Yugal Kishore Choudhary vs The State Of Bihar And Ors

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No.36019 of 2016 Arising Out of PS. Case No.- Year-1111 Thana- District- ====================================================== Yugal Kishore Choudhary Son of Late Mahesh Prasad Choudhary resident of village - Kalyanpur, Baitipar Tola, Police Station Bibhutipur, Distt. - Samastipur

... ... Petitioner/s Versus 1. The State of Bihar 2. Shambhu Kumar Jha Son of Late Rajeshwar Jha 3. Mahesh Kumar Jha Son of Sri Ram Krishna Jha Both ara resident of village - Kalyanpur, Baitipar Tola, Police Station Bibhutipur, Distt. - Samastipur

... ... Opposite Party/s ====================================================== Appearance : For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Gajendra Kumar Singh, Advocate For the Opposite Party/s : Mr. Tarkeshwar Nath Thakur, APP ====================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JITENDRA KUMAR ORAL JUDGMENT

Date : 03-10-2023

The present petition, under Section 482 Cr. P.C., has

been preferred by the petitioner impugning the order dated

17.06.2016

, passed by Ld. Additional District and Sessions

Judge, Rosera, Samastipur in Criminal Revision No. 263 of

2013 arising out of Criminal Proceeding bearing M.R. No. 316

of 2012, pending in the Court of Ld. Sub-divisional Magistrate,

Rosera.

2. Relevant facts, as emerging from the record, is that

the petitioner Yugal Kishore Choudhary is Sevait of Sri 108 Sri Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 2/41

Ram Janki Jee Thakurbari, situated at Village Kalyanpur, Police

Station-Bibhutipur, District-Samastipur. The land in dispute

bearing Old Plot No. 227, Khesra No. 3210 and 3211(New

Khesra No. 5553) measuring 1 katha 1.3/4 dhurs belongs to Sri

108 Sri Ram Janki Jee Thakurbari. However, respondent nos. 2

and 3, namely, Shambhu Kumar Jha and Mahesh Kumar Jha are

claiming to be the owner of the property in question on the basis

of sale deed executed by Indresh Kumar Jha and are disturbing

the peaceful possession of the petitioner. Hence, the matter was

reported by the petitioner to the police and the police, after

inquiry, sent a report to the Ld. Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Rosera, Samastipur stating that after enquiry, it has been found

that on account of land in dispute, there is tension prevailing

between the parties and one FIR bearing Bibhutipur P.S. Case

No. 58 of 2012 has been also lodged against the respondent nos.

2 and 3 at the instance of the petitioner. It was also reported that

there is possibility of breach of peace.

3. On the aforesaid report of the police, Ld. Sub-

Divisional Magistrate, Rosera, Samastipur initiated proceeding

under Section 144 Cr. P.C. However, after hearing both the

parties, Ld. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rosera, vide order dated

13.07.2012, passed in M.R. No. 316 of 2012 converted the Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 3/41

proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P.C. into proceeding under

Section 145 Cr. P.C. The aggrieved parties, i.e., respondent nos.

2 and 3, namely, Shambhu Kumar Jha and Mahesh Kumar Jha

preferred revision bearing Criminal Revision No. 263 of 2013

before Ld. Sessions Court, Samastipur, and vide order dated

17.06.2016, Ld. Sessions Court, Samastipur allowed the said

criminal revision setting aside the order dated 13.07.2012,

passed by Ld. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rosera in M.R. No.

316 of 2012. Hence, the petitioner has preferred the present

petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. against the revisional order

dated 17.06.2016.

4. It also transpires that the petitioner, Yugal Kishore

Choudhary has also filed Civil Suit bearing Title Suit No. 02 of

2012 for declaration of alleged sale deed executed in favour of

Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as null and void and the said title suit

is still pending consideration. It further transpires that the

petitioner, Yugal Kishore Choudhary has also filed interim

application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of the Civil

Procedure Code for injunction in the aforesaid suit, which is

also pending consideration.

5. Heard Ld. Counsel for the petitioner and Ld. APP

for the State. The matter is still at the stage of admission, hence, Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 4/41

no one is present on behalf of respondent nos. 2 and 3.

6. Ld. counsel for the petitioner submits that the

impugned order dated 17.06.2016, passed by Ld. Additional

District and Sessions Judge, Rosera, Samastipur in Cr. Revision

No. 263 of 2013 is not sustainable submitting that Ld. Sessions

Court has not considered the fact that there was apprehension of

breach of peace with respect to the land in dispute between the

parties. Hence, the order dated 13.07.2012, passed by Ld. Sub-

Divisional Magistrate, Rosera, Samastipur in M.R. Case No.

316 of 2012 has been rightly passed, but the Revisional Court

has erroneously set aside the said order by allowing the revision

petition.

7. However, Ld. APP for the State defends the order

of learned Sessions Court submitting that there is no illegality or

infirmity in the impugned order. In the facts and circumstances

of the case, initiation of proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P.C.

was not permissible.

8. Before I consider the above submissions of the

parties, it is imperative to know the ambit and scope of

jurisdiction under Section 145 Cr. P.C.

9. Section 145 Cr. P.C. is the part of Chapter X of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 dealing with maintenance of Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 5/41

public order and tranquility. Section 145 Cr. P.C. is the part of

Sub Chapter D dealing with disputes as to immovable property.

