Zunaid vs State Of U.P.
- SCC(2023) 14 SCC 576
- Neutral2023 INSC 778
- SCR[2023] 11 SCR 715
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Upon receipt of a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a Magistrate has three alternative courses of action: (1) to conclude that there is insufficient ground for proceeding and drop the action; (2) to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) on the basis of the police report and issue process without being bound by the police conclusions; and (3) to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) on the basis of an original complaint or protest petition and proceed to examine the complainant and witnesses under Sections 200 and 202. A Magistrate is not debarred from taking cognizance of a complaint or protest petition merely on the ground that he has already accepted or rejected a police report on the same allegations. Where a Magistrate has, within the scope of his judicial discretion and in compliance with law, rejected a final report and accepted a protest petition, that order cannot be challenged collaterally in a subsequent application under Section 482 after a significant lapse of time, and the High Court should not permit amendment of such applications to challenge orders that remained unchallenged when passed. The discretionary order of a Magistrate issuing summons after recording the statements of the complainant and witnesses and finding prima facie satisfaction regarding the commission of the alleged crime does not warrant interference by the High Court under Section 482 when the Magistrate has acted within the four corners of law.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
2023INSC778 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.2628-2629 OF 2023 (@ SLP(CRL.) Nos.8506-8507/2022)
ZUNAID … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Leave granted.
3. The two appeals arise out of the orders passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the Application No.14899/2022
filed by the respondents-accused under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’). These two appeals
have been filed by the appellant-complainant challenging the order
dated 21.07.2022 by which the High Court had granted the prayer
made by the respondents-accused to amend the application filed
under Signature Not Verified Section 482 Cr.P.C. and challenging the order dated Digitally signed by SWETA BALODI Date: 2023.08.31
22.07.2022 by which the High Court has set aside the orders dated 16:59:38 IST Reason:
15.11.2018 and dated 11.01.2022 passed by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate (for short, ‘CJM’) in Misc. Case No.06/11/2018 arising 2
out of Case Crime No.907/2017. The High Court vide the impugned
order further directed the concerned Magistrate to pass a fresh
order on the Protest Petition filed by the appellant-complainant in
the light of observations made by it in the impugned order.
4. The short facts giving rise to the present appeals are that on
16.08.2017, the appellant – Junaid Khan had lodged an FIR alleging
inter alia that the respondents–accused armed with sharp-edged
weapons had attacked him and his family and also abused them due to
an old enmity. As a result thereof, his family members got
seriously injured, and were sent to the hospital for treatment. The
said FIR was registered as Crime Case No.907 of 2017 for the
offence under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 324, 504 IPC at
P.S. Kotwali Gursahaiganj, Kannauj. The Investigating Officer,
after completing the investigation, submitted the Final Report
bearing No.164/2017 on 13.11.2017.
5. Being aggrieved by the said report, the appellant-complainant
filed a Protest Petition being F.R. No.06/11/18 before the
concerned CJM. The concerned CJM vide order dated 15.11.2018
rejected the Final Report of the Investigating Officer and directed
that the Protest Petition be registered as the Complaint Case. The
said complaint case was registered and numbered as the Complaint
No.2783/2018.
6. The concerned CJM having regard to the provisions contained in
Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. and after recording the statements of
the complainant and eight other witnesses, issued summons to the
respondents-accused vide order dated 11.01.2022 in the said 3
complaint case. Being aggrieved by the said order passed on
11.01.2022, the respondents-accused preferred an application under
Section 482 bearing No.14899/2022 before the High Court.
7. On 20.07.2022, the respondents-accused, who were the
applicants before the High Court, submitted an application seeking
amendment in the prayer clause of the application filed under
Section 482 and prayed for setting aside of the order dated
15.11.2018 as well. The said application for amendment came to be
allowed by the High Court vide the impugned order dated 21.07.2022.
On the very next day, the High Court after hearing the learned
counsel for the parties passed the impugned order on 22.07.2022,
allowing the said application under Section 482 as stated
hereinabove.
8. The High Court while passing the impugned order, observed as
under: -
“20. When the findings recorded by concerned Magistrate as noted above, are examined in the light of the observations contained in paragraph 28 of the judgement in Hari Ram (supra) do not fulfill the mandate of law which the Magistrate is required to comply while exercising jurisdiction under Section 190 (1) (b) Cr.P.C. No finding has been recorded by concerned Magistrate with regard to the papers accompanying the police report. Without recording any finding that there is no evidence against applicants in the papers accompanying police report, the conclusion drawn by Magistrate to treat the protest petition as a complaint is not only illegal, but also arbitrary. Once the Magistrate came to 4
prima facie conclusion that investigation of concerned case crime number is unsatisfactory or is the outcome of lackadaisical approach of investigating Officer, then in that eventuality, concerned Magistrate ought to have directed further investigation in the matter. The findings recorded by concerned Magistrate in support of his conclusion to treat the protest petition as a complaint are by themselves insufficient to proceed with the protest petition as a complaint.”
9. In our opinion, the above observations recorded by the High
Court are absolutely erroneous in view of the catena of decisions
of this Court.
