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Yedala Subba Rao vs Union Of India

Supreme Court17 April 2023Rajesh Bindal · Abhay S. Oka

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where an accused is charged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 with offences punishable under Chapters IV and VI, and the proviso to Section 43D(5) operates as a bar to bail, the Court must undertake a careful examination of the material in the case diary or chargesheet to determine whether there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusations are prima facie true, applying the principles of admissibility under the Indian Evidence Act, and excluding statements that are inadmissible under Sections 25, 26, and 27 thereof, and if upon such scrutiny the Court cannot form an opinion that the accusations are prima facie true, the embargo on bail does not apply and bail may be granted on appropriate conditions.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

1

NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1153 OF 2023 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.10160 of 2021)

Yedala Subba Rao & Anr. …Appellants

versus

Union of India ...Respondent

J U D G M E N T

ABHAY S. OKA, J.

1. Leave granted.

FACTUAL ASPECTS

2. The appellants are accused nos.46 and 47 in FIR No. 65 of 2018

registered on 23rd September 2018 at Dumbriguda Police Station,

District Vishakhapatnam, in Andhra Pradesh. The appellants, along

with other co­accused, are being prosecuted for the offences Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Indu Marwah

punishable under Section 120B read with Section 302 of the Indian Date: 2023.04.17 17:33:53 IST Reason:

Penal Code, Sections 18, 19, 20 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities 2

(Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short ‘the UAPA’). The appellants are also

charged with offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the

Explosives Substances Act, 1908 (for short ‘the Explosives Act’).

3. The incident is of 23rd September 2018. At about 12:10 hours,

Shri Kidari Sarveswara Rao, a member of the Legislative Assembly and

whip of the Telugu Desam Party in Legislative Assembly and one Shri

Siveri Soma, a former MLA belonging to Telugu Desam Party, were

killed near the village Livitiputtu, Pothangi Panchayat within the

jurisdiction of Dumbriguda Police Station at Visakhapatnam. This

incident took place when both of them were proceeding to village Sarai

to attend a function. The allegation is that 45 accused persons who

belonged to the Communist Party of India (Maoist), a terrorist

organisation notified in the first schedule of the UAPA, stopped the

convoy of vehicles of the aforesaid two leaders. The accused compelled

them to get out of their cars. Both of them were taken towards Y­

Junction. Thereafter, the MLA was taken to the left­hand side of Y­

Junction and the Ex­MLA was taken to the right­hand side of Y­

Junction. Both of them were killed by three gunshots. The Personal

Secretary of the deceased sitting MLA lodged FIR on the same day in

which he named 45 accused. Earlier, investigation was carried out by

a Special Investigation Team, which was subsequently transferred to 3

the National Investigation Agency (NIA). The case was registered by

NIA as RC­02/2018 NIA/HYD on 6th December 2018. The appellants

were arrested on 13th October 2018. A chargesheet was filed against

them on 10th April 2019. It appears from the said chargesheet that

there are 79 accused though initially there were 85 accused. About

144 witnesses have been named in the charge sheet so far. The

charge has not yet been framed. Some of the accused are absconding.

The appellants have been in custody for the last four years and seven

months.

SUBMISSIONS

4. Shri Colin Gonsalves, the learned senior counsel appearing for

the appellants, has taken us through the relevant portions of the

charge sheet filed against the present appellants. He pointed out that

the recovery of landmine is shown at the instance of appellant no.1­

accused no.46, which on the face of it, is highly suspicious. He

pointed out that there is no recovery shown at the instance of the

accused no.47. He pointed out that the second allegation against

accused no.46 is that the call details record of accused nos.46, 47 and

84 show that they were always in touch with each other which shows

that they were partners in the criminal conspiracy. He pointed out

that accused no.84 has been granted bail by the High Court. He 4

pointed out that another allegation against accused no.46 is that he

purchased huge quantity of medicines worth Rs.8,000/­ which were to

be handed over to a Maoist sent by accused no.84. He submitted that

there is no material against both the accused to show that they

provided shelter and logistic support to the Maoists as well as co­

accused and that they planted landmines. He pointed out that there

is no evidence to show that the alleged landmines had any connection

with the offence of killing the aforesaid two leaders. He would,

therefore, submit that there is no prima facie evidence of the

involvement of the two appellants in the offence. He relied upon a

decision of this Court in the case of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb1.

