for preferring of an

appeal to Ld. NCLT as against the refusal of registration in a situation where

a private company which is limited by its shares, refuses to register the

transfer or transmission by operation of law of rights to, any securities or

interests of a member of the company.

7. The provisions contained under Section 58 (3) of the Companies Act,

prescribe that the transferee may appeal to the Ld. Tribunal as against the

refusal of the company to register the transfer within 30 days from the date

of the receipt of the notice or where there is no notice has been sent by the

company, within 60 days from the date on which the instrument of transfer

or the intimation of transmission, as the case may be was delivered to the

company. The provisions contained under Section 58 (3) is extracted

hereunder: -

"58. Refusal of registration and appeal against refusal.--(1) If a private company limited by shares refuses, whether in pursuance of any power of the company under its articles or otherwise, to register the transfer of, or the transmission by operation of law of the right to, any

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 5 of 21 securities or interest of a member in the company, it shall within a period of thirty days from the date on which the instrument of transfer, or the intimation of such transmission, as the case may be, was delivered to the company, send notice of the refusal to the transfer or and the transferee or to the person giving intimation of such transmission, as the case may be, giving reasons for such refusal.

(2) Without prejudice to sub-section (1), the securities or other interest of any member in a public company shall be freely transferable:

Provided that any contract or arrangement between two or more persons in respect of transfer of securities shall be enforceable as a contract.

(3) The transferee may appeal to the Tribunal against the refusal within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the notice or in case no notice has been sent by the company, within a period of sixty days from the date on which the instrument of transfer or the intimation of transmission, as the case may be, was delivered to the company.

(4) If a public company without sufficient cause refuses to register the transfer of securities within a period of thirty days from the date on which the instrument of transfer or the intimation of transmission, as the case may be, is delivered to the company, the transferee may, within a period of sixty days of such refusal or where no intimation has been received from the company, within ninety days of the delivery of the instrument of transfer or intimation of transmission, appeal to the Tribunal.

8. In the instant case, the company petition was preferred by Respondent

No. 1 & 2 herein, by filing the same before the Ld. Tribunal on 21.05.2025

praying for recording of their names (of the Petitioners 1 & 2 therein, i.e.,

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 6 of 21 Respondent No. 1 & 2 herein), in the Register of Members of Respondent

No. 1 company, on the ground that, they would be having their rights to get

their name registered in the Register of Companies on basis of facts and

circumstances narrated in the company petition. But at this stage we do not

wish to deal with the merits of the said claim for the reason being that, it may

have an adverse bearing on the proceedings when it is taken upon on merits

before the Ld. NCLT or any other platform and we will confine ourselves to

consider the aspect of condonation of delay, in the impugned order rendered

by the Ld. Tribunal, condoning the delay of 36 days in filing of the company

petitions.

9. The Respondent No. 5 & 6, who had filed their objections on

05.01.2026 and 06.01.2026, had submitted that, the aspect and reasons

pertaining to the condonation of delay, under Section 58 of the Companies

Act, would not be tenable in the absence of there being a valid and lawfully

recognised share transfer with them in accordance with Section 56 of the

Companies Act, which too would be a vital aspect relating to deciding the

question regards the maintainability of the petition under Section 58 of the

Companies Act, but that in itself will not be having any exclusive impact so

far it relates to the issue of condonation of delay, to sustain the proceedings

under Section 58 of the Companies Act.

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 7 of 21

10. Another ground taken by Respondent No. 5 & 6 before the Ld.

Tribunal, was that mandatory procedure as it was contemplated required a

physical submission of Form SH-4 which was not done, nor the relevant

share certificates were ever received by the company or were even placed

before the Board of Directors for its approval. Once again, this would be an

issue, which would be required to be considered on merits at the stage, when

Section 58 application is considered on merits by the Ld. Tribunal. And

lastly, Respondent No. 5 & 6 in the company petition submitted that, owing

to the fact that the Applicants / Respondent No. 1 & 2 herein, in the company

appeal have not shown their due diligence and had stepped over their rights

while mentioning the date of execution in Form SH-4, that they have not

disclosed the date on which the instrument of transfer was allegedly

delivered to Respondent No. 1 company and that, in the absence of there

being a documentary proof, the delay, which has been sought to be condoned

in the proceeding under Section 58 of the Companies Act ought not to be

considered.

