Excel Arcade Private Limited vs Unity Small Finance Bank Limited

[Arising out of the Impugned Order dated 08.12.2025 passed by the Adjudicating Authority, National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench in I.A. No. 2168 of 2025 in C.P. (IB) No. 1068/MB/2023]

IN THE MATTER OF:

EXCEL ARCADE PRIVATE LIMITED 3RD Floor, HDIL Towers, Anant Kanekar Marg, Mumbai - 400051 ...Appellant(s)

Versus

UNITY SMALL FINANCE BANK LIMITED Centrum House, CST Road, Vidyanagari Marg, Kalina Santacruz (E), Mumbai - 400098 ...Respondent(s) Present: For Appellant : Mr. Gaurav Mitra, Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Ms. Disha Shah, Ms. Aishwarya Modi, Mr. Ajatshatru Singh Rawat, Advocates For Respondents : Mr. Atul Sharma, Ms. Renuka Iyer, Mr. Aman Agarwal, Advocates

ORDER

(Hybrid Mode) Per: Barun Mitra, Member (Technical)

Present is an appeal which has been filed by the Applicant under

Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, ('IBC' in short)

challenging the impugned order dated 08.12.2025 passed by the Adjudicating

Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Court-III) in I.A. No. 2168 of 2025 in C.P. (IB) No. 1068/MB/2023. The appeal is accompanied

with an application praying for condonation of delay in filing of the appeal.

2. Company Appeal No. 330 of 2026 has been e-filed by the Appellant

before this Tribunal challenging the impugned order. The appeal is

accompanied with I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 which is an application praying for

condonation of delay in filing of the appeal. The prayers contained in the said

application read as follows:

"a. Pass an Order condoning the delay of 14 days in filing the present Appeal against the Impugned Order dated 08.12.2025 passed in I.A. No. 2168 of 2025 in C.P. (IB) No. 1068/MB/2023 by the Hon'ble National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Court-III;

b. Pass such other order(s) as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case."

3. In terms of the statutory provision of IBC, the limitation period for filing

an appeal under Section 61(2) of the IBC is 30 days, which period is further

extendable by 15 days subject to the Tribunal being satisfied that there was

sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the 30 days permissible period

of limitation. Section 61(2) is extracted below:

"61. Appeals and Appellate Authority.

(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal:

Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days."

4. When we examine the sequential step in filing the present Appeal, we

find that the impugned order was passed on 08.12.2025. Calculated

Page 2 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026 therefrom, the statutory period of 30 days for filing the appeal ended on

07.01.2026. The further condonable period of 15 days expired on 22.01.2026.

However, the present appeal came to be e-filed on 28.01.2026, giving rise to

a delay beyond the maximum condonable period prescribed under Section

61(2) of the IBC.

5. The grounds for condonation of delay as mentioned in I.A. No. 1245 of

2026 are that the impugned order dated 08.12.2025, though pronounced on

the said date was uploaded and made available on the official website of the

Adjudicating Authority only on 24.12.2025. It has further been pleaded that

after uploading of the impugned order, some time was lost in filing the appeal

on account of pre-scheduled professional/personal commitments of the

counsel beside limited working days in the last week of December and first

week of January. Further time was consumed in taking instructions from the

authorised representatives of the Applicant and in obtaining internal

approvals/authorisation for filing of the appeal and collating the complete

record and annexures for preparation and finalisation of the appeal paper

book. Some delay was also due to logistical difficulties as documents had to

be sent from Mumbai to New Delhi.

6. More importantly, it was stressed by the Applicant that though they

were in state of readiness for filing the appeal on 22.01.2026, however

attempts to e-file could not be completed due to the e-filing portal of this

Registry being unresponsive/non-functional. This technical glitch aspect has

been articulated in para 8 of I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 which reads as under:

Page 3 of 14

I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026 "8. Notably, the complete Appeal paper book was ready for filing on 22.01.2026. However, when the Appellant attempted to file the accompanying appeal on 22.01.2026 through the e-filing portal, the said portal was not functioning. As a result, the Appellant was unable to file the appeal on 22.01.2026. Thereafter, the Appellant attempted to file the appeal on subsequent days but could not do so because of the e filing portal being unresponsive whenever the Appellant attempted to file it. By way of abundant caution, the Appellant emailed a complete copy of paper book on the email ID itsupport@nclat.nic.in on 22.01.2026 itself. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that any delay that has occurred in filing of the accompanying appeal beyond 22.01.2026 is solely due to factors and circumstances not within the Appellant's control."

