Yashodhara Shroff vs Union Of India
- CitationAIRONLINE 2019 KAR 933
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Section 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 is not ultra vires Article 14 or Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution; it is neither manifestly arbitrary nor disproportionate, as the provision operates by automatic operation of law based on objective circumstances (non-filing of financial statements or annual returns for three continuous financial years) and aims to achieve transparency, probity, and accountability in corporate governance. Principles of natural justice requiring pre- or post-decisional hearing do not apply to disqualifications occurring by operation of law under Section 164(2) of the Act, as the ineligibility is not a discretionary administrative order but a statutory consequence of objective facts; therefore, the absence of hearing does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Disqualification of directors under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act cannot be based on any continuous period of three financial years that commences prior to 01.04.2014 (the date of enforcement) and extends after that date; rather, the three-year period must either (a) commence from 01.04.2014 onwards, or (b) have occurred entirely prior to 01.04.2014 under the earlier Companies Act, 1956. Mixing the periods—counting non-filing both before and after commencement of the 2013 Act to constitute the three-year default triggering disqualification—constitutes an illegal exercise of power and gives impermissible retrospective effect to the provision. Disqualification of directors of private companies under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act is prohibited where the basis includes any period prior to 01.04.2014, as such disqualification is being applied for the first time to private companies under the 2013 Act and was never envisaged under Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act (which applied only to public companies); such retrospective application to private companies is unreasonable and ultra vires Article 14. Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, which provides that the office of a director shall become vacant upon incurring any disqualification specified in Section 164, encompasses disqualifications under Section 164(2) of the Act; however, the proviso inserted by the Amendment Act of 2017—by which a director disqualified under Section 164(2) does not vacate office in the company in default but vacates office in all other companies—has only prospective operation from 07.05.2018 and cannot be applied retrospectively to directors disqualified prior to that date. Directors whose disqualification occurred prior to 07.05.2018 are not required to vacate their office in either the defaulting company or other companies due to the prospective-only nature of the amended proviso; the proviso applies only to disqualifications occurring on or after 07.05.2018. A director cannot be deactivated or have their Director Identification Number (DIN) cancelled by virtue of disqualification under Section 164(2) of the Act, as Rule 11 of the Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014 does not provide for such cancellation on that ground. Striking off of a company under Section 248 of the Act does not per se result in automatic disqualification of its directors; disqualification arises only where the struck-off company has also failed to comply with Section 164(2)(a) of the Act.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
learned counsel for the petitioners and learned
Additional Solicitor General of India and other counsel
for Union of India and respondents, and perused the
pleadings and statement of objections filed on behalf
of the respondents.
2. The Petitioners herein were directors of
either public companies or private companies or both
and they are all aggrieved by their disqualification as
directors as per the list issued by the respondents.
Part - 2
Bird's eye view of the controversy:
3. In these writ petitions, some of the
petitioners have assailed the vires of Section
- 296 -
164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Act" for the sake of brevity) as well
as Section 54 of the Companies (Amendment) Act,
2017 (hereinafter referred to as "the Amendment Act,
2017") by which a proviso has been inserted to clause
(a) of sub-section (1) of Section 167 of the Act as well
as Section 167(1)(a) itself. In all these writ petitions,
the List published by the respondent - authority
(Ministry of Corporate Affairs) to the effect that the
petitioners have been disqualified from being directors
of their respective companies for the respective five
year period (mostly from 01.11.2016 to 30.10.2017)
is assailed. As a result, they are faced with the
consequences as stipulated under Section 164(2) and
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, particularly, its proviso
as inserted by the Amendment Act, 2017.
4. The vires of Section 164(2) of the Act is
assailed on the touch-stone of Articles 14 and/or
19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, as well as being
in violation of the principles of natural justice. Section
- 297 -
167(1)(a) and proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act
are challenged as being in violation of Article 14
and/or Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Further,
the petitioners have contended that there has been an
arbitrary exercise of power by the concerned
respondent authority in disqualifying the petitioners as
directors of the respective companies by giving a
retrospective operation to the aforesaid provisions of
the Act.
Part - 3
Factual matrix:
5. Since the main thrust of the controversy in
these cases is in the realm of constitutionality of the
aforementioned provisions and on interpretation of
statute, it is unnecessary to go into the factual
aspects of each of the cases except where the same is
necessary to advert to.
6. For the sake of convenience, the details
relevant for consideration of these cases are extracted
from the pleadings and are mentioned in the following
- 298 -
table. The names of the companies which are shown in
bold are struck off companies under Section 248 of
the Act. The names of the companies which have not
complied with Section 164(2)(a) of the Act are also
mentioned:
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 1 52911/2017 No 1/11/2016 to Pondicherry Design 164(2)(a) 00272346 31/10/2021 Company Pvt. Ltd.
Connected With
1 49012/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s. Bangalore Hi- Tech 164(2)(a) 2377082 S. 164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Weaving Park Ltd. & Proviso to S. 167(1)(a) 2 49989- No 1/11/2016 to 1.Interstuhl Seatings (India) 164(2)(a) 00220454 49991/2018 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd.. [Petr Nos.1 to 3] (Petr-1) 2.Suncity Karnataka 00245107 Developers Pvt. Ltd. [Petr (Petr-2) Nos.2 & 3] 00244162 (Petr-3) 3 50103/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to KGB Innoventure and Project 164(1)(a) 02689814 S.164(2)(a), 31/10/2021 Management Pvt. Ltd. 167(1)(a) & Proviso to S.167(1)(a) 4 50244-245/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Gauri Bidanur Sugars Pvt. 164(2)(a) 00854386 S.164(2)(a), 31/10/2021 Ltd. (Petr-1) 167 & Proviso to 2.M/s.Cassini Business 00854410 S.167(1)(a) Solutions India Pvt. Ltd.. (Petr-2)
5 50443/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s Whimsa Custom Works 164(2)(a) 2731251 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd.
6 50678-679/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.E-Cosmos (India) Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1740978 S.164(2)(a), 31/10/2021 (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 167 & Proviso to 2.M/s Sambhavi Homes 1793777 S.167(1)(a) And Rentals Pvt. Ltd. (Petr (Petr-2) Nos.1 & 2)
7 47796 and No 2014-2019 Magic Academy of 164(2)(a) 1799761 52294- 2015-2020 Animation Pvt. Ltd. 52295/2018 2016-2021 8 48232/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s. Fortune Frontiers Retail 164(2)(a) 1755323 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 9 50809- No 1/11/2016 to 1.Trimurthy Power Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 00559449 50810/2018 31/10/2021 Company(Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 2.Sagar Power (Neerukatte) 02741405 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-2) - 299 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 10 52055/2018 Yes 1/11/2014 to 1.Media Innvotech 164(2)(a) 1665813 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 2.Innovation Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
11 52293/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s.Searchlabs 164(2)(a) 3270537 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Technologies and Services Pvt. Ltd.. 12 52071/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1.Hills Organic Products 164(2)(a) 3556306 31/10/2021 India Pvt. Ltd. 2.Saptha Sanjevini Organics India Pvt. Ltd. 13 53208/2018 Yes. 1/11/2016 to BRINDAVAN HOMES Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2616838 164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. 14 53209/2018 Yes. 1/11/2016 to BRINDAVAN HOMES Pvt. 164(2)(a) 7444488 164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. 15 53210/2018 Yes. 1/11/2016 to Shubh Laxmi Technologies 164(2)(a) 2603085 164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 16 53442/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to C&B Holdings & Projects 164(2)(a) 824081 S.164(2)(a), 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 167(1)(a) & Proviso to S.167(1)(a) 17 52460/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s Adroitech Designing 164(2)(a) 1129651 S.164(2)(a), 31/10/2021 and Services Pvt. Ltd. 167(1)(a) & Proviso to S.167(1)(a) 18 52610/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Silver Events and Media 164(2)(a) 3118211 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 19 52611/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s Circle Source Software 164(2)(a) 610624 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
20 52612/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s Circle Source Software 164(2)(a) 610447 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
21 52766/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Prabhakar Power Projects 164(2)(a) 2341879 31/10/2021 Ltd.
22 52820- No 1/11/2014 to 1.Rathna Multi Films Pvt. 164(2)(a) 1854832 52822/2018 31/10/2019 Ltd. 1/11/2015 to 31/10/2020 2.Gooseberry Hotels And 1/11/2016 to Resorts Pvt. Ltd. 31/10/2021 23 3274/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Ankit Mining Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1916392 31/10/2021 24 6875/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1. N-Net Technologies Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2297414 31/10/2021 Ltd. 2. C&B Electronics Pvt. Ltd. 2 45742- No 1/11/2016 to Cayenne Developments 164(2)(a) 1664014 45743/2017 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr. Nos.1 & 2) 1657893 3 49062/2017 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Pixel Estate Services Pvt. 164(2)(a) 349821 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. 4 51714- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Kantech Agro Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 01121234 51716/2017 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021, (Petr Nos. 1 & 2) (Petr-1) 1/11/2016 to 2.Achala Energy Systems 01121313 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos. 1 & 2) (Petr-2) - 300 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 5 52720- Yes 1/11/2016 to Sauparnika Beverages Pvt. 164(2)(a) 6801279 52721/2017 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. (Petr Nos. 1 & 2) (Petr-1) 6801280 (Petr-2) 6 54764/2017 Yes 1/11/2014 to 1. Airwings Tours and Travels 164(2)(a) 260253 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 (India) Pvt. Ltd. 1/11/2015 to 2.M/s Urbana Projects (India) 31/10/2020 Pvt. Ltd. 1/11/2016 to 3.Arryama Builders Pvt. Ltd. 31/10/2021 4.M/s Thor energy India Pvt. --do-- Ltd. 7 54765/2017 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.M/s Urbana Projects (India) 164(2)(a) 2980597 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. --do-- 2.M/s Thor energy India Pvt. Ltd. 1/11/2014 to 3.M/s.Candor International 31/10/2019 Schools Pvt. Ltd.
8 55323- Yes 1/11/2015 to ISIS Medicare and Research 164(2)(a) 01017091 55324/2017 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Center Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 3465422 (Petr-2) 9 55623/2017 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s Valuemart Info 164(2)(a) 134025 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Technologies Ltd.
10 55702/2017 Yes 1/11/2015 to Carbon Accessories Ltd. 164(2)(a) 00045060 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 & 1/11/2016 to 31/10/2021
11 55942/2017 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Sunkabir Mobisolutions 164(2)(a) 364568 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd.
12 55949/2017 Yes 1/11/2014 to 1.M/s Euromarket Consult 164(2)(a) 349450 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 Services (India) Pvt. Ltd.
13 55950/2017 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.M/s Euromarket Consult 164(2)(a) 2096579 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. 14 56178- Yes 1/11/2015 to Sunway Properties Pvt. Ltd. 00694692 56179/2017 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 (Petr Nos.1 & 2) 164(2)(a) (Petr-1) 01936195 (Petr-2) 15 56180/2017 Yes 1/11/2015 to 1.Sunway Properties Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2964384 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Ltd. 2.Suncity Contractors Pvt. Ltd. 16 581/2018 No 1/11/2015 to Udupi Chamber of Commerce 164(2)(a) 426773 31/10/2020 & Industry (incorporated) 17 603-604/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Vaishnavi Developers and 164(2)(a) 02741270 31/10/2021 Investment Pvt. Ltd. (Petr (Petr-1) Nos.1 & 2) 03350877 (Petr-2) 18 613/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Omkara Machtech Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 556091 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 949035 (Petr-2) 19 1872/2018 No 1/11/2014 to DTS Diamond Tools Sea Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2095913 31/10/2019 Ltd. 20 1958/2018 Yes 1/11/2014 to 1.M/s.Rani Rasmani 164(2)(a) 24386 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 Constructions Pvt. Ltd. 2.Hampson Industries Pvt. Ltd. - 301 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 3.M/s Tocol Aerospace Pvt. Ltd. 4.M/s.candor International School Pvt. Ltd. 21 3132/2018 Yes 1/11/2014 to M/s.Epuron Renewable 164(2)(a) 797950 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 Energy Pvt. Ltd. 22 3350-3351/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Urban Reserves India Pvt. 164(2)(a) 02088900 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 02100387 (Petr-2) 23 3840/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Vishnu Forge (Mysore) 164(2)(a) 3631105 31/10/2021 Ltd. (VFML)
24 3841/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1.Steel Theatres (Mysore) 164(2)(a) 243868 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. (STMPL) 2.Metal Cutters (Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. 3.Vishnu Forge (Mysore) Ltd.(VFML) 25 3849/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Prabhakar Power Projects 164(2)(a) 157346 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. 2.Trigyn Technologies Ltd.
26 3957/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1.MKS Biolabs Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1743814 31/10/2021
27 4741/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Garuda Vriddhi Body Care 164(2)(a) 417662 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd.
28 5464/2018 No 1/11/2014 to M/s BCIL Little Acre 164(2)(a) 1239867 31/10/2019 Resorts Pvt. Ltd.
29 5465/2018 No 1/11/2014 to M/s BCIL Little Acre 164(2)(a) 2676065 31/10/2019 Resorts Pvt. Ltd.
30 5639/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Triad Enterprise Consulting 164(2)(a) 864658 31/10/2021 Services Pvt. Ltd.