11. We make it very clear that in the proceedings of the company

application CA No. 104/2025 in which the impugned order was passed the

impugned order condoning the delay of 36 days, only Respondent No. 5 &

6, had filed theier objections, and the same has been narrated by this

Appellate Tribunal in the preceding paragraphs. But the fact remains that,

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 8 of 21 after passing of the impugned order of allowing the condoned delay

application, the Respondent No. 5 & 6, are not before this Appellate Tribunal

in a company appeal, having expressed any grievance, as against allowing of

the Condone Delay Application, even though Respondent No. 5 & 6 of the

company petition, are represented in the present proceedings by Ld. Counsel

Mr. K. Gaurav Kumar, who opposed the motion of appeal. But then the

question would be that whether at all Respondent No. 5 & 6, in the absence

of giving an independent challenge to the impugned order of 06.02.2026, can

still question the propriety of the impugned order, condoning the delay in a

proceedings on the present company appeal, initiated at the behest of

Respondent No. 1 & 2 to the company appeal? Obviously, the complete

answer would be 'no', as it will amount to, that the Respondent No. 5 & 6

who are presently represented by Mr. K. Gaurav Kumar, were conscious of

the fact of passing of the order of condonation of delay, and yet they had not

sought to challenge the impugned order independently by filing of a

company appeal and rather had chosen to voluntarily participate in the

proceedings of the instant company appeal even without filing a cross-

objection to the appeal.

12. So far as the present Appellant is concerned, he happens to be

Respondent No. 2 to the company petition, as observed in the proceedings

before Ld. NCLT, to whom Ld. Tribunal had granted sufficient opportunity

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 9 of 21 to file objection to the condone delay application and even thereafter he did

not file his objections. Upon being asked by this Appellate Tribunal, Ld.

Counsel for the Appellant has ultimately admitted that he did not file any

objection to the condone delay application thereafter he tried to change his

argument, contending thereof that the senior counsel who was representing

cause of the Appellant before the Ld. Tribunal, had placed his oral argument

only qua the opposition of the condone delay application. It is difficult for

this Appellate Tribunal, to appreciate this argument of the Ld. Counsel for

the Appellant, as to on what grounds the Ld. Senior Counsel has opposed the

condone delay application when the matter was taken up by the Ld. Tribunal,

while passing the impugned order on 06.02.2026.

13. In that eventuality, when despite opportunity having being granted,

the Appellant has chosen not to file any objection to the delay condonation

application, it will be deemed that grounds taken in the condone delay

application at the behest of the Appellant remained uncontroverted. But still

considering the arguments raised, we will precisely deal with the pleadings

that has been raised in the condone delay application and the argument

extended by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant while opposing the said

application, though orally, as well in the shape of the instant company

appeal. The pleadings of the Applicants (Respondent No. 1 & 2 herein) in

the company petition was that the Applicant No. 1 was appointed as an

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 10 of 21 Additional Director of Respondent No. 1 Company on 24.08.2024, and she

was illegally removed from the directorship. Subsequently, that eventhough

she is said to have purchased 1,16,04,000 equity shares from Respondent No.

2, herein after paying a valuable consideration, and Applicant - 2 had

purchased 1,13,25,000 equity shares and 1,03,93,652 optionally convertible

preference shares from the Respondents, their names have not been entered

in the Register of Members of the Respondent No. 3 company and therefore,

directions may be issued to be enter their names in the Register of Members

and to make them Directors in the said company.