Besides Section 145 Cr. P.C., Section 146, 147 and 148 Cr. P.C.

are also part of Sub Chapter D of Chapter X of Cr. P.C. It is

found that disputes over the land and water often results in

breach of the peace, violence and bloodshed, the Executive

Magistrates have been empowered under Section 145-148 to

intervene at an incipient stage of such a dispute and to compel

the disputants to have recourse to legal remedies. If, upon a

report of a police officer or upon other information, an

Executive Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute concerning any

land or water or the boundaries thereof exists within his

jurisdiction, and that such dispute is likely to cause a breach of

the peace, he shall make an order in writing requiring the parties

concerned in such dispute to attend to his court on a specified

date and time, and to put in written statements of their claims

regarding the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute.

While making such order, the Magistrate shall state the grounds

for his satisfaction referred to above. The very foundation of the

jurisdiction of a Magistrate in cases under Section 145 is based

on the existence of a dispute giving rise to apprehension of

breach of peace and as soon as such apprehension ceases to Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 6/41

exist or if it never existed, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to

proceed with the case ceases and the only order he has to pass is

to drop the proceedings. The enquiry under Section 145(4) is

limited to the question of actual possession on the relevant date

and is not concerned with the claims and merits of the parties in

regard to the right to possess the subject of dispute. If the

magistrate decides that one of the parties was in possession of

the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to

be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due

course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession

until such eviction.

10. Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 8 of R.H.

Bhutani vs. Mani J. Desai, (1968 SCC OnLine SC 5) held that

the object of Section 145, no doubt, is to prevent breach of

peace and for that end to provide a speedy remedy by bringing

the parties before the court and ascertaining who of them was in

actual possession and to maintain status quo until their rights are

determined by a competent court. The section requires that the

Magistrate must be satisfied before initiating proceedings that a

dispute, regarding an immovable property exists and that such

dispute is likely to cause breach of peace. But once he is

satisfied of these two conditions, the section requires him to Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 7/41

pass a preliminary order under sub-section (1) and thereafter to

make an enquiry under sub-section (4) and pass a final order

under sub-section (6). It is not necessary that at the time of

passing the final order the apprehension of breach of peace

should continue or exist. The enquiry under Section 145 is

limited to the question as to who was in actual possession on the

date of the preliminary order irrespective of the rights of the

parties. Under the second proviso, the party who is found to

have been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two

months next preceding the date of the preliminary order may for

the purpose of the enquiry be deemed to have been in

possession on the date of that order. The opposite party may of

course prove that dispossession took place more than two

months next preceding the date of that order and in that case the

Magistrate would have to cancel his preliminary order. On the

other hand, if he is satisfied that dispossession was both forcible

and wrongful and took place within the prescribed period, the

party dispossessed would be deemed to be in actual possession

on the date of the preliminary order and the Magistrate would

then proceed to make his final order directing the dispossessor

to restore possession and prohibit him from interfering with that

possession until the applicant is evicted in due course of law. Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 8/41

This is broadly the scheme of Section 145.

11. Hon'ble Supreme Court further held in para 9

that the satisfaction under sub-section (1) is of the Magistrate.

The question whether on the materials before him, he should

initiate proceedings or not is, therefore, in his discretion which,

no doubt, has to be exercised in accordance with the well

recognised rules of law in that behalf. No hard and fast rule can,

therefore, be laid down as to the sufficiency of material for his

satisfaction. The language of the sub-section is clear and

unambiguous that he can arrive at his satisfaction both from the

police report or "from other information" which must include an

application by the party dispossessed. The High Court, in the

exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, would not go into the

question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the

Magistrate.

12. Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 10 of Shanti

Kumar Panda Vs. Shakuntala Devi [(2004) 1 SCC 438] has

held that possession is nine points in law. One purpose of the

enforcement of the law is to maintain peace and order in society.

The disputes relating to property should be settled in a civilized

manner by having recourse to law and not by taking the law in

own hands by members of society. A dispute relating to any land Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 9/41

etc. as defined in sub-section (2) of Section 145 having arisen,

causing a likelihood of a breach of the peace, Section 145 of the

Code authorizes the Executive Magistrate to take cognizance of

the dispute and settle the same by holding an enquiry into

possession as distinguished from right to possession or title. The

proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Code have been held

to be quasi-civil, quasi-criminal in nature or an executive or

police action. The purpose of the provisions is to provide a

speedy and summary remedy so as to prevent a breach of the

peace by submitting the dispute to the Executive Magistrate for

resolution as between the parties disputing the question of

possession over the property. The Magistrate having taken

cognizance of the dispute would confine himself to ascertaining

which of the disputing parties was in possession by reference to

the date of the preliminary order or within two months next

before the said date, as referred to in the proviso to sub-section

(4) of Section 145 and maintain the status quo as to possession

until the entitlement to possession was determined by a court,

having competence to enter into adjudication of civil rights,

which an Executive Magistrate cannot. The Executive

Magistrate would not take cognizance of the dispute if it is

referable only to ownership or right to possession and is not Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 10/41

over possession simpliciter; so also the Executive Magistrate

would refuse to interfere if there is no likelihood of breach of

the peace or if the likelihood of breach of peace though existed

at a previous point of time, had ceased to exist by the time he

was called upon to pronounce the final order so far as he was

concerned.

13. Hon'ble Supreme Court further held in para 15

that it is well settled that a decision by a criminal court does not

bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court binds the

criminal court. A decision given under Section 145 of the Code

has relevance and is admissible in evidence to show: (i) that

there was a dispute relating to a particular property; (ii) that the

dispute was between the particular parties; (iii) that such dispute

led to the passing of a preliminary order under Section 145(1) or

an attachment under Section 146(1), on the given date; and (iv)

that the Magistrate found one of the parties to be in possession

or fictional possession of the disputed property on the date of

the preliminary order. The reasoning recorded by the Magistrate

or other findings arrived at by him have no relevance and are

not admissible in evidence before the competent court and the

competent court is not bound by the findings arrived at by the

Magistrate even on the question of possession though, as Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 11/41

between the parties, the order of the Magistrate would be

evidence of possession. The finding recorded by the Magistrate

does not bind the court. The competent court has jurisdiction

and would be justified in arriving at a finding inconsistent with

the one arrived at by the Executive Magistrate even on the

question of possession. Sections 145 and 146 only provide for

the order of the Executive Magistrate made under any of the two

provisions being superseded by and giving way to the order or

decree of a competent court. The effect of the Magistrate's order

is that burden is thrown on the unsuccessful party to prove its

possession or entitlement to possession before the competent

court.