7. Reliance has been placed by the Applicant on judgement of the Hon'ble

Madras High Court in M/s Shivpad Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Deputy

Commissioner (ST) & Anr. in W.P. No. 26655 of 2024 to contend that

procedural and technical obstacles on the part of the judicial system cannot

defeat the substantive rights of a litigant. It was further urged that the maxim

actus curiae neminem gravabit i.e. an act of court shall prejudice no man

squarely applies to the present case since the Applicant cannot be made to

suffer for the alleged non-functioning of the e-filing portal of this Tribunal.

The Applicant further contended that though the Registry's Report has stated

that 70 filings had taken place on 22.01.2026, this did not conclusively

disprove their contention that the portal had become unresponsive during late

hours on 22.01.2026 when they attempted to file the appeal. It was therefore

submitted that they were prevented from filing their appeal on 22.01.2026

solely due to circumstances beyond their control and hence the delay

deserved to be condoned in the interest of furthering substantive justice.

8. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent stoutly opposed the

contention of the Applicant and argued that the computation of limitation for

Page 4 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026 filing of the appeal starts running from the date of the impugned order i.e.

08.12.2025 and not from the date of upload of the order or the alleged date of

knowledge. It was further submitted that the running of limitation is entirely

independent of when the Applicant allegedly acquired knowledge of the

impugned order. It was submitted that the prescribed statutory period of 30

days expired on 07.01.2026 and the further condonable period of 15 days

came to an end on 22.01.2026. However, as the present appeal admittedly

came to be e-filed only on 28.01.2026 it fell beyond the statutory outer limit

of 45 days prescribed under Section 61(2) of the IBC. Reliance was placed on

the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Safire Technologies Pvt.

Ltd. Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner in (2025) 9 SCC 504; A.

Rajendra Vs. Gonugunta Madhusudhan Rao & Ors. 2025 SCC OnLine SC

721; Kalpraj Dharamshi Vs Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd. (2021) 10

SCC 401 and Tata Steels Ltd. Vs. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors. in (2025)

9 SCC 483 and of the orders of this Tribunal in Lalremsiem Vs. IFCI Venture

Capital Funds Ltd. & Anr. in CA (AT)(Ins.) No. 1819 of 2025; Vivek Parti,

RP for Trading Engineers International Ltd. Vs. Uttrakhand Power

Corporation Ltd. & Anr in CA (AT)(Ins.) No. 1475 of 2025, to contend that

limitation commences from the date of pronouncement of the order and that

delay beyond the outer condonable limit of 15 days under Section 61(2) of the

IBC cannot be condoned even on equitable considerations.

9. It was further submitted that technical problem affecting the NCLAT

Registry portal cannot be a ground for condonation of delay since this

Tribunal cannot exceed the statutory limit of 15 days condonable period

Page 5 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026 beyond the initial 30-day period. It was further submitted that the Applicant

was using the technical glitch ground as a ploy to circumvent the delay on

their part in filing of the instant appeal and that even assuming without

admitting that the portal was non-functional on 22.01.2026, the Applicant

had admittedly waited till the last date of expiry of the condonable period for

attempting to file the appeal which in itself reflected negligent and

lackadaisical attitude on the part of the Applicant. It was additionally

contended that the alleged email to the Registry was sent only at 10:36 PM on

22.01.2026 which email could not substitute the requirement of e-filing in

terms of NCLAT Circular No. 071/ 2025 and hence the same cannot be treated

as a valid justification for construing 22.01.2026 as the date of filing of the

appeal. It was submitted that despite claiming that the appeal paper book was

completely ready on 22.01.2026, the Applicant eventually e-filed the appeal

only on 28.01.2026 after a further delay of six days which clearly

demonstrates absence of due diligence on the part of the Applicant.