14. The Applicant / Respondent No. 1 & 2 contended in the condone delay

application that, upon the rights having been created in favour of the

Applicant / Respondent by transfer of shares as it was referred to in the

application, they filed a petition under Section 58 of the Companies Act, for

the purposes of seeking direction to direct the Respondents to enter the name

of the Petitioner as members in the Register of Members of Respondent No.

1 Company, since having duly and validly purchased the equity shares and

optional convertible preference shares of Respondent No. 1 Company. But

since there was a refusal to register their names, the necessity arose for the

Applicants (Respondent No. 1 & 2 herein) to initiate the proceeding under

Section 58 of the Companies Act, because the correspondences made by the

Petitioner No. 1 & 2 on 17.02.2025, which was followed by the email of

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 11 of 21 13.03.2025 remained unresponded, and their name were not permitted to be

registered in the Register of Members of the Respondent No. 1 company.

However, there was a delay of 36 days in filing the said petition because of

medical reasons which they have prayed for to be condoned.

15. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant in his Memorandum of Appeal has

taken a ground, particularly that as contained under Para 9.3, that the

Applicant has utterly failed to establish sufficient cause for condonation of

delay and hence the delay should not have been condoned. If that be the

tenacity of argument, that 'sufficient cause' has not been established, then the

said argument of the Appellant does not appear to be based on evidence, as

he has not attempted to deny the contents of the medical certificate and

medical grounds, specifying the ailments, which is pleaded to have caused

the delay. Further, ailment itself would be a sufficient cause for delay and

will have to accept on the face of it to be true and genuine, when the

documents establishing ailment remain uncontroverted.

16. Besides that, it is a settled principle of law that "sufficient cause"

contemplated under any law need not mean a "good cause". It's only a prima

facie satisfaction, which is required to be recorded for the purposes of

rendering a substantial justice, for adjudicating a dispute on merits rather

than on technicalities of limitation, and it has to be liberally construed in the

interest of dispensation of justice on merits. Sufficient ground should

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 12 of 21 apparently show to be reasonable and acceptable under a common and

reasonable prudence, which would be generally acceptable by simple

rationale.

17. A very peculiar argument has been raised by the Ld. Counsel for the

Appellant, that the memo dated 05.01.2026 had been filed by the Petitioner's

counsel, not by the Petitioner. We are of the view that the Appellant is

oblivious of the conditions, as it is produced in the shape of vakalat, in the

judicial proceedings where the party to the proceedings intends his or her

cause to be represented by a counsel. The vakalath itself is a contract between

the Litigant and his Counsel and it confers within it the power to appear,

argue, plead, sign and verify the pleadings including the present application,

pleadings, and appeals, and even to take back the documents. These clauses

contained in vakalatnama, in itself will vest a sufficient authority with the

counsel to file a Memorandum on behalf of Respondent 1 & 2. Merely

because a memo has been filed by the Counsel that in itself will not prevent

the memo from being read for the purposes of seeking condonation of delay,

more particularly when the contents or even the acceptability of memo was

not a question that was raised by the Appellant before the Ld. Tribunal.

18. The reason for delay that was given in the application was that since

the Petitioners were travelling, the Petitioner No. 1 fell sick and Petitioner

No. 2 being the son, was taking care of her, they were not in a condition to

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 13 of 21 travel to Bangalore to instruct their Counsels to prefer the proceedings under

Section 58 of the Companies Act, within time and thus there had chanced an

inadvertent delay of 36 days which, according to Respondent No. 1 & 2,

deserve to be condoned.

19. The Appellant / Respondent No. 2 to the company petition, claims to

have opposed condone delay applications, without filing any written

objections, on the ground that the number of days that has been sought to be

condoned will be outside the ambit under Section 58 (3) of the Companies

Act, and that it cannot be condoned, because no specific power has been

vested with the Ld. Tribunal to condone the delay under Section 58 (3) of

the Companies Act. On the other hand, the Respondent No. 1 & 2, in support

of their condone delay application as filed in the proceedings under Section

58 of the Companies Act, had filed a memo before the Ld. Tribunal, on

05.01.2026, annexing therewith the medical documents to fortify the fact

about the ailment of Petitioner No. 1, annexing therewith the medical

records.