31 5640/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Triad Enterprise Consulting 164(2)(a) 1680646 31/10/2021 Services Pvt. Ltd. 32 5813/2018 Yes 1/11/2014 to Blue Green Infrastructures 164(2)(a) 1151904 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 & Pvt. Ltd.
1/11/2015 to 31/10/2020 &
1/11/2016 to 31/10/2021 33 6961/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Force 1 Security and 164(2)(a) 601254 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Consultancy Services (Bangalore) Pvt. Ltd. 34 6962/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Force 1 Security and 164(2)(a) 601201 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Consultancy Services (Bangalore) Pvt. Ltd.
35 9050/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to E-Merge Waste 164(2)(a) 2782989 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Management Solutions Pvt. Ltd. - 302 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 36 9051/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to E-Merge Waste 164(2)(a) 500654 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Management Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
37 9052/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to E-Merge Waste 164(2)(a) 25456 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Management Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
38 9531 & Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.VDB AGRO Farms Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 01657095 10113-116/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 (Petr Nos.1 to 5) (Petr-1) 01657135 (Petr-2) 01298669 (Petr-3) 02287392 (Petr-4) 02285795 (Petr-5) 39 9786/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/S.L.S Distributors Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2628612 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd.
40 10188/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.PCPS India Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1602368 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 2.Ecode Engineering Technologies Pvt. Ltd. 41 11652/2018 No 1/11/2015 to 1.V Connect Relations Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2727494 31/10/2020 Ltd. 2.Kelan Kare Hygenic Pvt. Ltd. 42 11654/2018 No 1/11/2015 to V Connect Relations Pvt. 164(2)(a) 3565607 31/10/2020 Ltd.
43 11657/2018 Yes 1/11/2015 to Blue Green Infrastructures 164(2)(a) 864636 S.164(2), 31/10/2020 Pvt. Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a) & 167(1)(f) 44 11829/2018 Yes 1/11/2015 to Anugraha Sunnyville Pvt. 164(2)(a) 1477343 S.164(2), 31/10/2020 Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a) & 167(1)(f) 45 12062/2018 Yes 1/11/2015 to Jagadish Sugars Ltd. 164(2)(a) 3447677 S.164(2), 31/10/2020 164(3), 167(1)(a) & And 1/11/2016 167(1)(f) to 31/10/2021 46 12159/2018 No 1/11/2015 to 1.Fifth Quadrant Business 164(2)(a) 2094244 31/10/2020 devpt. Pvt. Ltd. 2. 360 Online Management Consulting Pvt. Ltd. 47 13075/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/S.DATSI IT Solutions Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2719517 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. 48 13205- Yes 1/11/2016 to Sky Star Hospitality Pvt. 164(2)(a) 00225439 13206/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 00225450 (Petr-2) 49 13303/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Chourasia Trading Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1824370 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 (Petr Nos.1 & 2) 50 13304- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Achala Energy Systems 164(2)(a) 03139504 13305/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 03141020 (Petr-2) - 303 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 51 13306/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Trinetra Constructions Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2062888 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. 2.Atria Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. 52 13307/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Accupak Cartons Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 27646 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 2.Kutub Power Co. Ltd. 3.Career vault BPO Services Pvt. Ltd. 53 13326- No 1/11/2014 to Zoet Vineyards Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1389841 13327/2018 31/10/2019 (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 1/11/2016 to 2049500 31/10/2021 (Petr-2) 54 13531/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Accupack Cartons Pvt. 164(2)(a) 480679 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. 2.Marzdi Finance and Investments Pvt. Ltd. 55 13773/2018 Yes 1/11/2014 to M/s Health 24x7 Services 164(2)(a) 2325879 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 India Pvt. Ltd. 56 13784- No 1/11/2016 to 1.M/s.Acetec Holdings Pvt. 164(2)(a) 01653370 13792/2018 31/10/2021 Ltd. (Pet.1and 3) (Petr-1) 2.M/s.Design Shift Arch 01653394 products Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-2) (Pet. 1 and 8) 01042849 3.M/s.Canmin Resources (Petr-3) (India)Pvt. Ltd. (Pet.1 and 9) 01628656 4.M/s.Spatium Logistics (Petr-4) (India) Pvt. Ltd. 01765116 (Pet.1,3 and 4) (Petr-5) 5.M/s. Sidwin Holdings Pvt. 02406940 Ltd. (Pet.1 and 2) (Petr-6) 6.M/s.Acetec Trade links 02654184 Pvt. Ltd. (Pet.1 to 7) (Petr-7) 01223006 (Petr-8) 00467332 (Petr-9) 57 13835/2018 & Yes 1/11/2015 to M/s. Alokamala Agri India 164(2)(a) 06470483 17372-376/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 to 6) (Petr-6) & 167(1)(a) DIN not mentioned in respect of others. 58 13853/2018 Yes 1/11/2014 to Lorvin Impex Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 550632 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 Connected With 1 11865/2018 No 01-11-2014 to 1.RSRSR Techno Solutions 164(2)(a) 2079024 31-10-2019 Pvt. Ltd. Co. 2. Pristine Carbon Blocks Pvt. Ltd. 2 17428/2018 No 01-11-2016 to 1.Salt Social Media Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2941760 31-10-2021 Ltd. 3 17430/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Tuning Fork Technologies 164(2)(a) 2785546 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. 4 11509/2018 & No 01-11-2016 to 1.SAS Skytech Engineering 164(2)(a) 5157270 13263/2018 31-10-2021 Projects Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 2.Gooseberry Hotels and 706694 Resorts Pvt. Ltd. (Petr (Petr-2) Nos.1 & 2) - 304 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 5 12061/2018 Proviso to 01-11-2015 to Jagadish Sugars Ltd. 164(2)(a) 3547740 Sec.164(2), 31-10-2020 164(3), 167(1)(a), 167(1)(f)
6 6876/2018 No 01-11-2016 to N-Net Technologies Pvt. 164(2)(a) 958797 31-10-2021 Ltd. 7 6853/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Nakoda Construction Pvt. 164(2)(a) 545840 31-10-2021 Ltd. 8 15616- No 01-11-2016 to Malind Properties Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 2689814 15617/2018 31-10-2021 (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 3175306 (Petr-2)
9 15686/2018 No 01-11-2016 to M/s Garuda Vriddhi Boday 164(2)(a) 3137661 31-10-2021 Care Pvt. Ltd. 10 8036/2018 No 01-11-2016 to 1.M/s.J.H.Patel Hotels India 164(2)(a) 1714991 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd.
11 3842/2018 No 01-11-2016 to 1.Steel Theatres (Mysore) 164(2)(a) 116353 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Stmpl) 2.Mysore Food And Farm Products Pvt. Ltd.(Mfafppl) 3.Mrs Ramaiah Investments Pvt. Ltd. (Mrsripl) 4.Vishnu Forge (Mysore) Ltd. (Vfml) 5. Metal Cutters (Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. 12 3275/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Staal & Alliage Trading Pvt. 164(2)(a) 3553233 31-10-2021 Ltd. 13 52350/2017 No 01-11-2014 to Tag Media Network Pvt. 164(2)(a) 1888830 31-10-2019 Ltd. 14 10187/2018 Yes, Proviso to 01-11-2015 to Thinkspan Technologies 164(2)(a) 01802769 Sec.164(2), 31-10-2020 Pvt. Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a), 167(1)(f)- Provisions of Part III of the Indian Constitution 15 56364/2017 Yes 01-11-2016 to Syndeon Technologies Pvt. 164(2)(a) 3426838 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Ltd. 16 54832- Yes 01-11-2016 to Infants Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 00732560 54834/2017 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 (Petr Nos.1 to 3) (Petr-1) 03291311 (Petr-2) 00732600 (Petr-3) 17 54260- Yes 1/11/2014 to Pushti Refineries Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 01640784 54263/2017 S.164(1)(a), 31/10/2019 (Petr Nos.1 to 3) (Petr-1) 164(2) & 03196259 164(2)(a) (Petr-3) 03196286 (Petr-3)
18 51408/2017 No 1/11/2014 to 1.Kadur Industries Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1949383 31/10/2019 19 52351/2017 No 1/11/2014 to Tag Media Network Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 13238 31/10/2019 20 51121- No 01-11-2016 to B.S Appliances Ltd. (Petr 164(2)(a) 01984779 51122/2017 31-10-2021 Nos.1 & 3) (Petr-1) - 305 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 01984445 (Petr-2) 21 15797/2018 YES. 1/11/2014 to 1.C.S Resorts Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 280090
Proviso to 31/10/2019 2. OPG Systems Sec.164(2), Engineering Pvt. Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a), 167(1)(f) 22 4669/2018 No 1/11/2014 to 1.CAS Consultants Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1810692 31/10/2019 23 3273/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1.Staal and Alliage Trading 162(2)(a) 3535428 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd.
24 14465/2018 YES. 1/11/2015 to 1.Adhithyaa Eshan Food 164(2)(a) 492477 Proviso to 31/10/2020 Zone Pvt. Ltd.
Sec.164(2), 2.V.E.E. Agri Packaging 164(3), 167(1)(a), Pvt. Ltd. 167(1)(f) 25 17149/2018 No 1/11/2014 to Hitkari Land and Finance 164(2)(a) 716093 31/10/2019 Pvt. Ltd. (HLFPL) 26 14466/2018 YES. Proviso to 01-11-2015 to 1.Adhithyaa Eshan Food 164(2)(a) 3298096 Sec.164(2), 31-10-2020 Zone Pvt. Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a), 2.V.E.E. Agri Packaging Pvt. 167(1)(f) Ltd. 27 10752/2018 YES. Proviso to 01-11-2015 to Jagadish Sugars Ltd. 164(2)(a) 3444916 Sec.164(2), 31-10-2020 164(3), 167(1)(a), 167(1)(f)
28 14464/2018 YES. Proviso to 01-11-2015 to 1.Adhithyaa Eshan Food 164(2)(a) 3305472 Sec.164(2), 31-10-2020 Zone Pvt. Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a), 2.V.E.E. Agri Packaging Pvt. 167(1)(f) Ltd.
29 8205/2018 Yes 01-11-2014 to KOIOS Softtech Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 3219243 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2019
30 6854/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Nakoda Construction Pvt. 164(2)(a) 299476 31/10/2021 Ltd. 31 27876- No 01-11-2014 to 1.Quetzel Designs (India) 164(2)(a) 1770264 27877/2018 31-10-2019 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 1783285 (Petr-2) 32 28554/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to Regal Machine Tools Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2045710 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Ltd. 33 27779- No 01-11-2015 to 1.Renovo Power Gen Pvt. 164(2)(a) 02019078 27780/2018 31-10-2020 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) - do- 2.New Bridge Projects Pvt. 01934055 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-2) 01-11-2014 to 3.Acacia Energy Ventures 31-10-2019 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr No.1) 01-11-2015 to 4.Oysters Power Projects Pvt. 31-10-2020 Ltd. (Petr No.2) 01-11-2016 to 5.Vara Siddhi Vinayaka 31-10-2021 Energy Pvt. Ltd. (Petr No.1)
34 55358- No 01-11-2014 to M/s.Ace Forge Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 761913 55359/2017 31-10-2019 (Petr-1) 762029 (Petr-2) 35 51767- NO 01-11-2014 to SRV Polymers Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 00057893 51768/2017 31-10-2019 (Petr-1) 00057891 - 306 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on (Petr-2)
36 52904- Yes 01-11-2016 to 1.Teekays Plantation India 164(2)(a) 1513013 52906/2017 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 to 3) (Petr-1) 2.Teekays Furniture 728036 Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (Petr (Petr-2) Nos.1 to 3) 1512269 3.Teekays Prime Properties (Petr-3) India Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 to 3)
37 53707/2017 No 1/11/2016 to Devanesh Agro 164(2)(a) 1488855 31/10/2021 Development Pvt. Ltd. 38 54766/2017 Yes 01-11-2015 to 1.Air Wings Tours and 164(2)(a) 24261 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2020 Travels (India) Pvt. Ltd. 2.SSL infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. 3.Urbana Scapes (India) Pvt. Ltd. 4.M/s.Candor International Schools Pvt. Ltd. 5.Tocol Aerospace Pvt. Ltd. 39 54219- No. 01-11-2016 to Imanage Technology 164(2)(a) 02226978 54220/2017 31-10-2021 Services Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 (Petr-1) & 2) 03091392 (Petr-2)
40 54830- Yes 01-11-2016 to 1.Kadamba Intrac Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 00599012 54831/2017 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 00599066 (Petr-2) 41 53607- Yes 01-11-2016 to 1.Alacoque Hotel Bangalore 164(2)(a) 00800126 53609/2017 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 to 3) (Petr-1) 01858180 (Petr-2) 02370728 (Petr-3) 42 47145- No 01-11-2016 to Aparajita Hospitality 164(2)(a) 266555 47146/2017 31-10-2021 Services Pvt. Ltd. (Pet.Nos.1 (Petr-1) and 2) 1365708 (Petr-2) 43 51769/2017 No 01-11-2015 to LXY Homes Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 24837 31-10-2020 44 49124/2017 Yes 1/11/2015 to Bright Horizons Child Care 164(2)(a) 18155 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Services Pvt. Ltd. 45 53237- Yes 1/11/2015 to Bright Horizons Child Care 164(2)(a) 3508545 53238/2017 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2015 Services Pvt. Ltd. (Pet.Nos.1 (Petr-1) to 3) 3508551 (Petr-2) 18155 (Petr-3) 46 56098- No 1/11/2016 to Mulder Trading Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 00233146 56099/2017 31/10/2021 (Pet.No.1 and 2) (Petr-1) 00237723 (Petr-2) 47 56394/2017 Yes 01-11-2016 to 1.G.G. Tronics Minings 164(2)(a) 2066206 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 India Pvt. Ltd. 48 29857/2018 No 01-11-2015 to Fornax Software Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 03396048 31-10-2020 (Pet.No.1 and 2) (Petr-1) 03396058 (Petr-2) 49 27756/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Orca Infotech Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 105019 - 307 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 31-10-2021 50 29425/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1.MICNC Technologies Pvt. 164(2)(a) 1841679 31-10-2021 Ltd. 2.AMR Precision Engineers Pvt. Ltd. 51 23905/2018 YES. Proviso to Upto 31-10- 1.Neartivity Wireless India 164(2)(a) 2853403 Sec.164(2), 2021 Pvt. Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a) 2.Izwipe Payment & 167(1)(f) Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
52 26089- No 01-11-2014 to Vagmi Electromech 164(2)(a) 00194914 26090/2018 31-10-2019 Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Petr (Petr-1) Nos.1 & 2) 02114101 (Petr-2) 53 27599- Yes 01-11-2016 to Adithyasri Infrastructure 164(2)(a) 01630052 27600/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 00425112 (Petr-2) 54 27598/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to 1.Clintrac International Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2980197 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Ltd. 55 27891/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Casto Castings India Ltd. 164(2)(a) 2100683 31-10-2021 56 26851- No 01-11-2015 to E-Tech Training Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 233764 26852/2018 31-10-2020 (Petr-1) 682054 (Petr-2) 57 27297- Yes 01-11-2015 to RS Business Investments 164(2)(a) 2618404 27298/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2020 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 02894828 (Petr-2)
58 27459- Yes 01-11-2016 to Base Buildtech India Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2172270 27461/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 to 3) (Petr-1) 1667915 (Petr-2) 2172279 (Petr-3) 59 28185/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to Vishnusai Infra Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1636617 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 60 25635/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to Siri Lakshmi Coffee and Tea 164(2)(a) 1768340 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. 61 25637/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to Golden Hills Systems Pvt. 164(2)(a) 1768344 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Ltd. 62 26624- Yes 01-11-2016 to Tenxperts Technologies 164(2)(a) 2586853 26625/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 02586411 (Petr-2) 63 27926/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Celebration Software 164(2)(a) 3474437 31-10-2021 Development Park Pvt. Ltd.