10. We have heard both sides and perused the materials placed on record

carefully.

11. The short point which arise for consideration are whether in the facts

of the present case, the limitation for the purposes of filing the appeal under

Section 61 of the IBC is to be computed from the date of the impugned order

or from the date on which the impugned order came to be uploaded on the

portal and/or became available to the Applicant. The other issue which also

requires consideration is whether the alleged technical glitch in the NCLAT e-

filing portal on 22.01.2026, which prevented the Applicant from filing the

Page 6 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026 appeal on that date which happened to be the 45th day from the date of the

impugned order constituted a cogent and valid ground for condonation of

delay in filing the appeal.

12. Coming to the salient dates in the process of filing of this Appeal, we

find that the impugned order was passed on 08.12.2025 which order was

subsequently uploaded on 24.12.2025. Calculated from the aforesaid date of

pronouncement of order, the statutory period of 30 days for filing the appeal

came to an end on 07.01.2026. The further extendable period of 15 days in

terms of proviso to Section 61(2) of the IBC expired on 22.01.2026. However,

the present appeal admittedly came to be e-filed on 28.01.2026. Prima facie,

therefore, the appeal was filed beyond the outer limit of 30+15 days

contemplated under Section 61(2) of the IBC.

13. To return our finding as to whether the limitation for filing the present

appeal should start from 08.12.2025 which was the date of pronouncement

of the order or when the order got uploaded on 24.12.2025 or when it came

to the knowledge of the Applicant, we are guided by the law laid down by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Pandurang Kalate Vs. Vistra ITCL

(India) Limited & Ors. in (2024) 3 SCC 27 which has held as under:

"16. From the above discussion of law, it is clear that the date on which the limitation begins to run is intrinsically linked to the date of pronouncement. The question that arises in the facts of the present case, therefore, is when is an order deemed to be pronounced...."

In the present case, it is an undisputed fact that the order was pronounced

on 08.12.2025, hence, limitation commences from that date.

Page 7 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026

14. Even the contention of the Applicant that the limitation for filing the

present appeal should start from the time the impugned order came to their

knowledge is also not a tenable proposition as it is well settled by judicial

precedent laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Nagarajan vs. SKS

Ispat and Power Limited and Ors. in (2022) 2 SCC 244 that limitation for

filing an appeal commences on the day when order is pronounced and the

question when the Appellant came to know about the order is of no relevance.

In para 33 of the above judgment, following has been laid down:

"33. The answer to the two issues set out in Section C of the judgment-(i) when will the clock for calculating the limitation period run for proceedings under IBC; and (ii) is the annexation of a certified copy mandatory for an appeal to NCLAT against an order passed under IBC must be based on a harmonious interpretation of the applicable legal regime, given that IBC is a Code in itself and has overriding effect. Sections 61(1) and (2) IBC consciously omit the requirement of limitation being computed from when the "order is made available to the aggrieved party", in contradistinction to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act...."

It is therefore amply clear that question as to when the Applicant came to

know about the order is inconsequential and cannot be a good ground for

arresting the running of limitation from the date of pronouncement of the

order.

15. This brings us to the third limb of argument taken by Applicant that

they could not file the appeal on the 45th day despite making bonafide efforts

due to technical glitches confronting the NCLAT e-portal. The earnest efforts

made by the Applicant to e-file on time is also borne out by the fact that they

had sent an email on 22.01.2026 at itsupport@nclat.nic.in raising the issue

relating to technical glitch in the e-filing portal. Since it was the technical

Page 8 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026 problems in NCLAT e-portal file which prevented them from filing the appeal

within the 15 days extendable period, the delay should be condoned in view

of the exceptional circumstances. Hence, the Applicant cannot be held

responsible in any manner for being unable to e-file their appeal.