14. Hon'ble Supreme Court further held in para 22

that the stage of passing an interlocutory order such as on an

application for the grant of ad interim injunction under Rule 1 or

2 of Order 39 CPC, the competent court shall have to form its

opinion on the availability of a prima facie case, the balance of

convenience and the irreparable injury -- the three pillars on

which rests the foundation of any order of injunction. At that

stage material in the shape of affidavits, documents and

pleadings is placed before the court for its consideration. The

order of the Executive Magistrate may also be placed before it, Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 12/41

who having held an enquiry, though summary in nature, has

arrived at a finding on the question of possession which the

Code intends to be sustained unless the court of competent

jurisdiction by its judicial order supersedes the finding or the

effect of such finding and till then all disturbances in possession

of the successful party are intended by the Code to be forbidden.

The civil court shall also respect such order and will be loath to

arrive at an interim arrangement inconsistent with the one made

by the Executive Magistrate. However, this is far from holding

that the civil court does not have jurisdiction to make an order

of injunction inconsistent with the order of the Executive

Magistrate. The jurisdiction is there but the same shall be

exercised not as a rule but as an exception. There may be cases

such as one where the order of the Executive Magistrate can be

shown to be without jurisdiction, palpably wrong or containing

self-contradictory findings. For example, the Magistrate may

have made an order treating the party dispossessed beyond two

months to be as in possession. There may be cases where in

spite of the order made by the Executive Magistrate based on

the evidence adduced before it, the competent court, based on

the material produced before such court, may be inclined to hold

that prima facie a very strong case for retaining or placing one Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 13/41

of the parties in possession of the suit property is made out or

where it will be totally unjust or inequitable to continue one

party in possession of the property as ordered by the Executive

Magistrate. In such exceptional situations, the competent court

(which will mostly be a civil court) may have jurisdiction for

granting an order of injunction in departure from the findings

recorded and the declaration made by the Executive Magistrate

under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order

under Section 146 of the Code would not pose a problem of that

magnitude. Inasmuch as the property is under attachment and is

placed in the hands of a receiver, the civil court can comfortably

examine whether it would be just and expedient to continue with

the attachment and with the same receiver or to appoint another

receiver or to make some other interim arrangement during the

pendency of the civil suit.

15. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhinka Vs. Charan

Singh (AIR 1959 SC 960) has held that the Magistrate does not

purport to decide a party's title or right to possession of the land

but expressly reserves that question to be decided in due course

of law. His order is a temporary order irrespective of the rights

of the parties, which will have to be agitated and adjudicated

upon by a competent forum and in the manner provided by law. Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 14/41

The life of the said order is coterminous with the passing of a

decree by a civil court and the moment a civil court makes an

order of eviction, it displaces the order of the criminal court.

The orders under Section 145 of the Code are thus merely police

orders and do not decide any question of title.

16. Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 8 of Ranbir

Singh Vs. Dalbir Singh & Ors. [(2002) 3 SCC 700] held that

the Court, while dealing with a proceeding under Section 145

CrPC, is mainly concerned with possession of the property in

dispute on the date of the preliminary order and dispossession, if

any, within two months prior to that date; the court is not

required to decide either title to the property or right of

possession of the same.

17. Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 7 of Chandu

Naik and Ors. Vs. Sitaram B. Naik and Anr. (1978 1 SCC

210) has explained the duty of the Executive Magistrate under

Section 145 and held that the Magistrate, in the first instance,

will try to conclude the proceeding in accordance with the

various provisions of Section 145 of the Code. If he is able to

declare the possession of either party on consideration of the

evidence adduced or to be adduced before him he would do so.

In that event the other party will be forbidden from creating any Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 15/41

disturbance of the possession [including the deemed possession,

in case the application of the proviso to sub-section (4) is found

necessary] of the party declared in possession. The Magistrate,

then, will have to withdraw the attachment in accordance with

the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 146, because, as per his

order declaring a party in possession there would be no longer

any likelihood of the breach of the peace with regard to the

subject of dispute. The party not found in possession by the

Magistrate will have to seek the redress of his grievance, if any,

elsewhere. If, however, the Magistrate decides that none of the

parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of

the order made under sub-section (1) of Section 145 or if he is

unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in

possession of the subject of dispute he need not lift the

attachment until a competent Court had determined the rights of

the parties as provided for in Section 146(1). In such a situation,

recourse, if necessary, may be taken to sub-section (2) of

Section 146 of the Code either by the Magistrate or a civil court,

as the case may be.

18. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in para 1 of

Tarulata Devi vs. Nikhil Bandhu Mishra, (1982 SCC OnLine

Gau 35) has observed that the object of S. 145 of the Code is to Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 16/41

prevent breach of peace and for that end to provide a speedy

remedy by bringing the contending parties before the Court and

ascertaining who of them was in actual possession, to maintain

status quo until their rights are finally determined by a

competent court. The life of the order is co- terminus with the

passing a decree by Civil Court and the moment the Civil Court

makes an order of eviction, the final order of the Criminal Court

stands superseded. The section authorises a Magistrate to issue a

declaratory order in favour of the party that he is entitled to

possession "until evicted therefrom in due course of law". The

Magistrate does not decide or purport to decide a party's title or

right to possession of the land as these areas are especially

reserved for the Civil Court. The foundation of assumption of

jurisdiction is an apprehension of breach of the peace. The

Magistrate makes only a temporary order irrespective of the

rights of the parties which will have to be agitated and

determined in the manner provided by law. Under Sec. 145(1)

the jurisdiction of a Magistrate is exclusively limited to decide

whether any and which of the parties was, on the date of the

preliminary order, in possession of the land in dispute. The order

only declares the actual possession of a party on the specific

date.

Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 17/41

19. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court further held in para

2 that in the event of any party who has been forcibly and

wrongfully dispossessed within 2 months next before the date of

the preliminary order, the Magistrate is authorised to treat the

party who was dispossessed as if he had been in possession on

such date. The power is enjoined in proviso to Section 145(4)

read with sub-sec. (6) thereof. It is true that the Magistrate has

to decide who is in actual possession on the date of his

preliminary order, but if he finds that the party in defacto

possession on that date had obtained possession forcibly and

wrongfully dispossessing the other party within 2 months next

preceding the date of his order, the Magistrate can treat the

dispossessed party as if he was in possession on such date and

restore possession to him, and, prohibit the dispossessor from

interfering with the possession until eviction of that person in

due course of law.

20. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court further held in para

3 that it is evident that the proviso to Section 145(4) is grounded

on the principle that forcible and wrongful dispossession is not

to be recognised under the criminal law. The word

"dispossessed" in the proviso means and includes to be out of

possession, ousted, ejected, removed from the premises or Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 18/41

excluded. Even a person having a right to possession cannot

dispossess another by taking the law into his hands and making

a forcible entry otherwise than in due course of law.

21. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in para 5 of Md.

Ansar Uddin Vs. State of Assam & Ors. [2008 Cri. L.J. (NOC)

479 (GAU.) has held that it is trite that for exercising a given

power, when discretion is vested in an officer, Executive or

Judicial, a corresponding duty to ensure that such discretion is not

arbitrarily exercised, stands cast on such an officer. A careful

reading of section 145(1) clearly reveals that in order to ensure

that the drawing of a proceeding, under section 145, does not

become whimsical or arbitrary, law places a duty, on Executive

Magistrate, not to draw a proceeding, under section 145, unless he

is satisfied that the dispute has given rise to apprehension of

breach of the peace. In order to reveal as to why he was so felt

satisfied, sub-section (1) of section 145 requires the Magistrate,

who draws the proceeding, to assign the grounds of his

satisfaction.

22. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court further held in para 7

that what is, now, of paramount importance to note is that mere

omission to record the grounds of satisfaction by the Magistrate,

who draws the proceeding, under section 145, cannot ipso facto

make the order illegal or without jurisdiction. In such Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 19/41

circumstances, it is the duty of the Revisional Court to ascertain as

to what were the materials placed before the Magistrate on the

basis whereof the proceeding was drawn. If the materials justify

drawing of the proceeding, then, satisfaction of the Magistrate,

which is subjective in nature, cannot be interfered with. Hence, if

the materials, on record based on which a proceeding is drawn,

makes out a case for drawing of a proceeding under section 145,

Revisional Court will not interfere with such an order, for,

interference, in such a case, would be hyper-technical approach to

an order drawing the proceeding. Even if, on the basis of the

materials on record, there are two views possible and if an

Executive Magistrate is found to have adopted the view that the

materials on record justified drawing of a proceeding, Revisional

Court would not interfere with such an order.

23. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court further held in para 8

that while considering the above aspect of the matter, it needs to be

noted that the very case, set up by the first party, clearly reflects

that the dispute, in question, was a dispute confined to the parties

to the proceeding. Such a dispute is a private dispute and does not

involve the members of the public, in general. When the members

of the public have no interest in a dispute, such a dispute cannot

become the foundation for exercise of powers under section

145(1).

Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 20/41

24. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court further held in para 9

that it is, at this stage, imperative to recall the scheme of section

145 read with section 146, Cr. P.C. Section 145 appears under

Chapter X of the Code, which reads, "Maintenance of Public

Order and Tranquillity". This chapter is divided into separate

groups. Section 145 and 146 fall under Group-D. Though the

heading of the chapter, in any legislation, is not the sole criterion

for determination of the scope of the provisions, which may be

embodied in such a chapter, the fact remains that the heading of

the chapter in a piece of legislation does reflect the legislative

intent. A careful analysis of the various provisions, contained in

Chapter X, would show that this chapter essentially deals with

maintenance of public order and tranquillity. In other words, a

private dispute or a dispute, which has no bearing on public order

and tranquillity, cannot be regarded as a dispute and such a dispute

does not empower an Executive Magistrate to exercise jurisdiction

under sub-section (1) of section 145.

25. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court further held in para

10 that a close analysis of the provisions of section 145 shows that

the Magistrate is empowered to draw a proceeding, under sub-

section (1) of section 145, if he is satisfied from report of a police

officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause

breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 21/41

boundaries thereof within his local jurisdiction. A careful reading

of section 145(1) also shows that on receipt of report or

information as aforementioned, the Magistrate shall make an

order, in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and

requiring the parties concerned, in such dispute, to attend his Court

in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in

written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of

actual possession of the subject of dispute.

26. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court further held in para

11 that the provisions, contained in sub-section (1) of section 145,

show that the source of information for the purpose of drawing a

proceeding, under sub-section (1) of section 145, is not material;

what is material is that the Executive Magistrate must feel satisfied

about existence of a dispute as envisaged in section 145(1) and

must assign the grounds of his being so satisfied. This apart, the

dispute must relate to any land, water or boundary thereof and the

dispute must be such, which is likely to cause breach of the peace.