64 27927/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Celebration Software 164(2)(a) 3430989 31-10-2021 Development Park Pvt. Ltd. 65 27564/2018 No 01-11-2014 to Urban Blocks Solutions 164(2)(a) 1690689 31-10-2019 Pvt. Ltd. 66 11324/2018 YES. Proviso to 01-11-2015 to 1.Indoha Engineers Pvt. 164(2)(a) 414011 Sec.164(2), 31-10-2020 Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a), 167(1)(f) - 308 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 67 11656/2018 YES. Proviso to 01-11-2015 to 1.Sri Bala Finance and 164(2)(a) 596773 Sec.164(2), 31-10-2020 Investment Advisory 164(3), 167(1)(a), Services Pvt. Ltd. 167(1)(f) 68 27890/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Casto Castings India Ltd. 164(2)(a) 2132670 31-10-2021 69 27601/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to Adithyasri Infrastructure 164(2)(a) 3097327 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. 70 26060- No 01-11-2015 to Genetics Specialties Pvt. 164(2)(a) 1391196 26061/2018 31-10-2020 Ltd. (Petr-1) 1801958 (Petr-2) 71 25194/2018 YES. Proviso to 01-11-2014 to Mahal Network Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 2592710 Sec.164(2), 31/10/2019 164(3), 167(1)(a), 167(1)(f)
72 25203/2018 No 01-01-2014 to Urban Blocks Solutions Pvt. 164(2)(a) 1690684 31-10-2019 Ltd. 73 13756/2018 Yes 01-11-2014 to Lorvin Impex Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1160334 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2019 74 29593-597/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to 1.TeleLogix Techonologies 164(2)(a) 2126090 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 to 5) (Petr-1) 2176500 (Petr-2) 2176489 (Petr-3) 2126136 (Petr-4) 2126090 (Petr-5) 75 25706/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to Fat Biofuels Technology 164(2)(a) 265765 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. 76 56374/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to Vaishno Mata Commodities 164(2)(a) 03293842 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Peter Nos.1 to 3) (Petr-1) 03214882 (Petr-2) 2737209 (Petr-3) 77 56393/2017 Yes 01-11-2016 to Sanbo Tech Infra Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1827149 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 78 48347/2017 Yes 01-11-2016 to Value Fab Solutions Pvt. 164(2)(a) 9408 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Ltd. 79 52952/2017 Yes 01-11-2016 to Majaa Machines and Tools 164(2)(a) 833464 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. 80 51765/2017 Yes 01-11-2016 to 1.Mana constructions Pvt. 164(2)(a) 01125160 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Ltd. (Petr-1) 2.Mugen Hospitality Pvt. Ltd 01434673 (Petr-2) 81 48364- No 01-11-2014 to Outcomes Clinical 164(2)(a) 601883 48365/2017 31-10-2019 Research (India) Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) (Petr Nos.1 & 2) 893778 (Petr-2) 82 53604-606/2017 Yes 01-11-2016 to Sovereign Developers and 164(2)(a) 1594320 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Infrastructure Ltd. (Petr (Petr-1) Nos.1 to 3) 1594396 (Petr-2) 5259231 (Petr-3) 83 30800/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Mplast Moulding Solutions 164(2)(a) 2468123 31-10-2021 Pvt. Ltd. Co. - 309 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 84 30732-734/2018 No 01-11-2014 to Longas Autogas India Pvt. 164(2)(a) 01616647 31-10-2019 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 to 3) (Petr-1) 01778418 (Petr-2) 03583091 (Petr-3) 85 27548-549/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Prime Finstock (India) Pvt. 164(2)(a) 01016926 31-10-2021 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 01016988 (Petr-2) 86 31035/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to Kripa Cleanworld 164(2)(a) 1792893 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Equipments Pvt. Ltd. 87 28620/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Kissan Ghar Urban & Rural 164(2)(a) 1276241 31-10-2021 Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.
88 31575/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Parmarth Labs Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 2374595 31-10-2021 89 31576/2018 No 01-11-2016 to Parmarth Labs Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1765663 31-10-2021 90 24976/2018 No 01-11-2016 to 1.Tidel Silk Technologies 164(2)(a) 2757599 31-10-2021 Ltd. 2.Blue River Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. 3.Renaissance Clinical and Translational Science Institute (LLP) 91 31172/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to 1.Vamsi Infrastructure 164(2)(a) 3297468 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Project Company Pvt. Ltd. 2.Vamsicon Projects Pvt. Ltd. 92 25036/2018 & No 01-11-2015 to Tulip data Centre Services 164(2)(a) 00220670 25298/2018 31-10-2020 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 00276645 (Petr-2) 93 30070/2018 Yes 01-11-2014 to Neuro Products (India) Pvt. 164(2)(a) 152389 S.164 31-10-2019 Ltd. 94 54337 & No 01-11-2016 to Alchemy Agriculture Pvt. 164(2)(a) 00555579 56001/2018 31-10-2021 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 03260513 (Petr-2) 59 14468/2018 YES. Proviso to 1/11/2015 to 1.V.E.E Agri Packing Pvt. 164(2)(a) 3298113 Sec.164(2), 31/10/2020 Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a), 2.Adhithyaa Eshan Food 167(1)(f) Zone Pvt. Ltd. 60 15841/2018 Yes 1/11/2015 to Samtrupthi Innovative 164(2)(a) 1911182 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
61 15938- No 1/11/2014 to Sidarth Floritek Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1013474 15940/2018 31/10/2019 (Petr-1) 2425632 (Petr-2) 825383 (Petr-3) 62 17242- No 1/11/2016 to MT-D Wires Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 264788 17243/2018 31/10/2021 (Petr-1) 1151950 (Petr-2) 63 17328/2018 YES. Proviso to 1/11/2015 to 1.Markwell Entertainments 164(2)(a) 1784797 Sec.164(2), 31/10/2020 Pvt. Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a), 2.Advaith Biotech Pvt. Ltd. 167(1)(f) 3.Markwell Properties Pvt. Ltd. - 310 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 4.Tee Gee Housing Pvt. Ltd. 64 17329/2018 YES. Proviso to 1/11/2015 to 1.Markwell Entertainments 164(2)(a) 2017028 Sec.164(2), 31/10/2020 Pvt. Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a), 2.Tee Gee Housing Pvt. Ltd. 167(1)(f) 3.Markwell Holidays (India) Pvt. Ltd. 65 17330/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s.Rohan Infra Tech Pvt. 164(2)(a) 01194648 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. (Petr-2) (Pet.No.2 and 3) 02759463 (Petr-3)
66 17427/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Salt Social Media Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1761383 31/10/2021 67 17429/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1. Tuning Fork 164(2)(a) 1761471 31/10/2021 Technologies Pvt. Ltd. 2. Salt Social media Pvt. Ltd. 68 17456/2018 YES. Proviso to 1/11/2015 to DR Krunch Technologies 164(2) 649660 Sec.164(2), 31/10/2020 Pvt. Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a), 167(1)(f) 69 18384/2018 No 1/11/2016 to BCIL Little Acre Resorts 164(2)(a) 1986202 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 70 19712- No 1/11/2014 to 1.Peppermint India Projects 164(2)(a) 00081517 19713/2018 31/10/2019 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 1/11/2016 to 2.Peppermint Hospitality India 01525947 31/10/2021 private limited (Petr-2) 1/11/2016 to 3.Peppermint Real Estates 31/10/2021 private Ltd. 1/11/2014 to 4.Wonderdine Cuisines Pvt. 31/10/2019 Ltd. 1/11/2014 to 5.Peppermint Luxury Hotels 31/10/2019 Pvt. Ltd. 1/11/2014 to 6.Sqiggle works Design Pvt. 31/10/2019 Ltd. 1/11/2014 to 7.Madhatters Foods Pvt. 31/10/2019 Ltd. 1/11/2015 to 8.Peppermint Hebbal Hotels 31/10/2020 Pvt. Ltd. 71 21999- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Natsam Solutions (India) 164(2)(a) 00490110 22000/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 2.Kancherla Spinning Mills 01204874 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-2) 3.Sparrow Energy Pvt. Ltd.
72 22001- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Mythreyi Property Care 164(2)(a) 01257756 22002/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Services Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 2.Mythreyi Promoters and 01257812 Developers Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-2) 73 22003- Yes 1/11/2016 to Ayush Incense Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 02715014 22004/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 02817005 (Petr-2) 74 22005/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Natsam Solutions (India) 164(2)(a) 2018473 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 75 22006- Yes 1/11/2016 to Sri Shivabasava Sugars 164(2)(a) 03351779 22007/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 05135812 (Petr-2) - 311 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 76 22008/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to GBMT Structural Steel 164(2)(a) 2927288 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 manufacturing Industries Pvt. Ltd. 77 22010/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to DATSI IT Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 2719527 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 78 22011/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s.GBMT Structural Steel 164(2)(a) 2927266 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 manufacturing Industries Pvt. Ltd. 79 22122- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Venika Green Power Pvt. 164(2)(a) 01927660 22123/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. (Petr-1) 2.Venika Rain Power Pvt. 01633344 Ltd. (Petr-2) 3.Venika Renewable Energy Pvt. Ltd. 4.Rain Energy India Pvt. Ltd. 5.Aqua Green Energy India Pvt. Ltd. 6.Sampada Holdings private Ltd. 7.Chandra Power Projects Pvt. Ltd. 80 22124- Yes 1/11/2016 to Bayir Chemicals India Pvt. 164(2)(a) 00452458 22125/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Limited (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 00452561 (Petr-2) 81 22483- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Aspen Steels Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 00320905 22484/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 2.Triangle Institutions Pvt. (Petr-1) Ltd. 00745875 3.Polo holidays & Resorts (Petr-2) Pvt. Ltd. 82 22485- Yes 1/11/2016 to Annapoorneshwari EDESIA 164(2)(a) 02575875 22486/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Hotel Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & (Petr-1) 2) 02575915 (Petr-2) 83 22491- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Vikat Hotels Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 01209747 22492/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 2.Apple Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 02376902 (Petr-2) 84 22494- Yes 1/11/2016 to LSVK Housing Finance Pvt. 164(2)(a) 00061651 22495/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 00944809 (Petr-2) 85 22499/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s Mangosalsa Hospitality 164(2)(a) 2395142 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Services Pvt. Ltd.
