Anjaniputra Ispat Limited vs Iag Company Limited Through Official ...

IN THE MATTER OF: Anjaniputra Ispat Ltd. ...Appellant

Versus

1. IAG Company Ltd., Through Official Liquidator & Anr.

2. Trust Estate Khimji Keshwaji ...Respondents

Present: For Appellant : Ms. Purti Gupta, Ms. Henna George, Ms. Sunidhi Sah, Advocates. For Respondents : Mr. Siddharth Gautam, Advocate for R-2. Mr. Sougat Sinha, Mr. R. Gayathri Manasa, Advocates for R-1.

With

Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 & I.A. No. 7306 of 2025

IN THE MATTER OF: Anjaniputra Ispat Ltd. ...Appellant

Versus

1. IAG Company Ltd., Through Official Liquidator & Anr.

2. Trust Estate Khimji Keshwaji ...Respondents

Present: For Appellant : Ms. Purti Gupta, Ms. Henna George, Ms. Sunidhi Sah, Advocates. For Respondents : Mr. Siddharth Gautam, Advocate for R-2. Mr. Sougat Sinha, Mr. R. Gayathri Manasa, Advocates for R-1. Mr. Asav Rajan, Ms. Kashish Chadha, Adv. for Intervenor/SBI.

Cont'd../ -2-

ORDER

Per Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma, Member (Judicial)

These are two company appeals, they necessarily require a brief

narration of facts as to the manner and diligence with which the company

appeal has been taken up by the appellant, particularly so far it has a

bearing upon it, on the aspect of delay.

2. The admitted fact is that the appellant expressing his grudges

against the impugned order dated 08.09.2025, is shown to have filed a

company appeal before the Registry of this Tribunal by instituting the

same on 20.11.2025. The appeal was preferred by invoking the provisions

contained under Section 61 of the I&B Code. The company appeal in the

shape of Section 61 of the I&B Code was accompanied with the delay

condonation application being I.A. No. 7306 of 2025, wherein the

appellant has sought a condonation of 53 days of delay, that has chanced

in preferring the appeal.

3. It would be necessary to point out at this juncture itself that the

invocation of the provisions contained under Section 61 of the I&B Code,

for the purposes of filing of the appeal, since it was questioning the order

passed in the proceedings under Section 433 (E) and Section 433 (F) of

the Companies Act, 1956, the appellant jurisdiction under Section 61 of

the I&B Code was not available to the appellant. Thus, after the filing of

the company appeal under Section 61 of 20.11.2025, it remained pending

for some time till the matter was taken up by this Tribunal on

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -3-

29.01.2026, and while considering the I.A. No. 440 of 2026, the appellant,

while narrating the cause for filing of the appeal, prayed for the

amendment of the Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 in terms

of the order dated 13.01.2026 and prayed to permit carrying out of the

amendment by converting the appeal preferred under Section 61 of the

I&B Code, as to the appeal under Section 421 of the Companies Act,

2013. Simultaneously there was a prayer also sought by the appellant for

a grant of condonation of delay in filing the appeal, which was filed within

the condonable period in terms of Section 421 (3) of the Companies Act,

2013. The relief was thus prayed for in I.A. No. 440 of 2026, preferred in

an appeal under Section 61 of I&B Code reads as under:

(i) Permit amendment of Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 1874/2025 in terms of order dated 13.01.2026.

(ii) Permit the amendment to the extent that the captioned appeal being Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 1874/2025 filed under Section 61 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code be treated as a Company Appeal under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013.

(iii) Grant condonation of delay in filing the Appeal which is filed within the condonable period in terms of Section 421 (3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

4. The question that would be falling for consideration is that when

the appellant was conscious, that the impugned order of 08.09.2025 was

an order that was passed in regular proceedings under the Companies

Act, 2013. If at all any appeal would be tenable, that would be under the

appellate jurisdiction contained under Section 421 of the Companies Act,

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -4-

2013, and no appeal could have been preferred or be maintainable by

invoking the provisions contained under 61 of the I&B Code. Hence, the

filing of an appeal under Section 61 on 20.11.2025 was void ab initio

being not maintainable.

5. Be that as it may, even when the appellant has sought the relief as

extracted above in I.A. No. 440 of 2026, he had prayed for an amendment

for converting the appeal under 61 of the I&B Code as to be an appeal

under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013, which was granted by this

Tribunal by an order of 29.01.2026, thereby permitting the appellant to

convert the appeal under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013, and to

file an amended memo under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013,

and that was required to be done by the next date.

