Yogesh Kumar vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

2025 INSC 379 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP(C) NO.5505 of 2020)

YOGESH KUMAR …APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appeal is taken up for hearing.

3. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated

16th May 2019 passed by the Division Bench of the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter, “High Court”)

in Special Appeal Defective No.456 of 2019, vide which the

appeal filed by the appellant herein challenging the order

passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated

23rd May 2018 came to be dismissed.

Signature Not Verified

4. The facts, shorn of unnecessary details, giving rise to Digitally signed by NARENDRA PRASAD Date: 2025.03.21 16:40:13 IST Reason:

the present appeal are as under:

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4.1 The appellant, in response to the advertisement issued

by the District Court, Saharanpur, had applied for the post of

Stenographer. The appellant along with the other six

persons, who were found suitable in the selection process

were appointed to the post of Stenographer and assumed

their charge on 16th April 2002. However, subsequently it

was found that the number of posts advertised was only

three and four additional persons including the appellant

herein were appointed in excess. They were, therefore, issued

show cause notices, calling upon them to show cause as to

why their appointment should not be terminated. On 28th

February 2005, the District Judge passed an order

terminating the services of the appellant herein and three

others.

4.2 Being aggrieved by the termination, the appellant herein

and three others approached the learned Single Judge of the

High Court, by way of Writ Petition No.43168 of 2005. Vide

order dated 17th May 2012, the said writ petition came to be

dismissed. An intra court appeal being Special Appeal

No.1180 of 2012 was also dismissed. Being aggrieved

thereby, the appellant herein approached this Court by way

2 of a Special Leave Petition(C) No.26959 of 2012.

4.3 This Court vide order dated 21st September 2012

dismissed the special leave petition filed by the appellant

herein and others, in the following terms:-

“Heard.

We do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned order. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

Learned counsel for the petitioners at this stage submits that the petitioners were not paid salary for a period of 8 years even though they had worked as stenographers. He seeks liberty for the petitioners to claim payment of salary for the period they have worked. We make it clear that the dismissal of this special leave petition shall not prevent the petitioners from seeking any such relief in an appropriate civil action. We express no opinion as to the maintainability of any such action, or the tenability of the proposed claim.”

4.4 It appears that thereafter the appellant and others made

representation before the District Judge, Saharanpur for

payment of their salary for the period during which they had

worked. The said representation came to be rejected. Being

aggrieved thereby, the appellant and others preferred Writ

Petition No.26698 of 2015 before the learned Single Judge.

The said petition was dismissed vide order dated 23rd May

2018. An intra court appeal being Special Appeal Defective

3 No.456 of 2019 was carried thereagainst, which was also

dismissed. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal by

way of special leave has been filed. Vide order dated 28th

February 2020, notice was issued by this Court.

5. We have heard Dr. L.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for

the appellant and Shri Vishal Meghwal for respondent

No.2/High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

6. Dr. L.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellant,

submits that the learned Single Judge of the High Court as

well as the Division Bench have taken a totally erroneous

approach in rejecting the claim of the appellant. It is

submitted that it is not disputed that the appellant and

others had actually put in their services for eight years. It is

also submitted that even the learned Single Judge of the

High Court has accepted the position that the appellant and

others had actually worked for eight years. However, the

relief is denied to the appellant and others on the ground

that this Court had observed that insofar as the payment of

salary is concerned, the appellant and others were entitled to

take recourse to an appropriate civil action. It is submitted

that the approach of the learned Single Judge in non-suiting

4 the appellant, since the writ court was not a civil court, is

totally erroneous.

7. Shri Vishal Meghwal, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the High Court, vehemently opposes this appeal.

He submits that the appellant and others have lost up to this

Court in the first round of litigation. It is submitted that the

liberty that was granted by this Court was to take recourse to

an appropriate civil action. Since the appellant and others

rather than filing an appropriate action before a Civil Court

had made a representation to the learned District Judge. The

learned District Judge had rightly rejected the said claim. For

the very same reasons, it is submitted that the High Court

was justified in rejecting the petition as well as the appeal of

the appellant herein and others.