86 22500- Yes 1/11/2014 to Anaxl Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 2105306 22501/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 87 22512- Yes 1/11/2016 to Projenco Software Systems 164(2)(a) 00371068 22513/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 02009224 (Petr-2) 88 22515- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Penguins Outreach retail 164(2)(a) 01538541 22516/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 2.Nxus Promotions Pvt. Ltd. 01538546 (Petr-2) 89 22517/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Green Park Solutions Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2451860 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. 90 22706/2018 No 1/11/2016 to M/s.XP Software Solutions 164(2)(a) 983935 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 91 22800/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s.Aparna Power Ltd. 164(2)(a) 639818 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 - 312 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 92 22801/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s.Aparna Power Ltd. 164(2)(a) 340613 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 93 22819- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Altivo Information 164(2)(a) 00096515 22821/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 2. Gopalan Investments 00096668 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-2) 3.Gopalan Minerals and 00096717 Metals International Pvt. (Petr-3) Ltd. 94 23517/2018 Yes 1/11/2014 to 1.M/s Apricot Advisers Pvt. 164(2)(a) 1945020 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 Ltd. 2.M/s Avishya Securities Pvt. Ltd. Connected With 1 21153/2018 No 1/11/2015 to Ecotech Machinery Pvt. 164(2)(a) 212085 31/10/2020 Ltd. 2 17933- No 1/11/2014 to 1.Natural feeds Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 00467332 17934/2018 31/10/2019 (Petr Nos.1 and 2) (Petr-1) & 1/11/2015 to 2.Canmin resources (India) 00878017 20451-454/2018 31/10/2020 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr No.1) (Petr-2) 3.Matha waste management 1/11/2014 to Pvt. Ltd. (Petr No.1) 31/10/2019
3 23682/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1. Violette Art Creation Pvt. 164(2)(a) 1598389 31/10/2021 Ltd. (VACPL) 2.Burg Vinegar Pvt. Ltd.
4 23610- No 1/11/2014 to 1. Sai Leela Power Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 02828823 23624/2018 31/10/2019 (Petr-1, 2 and 3) (Petr-1) 1/11/2015 to 2.Sai Ranvita Power 01242916 31/10/2020 Projects Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-2 (Petr-2) & and 3) 01243223 1/11/2016 to 3.Sai Rutvika Power Pvt. (Petr-3) 31/10/2021 Ltd. (Petr-2 and 3) 4.Sai Aksha Power Project Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-2 and 3) 5.Sai Keerthi Power Projects Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 95 23524/2018 No 19/09/2016 to Classic Coffee and Species 164(2)(a) 276973 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 96 23894/2018 No 1/11/2016 to M/s BCIL Little Acre 164(2)(a) 2901169 31/10/2021 Resorts Pvt. Ltd. Co. 97 24803- No 1/11/2016 to V.S Commodities Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 0541217(P 24084/2018 31/10/2021 Co. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) etr-1) 1936058(P etr-2) 99 24087 & No 1/11/2016 to V.S.Stock Broking Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 0541217(P 24088/2018 31/10/2021 (Petr Nos.1 & 2) etr-1) 1936058(P etr-2) 99 24345- Yes 1/11/2016 to Sanwa Tec Pvt. Ltd. (Petr 164(2)(a) 01957098 24346/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 03424705 (Petr-2) 100 25206/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1.Urban Blocks Solutions 164(2)(a) 2521652 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 2.Ausm Consulting and Technologies Pvt. Ltd. - 313 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 101 25683- No 1/11/2014 to K.Raheja Hotels and Estates 164(2)(a) 28044 25684/2018 31/10/2019 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 29010 (Petr-2) Connected With 1 25930- No 1/11/2016 to Rodeo Drive Holdings Pvt. 164(2)(a) 1050126 25931/2018 31/10/2021 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 1050082 (Petr-2) 2 25928/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Creative Indus Construction 164(2)(a) 3138075 31/10/2021 and Infra Pvt. Ltd.
3 25927/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Creative Indus Construction 164(2)(a) 3109916 31/10/2021 and Infra Pvt. Ltd.
4 25929/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Mplast Moulding Solutions 164(2)(a) 2499577 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. Co.
5 23728/2018 & No 1/11/2015 to Design Oorja Experiential 164(2)(a) 3582687 24163-164/2018 31/10/2020 Labs Pvt. Ltd. 6 24343- Yes 1/11/2016 to Insys Instruments Systems 164(2)(a) 01682110 24344/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 (India) Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 (Petr-1) & 2) 02730918 (Petr-2) 7 24085- No 01/11/2016 to V S Bullion Pvt. Ltd. Co. 248, 164(2) 0541217(P 24086/2018 31/03/2021 (Petr Nos.1 & 2) etr-1) 1936058(P etr-2) 8 23906/2018 YES. Proviso to 01/11/2016 to 1.Neartivity Wireless India 164(2)(a) 2853367 Sec.164(2), 31/03/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 164(3), 167(1)(a), 01/11/2014 to 2.Izwipe Payment 167(1)(f) 31/03/2019 Technologies Pvt. Ltd. 9 31947- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.M/s Suffixtree 164(2)(a) 02338064 31948/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 2.M/s. Iteanz Consultancy 03522757 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-2)
10 31992/2018 No. 1/11/2016 to 1.Vishwapriya Mines and 164(2)(a) 1691102 31/10/2021 Minerals Pvt. Ltd. 2.RMV Developers Pvt. Ltd. 11 31994/2018 No. 1/11/2016 to 1.Sheshadri Mining Co.Pvt. 164(2)(a) 1622939 31/10/2021 Ltd. 2.Mariyappa Mines and Minerals Pvt. Ltd. Co., 3.VSJ Relators Pvt. Ltd. 12 32065- No 1/11/2014 to Innovative Wine Park and 164(2)(a) 01756695 32068/2018 31/10/2019 Resorts Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 01194845 (Petr-2) 01195709 (Petr-3) 01683742 (Petr-4) 13 32069- No 1/11/2015 to Grindwell Norton Managers 164(2)(a) 00437964 32071/2018 31/10/2020 Housing Pvt. Ltd. (Petr (Petr-1) Nos.1 to 3) 00438026 (Petr-2) 00470260 (Petr-3) - 314 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 14 32615/2018 Yes 1/11/2015 to Tanmathra Creative 164(2)(a) 354209 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 15 30995/2018 No 1/11/2014 to Natural Intima Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 562346 31/10/2019 16 32347/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s Recycle Cartridge Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2421278 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd.
17 32348/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.M/s ECF Products India 164(2)(a) 1739631 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 2.M/s React Media Pvt. Ltd. 18 33081/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s.Sree Anjanadri Iron and 164(2)(a) 1997854 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Alloys Pvt. Ltd. 19 31511- No 1/11/2016 to Dravid Soft (India) Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1792092 31513/2018 31/10/2021 (Petr Nos.1 to 3) (Petr-1) 1792309 (Petr-2) 1902245 (Petr-3) 20 28487/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Pennant Software Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 874382 31/10/2021 21 14828- Yes 1/11/2016 to S K International Glass Pvt. 164(2)(a) 01304633 14830/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. Co (Petr Nos.1 to 3) (Petr-1) 02143594 (Petr-2) 02186834 (Petr-3) 102 26991/2018 No 1/11/2016 to M/s Balaji Renewable 164(2)(a) 6806394 31/10/2021 Energies (India) Pvt. Ltd. Connected with 1 26992/2018 No 1/11/2016 to M/s Balaji Renewable 164(2)(a) 6558518 31/10/2021 Energies (India) Pvt. Ltd. 103 27420/2018 No 1/11/2016 to M/s Hiba Constructions Pvt. 164(2)(a) 182698 31/10/2021 Ltd. Connected With 1 27421/2018 No 1/11/2016 to M/s Hiba Constructions 164(2)(a) 182686 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 2 27892/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Casto Castings India Ltd. 164(2)(a) 2132513 31/10/2021 3 27893/2018 No 1/11/2014 to Natural Street Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 3630712 31/10/2019 4 32881/2018 Yes 1/11/2015 to Meme Media Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 2058667 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 5 33080/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s Sri Anjanadri Iron and 164(2)(a) 1670503 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Alloys Pvt. Ltd.
6 33933/2018 No 1/11/2016 to M/s.Irobot (India) Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 5243421 31/10/2021 7 34002/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Flytech Travels Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 5110488 31/10/2021 8 34186/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s Seef Builders and 164(2)(a) 2201636 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Developers Pvt. Ltd.
9 31733- No 1/11/2016 to Infinity Bullion Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 778655 31734/2018 31/10/2021 10 34832/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s.Dix Marine Solution Pvt. 164(2)(a) 3572873 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Ltd. 11 35330/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s Saddles Automotive 164(2)(a) 5203729 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Seatings Pvt. Ltd. - 315 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 12 35101/2018 Yes 1/11/2015 to 1. Gallery Mermaid Interior 164(2)(a) 2516195 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Concepts Pvt. Ltd.
1/11/2016 to 2. Kwik Media Solutions 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd.
1/11/2016 to 3.Mermaid Fabric and Art 31/10/2021 Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 13 29962/2018 No 1/11/2016 to M/s Ampelion Networks Pvt. 164(2)(a) 694137 31/10/2021 Ltd. 14 36624/2018 No 1/11/2015 to Nature Garden Fruits Impex 164(2)(a) 340682 31/10/2020 Pvt. Ltd. 15 36613/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Tec-Hub India Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 84000 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 16 36522/2018 No 1/11/2016 to SJPK Appareal Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 6734423 31/10/2021 17 34844/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Abhinav fashions Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 381891 31/10/2021 18 35332/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s Saddles Automotive 164(2)(a) 3534076 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Seatings Pvt. Ltd. 19 38408/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.T.S Figure and Fittness 164(2)(a) 2143592 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 2.Ankit Glass Industries Pvt. Ltd. 20 38495/2018 Yes 1/11/2015 to 1. Gallery Mermaid Interior 164(2)(a) 2128420 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Concepts Pvt. Ltd. 3. Kwik Media Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 5.Mermaid Fabric and Art Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
21 34845/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Abhinav Fashions Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1097530 31/10/2021 22 34930/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Simply Class Fashions 164(2)(a) 01645561 & S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 35321/2018 2.Rhea Holdings Pvt. Ltd. 01645602 3.Karuturi Farm Fresh (Petr-2) Products Pvt. Ltd. 4.Karuturi Greens And Marketing Pvt. Ltd. 104 29165/2018 Yes 1/11/2014 to Neuro Products (India Pvt.) 164(2)(a) 152263 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 Ltd. 105 38722/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Shiridi Business ventures 164(2)(a) 513694 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 2.Sweet Neem Publications 1/11/2016 to Pvt. Ltd. 31/10/2021 3.Ascent Real EAssets Pvt. Ltd. 4.Elements Constructions Pvt. Ltd. 5.Sacred Ash Health Care and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. Connected With 1 38952/2018 No 1/11/2016 to M/s.Nimishamba Energy 164(2)(a) 1927186 31/10/2021 India Pvt. Ltd. 2 39975- Yes 1/11/2015 to JSLAN Technologies Pvt. 164(2)(a) 3208387 39976/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Ltd. 3 39836/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s.Taras Technologies 164(2)(a) 2008668 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 4 40936/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Ankit Glass Industries Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2861435 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Co. - 316 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on 5 41535/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Ayee Edu Tech Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 2504580 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 6 41536/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Ayee Edu Tech Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 2495927 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 7 39347/2018 Yes 1/11/2015 to 1.Valmeeka Hotels Pvt. 164(2)(a) 2589206 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Ltd. 2.Gallery Mermaid Interior Concepts Pvt. Ltd. 3.Mermaid Fabric and Art Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 4.Kwik Media Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 8 39348- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.People Connect Solutions 164(2)(a) 2519967 39349/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 2.Sudhir Management 2590586 Services and Finance (Petr-2) Consultant Pvt. Ltd.
9 39814/2018 Yes 1/11/2015 to 1.Gallery Mermaid Interior 164(2)(a) 2592553 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Concepts Pvt. Ltd. 2.Mermaid Fabric and Art Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 3.Kwik Media Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 10 36625/2018 Yes 1/11/2015 to 1.Sai Mining Enterprises 164 (2)(a) 389387 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2020 Pvt. Ltd. 2.Parivarthan Textile Pvt. Ltd. 11 40817/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1.Vishala India Minmetals 164 (2)(a) 1662063 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 12 41215/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Ryan Info-tech Pvt. Ltd. 164 (2)(a) 683049 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 13 41217/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Ryan Agri-tech Pvt. Ltd. 164 (2)(a) 2337889 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 14 42814/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Sourceorbit Technologies 164 (2)(a) 3528464 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. 15 43039/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Kepran Infosoft Pvt. Ltd. 164 (2)(a) 6972734 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 16 43394/2018 No 1/11/2014to 1.Huthur Airways Pvt. Ltd. 164 (2)(a) 820570 31/10/2019 17 43851/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Kamal Farms India Pvt. Ltd. 164 (2)(a) 1829410 31/10/2021 18 43859/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1.Kamal Farms India Pvt. 164 (2)(a) 1865406 31/10/2021 Ltd. 2. Golden Hatcheries Pvt. Ltd. 19 43860/2018 No 1/11/2016 to 1.Kamal Farms India Pvt. 164 (2)(a) 1829374 31/10/2021 Ltd. 2. Golden Hatcheries Pvt. Ltd. 20 38914/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to M/s.PR Habitats Pvt. Ltd. 164 (2)(a) 5108779 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 21 42805- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Vasantha Hima 164 (2)(a) 00609874 42808/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Constructions Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 2.Bhadragiri Power Pvt. Ltd. 01885137 3. City Square Enterprises (Petr-2) Pvt. Ltd. 00609881 4. Fortune Power Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-3) 5. New Age Infrastructure 01913434 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-4) 6. Sagar Power (Neerukatte) - 317 -
Sl. No. Whether Date and Name of the defaulting Disqualificati Constitutional period of DIN Writ Petition No. company in which on Under Main Con. validity Disqualificati Number petitioner/s is/are director/s Section Case Case challenged? on Pvt. Ltd. 7. Spas and Resorts India Pvt. Ltd. 8. Narthaki Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. 9. White Stone Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. 10. Vinela Exports and Imports Pvt. Ltd. 22 44521- Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Protein Entertainment 164 (2)(a) 337385 44522/2018 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Pvt. Ltd. (Petr-1) 2. Hungry and Foolish 337429 Intellectual properties Pvt. (Petr-2) Ltd. 3. Protein Family Entertainment Centres Pvt. Ltd. 4. Annapurna Protein Family Entertainment Centre Pvt. Ltd. 5. Rhiti MSD- N Motor Sport India Pvt. Ltd. 6. N9 Sports and Leisure Holdings Pvt. Ltd. 23 40760/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to 1.Colossuss Electric 164 (2)(a) 6539032 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Company Pvt. Ltd. 24 25707/2018 No 1/11/2016 to N. Square Innovations Pvt. 164 (2)(a) 1832501 31/10/2021 Ltd. 25 44147/2018 Yes 1/11/2014 to 1.Orca Infotech Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 104893 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 2.Khader Farming (India Pvt. Ltd. 26 43198/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Onus Global Software and 164(2)(a) 5190588 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 Consultancy Pvt. Ltd.