6. In compliance of the order of 29.01.2026, it is alleged by the

appellant that he had, instead of carrying the amendment as it was

directed by the order of 29.01.2026, to convert the appeal, the appellant

had filed an appeal under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013, by e-

filing of the same on 30.01.2026, containing it to be an appeal under

Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013. This company appeal too was

accompanied by the delay condonation application, seeking condonation

of delay that has chanced in preferring the appeal. The issue that emerges

for consideration, while considering the aspect of delay condonation

application i.e. I.A. No. 816 of 2026 preferred in Comp. App. (AT) No. 39 of

2026, would be as to whether the liberty granted by an order of

29.01.2026 in the appeal under Section 61 of the I&B Code of carrying the

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -5-

conversion of appeal as to be under Section 421 of the Companies Act,

2013, could at all be taken into consideration for the purposes of

determining the limitation in the filing of an appeal under Section 421 of

the Companies Act, 2013, more particularly when in both the provisions

the delay has to be independently considered under the self-contained

provisions, which do not have any interaction or interplay with one

another since being independent provisions.

7. Under the I&B Code the aspect of delay is contained under sub

Section 2 of Section 61, which is to be read with the proviso which is

extracted hereunder:

"Section 61 (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal:

Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days."

8. The self-contained provision of the aspect of delay for the purposes

of preference of an appeal under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013

against any proceedings contemplated under the Companies Act, 2013, it

prescribes for dealing with an aspect of limitation as per provisions of

subsection 3 of Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 which reads as

under:

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -6-

"Section 421 (3) :- Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved and shall be in such form, and accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed:

Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days from the date aforesaid, but within a further period not exceeding forty- five days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period."

9. The question would be that whether the appellant is at all entitled

to a condonation of delay after granting an exemption for the period from

20.11.2025 till the passing of an order by this tribunal in his appeal

under Section 61 of the I&B Code on 29.01.2026 whether period from

20.11.2025 to 29.01.2026 is condonable? The appellant argues that he

would be entitled for the exemption to be granted for the period from

20.11.2025 to 29.01.2026 owing to the ratio propounded by the

provisions contained under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which

could be attracted to be made applicable under the given circumstances.

10. In order to answer the aforesaid argument, if we go through the

records of the company appeal preferred under Section 61 of the I&B

Code, it was against an impugned order of 08.09.2025. The appeal under

Section 61 of the I&B Code, if we determine the limitation therein itself

from the date of passing of the order, the appeal under Section 61 of I&B

Code was preferred on 76th day, thus, even after exclusion of condonable

period and the limitation prescribed under Section 61 of the I&B Code,

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -7-

the appeal at that point of time was much beyond the prescribed period

even after granting the exemption of the condonable period as per the

proviso to sub - Section 2 of Section 61 of the I&B Code. As only, there

was an apparent 31-day delay even after including the maximum

condonable period of maximum 45 days under the I&B Code.

11. The issue would be when the main appeal, that was preferred under

Section 61 of the I&B Code itself was beyond the prescribed period under

Section 61 of the I&B Code, whether at all under the garb of conversion

granted by this tribunal vide its order of 29.01.2026, could the appellant

avail the benefit of the period that has been undertaken by the appellant

while pursuing the appeal under Section 61 of the I&B Code. That too

when it was not a bonafide act of filing of appeal under Section 61 of the

I&B Code, knowing the fact that the proceedings under question was

arising from provisions of Companies Act, 2013.

12. Primarily, we are of the view that when the appeal under Section

61 itself was beyond limitation as being preferred with delay of 31 days,

that was beyond the condonable period even after excluding the upper

limit of 45 days. The liberty granted for conversion of appeal under

Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 by an order of 29.01.2026 would

disentitle the appellant to be considered for condonation of delay in

preference of an appeal under Section 421 of the Companies Act. The logic

behind it is that under the I&B Code, though under Section 238A of the

I&B Code, it prescribes dealing with the issue of limitation, but if Section

238A of the I&B Code itself is taken into consideration, it prescribes that

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -8-

the provisions under Section 238A would be in relation with the

proceedings under the I&B Code would apply to the proceedings or

appeals 'as far as it may' and 'as the case may be' meaning thereby the

provisions of limitation contained under Section 238A of the Limitation

Act, 1963, are not a sweeping provision and that to when it has to be read

in context of the appeal being preferred under Section 61 of the I&B Code

where the aspect of limitation is self-contained, more particularly when

under the statute, an appellate provision itself contains the self-contained

provision for determining the aspect of limitation which has been

restricted not to be extended beyond the condonable period that is a total

of 45 days. The so-called theory of implications of the Limitation Act, 1963

will not be applicable in the present circumstances and more particularly

when the company appeals under Section 61, being Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.)