8. The facts in the present case are not in dispute. The

appellant and others had applied in pursuance to the

advertisement issued by the District Court, Saharanpur.

However, it appears that though at the relevant time, there

were only three regular vacancies, since the Fast Track

Courts were functioning, the appellant and others were

appointed to work in the Fast Track Courts. Subsequently,

5 after the Fast Track Courts seized to function, the services of

the appellant and others appeared to have been terminated.

9. No doubt that the termination of the appellant has been

upheld by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench

of the High Court as well as by this Court in the first round.

However, this Court has specifically clarified that the

dismissal of the special leave petition shall not prevent the

appellant and others from seeking any such relief in an

appropriate civil action.

10. The High Court has non-suited the appellant and others

on the ground that an appropriate civil action would mean

the proceedings only before a Civil Court. The learned Single

Judge has elaborated on as to what would amount to a ‘civil

action’ by referring to the Advanced Law Lexicon.

11. No doubt that the learned Single Judge has correctly

considered the definition of a ‘civil action’; but, in our view,

while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, the Court is not expected to be hyper-

technical.

12. The position that the appellant and others had, in fact,

put in eight years of service is not disputed by anyone at all.

6 Much before the judgment of the learned Single Judge was

delivered on 23rd May 2018, this Court in the case of ABL

International Ltd. and Another v. Export Credit

Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Others1 has

held that even in case of disputed questions of fact, the High

Court would be justified in entertaining a petition under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been held that

even in cases where there are disputed questions of fact,

where such disputes can be decided on the basis of an

affidavit evidence and no elaborate evidence is required to be

led, the High Court would be justified in granting a relief

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

13. In any case, the State as well as the High Courts are

expected to be model litigants. The High Court is not

expected to take a hyper-technical view, when dealing with

the case of payment of salary of the employees of the District

Judiciary, who have actually put in eight years of service.

The law laid down by this Court in the case of ABL

International (supra) has been subsequently followed by

this Court in the cases of Zonal Manager, Central Bank of

1 (2004) 3 SCC 553 7 India v. Devi Ispat Limited and Others2, Real Estate

Agencies v. State of Goa and Others3, Popatrao

Vyankatrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra and Others4,

Unitech Limited and Others v. Telangana State

Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (TSIIC) and

Others5, National Company represented by its Managing

Partner v. Territory Manager, Bharat Petroleum

Corporation Limited and Another6 and State of Uttar

Pradesh v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Others7.

14. In that view of the matter, we find that the judgment

passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned

judgment and order passed by the learned Division Bench

are not at all sustainable in law.

15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned

judgment and order dated 16th May 2019 passed by the

Division Bench of the High Court and the judgment and

order dated 23rd May 2018 passed by the learned Single

Judge of the High Court are set aside.

2 (2010) 11 SCC 186 : 2010 INSC 462 3 (2012) 12 SCC 170 : 2012 INSC 387 4 (2020) 19 SCC 241 : 2020 INSC 183 5 (2021) 16 SCC 35 : 2021 INSC 96 6 (2021) 13 SCC 121 : 2021 INSC 714 7 (2021) 19 SCC 706 2020 INSC 603 8

16. The respondents are directed to pay the salary of the

appellant herein and other similarly circumstances persons

for the period during which they have actually worked in the

District Court. The same shall be paid within a period of

three months from today, along with interest at the rate of

6% per annum from the date on which the salaries ought to

have been paid to them.

17. We further find that since the appellant herein and

others who were made to run from one Court to another,

specifically after 2012 i.e. the date on which the order was

passed by this Court, the appellant would also be entitled to

costs quantified at Rs.1 lakh, to be paid within three months

from today.

18. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

..............................J. (B.R. GAVAI)

............................................J. (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 18, 2025.

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