27 44148/2018 Yes 1/11/2014 to Khader Farming (India Pvt. 164(2)(a) 106674 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 Ltd.
28 44729/2018 Yes 1/11/2014 to Hutur Airways Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 1858716 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2019 29 44730/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to Hutur Airways Pvt. Ltd. 164(2)(a) 635793 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021 30 44839/2018 & No 1/11/2016 to Hara KHT Enterprises Pvt. 164(2)(a) 01017171 46210/2018 31/10/2021 Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 & 2) (Petr-1) 01017271 (Petr-2) 31 45594/2018 Yes 01-11-2015 to Ecosys Building Solutions 164(2)(a) 1193104 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2020 Pvt. Ltd. 32 46208/2018 Yes 01-11-2016 to Pradhan Hospitality 164(2)(a) 3010409 S.164(2)(a) 31-10-2021 Services Pvt. Ltd. 33 47819- No 1/11/2015 to Benda Infrastructure 164(2)(a) 3080933 47821/2018 31/10/2020 Development Ltd. (Petr Nos.1 (Petr-1) & 2) 3085239 (Petr-2) 34 29233/2018 No 1/11/2016 to Mplast Moulding Solutions 164(2)(a) 2829219 31/10/2021 Pvt., Ltd. 106 38913/2018 Yes 1/11/2016 to PR Habitats Pvt. Ltd. 164 (2)(a) 5108796 S.164(2)(a) 31/10/2021
*Sequence of Case Numbers is as per cause-list dated 27.03.2019.
- 318 -
7. On perusal of the aforesaid table, it could
be gathered that the petitioners are directors either in
public companies or private companies, or both, and
the period of their disqualification have also been
noted. They are aggrieved by they being disqualified
on account of non-compliance with the provisions of
Section 164(2)(a) of the Act and also the fact that
during the pendency of their disqualification and
during the pendency of most of these writ petitions,
proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act has been
inserted. As a result of which, they have to vacate
their office as director in all other companies where
they are functioning as directors even though there is
no default under Section 164(2) of the Act by the
other companies.
Part - 4 Legal frame work:
8. The relevant provisions of the Companies
Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "1956 Act" for
- 319 -
the sake of convenience) and "the Act" are extracted
as under:
Relevant provisions of 1956 Act:
274. Disqualifications of directors.-
(1) A person shall not be capable of being appointed director of a company, if -
(a) he has been found to be of unsound mind by a Court of competent
jurisdiction and the finding is in force;
(b) he is an undischarged insolvent;
(c) he has applied to be adjudicated as an insolvent and his application is pending;
(d) he has been convicted by a Court of any offence involving moral turpitude and sentenced in respect thereof to imprisonment for not less than six months, and a period of five years has not elapsed from the date of expiry of the sentence;
(e) he has not paid any call in respect of shares of the company held by him, whether alone or jointly with others, and six months have elapsed from the last day fixed for the payment of the call; or
(f) an order disqualifying him for appointment as director has been passed by a Court in pursuance of section 203 and is in force, unless the leave of the Court has been obtained for his appointment in pursuance of that section;
(g) such person is already a director of a public company which, -
- 320 -
(A) has not filed the annual accounts and annual returns for any continuous three financial years commencing on and after the first day of April, 1999; or
(B) has failed to repay its deposit or interest thereon on due date or redeem its debentures on due date or pay dividend and such failure continues for one year or more:
Provided that such person shall not be eligible to be appointed as a director of any other public company for a period of five years from the date on which such public company, in which he is a director, failed to file annual accounts and annual returns under sub-clause (A) or has failed to repay its deposit or interest or redeem its debentures on due date or pay dividend referred to in clause (B).
(2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, remove -
(a) the disqualification incurred by any person in virtue of clause (d) of sub-section (1), either generally or in relation to any company or companies specified in the notification; or
(b) the disqualification incurred by any person in virtue of clause (e) of sub-section (1).
(3) A private company which is not a subsidiary of a public company may, by its articles, provide that a person shall be disqualified for appointment as a director on any grounds in addition to those specified in sub-section (1).
x x x
283. Vacation of office by directors. - (1) The office of a director shall become vacant if -
- 321 -
(a) he fails to obtain within the time specified in sub-section (1) of section 270, or at any time thereafter ceases to hold, the share qualification, if any, required of him by the articles of the company;
(b) he is found to be of unsound mind by a Court of competent jurisdiction;
(c) he applies to be adjudicated an insolvent;
(d) he is adjudged an insolvent;
(e) he is convicted by a Court of any offence involving moral turpitude and sentence in respect thereof to imprisonment for not less than six months;
(f) he fails to pay any call in respect of shares of the company held by him, whether alone or jointly with others, within six months from the last date fixed for the payment of the call unless the Central Government has, by notification in the Official Gazette, removed the disqualification incurred by such failure;
(g) he absents himself from three consecutive meetings of the Board of directors, or from all meetings of the Board for a continuous period of three months, whichever is longer, without obtaining leave of absence from the Board;
(h) he (whether by himself or by any person for his benefit or on his account), or any firm in which he is a partner or any private company of which he is a director, accepts a loan, or any guarantee or security for a loan, from the company in contravention of section 295;
(i) he acts in contravention of section 299;
(j) he becomes disqualified by an order of Court under section 203;
(k) he is removed in pursuance of section 284; or
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(l) having been appointed a director by virtue of his holding any office or other employment in the company, he ceases to hold such office or other employment in the company.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (d), (e) and (j) of sub-section (1), the disqualification referred to in those clauses shall not take effect -
(a) for thirty days from the date of the adjudication, sentence or order ;
(b) where any appeal or petition is preferred within the thirty days aforesaid against the adjudication, sentence or conviction resulting in the sentence, or order until the expiry of seven days from the date on which such appeal or petition is disposed of; or
(c) where within the seven days aforesaid, any further appeal or petition is preferred in respect of the adjudication, sentence, conviction, or order, and the appeal or petition, if allowed, would result in the removal of the disqualification, until such further appeal or petition is disposed of.
(2A) Subject to the provisions of sub- sections (1) and (2), if a person functions as a director when he knows that the office of director held by him has become vacant on account of any of the disqualifications, specified in the several clauses of sub-section (1), he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five thousand] rupees for each day on which he so functions as a director.
(3) A private company which is not a subsidiary of a public company may, by its articles, provide that the office of director shall be vacated on any grounds in addition to those specified in sub-section (1).
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x x x
560. Power of Registrar to strike defunct company off register.-- (1) Where the Registrar has reasonable cause to believe that a company is not carrying on business or in operation, he shall send to the company by post a letter inquiring whether the company is carrying on business or in operation.
(2) If the Registrar does not within one month of sending the letter receive any answer thereto, he shall, within fourteen days after the expiry of the month, send to the company by post a registered letter referring to the first letter, and stating that no answer thereto has been received and that, if an answer is not received to the second letter within one month from the date thereof, a notice will be published in the Official Gazette with a view to striking the name of the company off the register.
(3) If the Registrar either receives an answer from the company to the effect that it is not carrying on business or in operation, or does not within one month after sending the second letter receive any answer, he may publish in the Official Gazette, and send to the company by registered post, a notice that, at the expiration of three months from the date of that notice, the name of the company mentioned therein will, unless cause is shown to the contrary, be struck off the register and the company will be dissolved.
(4) If, in any case where a company is being wound up, the Registrar has reasonable cause to believe either that no liquidator is acting, or that the affairs of the company have been completely wound up, and any returns required to be made by the liquidator have not been made for a period of six consecutive months, the Registrar shall publish in the
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Official Gazette and send to the company or the liquidator, if any, a like notice as is provided in sub-section (3).
(5) At the expiry of the time mentioned in the notice referred to in sub-section (3) or (4), the Registrar may, unless cause to the contrary is previously shown by the company, strike its name off the register, and shall publish notice thereof in the Official Gazette; and on the publication in the Official Gazette of this notice, the company shall stand dissolved:
Provided that--
(a) the liability, if any, of every director, the managing agent, secretaries and treasurers, manager or other officer who was exercising any power of management, and of every member of the company, shall continue and may be enforced as if the company had not been dissolved; and
(b) nothing in this sub-section shall affect the power of the Court to wind up a company the name of which has been struck off the register.
(6) If a company, or any member or creditor thereof, feels aggrieved by the company having been struck off the register, the Court, on an application made by the company, member or creditor before the expiry of twenty years from the publication in the Official Gazette of the notice aforesaid, may, if satisfied that the company was, at the time of the striking off, carrying on business or in operation or otherwise that it is just that the company be restored to the register, order the name of the company to be restored to the register; and the Court may, by the order, give such directions and make such provisions as seem just for placing the company and all other persons in the same position as nearly as
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may be as if the name of the company had not been struck off.
(7) Upon a certified copy of the order under sub-section (6) being delivered to the Registrar for registration, the company shall be deemed to have continued in existence as if its name had not been struck off.
(8) A letter or notice to be sent under this section to a company may be addressed to the company at its registered office, or if no office has been registered, to the care of some director, the managing agent, secretaries and treasurers, manager or other officer of the company, or if there is no director, managing agent, secretaries and treasurers, manager or officer of the company whose name and address are known to the Registrar, may be sent to each of the persons who subscribed the memorandum, addressed to him at the address mentioned in the memorandum.
(9) A notice to be sent under this section to a liquidator may be addressed to the liquidator at his last known place of business.
x x x
Relevant provisions of 2013 Act:
2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
x x x (20) "company" means a company incorporated under this Act or under any previous company law;
x x x (32) "depository" means a depository as defined in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Depositories Act, 1996 (22 of 1996);
x x x
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(40) "financial statement" in relation to a company, includes--
(i) a balance sheet as at the end of the financial year;
(ii) a profit and loss account, or in the case of a company carrying on any activity not for profit, an income and expenditure account for the financial year;
(iii) cash flow statement for the financial year;
(iv) a statement of changes in equity, if applicable; and
(v) any explanatory note annexed to, or forming part of, any document referred to in sub-clause (i) or to sub-clause (iv):
Provided that the financial statement, with respect to One Person Company, small company and dormant company, may not include the cash flow statement;
(41) "financial year", in relation to any company or body corporate, means the period ending on the 31st day of March every year, and where it has been incorporated on or after the 1st day of January of a year, the period ending on the 31st day of March of the following year, in respect whereof financial statement of the company or body corporate is made up:
Provided that on an application made by a company or body corporate, which is a holding company or a subsidiary of a company incorporated outside India and is required to follow a different financial year for consolidation of its accounts outside India, the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied, allow any period
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as its financial year, whether or not that period is a year:
Provided further that a company or body corporate, existing on the commencement of this Act, shall, within a period of two years from such commencement, align its financial year as per the provisions of this clause;
x x x
92. Annual return.- (1) Every company shall prepare a return (hereinafter referred to as the annual return) in the prescribed form containing the particulars as they stood on the close of the financial year regarding--
(a) its registered office, principal business activities, particulars of its holding, subsidiary and associate companies;
(b) its shares, debentures and other securities and shareholding pattern;
(c) its indebtedness;
(d) its members and debenture-holders along with changes therein since the close of the previous financial year;
(e) its promoters, directors, key managerial personnel along with changes therein since the close of the previous financial year;
(f) meetings of members or a class thereof, Board and its various committees along with attendance details;
(g) remuneration of directors and key managerial personnel;
(h) penalty or punishment imposed on the company, its directors or officers and details of compounding of offences and appeals made against such penalty or punishment;
(i) matters relating to certification of compliances, disclosures as may be prescribed;
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(j) details, as may be prescribed, in respect of shares held by or on behalf of the Foreign Institutional Investors indicating their names, addresses, countries of incorporation, registration and percentage of shareholding held by them; and
(k) such other matters as may be prescribed,
and signed by a director and the company secretary, or where there is no company secretary, by a company secretary in practice:
Provided that in relation to One Person Company and small company, the annual return shall be signed by the company secretary, or where there is no company secretary, by the director of the company.