16. We now advert attention to the Shivpad judgment supra of the High

Court of Madras which has been relied upon by the Applicant in support of

their contention that an appeal cannot be rejected solely on the ground that

the soft copy was not uploaded due to technical problems which problem was

not the creation of the Applicant. It was asserted the said judgement also laid

down that in the interest of justice, the Applicant should be given an

additional opportunity to present their case. The relevant paragraph of the

above judgment is as reproduced below:

"5. Considering the submissions made, this Court finds that the appeal was rejected solely on the ground that the soft copy was not uploaded due to technical problems. This Court acknowledges that the delay in filing the appeal was genuine, as it was caused by these issues during the upload process. In such circumstances, an appeal should not be rejected without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard, particularly when the rejection arises from technical issues beyond their control. Therefore, in the interest of justice, this Court deems it appropriate to grant the petitioner an additional opportunity to present their case."

17. To appreciate the issue at hand, we have perused the report received

from NCLAT Registry on the status of e-filing portal of the NCLAT Registry as

on 22.01.2026. We find that the enquiry of NCLAT Registry with the National

Informatics Centre ("NIC" in short) shows that a communication dated

13.04.2026 was sent to the NIC seeking confirmation whether the e-filing

portal was functional on 22.01.2026 and also to indicate whether any e-filings

Page 9 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026 had been successfully carried out on the said date. The relevant portion of

NIC's report on the query raised by NCLAT Registry as reported by this

Registry is as under:

"6. Further, in this regard, the National Informatics Centre (NIC) has sent a reply email dated 21.04.2026 (Flag 'C'), stating therein "The Efiling portal was functional on 22.01.2026 as we checked from cases filed on this date." Furthermore, they have attached a list of cases in the Excel sheet filed on the mentioned date (Flag - 'D'). In the list, 70 filings were done on 22.01.2026."

(Emphasis Supplied)

18. The NIC in its reply dated 21.04.2026 has categorically stated that the

filing portal was functional on 22.01.2026 and further informed that around

70 filings had been done on the said date. When other litigants could have

successfully e-filed their appeals on 22.01.2026 and no complaint has been

received in this regard from others, we are not persuaded by the present

Applicant as a lone-ranger using this ground to justify delay in e-filing beyond

the condonable period. It is also confirmed by NIC in its report that the email

sent by the counsel for the Applicant on 22.01.2026 at 22:36:33 hours to

itsupport@nclat.nic.in had been quarantined under phishing protection

controls as part of standard security measures. Quite apart from the fact that

email had been quarantined as per security protocol norms for which the

Applicant cannot cry hoarse, since the same norm was equally applicable to

all and sundry in any case, emailing of appeal petition cannot substitute the

e filing requirement for registering the filing of an appeal.

19. We also find that the Shivpad judgment supra does not come to the

aid of the Applicant in view of the distinguishing feature of the above case

wherein the judgment was passed by the High Court of Madras by invoking

Page 10 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026 writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which

jurisdiction is not vested in this Tribunal. Furthermore, in that case, a hard

copy had already been submitted but the soft copy of the same which was

also required to be uploaded could not be so done due to technical problems.

Thus, we are of the considered view that the ratio of the above judgment is

not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case, neither e-

filing nor physical filing was done. We have already noted in the preceding

paragraphs that while the Applicant had claimed technical bottlenecks in

NCLAT e-portal to impede the uploading of e-filing their appeal on 22.01.2026,

but on that same day, several other litigant parties had successfully e-filed

their respective appeals.

20. To answer the question as to whether the present appeal which had

been e-filed beyond 28.01.2026 having fallen outside the statutory outer limit

of 45 days contemplated under Section 61(2) of the IBC can be condoned or

not, we are also guided by the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in Tata Steel Ltd. Vs. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 408

of 2023 where in para 11 it has been held:

"11. As indicated above, the IBC prescribes strict timelines for filing appeals and taking legal action so as to ensure that insolvency proceedings are not misused to recover time-barred debts. The proviso to Section 61(2) clearly limits the NCLAT's jurisdiction to condone delay only up to 15 days beyond the initial 30-day period. Where a statute expressly limits the period within which delay may be condoned, an Appellate Tribunal cannot exceed that limit. In other words, the NCLAT being a creature of statute, operates strictly within the powers conferred upon it. Unlike a civil suit, it lacks inherent jurisdiction to extend time on equitable grounds. 11.1. Once the prescribed and condonable periods (i.e., 30 + 15 days) expire, the NCLAT has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals,