20. A hyper-technical argument has been raised by the Ld. Counsel for the

Appellant, that memo in itself cannot be reckoned as to be a procedure to

take document on record, which could be considered for the purposes of

condonation of delay. But it is seen that he has not raised the said objection,

at the first opportunity and no such written objection has been filed by him

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 14 of 21 at the stage of inception of the proceedings when the delay was being

considered, further, he didn't object to the contents of the medical certificates

annexed along with the memo. In that eventuality, the Ld. Tribunal, has not

erred in condoning the delay while exercising its inherent powers under Rule

11 of the NCLT Rules, in order to meet out the object of rendering substantial

justice, especially when the contents of the document itself is not disputed.

Further, in the memorandum of appeal, which has been presented before this

Appellate Tribunal, the Appellant doesn't deny the veracity of the medical

certificate issued by the doctor. In that eventuality, the Appellant cannot take

the stand that the documents placed on record by the Applicants ought not to

have been read in evidence for the purposes of condonation of delay.

21. The proceedings contemplated under Section 58 of the Companies

Act, can be split into two parts.

I. The preference of a CA No. 103/2025, would be a proceedings,

which upon its adjudication will have no bearing on the main

company petition, which is still to be decided independently.

II. Restrictions of taking document on record to be read in

evidence, would always be taken in context of the contents of

the documents, which are being taken on record to be read in

the principal proceedings, but not in a miscellaneous

proceeding.

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 15 of 21

22. Hence, in a situation where the Appellant doesn't controvert the

contents of the medical documents, and where, the said documents are only

being utilized for the purposes of enabling the Ld. Tribunal to reach to a

conclusion while exercising its inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT

Rules for condonation of delay, the uncontroverted documents can still be

read by the Ld. Tribunal, for the purposes of considering the condone delay

application, which does not have any implication on merits of Section 58

proceedings. Hence, the argument extended pertaining to non-admissibility

of the documents being taken on record to be read for the purposes of

condonation of delay is not acceptable by this Appellate Tribunal.

23. In the proceeding under Section 58 of the Companies Act, it is

prescribed that preference of the appeal should be within 30 days from the

date of receipt of the notice of refusal. It is to be noted that the time limit of

30 days is not a fixed feature. In case, the notice of refusal is not received,

the time limit will be 60 days from dated on which the instrument of transfer

or intimation of such transmission, as the case may be, is delivered to the

company. Thus, the time limit is a variable feature depending upon the fact

of each case, and therefore it is not to be stringently construed to deceive the

object of merit adjudication.

24. We are of the view that any provision of law where aspect of limitation

could be determined based upon happening of an incident, referred to in the

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 16 of 21 provision itself dealing with the aspect of condonation of delay or

prescribing for a limitation, that period of filing of an appeal will in itself be

not stagnant or stringent in nature, but rather would be variable and if the

said provision of limitation for the purposes of preference of an appeal is

variable, it is not to be dealt with a stringent yardstick when it falls for

consideration for condonation of delay in the light of the provisions

contained under Rule 11 where the Ld. Tribunal could exercise its inherent

powers for condoning the delay, which is to be read with provisions

contained under Section 433 of the Companies Act.

25. By virtue of the provisions contained under Section 433 of the

Companies Act, the provisions of the Companies Act will apply in its

entirety. Section 58 of the Companies Act, in itself doesn't prescribe any

fixed upper limit of limitation as given therein is not condonable. In that

eventuality where a provision of appeal doesn't prescribe a maximum period

of limitation, in that eventuality the provisions contained under Section 433

of the Companies Act is to be read with Section 29 of the Limitation Act will

come into play, which prescribes that under the Savings Clause of the

Limitation Act in its Sub-Section (2) reads as under: -

"29. Savings.--(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 17 of 21 provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.