No. 1874 of 2025, itself was delayed by 31 days.

13. It's not in controversy that this tribunal, by an order of 29.01.2026,

did grant liberty to the appellant to convert the appeal under Section 421

of the Companies Act, 2013, and to file an amended memo. If we read the

implications flowing from paragraph 4 of the order, it was conversion that

was permitted by way of carrying out the amendment in the memo of an

existing appeal under Section 61 of the I&B Code. It didn't contemplate

granting liberty of filing a fresh appeal under Section 421 of the

Companies Act, 2013; rather, it was rectification in memo of appeal which

was permitted in the appeal already preferred by the appellant under

Section 61 of the I&B Code in order to enable him to convert the same

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -9-

under Section 421 of the Companies Act. The relevant directions given in

the order of 29.01.2026 are extracted hereunder:

"4. Sufficient cause has been made out in the application 440/2026 to allow the application and allow the prayers. We permit the appellant to convert the appeal in under Section 421. Appellant is permitted to file an amended memo under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 which may be done by tomorrow."

14. It's a settled law that when the appellant visualized that his appeal

under Section 61 of the I&B Code was not maintainable, he filed I.A. No.

440 of 2026. In the said I.A. the relief of which is already extracted above

(the relief of which is already extracted above) contained relief no. (iii)

which reads as under:

"(iii) Grant condonation of delay in filing the Appeal which is filed within the condonable period in terms of Section 421 (3) of the Companies Act, 2013."

15. This relief prayed for by the appellant in I.A. No. 440 of 2026

preferred in appeal under Section 61 of the I&B Code, was not granted,

and no observation has been made by this Tribunal while passing the

order of 29.01.2026 in relation to the aspect dealing with the condonation

of delay which was prayed for in relation to the appeal, which was to be

preferred after its amendment under Section 421 of the Companies Act.

Hence, under law it will be deemed that the prayer for condonation of

delay in an appeal under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 by

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -10-

passing an order on I.A. No. 440 of 2026 stood denied. Because it is a

settled law, if a relief is prayed for and it is not granted by an order and no

reference is made in relation to it in the order it would be treated as to

have been denied. The appellant, in compliance of an order of 29.01.2026

had rather, filed an appeal on 30.01.2026, altogether a fresh appeal under

Section 421 of the Companies Act, which was contrary to the directions

issued by paragraph 4 of the order dated 29.01.2026, which only

permitted the appellant to carry out the amendment in the memo of the

existing appeal under Section 61 of I&B Code. Hence, the limitation for

appeal under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 would entail fresh

determination of limitation from date of its filing.

16. This appeal, too, preferred under Section 421 of the Companies Act,

2013, which was numbered as Comp. App. (AT) No. 39 of 2026, was

accompanied by the delay condonation application, being I.A. No. 7306 of

2025 where the appellant has alleged to have sought a condonation of

delay of 43 days. Even if the appellant has preferred the appeal under

Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013, on 30.01.2026 after the order

passed by this Tribunal on 29.01.2026, then according to the provisions

contained under Sub-Section 3 of Section 421 of the Companies Act,

2013, don't carve out any exception from the perspective of differently

dealing with the delay condonation application because that has to be

dealt with strictly in consonance with the provision in itself, which is self-

contained under Section 421 (3) of the Companies Act, 2013 and Section

14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, have no applicability, and also the order of

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -11-

29.01.2026, since there had been no observation pertaining to the aspect

of the delay as it was prayed for, the delay aspect has to be independently

considered in the instant company appeal.

17. In that eventuality, the delay will have to be determined from the

date of the passing of the order itself, since law under Section 421 of the

Companies Act, 2013, was not carve out any exception, as it has been

sought to be pressed upon by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant. Since

admittedly the appeal was preferred on 30.01.2026, as against the

impugned order of 08.09.2025 there was a delay of 53 days, in all, there is

a delay of 144 days, and even if it is enlarged by granting the appellant

the benefit of the condonable period of an additional 45 days as

contemplated under the proviso to sub-section 3 of Section 421 of the

Companies Act, 2013, then to the appeal would be barred by 54 days.

18. In regard to the aforesaid issue, the Ld. Counsel for the appellant

had referred to a judgment of the Delhi High Court as reported in

'UltraTech Cement Ltd. v. Maxout Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd.' [(2023) 241

Company Cases 46], decided on July 10, 2023.