Page 11 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026 regardless of the reason for the delay. In Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited, while interpreting Section 9 IBC, this Court underscores the IBC's strict procedural discipline i.e., only applications strictly conforming to statutory requirements can be entertained. This principle is also applicable to limitation issues under section 61(2), as it supports the idea that tribunals must operate within the bounds of the Code, without adding equitable or discretionary powers not conferred by statute. This Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Another has categorically held that the NCLAT cannot condone any delay beyond 15 days even on equitable grounds; and that the appellate mechanism under IBC is strictly time-bound by design to preserve the speed and certainty of the insolvency resolution process.

11.2. Thus, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute. Accordingly, the second issue is answered by us.

13. Before parting, we may observe that time is of the essence in statutory appeals, and the prescribed limitation period must be strictly adhered to. Even a delay of a single day is fatal if the statute does not provide for its condonation. As held by us, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute. Allowing condonation in such cases would defeat the legislative intent and open the floodgates to belated and potentially frivolous petitions, thereby undermining the efficacy and finality of the appellate mechanism."

21. In the present case, we find that the present appeal was admittedly e-

filed beyond the 45th day from the date of the impugned order. Prima facie,

therefore, the appeal falls beyond the outer limit of 30+15 days contemplated

under Section 61(2) of the IBC and consequently beyond the condonable

jurisdiction of this Appellate Tribunal as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

Tata Steel judgment supra.

22. It may also be pertinent to add here that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

National Spot Exchange Ltd. Vs. Anil Kohli, RP for Dunar Foods Ltd.

(2022) 11 SCC 761 has held that delay beyond 15 days in preferring an

Page 12 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026 appeal cannot be condoned even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of

the Constitution. Para 20 of the above judgment reads to the effect:-

"Thus, considering the statutory provisions which provide that delay beyond 15 days in preferring the appeal is uncondonable, the same cannot be condoned even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution."

23. The scheme of the IBC is founded upon strict adherence to timelines

and this Tribunal, being a creature of statute, cannot travel beyond the

jurisdiction expressly conferred upon it by the legislature. It is a well-accepted

principle that inconvenience caused to any litigating party cannot be

considered as a decisive or determinative factor while interpreting a statute.

Section 61 of IBC empowers this Tribunal to admit an appeal even after the

prescribed period of 30 days only upto another 15 days provided the Appellant

gives 'sufficient cause' for not preferring the appeal within the 30 days

prescribed period. This Tribunal has not been vested with any discretionary

powers after the expiry of the 15 days extended period to admit an appeal.

Clearly therefore it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss any appeal

which is presented before it beyond 30 + 15 days limitation. Any condonation

of delay being allowed beyond 30 + 15 days would be in violation of the

legislative intent and statutorily impermissible. This Tribunal cannot clothe

itself with a jurisdiction which has not been vested upon it by the legislature.

Thus, grant condonation of delay beyond the 15th day even on equitable

consideration or on the ground of hardship or technical considerations will

amount to jettisoning the intent of the legislature which is impermissible.

Being a creature of the statute, this Tribunal is bound by the provisions of

the statute and has to apply the statutory provision with all its rigour and

Page 13 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026 vigour. The Tribunal has no choice before it but to apply the law as it stands

which does not vest any power to condone the delay on equitable grounds

after the expiry of 30 plus 15 days period.

24. In view of the foregoing discussion and the settled legal position, we are

of the considered opinion that the present appeal having admittedly been e-

filed beyond the outer limit of 30 + 15 days prescribed under Section 61(2) of

the IBC the same is statutory barred and hence this Tribunal lacks

jurisdiction to condone the said delay. Consequently, I.A. No. 1245 of 2026

seeking condonation of delay stands dismissed. Resultantly, Memo of Appeal

also stands rejected. No cost.

[Justice Ashok Bhushan] Chairperson

[Mr. Barun Mitra] Member (Technical) Place: New Delhi Date : 22.05.2026 Sheetal

Page 14 of 14 I.A. No. 1245 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 330 of 2026