He submitted that even charges have not been framed. Some of the

accused are absconding. Considering the fact that there are 144

prosecution witnesses, the trial is going to take years and therefore,

continuing incarceration of the appellants will amount to a violation of

their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.

5. Shri K.M. Nataraj, learned ASG appearing for the respondent,

pointed out the Memorandum dated 13 th October 2018 under Section

27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short ‘the Evidence Act’),

which shows that a steel can weighing about 10 kg containing bolts,

nuts and filled with explosive material and connected to a detonator 1 (2021) 3 SCC 713 5

through a wire was recovered at the instance of accused no.46 near a

kaccha road near village Sarai where the deceased political leaders

were to visit. He also pointed out that the landmine was planted with

the object of killing the said two leaders. He pointed out that the

disclosure statement made by accused no.46 on 16 th January 2019

shows that he purchased a huge quantity of medicines worth

Rs.8,000/­ and handed them over to a Maoist. He pointed out that the

appellants­accused used different SIMs standing in the names of third

parties to remain in touch with the co­accused. As regards accused

no. 47, he submitted that the disclosure statement of 13 th October

2018 records that both the appellants dug a pit near a kaccha road

leading to Sarai village and planted a landmine therein. He also

pointed out that the accused nos.46 and 47 were constantly in touch

with each other on cell phones for 18 days prior to the incident and

thereafter, the cell phone of accused no.47 was switched off. Shri

Nataraj further urged that both accused nos.46 and 47 are involved in

the offence and there is a strong prima facie material against them.

He, therefore, submitted that in view of the proviso to sub­section (5)

of Section 43D of UAPA, the appellants are disentitled to bail as there

is material on record to believe that the accusations against the

appellants are prima facie true.

6

OUR VIEW

6. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. We

have perused the material against the appellants in the context of

stringent provisions for the grant of bail incorporated under the

proviso to sub­section (5) of Section 43D of UAPA. We have perused

the chargesheet filed against the appellants. The allegation against

the first appellant­accused no.46 is that he provided shelter and

logistic support to Maoists and co­accused for facilitating the offence

of murder of the two leaders. The second allegation is that the present

appellants planted landmines near the village where the programme

was to be held. It is further alleged that appellant no.1 ­ accused

no.46 was in constant touch with accused no.84, who in turn was in

touch with the Maoists. It is further alleged that the cell phone call

record shows that the appellants were in touch with each other

immediately after the incident. The accused no.46 purchased huge

quantity of medicines and handed over the same to a Maoist sent by

accused no.84.

7. The allegation against accused no.47 is that he had association

with accused no.46. He was found in possession of certain pamphlets

and literature of the terrorist organisation – CPI (Maoist). Another

allegation is that accused no.47 had given shelter to Communist party

workers.

7

8. One of the allegations in the chargesheet is that the present

appellants were in touch with each other for about 17­18 days before

the incident. Moreover, they were regularly conversing with accused

no.84, who in turn was communicating with the workers of the CPI

(Maoist) Party.

9. We may note here that by the judgment and order dated 15 th

December 2020 passed by a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High