The expression "breach of the peace" does not really rhean mental

peace of the parties concerned. Disturbance of public order is

distinct and different from actions of the individuals, which do not

disturb the society to the extent of vibrating a general disturbance

of public order. The breach of peace, envisaged under section 145,

Cr. P.C., means disturbance of the even tempo of the life of the Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 22/41

community in a given locality. When a party illegally or forcibly

occupies land of another party, people, in general, or even

neighbours of such a party may be shocked and mentally

disturbed, but life of the community may still move keeping pace

with the even tempo of life of the community. If by such act of

dispossession, even tempo of life of the community is disturbed or

jeopardized, it may become a case of disturbance of public order

and tranquillity. The acts of a private party, which affect personal

rights of another party, do not disturb the even tempo of the

society, for, such feuds are private feuds. Basis of jurisdiction

under section 145(1) is a dispute, which is likely to cause a breach

of the peace. Ordinarily, a person, dispossessed from his land,

shall sue for recovery of the immovable properly under the

provisions of the Specific Relief Act and if there is a threat of his

dispossession, he should institute a suit to obtain injunction. These

are, ordinarily, forum for establishing rights of the litigants. A

proceeding under section 145 is, therefore, an extra-ordinary

provision to grant extra-ordinaiy relief, when there is likelihood of

breach of the peace in a given locality. The final order of the

Magistrate is subject to the decision of the Civil Court. It is,

therefore, clear that private dispute between two persons, which

does not disturb law and order or occasion breach of the peace in

the locality, cannot form basis for drawing a proceeding under Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 23/41

section 145, Cr. P.C. and the forum for obtaining relief, in such a

case, is the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction and not the

Executive Magistrate's Court.

27. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court further held in para

13 that in order to enable an Executive Magistrate to assume

jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of section 145, necessary it is

that there is a dispute with regard to any land, water or boundaries

thereof and the dispute must be such, which is likely to cause

breach of the peace. This apprehension of breach of the peace is

one of the condition precedents for assumption of jurisdiction

under sub-section (1) of section 145. The breach of the peace,

which sub-section (1) of section 145 envisages, is not breach of

the peace between two individuals or private parties. The dispute

must be such, which involves people, in general. In other words, a

private dispute is not amenable to the exercise of jurisdiction,

under section (1) of section 145, unless such a dispute affects the

even tempo of life of the people in a given locality.

28. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in para 10 of

Kaushal Mishra & Ors. Vs. Raj Kumar Mishra [2008 Cri. L.J.

(NOC) 272 (GAU,)] has held that when a Magistrate draws a

proceeding under section 145(1), the order, drawing the

proceeding, is commonly known as preliminary order. Since there

is no provision for conversion of the proceeding from one under Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 24/41

sections 144 to 145 Cr. P.C., the order of conversion is nothing, but

a preliminary order. This order, therefore, must reveal that the

conditions precedent for drawing of a proceeding under section

145 stands satisfied.

29. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court further held in para

11 that the dispute in the present case was out and out a private

dispute inasmuch as the dispute did not involve anyone other than

the parties to the proceeding and the members of the general

public were neither affected nor were they shown to be interested

in the dispute. Hence, it was held that the Ld. Magistrate had no

jurisdiction in the matter and could not have drawn a proceeding

under section 145.

30. Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Chirstalin

Costa Vs. State of Goa (1993 MH LJ 1409) has observed that

quarrels between two individuals normally does not create any

problem of public order and at the most, it may lead to a

problem of law and order which may be dealt with appropriate

penal laws.

31. Hon'ble Delhi High Court in para 18 of

Dharampal & Ors. Vs. State of Delhi & Anr. ( 2012 SCC

OnLine Del 5321) has held that jurisdiction under Sections 145

and 146 Cr. P.C. is preventive in nature and can be resorted to only

in case of emergency or on genuine apprehension of breach of Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 25/41

peace or if no one is in settled possession. Hon'ble Delhi High

Court further held in para 19 that in our Constitution, there is a

clear separation of judicial and executive powers. The civil

disputes are to be decided by civil Courts and an unsuccessful

litigant has a right to file an appeal. The SDMs cannot use the

power conferred on them under Sections 145 and 146 Cr. P.C. to

pass an interim injunction order when the civil Court has refused

to do so.

32. Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 2 of Ram

Sumer Puri Mahant Vs. State of U.P. & Others [(1985) 1

SCC 427] has held that when a civil litigation is pending for the

property wherein the question of possession is involved and has

been adjudicated, there is hardly any justification for initiating a

parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code.

There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree

of the civil court is binding on the criminal court. Parallel

proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event

of a decree of the civil court, the criminal court should not be

allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is

being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to

approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or

appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property

during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 26/41

in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to

be wasted over meaningless litigation.

33. Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 8 of

Jhummamal @ Devandas Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh &

Others [(1988) 4 SCC 452] has held that an order made under

Section 145 Cr.P.C. deals only with the factum of possession of

the parties as on a particular day. It confers no title to remain in

possession of the disputed property. The order is subject to

decision of the civil court. The unsuccessful party therefore

must get relief only in the civil court. He may move the civil

court with properly instituted suit. He may file a suit for

declaration and prove a better right to possession. The civil

court has jurisdiction to give a finding different from that which

the Magistrate has reached.

34. Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 3 of Prakash

Chand Sachdeva Vs. State & Anr. [(1994) 1 SCC 471]

referring to Ram Sumer Puri Mahant (supra), has held that a

suit or remedy in civil court for possession or injunction

normally prevents a person from invoking jurisdiction of the

criminal court, particularly when possession is being examined

by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the

civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 27/41

of receiver for adequate protection of the property during

pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the

interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be

wasted over meaningless litigation. Hon'ble Supreme Court

further held that the ratio of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant (supra)

cannot apply where there is no dispute about title and explained

that when claim or title are not in dispute and the parties on their

own showing are co-owners and there is no partition one cannot

be permitted to act forcibly and unlawfully and ask the other to

act in accordance with law. Where the dispute is not on the right

to possession but on the question of possession the Magistrate is

empowered to take cognizance under Section 145 CrPC.

35. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kunjbihari Vs.

Balram and Anr. (2006 11 SCC 66) has also quashed the

Criminal Proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr. P.C. when the

rights of the parties in respect of property in question was

settled by a compromise decree passed by the Civil Court during

pendency of Civil Proceeding between the parties, despite the

Civil Proceeding having achieved finality, proceeding under

Section 145 Cr.P.C. was initiated. The Proceeding under Section

145 Cr. P.C. was held to be an abuse of process of Court and

was set aside by Hon'ble Supreme Court.

Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 28/41

36. Hon'ble Patna High Court, followed the ratio of

Ram Sumer Puri Mahant case (supra) in Atahaul Haque &

Ors. Vs. Md. Allauddin [(2000) 3 PLJR 90] and Chandra

Shekhar Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr., (2000 SCC

Online Pat 1095), and held that when a civil suit is pending in a

competent Civil Court, the parties to the suit can seek their

relief/reliefs from that Court. A parallel proceeding in a criminal

Court cannot be allowed to continue when civil suit is already

pending between the parties regarding the subject matter.

37. Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 13 of Amresh

Tiwari Vs. Lalta Prasad Dubey & Anr., [(2000) 4 SCC 440]

explaining the ratio of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant (supra), held

that multiplicity of litigation should be avoided as it is not in the

interest of the parties and public time would be wasted over

meaningless litigation. On this principle it was held that when

possession is being examined by the civil court and parties were

in a position to approach the civil court for adequate protection

of the property during the pendency of the dispute, the parallel

proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. should not continue. Referring to Jhummamal case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court,

clarified that it is not that in every case where a civil suit is

filed, Section 145 proceedings would never lie. It is only in Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 29/41

cases where civil suit is for possession or for declaration of title

in respect of the same property and where reliefs regarding

protection of the property concerned can be applied for and

granted by the civil court that proceedings under Section 145

should not be allowed to continue. This is because the civil

court is competent to decide the question of title as well as

possession between the parties and the orders of the civil court

would be binding on the Magistrate.

38. Hon'ble Patna High Court in para 5 of Nand

Kishore Prasad Sah Vs. State of Bihar, (2005(2) PLJR 506)

has held that when a civil litigation involving question of title

and possession is pending for the same property, a parallel

proceeding under Section 145 of the Code will amount to

multiplicity of litigation and wastage of public time and money

because question of title and possession has to be finally

decided in the civil suit and not in the proceeding under Section

145 of the Code. Hence, a proceeding under Section 145 of the

Code would be a misuse of process of Court.

39. Hon'ble Patna High Court in para 7 of Gyandeo

Sharma Vs. State of Bihar (2006(2) PLJR 181) has held that

where suit between the parties is only for declaration of title in

respect of the same property in that case also a parallel Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 30/41

proceeding under section 145, Cr.P.C. cannot be instituted or

allowed to proceed.

40. Hon'ble Patna Court in Ras Bihari Rai & Ors.

Vs. The State of Bihar & Anr., (2006 SCC Online Pat 263)

has followed Ram Sumer Puri Mahant case (supra) and held

that proceeding initiated under Section 145 Cr. P.C. is not

maintainable in view of civil litigation pending between the

parties.

41. Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 4 of Mahar

Jahan vs. State of Delhi, [(2004) 13 SCC 421] has held that

when the same property is subject matter of the civil suit

between the parties and criminal proceeding, there is no

propriety to continue the criminal proceeding.

42. Hon'ble Patna High Court in para 9 of Shrikant

Prasad @ Chirkut Sah Vs. The State of Bihar [(2013) 3

PLJR 392] has held that it is essential for the assumption of

jurisdiction by the Magistrate under Section 145 of the Code

that he should be satisfied either from the police report or from

the other information which would include an application by the

party dispossessed that there is likelihood of breach of peace.

The mere fact that there is dispute concerning land is clearly not Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 31/41

sufficient by itself to give him jurisdiction. An order under this

section must be a speaking order. The failure to indicate ground

that there is likelihood of breach of peace vitiates the order.

Where the order is vitiated, the Magistrate fails to get the

jurisdiction to hold an enquiry or pass any order under this

section. The defects in the preliminary order like failure to set

out the grounds of his satisfaction regarding likelihood of

breach of peace relating to immovable property would make the

subsequent proceeding without jurisdiction and erroneous in

law.

43. Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Sharad

Yadav @ Gappu & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (2013 SCC

Online All 4840) has held that in the police report as well as in

the orders under section 145(1) and 146(1) Cr. P.C., Ld.

Additional City Magistrate has admitted the possession of

petitioner no.1. Thus there was no dispute regarding possession

before Ld. Additional City Magistrate and there was no occasion

for him to pass an order under section 146(1) Cr. P.C. attaching

the property. Mere apprehension of breach of peace is not

sufficient to initiate proceedings under sections 145 and 146(1)

Cr. P.C.

44. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in para 21 of Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 32/41

Madhu Sarma & Ors. Vs. Ajit Sarma [(2013) 2 Gauhati Law

Reports 837] has held that Section 145 is within Chapter X of

the Cr. PC. which deals with maintenance of public order and

tranquility, particularly the object of the section is to maintain

law and order and to prevent a breach of peace by maintaining

either one or other of the parties in possession just two months

immediately before the reports submitted by the Police Officer

or the information regarding the dispute likely to cause breach

of peace concerning the land in dispute and not only that, in 145

proceeding the Magistrate cannot inquire the rights of the

parties so far as the title of the land is concerned. He can only

decide the question of possession and while considering the

possession of the disputed land in question, then the Magistrate

is to consider the evidence adduced by the parties in the

proceeding. Every dispute between the parties regarding the

possession of the land would not come within the purview of the

section 145 of the Code unless there is likelihood of breach of

peace and if there is no material before the Magistrate which

suggests likelihood of breach of peace, then the proceeding

under section 145 would be without jurisdiction. It is also

settled that the likelihood of breach of peace should not only be

existed on the date of application, but also on the date of Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 33/41

preliminary order passed by the Magistrate.

45. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court has further held in

para 22 that on proper examination of sub-section (1) of section

145, it appears that for initiating a proceeding relating to dispute

of land an apprehension of breach of peace in and around the

locality is a sine quo non, each and every dispute of land would

not attract the provisions of section 145, more particularly

private dispute between two individuals for which remedy under

civil law is available and to come within the purview of 2nd

proviso of sub-section (4) of section 145 it has to be proved that

the person dispossessed forcibly and wrongfully within two

months just before the date on which the police report or

otherwise, the information was received by the Magistrate. In

the instant case, from the evidence of the witnesses, it is not

clear as to how and in what manner the 2nd party-petitioners

forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed the 1st party-OP when the

1st party-OP was admittedly not residing in the hut within the

disputed land as at the relevant time he was at Hatigaon and it is

not established that how and in what manner the 2nd party-

petitioners trespassed into the alleged disputed land when

admittedly from the evidence it appears that the 2nd party-

petitioners were in the disputed land prior to 1974, i.e., before Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 34/41

the death of the father of the 1st party-OP. Even if the allegation

of the 1st party-OP regarding trespass of the 2nd party-

petitioners into the disputed land is accepted, then also a

question arises whether due to such trespass there is a likelihood

of breach of peace in the locality where the disputed land is

situated. If appears from the evidence of the 1st party witnesses

that none of them stated anything regarding the likelihood of

breach of peace in the locality for the alleged dispossession of

the 1st party-OP. If this type of land dispute which in no way

disturbs the peace and tranquility in the locality is considered

for initiation of a proceeding under section 145 of the Cr. PC,

then that would not really protect the interest of justice, rather

defeat the justice. In view of the above, the learned Magistrate

very rightly declared the possession of the 2nd party-petitioners

over the disputed land which would he subject to the decision in

the civil suit between the parties.

46. In Mahant Ram Saran Dass Vs. Harish Mohan

& Anr. [(2001) 10 SCC 758], question before Hon'ble Supreme

Court was whether the Respondent was entitled to invoke the

jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 145 CrPC, when a

suit for declaration was pending before competent civil court.

Here Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is not disputed that in Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 35/41

the civil suit itself the court has passed interim order of

injunction, and put certain restrictions on the parties with regard

to alienation of the property in question. It was true that the

applicant before the Magistrate, was not arrayed as party-

defendant in the civil suit, but that would not alter the position

in any manner since the civil court being in seisin of the matter,

any appropriate relief could be obtained from the civil court

itself and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction in the case in hand

to entertain the application under Section 145, and to pass any

orders thereon. Hence, the proceedings initiated by the

Magistrate under Section 145 CrPC was set aside.

47. Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in para 13 of

Ganga Bux Singh Vs. Sukhdin (1958 SCC Online All 297)

has held that Sec. 145(1) does not specifically mention any

petition. The Magistrate has to be satisfied from a 'police report'

or 'other information'. That 'information' may be an application

by an interested party or a third party or even the Magistrate's

personal information. The information may have been

communicated to him in writing or orally or he may have even

noticed some conduct of a party which might have given him an

indication of an apprehension of a breach of the peace. The

starting point of any proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P.C. is Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 36/41

not the information received by the Magistrate or the application

made to him or even the police report but his satisfaction

recorded in writing.

48. In Laxmi Kant Dubey Vs. Smt. Jamuni and Ors.

(1999 SCC OnLine All 809), there was civil dispute between the

parties and proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. was also

initiated. Here, Hon'ble Allahabad High Court quashed the

proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr. P.C. following the ratio of

Ram Sumer Puri Mahant's case (supra).

49. In Brahmaputra Iron & Steel Co. Pvt. Ltd & Anr.

Vs. Premchand Tolaram Bafna Charitable Trust, Assam [2012

Cri.L.J. (NOC) 375 (GAU.)], there was a dispute in regard to the

land between the parties and civil suit was filed in Civil Court, but

at the same time criminal proceeding under Sections 145 and 146

was also initiated, which was set aside by the Hon'ble Gauhati

High Court, holding that if the criminal proceeding is allowed to

continue, it would amount to abuse of process of the Court.

50. In Sundari Devi & Ors. Vs. Dudheshwar Singh &

Ors. (2009(4) PLJR 1014, the question was whether criminal

court can pass any order under Section 145 Cr. P.C. when the

matter is decided by competent civil court in its trial and in appeal

and thereafter pending before the High Court in second appeal.

The right, title and possession over the disputed land between the Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 37/41

parties was decided by the trial court as well appellate court. The

matter was pending in the High Court in second appeal. Hence, the

criminal proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P.C. being converted

under Section 145 Cr. P.C. was set aside by Hon'ble Patna High

Court.