(2) The annual return, filed by a listed company or, by a company having such paid-
up capital or turnover as may be prescribed, shall be certified by a company secretary in practice in the prescribed form, stating that the annual return discloses the facts correctly and adequately and that the company has complied with all the provisions of this Act.
(3) An extract of the annual return in such form as may be prescribed shall form part of the Board's report.
(4) Every company shall file with the Registrar a copy of the annual return, within sixty days from the date on which the annual general meeting is held or where no annual general meeting is held in any year within sixty days from the date on which the annual general meeting should have been held together with the statement specifying the reasons for not holding the annual general meeting, with such fees or additional fees as may be prescribed, within the time as specified, under section 403.
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(5) If any company fails to file its annual return under sub-section (4), before the expiry of the period specified under section 403 with additional fees, the company shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to five lakhs rupees and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both.
(6) If a company secretary in practice certifies the annual return otherwise than in conformity with the requirements of this section or the rules made thereunder, he shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to five lakh rupees.
x x x
96. Annual general meeting.-
(1)Every company other than a One Person Company shall in each year hold in addition to any other meetings, a general meeting as its annual general meeting and shall specify the meeting as such in the notices calling it, and not more than fifteen months shall elapse between the date of one annual general meeting of a company and that of the next:
Provided that in case of the first annual general meeting, it shall be held within a period of nine months from the date of closing of the first financial year of the company and in any other case, within a period of six months, from the date of closing of the financial year:
Provided further that if a company holds its first annual general meeting as aforesaid, it shall not be necessary for the company to hold
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any annual general meeting in the year of its incorporation:
Provided also that the Registrar may, for any special reason, extend the time within which any annual general meeting, other than the first annual general meeting, shall be held, by a period not exceeding three months.
(2) Every annual general meeting shall be called during business hours, that is, between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. on any day that is not a National Holiday and shall be held either at the registered office of the company or at some other place within the city, town or village in which the registered office of the company is situate:
Provided that the Central Government may exempt any company from the provisions of this sub-section subject to such conditions as it may impose.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, "National Holiday" means and includes a day declared as National Holiday by the Central Government.
x x x
129. Financial statement.-- (1) The financial statements shall give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company or companies, comply with the accounting standards notified under section 133 and shall be in the form or forms as may be provided for different class or classes of companies in Schedule III:
Provided that the items contained in such financial statements shall be in accordance with the accounting standards:
Provided further that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any insurance or banking company or any company engaged
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in the generation or supply of electricity, or to any other class of company for which a form of financial statement has been specified in or under the Act governing such class of company:
Provided also that the financial statements shall not be treated as not disclosing a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company, merely by reason of the fact that they do not disclose--
(a) in the case of an insurance company, any matters which are not required to be disclosed by the Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938), or the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999 (41 of 1999);
(b) in the case of a banking company, any matters which are not required to be disclosed by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949);
(c) in the case of a company engaged in the generation or supply of electricity, any matters which are not required to be disclosed by the Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003);
(d) in the case of a company governed by any other law for the time being in force, any matters which are not required to be disclosed by that law.
(2) At every annual general meeting of a company, the Board of Directors of the company shall lay before such meeting financial statements for the financial year.
(3) Where a company has one or more subsidiaries, it shall, in addition to financial statements provided under sub-
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section (2), prepare a consolidated financial statement of the company and of all the subsidiaries in the same form and manner as that of its own which shall also be laid before the annual general meeting of the company along with the laying of its financial statement under sub-section (2):
Provided that the company shall also attach along with its financial statement, a separate statement containing the salient features of the financial statement of its subsidiary or subsidiaries in such form as may be prescribed:
Provided further that the Central Government may provide for the consolidation of accounts of companies in such manner as may be prescribed.
Explanation.-- For the purposes of this sub-section, the word "subsidiary" shall include associate company and joint venture.
(4) The provisions of this Act applicable to the preparation, adoption and audit of the financial statements of a holding company shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to the consolidated financial statements referred to in sub-
section (3).
(5) Without prejudice to sub-
section (1), where the financial statements of a company do not comply with the accounting standards referred to in sub-section (1), the company shall disclose in its financial statements, the deviation from the accounting standards, the reasons for such deviation and the financial effects, if any, arising out of such deviation.
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(6) The Central Government may, on its own or on an application by a class or classes of companies, by notification, exempt any class or classes of companies from complying with any of the requirements of this section or the rules made thereunder, if it is considered necessary to grant such exemption in the public interest and any such exemption may be granted either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification.
(7) If a company contravenes the provisions of this section, the managing director, the whole-time director in charge of finance, the Chief Financial Officer or any other person charged by the Board with the duty of complying with the requirements of this section and in the absence of any of the officers mentioned above, all the directors shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to one year or with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, except where the context otherwise requires, any reference to the financial statement shall include any notes annexed to or forming part of such financial statement, giving information required to be given and allowed to be given in the form of such notes under this Act.
x x x
131. Voluntary revision of financial statements or Board's report. - (1) If it appears to the directors of a company that--
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(a) the financial statement of the company; or
(b) the report of the Board,
do not comply with the provisions of section 129 or section 134 they may prepare revised financial statement or a revised report in respect of any of the three preceding financial years after obtaining approval of the Tribunal on an application made by the company in such form and manner as may be prescribed and a copy of the order passed by the Tribunal shall be filed with the Registrar:
Provided that the Tribunal shall give notice to the Central Government and the Income-tax authorities and shall take into consideration the representations, if any, made by that Government or the authorities before passing any order under this section:
Provided further that such revised financial statement or report shall not be prepared or filed more than once in a financial year:
Provided also that the detailed reasons for revision of such financial statement or report shall also be disclosed in the Board's report in the relevant financial year in which such revision is being made.
(2) Where copies of the previous financial statement or report have been sent out to members or delivered to the Registrar or laid before the company in general meeting, the revisions must be confined to--
(a) the correction in respect of which the previous financial statement or report do not comply with the provisions of
- 335 -
section 129 or section 134;
and
(b) the making of any necessary consequential alternation.
(3) The Central Government may make rules as to the application of the provisions of this Act in relation to revised financial statement or a revised director's report and such rules may, in particular--
(a) make different provisions according to which the previous financial statement or report are replaced or are supplemented by a document indicating the corrections to be made;
(b) make provisions with respect to the functions of the company's auditor in relation to the revised financial statement or report;
(c) require the directors to take such steps as may be prescribed. x x x
164. Disqualifications for
appointment of director.- (1) A person shall not be eligible for appointment as a director of a company, if --
(a) he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court;
(b) he is an undischarged insolvent;
(c) he has applied to be adjudicated as an insolvent and his application is pending;
(d) he has been convicted by a court of any offence, whether involving moral turpitude or otherwise, and sentenced in respect thereof to imprisonment for not less than six months and a period of five
- 336 -
years has not elapsed from the date of expiry of the sentence:
Provided that if a person has been convicted of any offence and sentenced in respect thereof to imprisonment for a period of seven years or more, he shall not be eligible to be appointed as a director in any company;
(e) an order disqualifying him for appointment as a director has been passed by a court or Tribunal and the order is in force;
(f) he has not paid any calls in respect of any shares of the company held by him, whether alone or jointly with others, and six months have elapsed from the last day fixed for the payment of the call;
(g) he has been convicted of the offence dealing with related party transactions under section 188 at any time during the last preceding five years; or
(h) he has not complied with sub-section (3) of section 152.
(2) No person who is or has been a director of a company which--
(a) has not filed financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years; or
(b) has failed to repay the deposits accepted by it or pay interest thereon or to redeem any debentures on the due date or pay interest due thereon or pay any dividend declared and such failure to pay or redeem continues for one year or more, shall be eligible to be re-appointed as a director of that company or appointed in other company for a period of five years from the date on which the said company fails to do so.
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(3) A private company may by its articles provide for any disqualifications for appointment as a director in addition to those specified in sub-sections (1) and (2):
Provided that the disqualifications referred to in clauses (d), (e) and (g) of sub- section(1) shall not take effect--
(i) for thirty days from the date of conviction or order of disqualification;
(ii) where an appeal or petition is preferred within thirty days as aforesaid against the conviction resulting in sentence or order, until expiry of seven days from the date on which such appeal or petition is disposed of; or
(iii) where any further appeal or petition is preferred against order or sentence within seven days, until such further appeal or petition is disposed of.
xxx
167. Vacation of office by director.-- (1) The office of a director shall become vacant in case--
(a) he incurs any of the disqualifications specified in section 164;
(b) he absents himself from all the meetings of the Board of Directors held during a period of twelve months with or without seeking leave of absence of the Board;
(c) he acts in contravention of the provisions of section 184 relating to entering into contracts or arrangements in which he is directly or indirectly interested;
(d) he fails to disclose his interest in any contract or arrangement in which he is directly or indirectly interested, in contravention of the provisions of section 184;
(e) he becomes disqualified by an order of a court or the Tribunal;
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(f) he is convicted by a court of any offence, whether involving moral turpitude or otherwise and sentenced in respect thereof to imprisonment for not less than six months:
Provided that the office shall be vacated by the director even if he has filed an appeal against the order of such court;
(g) he is removed in pursuance of the provisions of this Act;
(h) he, having been appointed a director by virtue of his holding any office or other employment in the holding, subsidiary or associate company, ceases to hold such office or other employment in that company.
(2) If a person, functions as a director even when he knows that the office of director held by him has become vacant on account of any of the disqualifications specified in sub-
section (1), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both.
(3) Where all the directors of a company vacate their offices under any of the disqualifications specified in sub-section(1), the promoter or, in his absence, the Central Government shall appoint the required number of directors who shall hold office till the directors are appointed by the company in the general meeting.
(4) A private company may, by its articles, provide any other ground for the vacation of the office of a director in addition to those specified in sub-section (1).
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9. The Act was amended with effect from May,
2018. The amendments relevant for this case are in
respect of Sections 164 & 167.
"The Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017 [No.1 of 2018]:
xxx *Section 52. In Section 164 of the Principal Act.--
(i) In sub-section (2), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:--
"Provided that where a person is appointed as a director of a company which is in default of clause (a) or clause (b), he shall not incur the disqualification for a period of six months from the date of his appointment.";
(ii) in sub-section (3), for the proviso, the following proviso shall be substituted namely:--
"Provided that the disqualifications referred to in clauses (d), (e) and (g) of sub-
section (1) shall continue to apply even if the appeal or petition has been filed against the order of conviction or disqualification."
x x x *Section 54. In Section 167 of the principal Act, in sub-section (1),--
(i) in clause (a), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:--
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"Provided that where he incurs disqualification under sub-
section (2) of section 164, the office of the director shall become vacant in all the companies, other than the company which is in default under that sub-section.";
(ii) x x x"
[*Came into force w.e.f. 07.05.2018]
At this stage, it is relevant to refer to the
Companies (Appointment and Qualification of
Directors) Rules, 2014. The Rules have come into
force from the date of their publication in the Official
Gazette. Rule 2 (d) defines "Director Identification
Number" (DIN) to mean an identification number
allotted by the Central Government to any individual,
intending to be appointed as director or to any
existing director of a company, for the purpose of his
identification as a director of a company, provided
that the DIN obtained by the individuals prior to the
notification of these rules shall be the DIN for the
purpose of the Act. Provided further that the DIN
includes vis-à-vis the Designated Partnership
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Identification Number (DPIN) issued under Section 7
of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6 of
2009) and rules made thereunder. Rule 9 deals with
application for allotment of "Director Identification
Number", while Rule 10 deals with "Allotment of DIN"
and Rule 11 deals with "Cancellation or surrender or
Deactivation of DIN. Rule 12 deals with "Intimation of
changes in particulars specified in DIN application".
Rule 14 speaks about "Disqualification of directors
under sub-section(2) of section 164". For the purpose
of this case, it would be relevant to extract Rules 11
and 14 which read as under:
"11. Cancellation or surrender or Deactivation of DIN.- The Central Government or Regional Director (Northern Region), Noida or any officer authorised by the Regional Director may, upon being satisfied on verification of particulars or documentary proof attached with the application received along with fee as specified in Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014 from any person, cancel or deactivate the DIN in case -
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(a) the DIN is found to be duplicated in respect of the same person provided the data related to both the DIN shall be merged with the validly retained number;
(b) the DIN was obtained in a wrongful manner or by fraudulent means;
(c) of the death of the concerned individual;
(d) the concerned individual has been declared as a person of unsound mind by a competent Court;
(e) if the concerned individual has been adjudicated an insolvent:
Provided that before cancellation or deactivation of DIN pursuant to clause
(b), an opportunity of being heard shall be given to the concerned individual;
(f) on an application made in Form DIR-5 by the DIN holder to surrender his or her DIN along with declaration that he has never been appointed as director in any company and the said DIN has never been used for filing of any document with any authority, the Central Government may deactivate such DIN:
Provided that before deactivation of any DIN in such case, the Central Government shall verify e-records.
Explanation.- For the purposes of clause(b) -
(i) the term "wrongful manner" means if the DIN is obtained on the strength of documents which are not legally valid or incomplete documents are furnished or on suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong certification or by making misleading or false information or by misrepresentation;
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(ii) the term "fraudulent means" means if the DIN is obtained with an intent to deceive any other person or any authority including the Central Government.
x x x
14. Disqualification of directors sub- section (2) of section 164.-
(1) Every director shall inform to the company concerned about his disqualification under subsection (2) of section 164, if any, in Form DIR-8 before he is appointed or re-appointed. (2) Whenever a company fails to file the financial statements or annual returns, or fails to repay any deposit, interest, dividend, or fails to redeem its debentures, as specified in sub-section (2) of section 164, the company shall immediately file Form DIR-9, to the Registrar furnishing therein the names and addresses of all the directors of the company during the relevant financial years.