Court in Crl. Appeal No.229 of 2020, accused no.84 has been granted

bail. We have perused the judgment, which is produced along with IA

No.21015 of 2022. In the said judgment, the High Court has

considered the CDR records of the telephonic conversation between

accused no.46 and accused no.84. In paragraph 9, the High Court

observed that accused no.46 was an Ex­Sarpanch of the village where

accused no.84 was teaching in a government school and therefore, it

was natural that being an Ex­Sarpanch, people were constantly

approaching him. The calls were exchanged between these two

accused on the date of the offence and after the offence. The High

Court observed that when an offence of such a nature happened in the

vicinity, it is not unusual that accused no.46, who was an Ex­

Sarpanch, would receive calls from many persons immediately after

the commission of the offence. The High Court further observed that 8

there was an allegation that medicines worth Rs.8,000/­ were

purchased at the instance of the accused no.84 which were handed

over at his instance to one Kiran, who was also a Maoist. The High

Court observed that in the chargesheet filed against accused no.46, it

was noted that the said Kiran was arrested on 18 th September 2018

and was in custody on the date of the offence. Therefore, the High

Court opined that accused no.84 was prima facie not involved in the

offence and, at the highest, was guilty of an offence punishable under

Section 202 of IPC.

10. The grant of bail by the High Court to accused no.84 is very

relevant in this case as in paragraph 17.19 of the chargesheet filed

against the present appellants, the allegation is that call detail records

of accused nos.46,47 and 84 show that they were exchanging calls

which indicates that they are the parties to the conspiracy.

11. As regards the allegation of purchase of medicines worth

Rs.8,000/­ by accused no.46, the prosecution has relied upon a

Disclosure Memo dated 16th January 2019. In the Disclosure Memo,

it is alleged that accused no.46 disclosed that one Kiran approached

him in July 2018 to help him to purchase medicines. Thereafter, he

received a call from accused no.84, who informed him that one person

will give him a list of medicines and cash of Rs.10,000/­ and he 9

should help him to purchase medicines. The disclosure statement

records that accused no.46 helped that person to purchase medicines

from a medical shop and he led the police party to the said medical

shop. In the disclosure statement, he also stated that on 23 rd

September 2018, he saw accused no.47 along with one person (Kiran)

at a Xerox shop at Dumbriguda Junction. Accused no.46 stated that

he will be able to show the said shop, and accordingly, he showed the

said shop.

12. We fail to understand how the purchase of medicines worth

Rs.8,000/­ by accused no.46 at the instance of accused no.84 much

before the incident has any connection with the incident which took

place on 23rd September 2018. This is apart from the fact that accused

no.84 has been granted bail by the High Court.

13. Now we will have to decide whether the disclosure statement

dated 16th January 2019 is admissible in evidence. It is necessary to

advert to the law laid down by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this

Court in the case of Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of

Maharashtra2. This Court followed a decision of the Privy Council in

the case of Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor3 which is a locus

classicus. In paragraph no.5 of the decision in the case of Jaffar, this

2 (1969) 2 SCC 872 3 (1946) SCC online Privy Council 47 10

Court held thus:

“5. Under Section 25 of the Evidence Act no confession made by an accused to a police officer can be admitted in evidence against him. An exception to this is however provided by Section 26 which makes a confessional statement made before a Magistrate admissible in evidence against an accused notwithstanding the fact that he was in the custody of the police when he made the incriminating statement. Section 27 is a proviso to Section 26 and makes admissible so much of the statement of the accused which leads to the discovery of a fact deposed to by him and connected with the crime, irrespective of the question whether it is confessional or otherwise. The essential ingredient of the section is that the information given by the accused must lead to the discovery of the fact which is the direct outcome of such information. Secondly, only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said recovery is admissible against the accused. Thirdly, the discovery of the fact must relate to the commission of some offence. The embargo on statements of the accused before the police will not apply if all the above conditions are fulfilled. If an accused charged with a theft of articles or receiving stolen articles, within the meaning of Section 411 IPC states to the police, “I will show you the articles at the place where I have kept them” and the articles are actually found there, there can be no doubt that the information given by him led to the discovery of a fact i.e. keeping of the articles by the accused at the place mentioned. The discovery of the fact deposed to in such a case is not the discovery of the articles but the discovery of the fact that the articles were kept by the accused at a particular place. In principle there is no difference between the above statement and that made by the appellant in this case which in effect is that “I will show you the person to 11

whom I have given the diamonds exceeding 200 in number”. The only difference between the two statements is that a “named person” is substituted for “the place” where the article is kept. In neither case are the articles or the diamonds the fact discovered.” (emphasis added)