51. In Radheshyam Sharma & Anr. V. Jagtendra

Prasad Jaiswal & Anr. [2010(1) AIR Jhar R 780, the main

question before the Court was whether proceeding under Section

145 Cr. P.C. should be allowed to proceed in view of the fact that

opposite party had already initiated a civil suit and interim

application was filed therein. Civil suit was for declaration of

right, title and interest for perpetual injunction. In this case

Hon'ble Jharkhand High followed Ram Sumer case (supra) and

held that there is no reason to allow the parallel proceeding under

Section 145 Cr. P.C. Since, the civil suit was going on between the

parties regarding same property, continuation of present

proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P.C. was held to be consuming

public time unnecessarily against public interest.

52. Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in

Sukhbir Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [(2008 Cri.

L.J. (NOC) 714 (P.&H.)] has also held that in view of the fact

that once the matter stands settled finally between the parties with

regard to their rights qua property and the civil proceedings are Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 38/41

pending in which status quo has already been ordered, initiation of

proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 Cr. P.C. can be said

nothing but an abuse of the process of the court and therefore

cannot be allowed to continue.

53. As such, it emerges from the statutory provisions of

Section 145 Cr. P.C. and relevant case laws on the subject that

mandate of Section 145 Cr.P.C. is that in case taking forceful

possession of any property by either party leads to apprehension of

breach of public peace, proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P.C

should be initiated and the possession of property of the party

should be protected against forceful dispossession by other party

taking law in his own hand. It also manifests that apprehension of

breach of public peace is sine qua non for invoking jurisdiction

under Section 145 Cr. P.C. by Executive Magistrates. It is also

pertinent to point out that concept of public peace and tranquility

is much wider concept than that of simple problem of law and

order. All law and order problems cannot be equated with breach

of public peace unless it affects the public at large, like riot, affray

or widespread unrest. Simple disputes between two individuals

involving violation of penal laws on the part of the two cannot be

termed as breach of public peace. Similarly, purely civil dispute

between two individuals also cannot be treated as breach of public

peace. For resolution of civil disputes between parties, there is Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 39/41

establishment of Civil Courts in our legal framework, whereas in

case of violation of criminal law, there is provision of prosecution

of such persons in criminal courts. Occasion for invoking

jurisdiction under Section 145 Cr. P.C. comes to Executive

Magistrate only where there is apprehension of breach of public

peace and tranquility so that such breach may be nipped in the

bud. However, on the pretext of apprehension of breach of public

peace, Executive Magistrate is not expected to exercise

jurisdiction of Civil or Criminal Courts. Such colourable exercise

of jurisdiction would be against the object and spirit of Section

145 Cr. P.C. and it would render Civil and Criminal Courts

irrelevant and the people would get harassed by illegal and

unnecessary proceedings. In our legal framework, power and

jurisdiction are defined for different instrumentalities of the State

and no instrumentality is expected to exceed its jurisdiction and

encroach upon that of others.

54. In the case at hand I find that there is dispute

between the parties in regard to title over the land in question and

there is allegation of some disturbance being created in peaceful

possession of the petitioner by the respondents. There is however

no allegation of forceful dispossession or attempt for

dispossession, nor is there any allegation that public at large are

affected by the dispute leading to apprehension of breach of public Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 40/41

peace and tranquility. Though the police has reported that there is

intense tension between both the sides and any time peace may be

breached, Ld. Sub-Divisional Magistrate has not recorded such

satisfaction that there is apprehension of breach of public peace.

Ld. Executive Magistrate, after referring to facts and

circumstances of the case, has opined that there is complex land

dispute between both the sides, which could not be resolved in this

proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P.C. Hence, the proceeding was

converted into one under Section 145 Cr. P.C. Moreover, as per

statutory provisions, the Executive Magistrate is required to record

his satisfaction regarding apprehension of breach of public peace,

but there is no such satisfaction recorded in his order dated

13.07.2012 passed in M.R. No. 316 of 2012 and as such whole

basis of initiation of proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P.C. goes

rendering the order of the Ld. Sub-Divisional Magistrate without

jurisdiction.

55. Moreover, the alleged facts and circumstances of the

case constitute a classical case of civil dispute and Civil Court is

already seized with the matter and the petitioner has even filed an

interim application for injunction. The petitioner can press his

application for interim injunction before Ld. Civil Court, who is

duty bound to dispose it of without any delay, as per the facts and

applicable laws. In such situation, proceeding under Section 145 Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.36019 of 2016 dt.03-10-2023 41/41

Cr. P.C. is not permissible because multiplicity of litigation is not

in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to

be wasted over meaningless litigation as Hon'ble Supreme Court

has time and again reiterated.

56. Moreover, in the given facts and circumstances of

the case, there is no question of any apprehension of breach of

public peace and tranquility because the effect of the dispute is

strictly confined only to the parties. No public at large are affected

or involved. Hence, there is no occasion for Ld. Sub-Divisional

Magistrate to invoke jurisdiction under Section 145 Cr. P.C.

57. Hence, in the given facts and circumstances of the

case, initiation of proceeding under section 145 Cr. PC., vide order

dated 13.07.2012, passed by Ld. Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Rosera in M.R. No. 316 of 2012 is not sustainable in the eyes of

law. In fact, this is abuse of provisions under Section 145 Cr. P.C.

Hence, Ld. Revisional Court has rightly set aside the said order of

Ld. Sub-Divisional Magistrate vide impugned order dated

17.06.2016, passed in Criminal Revision No. 263 of 2013.

58. Hence, the present petition being devoid of any

merit, is dismissed in limine.

(Jitendra Kumar, J) Amrendra/-

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