19. In those matters, the issues that were being considered by the High

Court were not of a conversion of appeal from Section 61 of I&B Code to

Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013. Rather, it was exclusively

dealing with the issue pertaining to the transfer of the proceedings by

invoking the provisions contained under Section 434 of the Companies

Act, 2013, and it was under the aforesaid backdrop that the Delhi High

Court has observed in paragraph 11 of the judgment where it has

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -12-

interpreted the implication of Section 434 (1) (c) of the Companies Act,

2013, which prescribed that if the matter is transferred and is to be dealt

with by the Ld. National Company Law Tribunal elsewhere, the limitation

has to be construed otherwise because the transfer is on the basis of a

judicial order exercising the powers of transfer under Section 434 of the

Companies Act, 2013, by directing thereof that, upon transfer of a

petition, it has to be strictly proceeded as if it was a proceeding that was

initiated for the first time. This principle contemplated in paragraphs 11 &

12 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:

"11. From a perusal of the second proviso to section 434(1)(c) as also the aforesaid judgment it is clear that any matter, which is transferred, is to be dealt with by the National Company Law Tribunal as an application for initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) under the IBC, 2016.

12. Thus, it is clarified that the National Company Law Tribunal would have to strictly proceed in accordance with the said provision and treat the petition as an initiation of CIRP."

20. And paragraph 12 in itself is an answer to the issue!

21. Paragraph 12 has quite specifically made it clear that in the

situation where there is a judicial transfer of proceedings under Section

434 of the Companies Act, 2013 in those eventualities, upon transfer and

receipt of records, it will be treated as an initiation of the process, and it

will provide a continuity to it and not a break. Because upon transfer

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -13-

under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013, is to be treated as

initiation of proceedings.

22. The respondents have filed their objections and contended that in

the proceedings the appellant actively participated in the proceedings and

had the knowledge of the orders passed by the High Court on 05.01.2022

and 17.02.2025 wherein the observation was made with regard to the

transfer of the proceedings before the Ld. NCLT in pursuance to the

judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court as reported in (2021) Vol.2 SCC

OnLine Page 641 'Action Ispat and Power (P) Ltd. vs. Shyam Metalics and

Energy Ltd.'. It is argued by the Ld. Counsel for the respondent that when

the appellant had knowledge of the order dated 05.01.2022 and

17.02.2025 passed by the Division Bench and Single Judge, respectively.

The appellant had not approached the Tribunal with clean hand by

initiating the proceedings within the relevant time period because the

appellant had filed the appeal against the order of 08.09.2025 before the

Ld. NCLT much after the uploading of the order, and hence he would not

be entitled to the benefit of the period of time during which the appeal

under Section 61 of I&B Code was on the record of the NCLAT under the

provisions of the I&B Code, till it was filed under the provisions of the

Companies Act under Section 421. He further argues that the appellant

would not be entitled for the benefit of the condonable period because the

reasons given in the application may not be treated as to be satisfactory,

for the purposes of preference of an appeal under Section 421, it has to be

construed as to be in 45 days from the date of order because the appellant

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -14-

has not approached this appellate forum by not adhering to the orders

passed by the High Court in the earlier proceedings of 05.01.2022 and

17.02.2025.

23. This case is quite distinct from the one referred to by the counsel for

the appellant, because a judicial transfer of proceedings cannot be kept at

same pedestal to a wrongful invocation of jurisdiction of an appeal by the

appellant and thereafter seeking a rectification in memo of appeal for its

conversion as an appeal under Section 421 of the Companies Act. In that

eventuality, the aspect of initiation of an appeal for the purposes of

Section 421 would be treated to be 30.01.2026, only the date when

actually Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 appeal was instituted by

the appellant before this Tribunal.

24. Another Judgment of which reference was made, pertaining to the

Civil Appeal No. 818 of 2018 in the matter of 'Forech India Ltd. vs.

Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd.', decided on January 22,

2019, wherein a winding-up petition was filed before the Delhi High Court

on 10.01.2014, once again being a proceeding under Section 433 (E) of

the Companies Act, 2013, due to inability to pay the dues, and at a later

stage a transfer of petition was sought in accordance with Section 434 of

the Companies Act, 2013, once again, as referred to in paragraph 8 of the

said judgment, in this case too, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that

the liberty was granted under the proviso to Section 434 of the Companies

Act, 2013, dealing with the transfer of winding up proceedings pending

before the Hon'ble High Court to the Ld. NCLT, which was directed to be

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -15-

treated as the proceedings under Section 9 of the I&B Code. The very fact

that it was permitted to be transferred by the judicial orders of the

Hon'ble Apex Court it had provided continuity to the proceedings of the

winding-up, which was initially instituted before the Hon'ble Delhi High

Court in the said case and later on was directed to be treated as the

proceedings under Section 9 of the I&B Code by way of transfer.