14. As held by this Court, Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an

exception to the general rule under Section 25 that a confession made

by an accused to a police officer is not admissible in evidence. The

first condition for the applicability of Section 27 is that the information

given by the accused must lead to the discovery of the fact, which is

the direct outcome of such information. Only such portion of the

information given as is distinctly connected with the said discovery is

admissible against the accused. Now looking at the Discovery Memo

dated 16th January 2019, at the highest, it means that accused no.46

showed the shop from which the medicines were purchased. Thus, he

led the police to the shop. There was no discovery of any fact as a

result of the information supplied by accused no.46. The same is the

case with the other allegation that accused no.46 showed a Xerox

shop where accused no.47 and one Kiran were allegedly standing on

23rd September 2018. Therefore, the statements of accused no.46 that

he would show the medical shop and the Xerox shop may not be,

prima facie, admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

Moreover, as noted in the order of the High Court granting bail to 12

accused no.84, the said Kiran, who was allegedly standing with

accused no.47 near the Xerox shop on 23 rd September 2018 was

already in custody from 18 th September 2018 and he continued to be

in custody even on 23rd September 2018.

15. There is one more crucial aspect. A statement of one G.Narasinga

Rao, who was allegedly running the said medical shop has been

recorded during the investigation. In the statement, he has stated that

on 16th January 2019, NIA team visited his shop and inquired about

the sale of medicines involving a large amount in July 2018 and the

team brought accused no.46 with them. This shows that the NIA team

was already aware of the location of the shop from which a large

quantity of medicines was allegedly purchased by accused no.46 in

July 2018.

16. Now, we come to the material to show that there was a recovery

of landmine at the instance of accused no.46. It must be noted here

that it is not the case of the prosecution that the recovery of landmine

was at the instance of the accused no.47. The recovery Panchama

(Annexure A­1) to IA no. 74099 of 2022 is styled as “Mediators’ Report

and Seizure Panchnama”. It records that at about 4 pm on 13 th

October 2018, the mediators were present at Livitiputtu village with

ASP Amitabh for preparing the Mediators’ Report and Seizure

Panchanama. It is recorded in the Panchnama that ASP Amitabh, an 13

IPS officer, along with other 9 or 10 police officials with a Bomb

Disposal Team, visited Livitiputtu village. On the way, they saw four

persons, including the accused nos.46 and 47, who were holding

plastic bags. When they tried to flee, the police chased them and

caught hold of them. In the same Panchnama, a long statement of

accused no.46 is recorded, which is in the nature of a confessional

statement. There is also a confessional statement of accused no.47 in

the same Panchnama. Prima facie, these statements may not be

admissible in evidence being hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

Going by the “Mediators’ Report and Seizure Panchnama”, the

appellants gave confessional statements immediately after the police

caught hold of them even before their arrest was recorded. Therefore,

prima facie, it creates a doubt about the genuineness of the

statements. The material portion of the “Mediators’ Report and

Seizure Panchnama” appears after the confessional statement of the

accused no. 46. It reads thus:

“After that He himself taken us to some far kuccha road towards Sarvai village. He then shown us the Land mine plotted along with the Electrical wire. Thereafter Bomb Disposal team removed bomb in presence of us (Mediators), ASP Amitabh Bardar, IPS and by examining it was found to be a Steel Can weighing about 10 kg, containing Bolts, Nuts and filled with Explosive Material and connected to a Detonator through a hole. A 20 m long red wire is attached to operate it. After that Bomb Disposal Team Defused 14

and recorded videos and took pictures and Seized Landmine, Detonator, Electrical Wire. We Mediators examined the plastic bag of Yedala Subbarao, found Brochures and banners along with his Karbonn mobile and has been seized.” [emphasis added]