(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement" in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend."

which prescribes that under special or local law, which prescribes for a suit,

appeal or an application, a specific period of limitation, different from that

period prescribed under the schedule, the savings contemplated under

Section 29 of the Limitation Act will come into play. And in that eventuality,

the argument extended by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, that Section 58

(3) of the Companies Act doesn't contemplate a condonation of delay, cannot

be accepted by this Appellate Tribunal.

26. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has referred to ground number 9.1

about the ambit of exercise of inherent power as contemplated under Rule

11 of the NCLT Rules, in context of the ratio propounded by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in the judgment of The Property Company (P) Ltd vs Rohinten

Daddy Mazda has reported in 2026 INSC 33 and particularly he has made

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 18 of 21 reference to Para 100, as to, up to what extent the inherent powers could be

exercised for the purposes of the circumstances of the instant case where the

aspect of delay condonation is being under consideration. The argument

extended by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant in context of the ratio

propounded in the matters of The Property Company (P) Ltd (Supra), there

cannot be any doubt about the said principle about the limit of exercise of

inherent powers, which is that any statute when it confers an inherent power,

the said power is an extraordinary power which is granted to the Tribunal or

the Courts to meet a contingency or a situation which could not be

contemplated of, under the statute, and to facilitate Ld. Tribunal to meet the

ends of justice.

27. The restriction of inherent powers as dealt in the judgment of the

Property Company (P) Ltd (Supra), will not be applicable under the

circumstances of the instant case particularly when, in the given set of

circumstances, and that too in the light of the provisions contained under

Section 58 (3) of the Companies Act, where period of limitation is required

to be extended, it could be only done by virtue of attracting the principles

enunciated in the Limitation Act as made applicable by Section 433 of the

Companies Act and since there is no specific provision for prescribing an

upper limit condonation of delay beyond a certain specified limit could very

well be done by exercising powers under Rule 11 to ensure that party to the

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 19 of 21 proceeding is not deprived of his right of judicial remedies as envisaged and

preserved by the Constitution of India.

28. In the situation herein, it is not that the Ld. Tribunal, has exclusively

relied upon its inherent powers under Rule 11. Looking to the nature of the

order, it will be evident that the Ld. Tribunal has exercised its power well

within the ambit as prescribed under Section 433 of the Companies Act, and

mere reference of Rule 11 by the Applicant in his application will not make

the impugned order, to have been rendered by the Ld. Tribunal exclusively

while exercising the powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules. Procedural

rules contemplated by the provisions contained under the NCLT Rules will

not over-ride the provisions of the principal statute, which in itself has got

an in-built mechanism of condonation of delay by prescribing for the

provisions contained under Section 433 of the Companies Act, which is to

be read in context of Section 29 of the Limitation Act in the instant case.

29. Though not relevant, but looking to the tenacity of argument, we

would not hesitate to observe that the Appellant had not availed these

opportunities before the Ld. Tribunal by filing an objection, despite the

opportunities having been granted. Having not done so, it will be deemed

that he has accepted the grounds taken by the Respondent No. 1 & 2 in their

application for condonation of delay. Further, since condonation of 36 days

of delay, rather facilitates Ld. NCLT to meet the ends of dispensation of

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 20 of 21 justice by being able to decide a controversy on merits of the matter, it

doesn't require any interference by this Appellate Tribunal in the exercise of

our appellate jurisdiction.

30. Hence, the company appeal lacks merit, and the same is accordingly

dismissed. All pending interlocutory applications would stand closed.

[Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma] Member (Judicial)

[Jatindranath Swain] Member (Technical)

22/04/2026 SN/MS/AK

Company Appeal (AT) (CH) No. 28 of 2026 Page 21 of 21