10. In Rakesh & Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another 1, it
is observed as under: -
“6. If we are to go back to trace the genesis of the views expressed by this Court in Gopal Vijay Verma v. Bhuneshwar Prasad Sinha, (1982) 3 SCC 510, notice must be had of the decision of this Court in H.S. Bains v. State (UT of Chandigarh) (1980) 4 SCC 631 wherein it was held that after receipt of the police report under Section 173, the Magistrate has three options: (H.S. Bains case (supra)
“6. …. (1) he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop action; (2) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) on the basis of the police report and issue
1 (2014) 13 SCC 133 5
process; this he may do without being bound in any manner by the conclusion arrived at by the police in their report; (3) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) on the basis of the original complaint and proceed to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200. If he adopts the third alternative, he may hold or direct an inquiry under Section 202 if he thinks fit.
Thereafter he may dismiss the complaint or issue process, as the case may be.”
The second and third options available to the Magistrate as laid down in H.S. Bains (supra) has been referred to and relied upon in subsequent decisions of this Court to approve the action of the Magistrate in accepting the final report and at the same time in proceeding to treat either the police report or the initial complaint as the basis for further action/enquiry in the matter of the allegations levelled therein. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of this Court in Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 7 SCC 768. The following view may be specifically noted:
“9. ….The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, exercise his powers under Section 190(1)(b) and direct the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the 6
procedure laid down in Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under Section 190(1)(a) though it is open to him to act under Section 200 or Section 202 also. [See India Carat (P) Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka, (1989) 2 SCC 132]” (SCC P. 140, Para 16).”
11. In view of the above, there remains no shadow of doubt that on
the receipt of the police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the
Magistrate can exercise three options. Firstly, he may decide that
there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop
action. Secondly, he may take cognizance of the offence under
Section 190(1)(b) on the basis of the police report and issue
process; and thirdly, he may take cognizance of the offence under
Section 190(1)(a) on the basis of the original complaint and
proceed to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses
under Section 200. It may be noted that even in a case where the
final report of the police under Section 173 is accepted and the
accused persons are discharged, the Magistrate has the power to
take cognizance of the offence on a complaint or a Protest Petition
on the same or similar allegations even after the acceptance of the
final report. As held by this Court in Gopal Vijay Verma Vs.
Bhuneshwar Prasad Sinha and Others2, as followed in B. Chandrika
Vs. Santhosh and Another3, a Magistrate is not debarred from taking
cognizance of a complaint merely on the ground that earlier he had
declined to take cognizance of the police report. No doubt a
2 (1982) 3 SCC 510 3 (2014) 13 SCC 699 7
Magistrate while exercising his judicial discretion has to apply
his mind to the contents of the Protest Petition or the complaint
as the case may be.
12. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the
concerned CJM vide the detailed order passed on 15.11.2018 had
rejected the final report submitted by the Investigating Officer
and had accepted the Protest Petition, and decided to proceed
further under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Such a course opted by the CJM
was absolutely just, legal and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case. The said order dated 15.11.2018 remained
unchallenged at the instance of the respondents-accused. It was
only when the concerned CJM after recording the statements of the
complainant and eight witnesses, issued summons on 11.01.2022, the
respondents filed the application challenging the said order dated
11.01.2022 under Section 482 before the High Court, and in the said
application, the order dated 15.11.2018 came to be challenged by
way of amendment. As such, the High Court should not have permitted
the respondents-accused to amend the Application for challenging
the order dated 15.11.2018 after about four years of its passing,
and in any case should not have interfered with the discretion
exercised by the CJM within the four corners of law. The
discretionary order of 11.01.2022 passed by the concerned CJM
issuing summons to the accused, after recording statements of the
complainant and the eight witnesses and after recording prima facie
satisfaction about the commission of the alleged crime, also did
not warrant any interference by the High Court. In our opinion, 8
the High Court has committed gross error in setting aside the
orders dated 15.11.2018 and 11.01.2022 passed by the CJM.
13. In that view of the matter the impugned orders passed by the
High Court being highly erroneous, the same are quashed and set
aside. The concerned CJM is directed to proceed with the complaint
case in accordance with law. It shall be open for the respondents-
accused to respond to the summons and appear before the concerned
CJM within two weeks.
14. The appeals stand allowed accordingly.
15. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
……………………………………………………J. [BELA M. TRIVEDI]
……………………………………………………J. [DIPANKAR DATTA]
NEW DELHI;
29TH AUGUST, 2023 9
ITEM NO.29 COURT NO.15 SECTION II
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 8506- 8507/2022
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 22-07-2022 in A482 No. 14899/2022 21-07-2022 in A482 No. 14899/2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad)
ZUNAID Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. Respondent(s)
(IA No. 134032/2022 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)
Date : 29-08-2023 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE BELA M. TRIVEDI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Anurag Kishore, AOR Ms. Ritika Srivastava, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Salman Khurshid, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Misbah Bin Tariq, Adv.
Mr. Mohd. Amanullah, Adv.
Ms. Shabana Anjum, Adv.
Mr. Azhar Ali, Adv.
Mr. Saurabh Mishra, AOR
Mr. Ankit Goel, AOR Mr. Satyam Pandey, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable order.
Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
(SWETA BALODI) (R.S. NARAYANAN) COURT MASTER (SH) ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
(Signed reportable order is placed on the file)
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