(3) When a company fails to file the Form DIR-9 within a period of thirty days of the failure that would attract the disqualification under sub-section (2) of section 164, officers of the company specified in clause (60) of section 2 of the Act shall be the officers in default. (4) Upon receipt of the Form DIR-9 under sub-rule (2), the Registrar shall immediately register the document and place it in the document file for public inspection.
(5) Any application for removal of disqualification of directors shall be made in Form DIR-10."
- 344 -
10. A comparison of Sections 274 of 1956 Act
with Section 164 of the Act and Section 283 of 1956
Act with Section 167 of 2013 Act along with the
amendments could be made at this stage. Similarly,
comparison of Section 560 of 1956 Act with Sections
248 and 252 of the Act could be noted.
1956 Act 2013 Act
274. Disqualifications of 164. Disqualifications for directors.- (1) A person shall appointment of director.- not be capable of being (1) A person shall not be appointed director of a eligible for appointment as a company, if - director of a company, if -- (a) he has been found to be (a) he is of unsound mind of unsound mind by a Court and stands so declared of competent jurisdiction and by a competent court; the finding is in force; (b) he is an undischarged (b) he is an undischarged insolvent; insolvent; (c) he has applied to be (c) he has applied to be adjudicated as an insolvent adjudicated as an and his application is insolvent and his pending; application is pending; (d) he has been convicted by (d) he has been convicted by a Court of any offence a court of any offence, involving moral turpitude and whether involving moral sentenced in respect thereof turpitude or otherwise, to imprisonment for not less and sentenced in respect than six months, and a period thereof to imprisonment of five years has not elapsed for not less than six from the date of expiry of the months and a period of sentence; five years has not (e) he has not paid any call elapsed from the date of in respect of shares of the expiry of the sentence: company held by him, whether alone or jointly with Provided that if a person others, and six months have has been convicted of any elapsed from the last day offence and sentenced in fixed for the payment of the respect thereof to call; or imprisonment for a period of (f) an order disqualifying him seven years or more, he - 345 -
for appointment as director shall not be eligible to be has been passed by a Court appointed as a director in in pursuance of section 203 any company; and is in force, unless the leave of the Court has been (e) an order disqualifying obtained for his appointment him for appointment as a in pursuance of that section; director has been passed (g) such person is already by a court or Tribunal a director of a public and the order is in force; company which, - (f) he has not paid any calls (A) has not filed the annual in respect of any shares accounts and annual returns of the company held by for any continuous three him, whether alone or financial years commencing jointly with others, and on and after the first day of six months have elapsed April, 1999; or from the last day fixed (B) has failed to repay its for the payment of the deposit or interest thereon on call; due date or redeem its debentures on due date or (g) he has been convicted of pay dividend and such failure the offence dealing with continues for one year or related party transactions more: under section 188 at any time during the last Provided that such person preceding five years; or shall not be eligible to be appointed as a director of any (h) he has not complied with other public company for a sub-section (3) of section period of five years from the 152. date on which such public company, in which he is a (2) No person who is or has director, failed to file annual been a director of a company accounts and annual returns which-- under sub-clause (A) or has failed to repay its deposit or (a) has not filed financial interest or redeem its statements or annual debentures on due date or returns for any pay dividend referred to in continuous period of clause (B). three financial years; or
(2) The Central Government (b) has failed to repay the may, by notification in the deposits accepted by it or Official Gazette, remove - pay interest thereon or to (a) the disqualification redeem any debentures incurred by any person in on the due date or pay virtue of clause (d) of sub- interest due thereon or section (1), either generally pay any dividend or in relation to any company declared and such failure or companies specified in the to pay or redeem notification; or continues for one year or (b) the disqualification more, - 346 -
incurred by any person in shall be eligible to be re- virtue of clause (e) of sub- appointed as a director of section (1). that company or appointed in other company for a (3) A private company which period of five years from the is not a subsidiary of a public date on which the said company may, by its articles, company fails to do so. provide that a person shall be disqualified for appointment (3) A private company as a director on any grounds may by its articles provide in addition to those specified for any disqualifications for in sub-section (1). appointment as a director in addition to those specified in sub-sections (1) and (2): Provided that the disqualifications referred to in clauses (d), (e) and (g) of sub-section(1) shall not take effect-- (i) for thirty days from the date of conviction or order of disqualification; (ii) where an appeal or petition is preferred within thirty days as aforesaid against the conviction resulting in sentence or order, until expiry of seven days from the date on which such appeal or petition is disposed of; or
(iii) where any further appeal or petition is preferred against order or sentence within seven days, until such further appeal or petition is disposed of.
283. Vacation of office by 167. Vacation of office by directors. - (1) The office director.-- (1) The office of of a director shall become a director shall become vacant if - vacant in case-- (a) he fails to obtain (a) he incurs any of the within the time specified in disqualifications specified sub-section (1) of section in section 164; 270, or at any time thereafter (b) he absents himself from ceases to hold, the share all the meetings of the qualification, if any, required Board of Directors held of him by the articles of the during a period of twelve company; months with or without - 347 -
(b) he is found to be of seeking leave of absence unsound mind by a Court of of the Board; competent jurisdiction; (c) he applies to be (c) he acts in contravention adjudicated an insolvent; of the provisions of (d) he is adjudged an section 184 relating to insolvent; entering into contracts or (e) he is convicted by a arrangements in which he Court of any offence involving is directly or indirectly moral turpitude and sentence interested; in respect thereof to (d) he fails to disclose his imprisonment for not less interest in any contract than six months; or arrangement in which (f) he fails to pay any call he is directly or indirectly in respect of shares of the interested, in company held by him, contravention of the whether alone or jointly with provisions of section 184; others, within six months from the last date fixed for (e) he becomes disqualified the payment of the call by an order of a court or unless the Central the Tribunal; Government has, by (f) he is convicted by a court notification in the Official of any offence, whether Gazette, removed the involving moral turpitude disqualification incurred by or otherwise and such failure; sentenced in respect (g) he absents himself thereof to imprisonment from three consecutive for not less than six meetings of the Board of months: directors, or from all meetings of the Board for a Provided that the office continuous period of three shall be vacated by the months, whichever is longer, director even if he has filed without obtaining leave of an appeal against the order absence from the Board; of such court; (h) he (whether by himself or by any person for (g) he is removed in his benefit or on his account), pursuance of the or any firm in which he is a provisions of this Act; partner or any private company of which he is a (h) he, having been director, accepts a loan, or appointed a director by any guarantee or security for virtue of his holding any a loan, from the office or other company in contravention of employment in the section 295; holding, subsidiary or (i) he acts in associate company, contravention of section 299; ceases to hold such office (j) he becomes or other employment in disqualified by an order of that company. Court under section 203; (k) he is removed in (2) If a person, functions - 348 -
pursuance of section 284; or as a director even when he (l) having been appointed knows that the office of a director by virtue of his director held by him has holding any office or other become vacant on account of employment in the company, any of the disqualifications he ceases to hold such office specified in sub-section (1), or other employment in the he shall be punishable with company. imprisonment for a term (2) Notwithstanding which may extend to one anything in clauses (d), (e) year or with fine which shall and (j) of sub-section (1), the not be less than one lakh disqualification referred to in rupees but which may those clauses shall not take extend to five lakh rupees, effect - or with both. (a) for thirty days from the date of the adjudication, (3) Where all the directors sentence or order ; of a company vacate their (b) where any appeal or offices under any of the petition is preferred within disqualifications specified in the thirty days aforesaid sub-section(1), the promoter against the adjudication, or, in his absence, the sentence or conviction Central Government shall resulting in the sentence, or appoint the required number order until the expiry of of directors who shall hold seven days from the date on office till the directors are which such appeal or petition appointed by the company in is disposed of; or the general meeting. (c) where within the seven days aforesaid, any (4) A private company further appeal or petition is may, by its articles, provide preferred in respect of the any other ground for the adjudication, sentence, vacation of the office of a conviction, or order, and the director in addition to those appeal or petition, if allowed, specified in sub-section (1). would result in the removal of
the disqualification, until such further appeal or petition is disposed of.
(2A) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2), if a person functions as a director when he knows that the office of director held by him has become vacant on account of any of the disqualifications, specified in the several clauses of sub-
section (1), he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five thousand] rupees for each day on which
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he so functions as a director.
(3) A private company which is not a subsidiary of a public company may, by its articles, provide that the office of director shall be vacated on any grounds in addition to those specified in sub-section (1).
560. Power of Registrar to 248. Power of Registrar strike defunct company off to remove name of register.-- (1) Where the company from register of Registrar has reasonable companies.- (1) Where the cause to believe that a Registrar has reasonable company is not carrying on cause to believe that--
business or in operation, he
(a) a company has failed to shall send to the company by commence its business post a letter inquiring within one year of its whether the company is incorporation or;
carrying on business or in operation. (b) [Omitted]
(2) If the Registrar does (c) a company is not not within one month of carrying on any business sending the letter receive any or operation for a period answer thereto, he shall, of two immediately within fourteen days after the preceding financial years expiry of the month, send to and has not made any the company by post a application within such registered letter referring to period for obtaining the the first letter, and stating status of a dormant that no answer thereto has company under section been received and that, if an 455, answer is not received to the he shall send a notice to the second letter within one company and all the month from the date thereof, directors of the company, of a notice will be published in his intention to remove the the Official Gazette with a name of the company from view to striking the name of the register of companies the company off the register. and requesting them to send their representations along (3) If the Registrar either with copies of the relevant receives an answer from the documents, if any, within a company to the effect that it period of thirty days from is not carrying on business or the date of the notice.
in operation, or does not within one month after (2) Without prejudice to sending the second letter the provisions of sub-section receive any answer, he may (1), a company may, after publish in the Official Gazette, extinguishing all its - 350 -
and send to the company by liabilities, by a special registered post, a notice that, resolution or consent of at the expiration of three seventy-five per cent. months from the date of that members in terms of paid-up notice, the name of the share capital, file an company mentioned therein application in the prescribed will, unless cause is shown to manner to the Registrar for the contrary, be struck off the removing the name of the register and the company will company from the register of be dissolved. companies on all or any of the grounds specified in sub- (4) If, in any case where a section (1) and the Registrar company is being wound up, shall, on receipt of such the Registrar has reasonable application, cause a public cause to believe either that notice to be issued in the
no liquidator is acting, or that prescribed manner:
the affairs of the company Provided that in the case have been completely wound of a company regulated up, and any returns required under a special Act, approval to be made by the liquidator of the regulatory body have not been made for a constituted or established period of six consecutive under that Act shall also be months, the Registrar shall obtained and enclosed with publish in the Official Gazette the application.
and send to the company or the liquidator, if any, a like (3) Nothing in sub-section notice as is provided in sub- (2)shall apply to a company section (3). registered under section 8. (5) At the expiry of the (4) A notice issued under time mentioned in the notice sub-section (1) or sub-
referred to in sub-section (3) section (2) shall be published or (4), the Registrar may, in the prescribed manner unless cause to the contrary and also in the Official is previously shown by the Gazette for the information company, strike its name off of the general public. the register, and shall publish notice thereof in the Official (5) At the expiry of the Gazette; and on the time mentioned in the publication in the Official notice, the Registrar may, Gazette of this notice, the unless cause to the contrary company shall stand is shown by the company, dissolved: strike off its name from the register of companies, and Provided that-- shall publish notice thereof
(a) the liability, if any, of in the Official Gazette, and every director, the managing on the publication in the agent, secretaries and Official Gazette of this treasurers, manager or other notice, the company shall officer who was exercising stand dissolved. any power of management, and of every member of the (6) The Registrar, before company, shall continue and
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may be enforced as if the passing an order under sub- company had not been section (5), shall satisfy dissolved; and himself that sufficient
(b) nothing in this sub- provision has been made for section shall affect the power the realisation of all amount of the Court to wind up a due to the company and for company the name of which the payment or discharge of has been struck off the its liabilities and obligations register. by the company within a reasonable time and, if (6) If a company, or any necessary, obtain necessary member or creditor thereof, undertakings from the feels aggrieved by the managing director, director company having been struck or other persons in charge of off the register, the Court, on the management of the an application made by the company:
company, member or creditor before the expiry of twenty Provided that notwith- years from the publication in standing the undertakings the Official Gazette of the referred to in this sub- notice aforesaid, may, if section, the assets of the satisfied that the company company shall be made was, at the time of the available for the payment or striking off, carrying on discharge of all its liabilities business or in operation or and obligations even after otherwise that it is just that the date of the order the company be restored to removing the name of the the register, order the name company from the register of of the company to be companies.
restored to the register; and the Court may, by the order, (7) The liability, if any, of give such directions and every director, manager or make such provisions as other officer who was seem just for placing the exercising any power of company and all other management, and of every persons in the same position member of the company as nearly as may be as if the dissolved under sub-section name of the company had not (5), shall continue and may been struck off. be enforced as if the company had not been (7) Upon a certified copy of dissolved. the order under sub-section (6) being delivered to the (8) Nothing in this section Registrar for registration, the shall affect the power of the company shall be deemed to Tribunal to wind up a have continued in existence company the name of which as if its name had not been has been struck off from the struck off. register of companies.