17. It is pertinent to note that a long confessional statement of

accused no.46 has been recorded within inverted commas in the said

document, and thereafter, the aforesaid portion has been written. It is

not noted in the confessional statement of accused no.46 that he

stated that he would show the place where he had planted the

landmine. If accused no.46 had made such a statement leading to the

discovery of the landmine, the discovery of the fact that the landmine

was planted by accused nos.46 at a particular place could have been

proved, provided the landmine was to be used in the offence. However,

there is no such confessional statement of accused no.46 recorded

that he will show the place where landmine was planted by him. The

Panchnama shows that the accused no.46 took them to a place and

showed landmine. There is no confessional statement made by him

giving information that he is in a position to show the place where he

had planted landmine. Therefore, prima facie, “the Mediators’ Report

and Seizure Panchnama” is not helpful to the prosecution in proving

that the landmine was discovered at the instance of the accused

no.46.

15

18. As can be seen from the chargesheet, in paragraph 17.32, there

were three material allegations against accused no.46. The first was of

plantation of a landmine which we have already discussed. The

second one was that he provided shelter and logistic support to the

Maoists for facilitating the commission of the offence. The third

circumstance that he purchased medicines worth Rs.8,000/­ as per

the suggestion of accused no.84 will also have to be kept out of

consideration for the reasons already recorded. In paragraph 5 of the

additional affidavit of the respondent, the material against the

appellants has been set out in a tabular form. In the tabular form, it

is not mentioned that there are statements of the witnesses who had

seen accused nos.46 or 47 giving shelter to the Maoists. In any case,

accused no.46 and 47 were not present at the time of the commission

of the offence. Therefore, we cannot form an opinion that there are

reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against accused

no.46 are prima facie proved.

19. Coming to allegations against accused no.47, we may note here

that his confessional statement recorded under the Mediators Report

and Seizure Panchnama is not admissible evidence as he has not

disclosed any fact that led to any discovery. In his statement, it is

recorded that he was carrying Maoist literature and banners. It is 16

recorded in the Panchnama that eight brochures, two banners, and

one landmine, along with electric wire and detonators, were seized

from four persons. It is not specifically mentioned in the Panchnama

that the brochures and banners were recovered from accused no.47.

The prosecution case that accused no.47, with one Kiran, was found

standing at a particular place on 23 rd September 2018 appears to be

very doubtful, as noted by us earlier. Then what is against accused

no.47 is that he was in touch with accused no.46 on the telephone.

The same was the allegation against accused no.84, who has been

enlarged on bail.

20. Sub­section (5) of Section 43D of the UAPA reads thus:

“(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release:

Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.” (emphasis added)

21. We have examined material relied upon against the appellants in

paragraph 5 of the additional affidavit of the respondent as well as the 17

chargesheet. Taking the material against the appellants as it is and

without considering the defence of the appellants, we are unable to

form an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that

the accusations against the appellants of commission of offence under

the UAPA are prime facie true. Hence, the embargo on the grant of bail

under proviso to sub­section (5) of Section 43D will not apply in this

case. We, however, make it clear that the findings recorded in this

Judgment are only prima facie observations recorded for the limited

purposes of examining the case in the light of the proviso to sub­

section (5) of Section 43D of the UAPA. The trial shall be conducted

uninfluenced by these observations.

22. As narrated earlier, the appellants are in custody for four and

half years. The charge has not been framed and the prosecution

proposes to examine more than 140 witnesses. Some of the accused

are absconding. Thus, there is no possibility of the trial commencing

in the near future.

23. It is obvious that while granting bail, stringent conditions will

have to be imposed. We propose to leave it to the learned Special

Judge to impose appropriate conditions.

24. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned orders. We direct the

respondent to ensure that appellants are produced before the learned

Special Judge for the trial of NIA cases at Vijayawada within a 18

maximum period of one week from today. The learned Special Judge

shall release the appellants on bail on appropriate conditions

determined by him after hearing the appellants and respondent. The

appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

.………………………J. (Abhay S. Oka)

..………..……………J. (Rajesh Bindal) New Delhi;

April 17, 2023.

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