25. In this case, the aspect of limitation should be determined much

prior to the stage when the winding-up proceedings stood instituted

before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, and in that eventuality the limitation

was to be construed from the date of filing of the case before the Hon'ble

Delhi High Court since it was provided a continuity due to its transfer to

the Ld. NCLT under Section 9 of the I&B Code. Factually, the present case

may not fall under the circumstances of the case, and by way of a

repetition, we reiterate that this is not a case of transfer under Section

434 of the Companies Act. Had it been a case of transfer under Section

434 of the Companies Act, obviously it would have provided continuity

with regard to the aspect of limitation, and for that purpose, the initiation

would have been treated to be the date of initiation at the stage when the

appellant has filed the appeal under Section 61 of I&B Code, this is not

the case.

26. Herein, the appellant has admittedly filed an I.A. seeking a

conversion by way of carrying out the amendment in the existing appeal

under Section 61 of I&B Code. And that was the liberty granted by this

tribunal vide its order of 29.01.2026, but however that was not availed by

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -16-

the appellant, rather a fresh appeal was preferred under Section 421 of

the Companies Act, having been instituted on 30.01.2026. In that

eventuality, for all practical purposes, the limitation has to be determined

on the date when actually the proceedings under Section 421 of the

Companies Act came into existence upon its institution at the behest of

the appellant. We have to keep in mind, and by way of reiteration, that it's

not a case of transfer under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Because once the inception of the proceeding is accepted, and it has taken

birth on 30.01.2026, the limitation would be governed by Section 421 sub

Section 3 of the Companies Act and it will not be dealt with under the

concept of continuity to the date of institution of the proceedings under

Section 61 of the I&B Code, and more particularly when the proceedings

under Section 61 of the I&B Code itself were barred by limitation as per

the proviso to sub Section 2 of Section 61 of the I&B Code.

27. Literally, there is a marked distinction between the expressions

'Transfer' and 'Transformation'. The authorities relied on by the appellant

were the cases of transfer, where the principal proceeding was in its

original form, without there being change brought either in the

proceedings or the court transpired in its original form without losing its

original structure and characteristics, and that too it was transferred to

the court of competent of concurrent jurisdiction by a judicial order. The

present case is not of transfer but rather of transformation, which has

been sought by the appellant for transformations of the appellant's

proceedings under 61 of I&B Code to that of appellate proceedings under

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -17-

a different statute, i.e. under Section 421 of Companies Act, 2013 there

the limitation would be construed differently, where the basic character of

the appeal has to undergo a change, and a change in the consideration of

the appeal on its transformation from one provision of appellants law to

another, would not be a case of 'transfer' but that of 'transformation'.

Where the gravamen and parameters of consideration too under the vital

judicial and procedural change, particularly herein the aspect of

limitation. Such a transformation of proceedings does not provide it with a

continuity of proceedings under the earlier statute. Rather, it would be a

rebirth with a fresh start from the date of institution under different

provisions of law. The continuance of consideration of aspects of

limitation would not be borrowed to be applied, particularly where the

previous act or code itself is not applicable. Hence, the limitation on a

solicited transformation would be as per the provisions of the new statute,

as the proceedings stood initiated with its new birth under the new

statute. The old provisions lose their applicability to be saved to apply the

theory of limitation borrowing from previous statutes.

28. Thus, if we determine the limitation in the instant case from the

date of passing of an order, i.e., 08.09.2025, till the filing of an appeal

under Section 421 of the Companies Act i.e. on 30.01.2026, in view of the

strict provision of determination of limitation under Section 421, which

doesn't attract the applicability of the Limitation Act in the light of the

provisions contained under Section 14, the limitation has to be construed

under sub section 3 of Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 in itself

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025 -18-

and not by virtue of borrowing any other provision. Hence, this appeal

would be barred by limitation, being preferred after a delay of 53 days.

29. In that view of the matter, the Comp. App. (AT) No. 39 of 2026 and

the supporting delay condonation application would stand rejected. The

delay condonation application I.A. No. 7306 of 2025 would stand rejected,

and as a consequence thereto, the Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) No. 1874 of

2025 would too stand rejected.

[Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma] Member (Judicial)

[Arun Baroka] Member (Technical)

NEW DELHI

18th September, 2026

SA

Company Appeal (AT) No. 39 of 2026, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1874 of 2025