(8) A letter or notice to be sent under this section to a company may be addressed to the company at its
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registered office, or if no office has been registered, to the care of some director, the managing agent, secretaries and treasurers, manager or other officer of the company, or if there is no director, managing agent, secretaries and treasurers, manager or officer of the company whose name and address are known to the Registrar, may be sent to each of the persons who subscribed the memorandum, addressed to him at the address mentioned in the memorandum.
(9) A notice to be sent under this section to a liquidator may be addressed to the liquidator at his last known place of business.
252. Appeal to Tribunal.-
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Registrar, notifying a company as dissolved under section 248, may file an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of three years from the date of the order of the Registrar and if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the removal of the name of the company from the register of companies is not justified in view of the absence of any of the grounds on which the order was passed by the Registrar, it may order restoration of the name of the company in the register of companies:
Provided that before passing any order under this section, the Tribunal shall give a reasonable opportunity of making representations and of being
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heard to the Registrar, the company and all the persons concerned :
Provided further that if the Registrar is satisfied, that the name of the company has been struck off from the register of companies either inadvertently or on the basis of incorrect information furnished by the company or its directors, which requires restoration in the register of companies, he may within a period of three years from the date of passing of the order dissolving the company under section 248, file an application before the Tribunal seeking restoration of name of such company.
(2) A copy of the order passed by the Tribunal shall be filed by the company with the Registrar within thirty days from the date of the order and on receipt of the order, the Registrar shall cause the name of the company to be restored in the register of companies and shall issue a fresh certificate of incorporation.
(3) If a company, or any member or creditor or workman thereof feels aggrieved by the company having its name struck off from the register of companies, the Tribunal on an application made by the company, member, creditor or workman before the expiry of twenty years from the publication in the Official Gazette of the notice under sub-section (5) of section 248 may, if satisfied that the company was, at the time of its name being struck off,
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carrying on business or in operation or otherwise it is just that the name of the company be restored to the register of companies, order the name of the company to be restored to the register of companies, and the Tribunal may, by the order, give such other directions and make such provisions as deemed just for placing the company and all other persons in the same position as nearly as may be as if the name of the company had not been struck off from the register of companies.
11. At the outset, a comparison of Section 274
of 1956 Act with Section 164 of the Act could be made
and similarly, a comparison of Section 283 of the 1956
Act with Section 167 of the Act could be made.
(a) On a comparison of Section 274 of 1956 Act
with Section 164 of the Act, what emerges is, sub-
section (1) of Section 274 of 1956 Act as well as sub-
section (1) of Section 164 of the Act deal with the
grounds for disqualification or basis of disqualification
of a person for being appointed as a director of a
Company. Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 274 (1) and
clauses (a) to (h) of Section 164 (1) are almost in pari
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materia and apply to directors of both public as well
as private companies. It is submitted by learned
counsel for the petitioners that the basis of
disqualification in the aforesaid clauses is personal to
the director, such as unsoundness of mind, being an
un-discharged insolvent, being adjudicated as an
insolvent, conviction of any criminal offence, etc.
(b) Section 274(1)(g) of 1956 Act was inserted
with effect from 13.12.2000, whereby for the first
time, a person was held to be not capable of being
appointed as a director of a company, if such person
was already a director of a public company which had,
inter alia, not filed the annual accounts and annual
returns for any continuous three financial years
commencing on and after the first day of April, 1999;
whereas Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, inter alia, states
that no person who is or has been a director of a
company which has not filed financial statements or
annual returns for any continuous period of three
financial years would be visited with certain
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consequences. The consequences under 1956 Act is
as per proviso to Section 274(1)(g), which states that
such a person shall not be eligible to be appointed as
a director of any other public company for a period of
five years from the date on which such public
company, in which he is a director, failed to file annual
accounts and annual returns under sub-clause(g),
whereas under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, a person
who is or has been a director of a company which has
not filed financial statements or annual returns for any
continuous period of three years or under Section
164(2)(b) has failed to repay the deposits accepted by
it or pay interest thereon or to redeem any
debentures on the due date or pay interest due
thereon or pay any dividend declared and such failure
to pay or redeem continues for one year or more shall
not be eligible to be re-appointed as a director of the
defaulting company or appointed in any other
company for a period of five years from the date on
which the said company fails to do so. The distinction
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is that under the Act, a director of a company which is
in default under Section 164(2)(a) and (b) of the Act
shall not be eligible to be re-appointed as a director of
the defaulting company and be appointed in any other
company for a period of five years from the date on
which the said company fails to do so. In other words,
under the proviso to Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956
Act, the director of a defaulting company could be re-
appointed as a director of such a company, whereas
under the Act he cannot be so re-appointed as a
director of even the defaulting company as well as any
other company for a period of five years from the date
on which the defaulting company has failed to comply
with Section 164(2)(a) of the Act.
(c) Further under Section 274(3) of the 1956
Act, a private company which is not a subsidiary of a
public company may, by its articles, provide that a
person shall be disqualified for appointment as a
director on grounds in addition to those specified in
Section 274(1). Under Section 164(3) of the Act, a
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private company may, by its articles, provide for any
disqualification for appointment as a director in
addition to those specified in sub-sections (1) and (2)
of Section 164 of the Act. Under the Act, it is
immaterial whether a private company is or is not a
subsidiary of a public company.
12. It would not be out of place to also note
the differences between Section 275 of 1956 Act and
Section 165 of the Act. Section 165 of the Act deals
with the maximum number of public companies in
which a person can hold office as a director. Under
Section 275 of 1956 Act, a person could, save as
otherwise provided in Section 276, hold office at the
same time as director in not more than fifteen
companies. The words "fifteen companies" was
substituted for the words "twenty companies" with
effect from 13.12.2000. As per Section 53 of the
Amendment Act, 2017, the Explanation has been
renumbered as Explanation I and after Explanation I,
Explanation II has been inserted namely, for
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reckoning the limit of directorships of twenty
companies, the directorship in a dormant company
shall not be included. But, under Section 165 of the
Act, no person after the commencement of the Act,
can hold office as a director, including any alternate
directorship, in more than twenty companies at the
same time. The proviso states that the maximum
number of public companies in which a person can be
appointed as a director shall not exceed ten. The
other clauses of Section 165 of the Act is not relevant
for the purpose of the case, except referring to the
explanation, which states that for reckoning the limit
of public companies in which a person can be
appointed as a director, directorship in private
companies that are either holding or subsidiary
company of a public company shall be included.
13. A comparison of Section 283 of the 1956
Act with Section 167 of the Act could be made as
under:
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(a) Section 283 of the 1956 Act and Section 167
of the Act both deal with vacation of office by directors
on being disqualified. Section 283 of 1956 Act states
that the office of the director shall become vacant if
any of the contingencies as stated in Clauses (a) to (l)
thereto apply. On perusal of the same, they clearly
indicate that there is no reference to Section
274(1)(g) of 1956 Act. In other words, when Section
274(1)(g) of 1956 Act was inserted by amendment to
1956 Act with effect from 13.12.2000, there was no
corresponding amendment made to Section 283 of
1956 Act. Therefore, even if a director was
disqualified by virtue of Section 274(1)(g) of 1956
Act, it did not result in his vacating the office of
director either in the defaulting company or in any
other company in which he was a director. But, under
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, it is clearly indicated that
the office of a director shall become vacant in case he
incurs any of the disqualifications specified in Section
164 of the Act. As already noted, Section 164 of the
- 361 -
Act is in two parts. Section 164(1)(a) to (h) deals
with the disqualifications which affect a director
personally, while Section 164(2)(a) and (b) are
disqualifications which visit a director on account of a
default committed by the company in which he is a
director. But, according to Section 167(1)(a) of the
Act, if there is disqualification of a director under
Section 164, which comprises of sub-sections (1), (2)
and (3) then the office of such a director would
become vacant.
(b) The comparison does not end, as by
amendment made to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act by
virtue of the Amendment Act, 2017, a proviso has
been added. As per the proviso, if a director incurs
disqualification under sub-section (2) of Section 164
of the Act, the office of the director shall become
vacant in all the companies where he is a director
except the companies which is in default under that
sub-section. In other words, by the proviso, a
director of a defaulting company as per Section 164
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(2) of the Act, would not vacate his office as director
of the defaulting company, but he would vacate the
office of director in all other companies in which he is
a director.
(c) In this regard, it would also be useful to
refer to Section 52 of the Amendment Act 2017 which
has added a proviso to Section 164(2) to the effect
that where a person is appointed as a director of a
company which is in default under Clause (a) or
Clause (b), he shall not incur the disqualification for a
period of six months from the date of his
appointment.
14. On a comparison of the aforesaid
provisions, what emerges is the bone of contention
between the parties. According to the petitioners,
Section 164(2) of the Act is ultra vires Article 14
and/or Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India as
being manifestly arbitrary. That, the aforesaid
provision does not envisage pre and post decisional
- 363 -
hearing, which is violation of principles of natural
justice. That, Section 164(2)(a) of the Act has been
given a retrospective effect by the respondents and is
hence unreasonable and arbitrary. That, Section
167(1)(a) as well as the proviso thereto is ultra vires
Article 14 and/or Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution
as being manifestly arbitrary. That, it cannot have a
retrospective operation and thereby affect the vested
rights of the petitioners herein adversely. In the above
context, learned Senior counsel as well as learned
counsel for the petitioners have also submitted that
for the first time, the disqualification for appointment
of a director has been imposed on private companies
under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act as, under Section
274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act, such a disqualification was
only restricted to public companies.
Part - 5 SUBMISSIONS:
15. In the above background, the submissions
of learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the
- 364 -
petitioners and learned senior counsel and Additional
Solicitor General for India, Sri Prabhuling Navadagi
and learned Central Government Standing Counsel
have been heard at length.
Submissions of Petitioners:
16. Learned senior counsel, Sri Dhyan
Chinnappa appearing for the petitioners in Writ
Petition Nos.51769 of 2017, 36613 of 2018 and other
connected cases drew my attention to Section 164 of
the Act and contended that the constitutional validity
of Section 164(2)(a) of the Act is assailed. He
submitted that Section 164 of the Act deals with
disqualification for appointment of director and that
Section 164(1) of the Act are those disqualifications
which are personal to a director. Section 164(1) of
the Act states that a person shall not be eligible for
appointment as a director of a company on account of
the circumstances stated in Clauses (a) to (h) of the
Act thereof, such as unsoundness of mind, being
convicted by a court of any offence, an order of
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disqualification for appointment as a director being
passed by a court or tribunal, or such other grounds.
He contended that Section 164(2) of the Act relates to
ineligibility to be appointed as a director of a company
which has not filed financial statements or annual
accounts for any continuous period of three financial
years or has failed to repay the deposits accepted by
it or pay interest thereon or to redeem any
debentures on the due date or pay interest due
thereon or pay any dividend declared and such failure
to pay or redeem continues for a period of one year or
more. That the ground of disqualification for
reappointment as a director of a defaulting company
or appointment in any other company for a period of
five years, is not directly attributable to a director of a
defaulting company, but the consequence is vicarious
on account of the default committed by the company.
That the said consequence is serious, almost penal
and disproportionate to the default and hence, it is in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. That the
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disqualification is not on account of any act/omission
of the director per se, but due to the default
committed by the company in which he is a director.
That Section 167 of the Act has also been amended in
the year 2017 by the insertion of a proviso, as a result
of which a director of a defaulting company would
have to vacate his office as a director as per Section
164(2) of the Act in respect of any other company
where there is no default while he continues to be a
director of the company which has defaulted. Sri
Chinnappa contended that if both these consequences
are read cumulatively, it is wholly disproportionate to
the default stated under Section 164(2) of the Act.
17. It was contended that the disqualification is
by operation of law without there being any prior
hearing; not even a post-decisional hearing being
provided and without taking into consideration the
valid circumstances or grounds for not filing the
financial statements or annual returns for a period of
three continuous years. In the absence of hearing, if
- 367 -
a director is visited with such serious consequences,
the provisions are manifestly arbitrary.
18. In this context, it was contended that this
Court may interpret the expression "who is or has
been a director of a company" in Section 164(2) of the
Act in such a manner as to not apply to a person who
was not a director during the three years period when
the financial statements or annual returns were not
filed and not extend it to any person who has been a
director of a company during any period prior thereto.
Further, the period of three years must commence
from 01.04.2014 when the Act commenced and not
include any period prior thereto.
19. It was further contended that the intention
of Section 167(1)(a) of the Act is to restrict the
disqualification to only 164(1) of the Act and it does
not extend to Section 164(2) of the Act. But, by the
proviso, the director who is disqualified on account of
Section 164(2) of the Act has to also vacate his office
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as a director in all companies other than the Company
which is in default under that sub-section. It was
contended that such a consequence does not have a
nexus to the default committed by a company in
which a person is a director and the consequence far
exceeds the mischief sought to be remedied and
hence, it is manifestly arbitrary and disproportionate.
20. In this regard, my attention was drawn to
Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act and Section 164(2)
of the Act. Similarly, a comparison was made
between Section 283 of 1956 Act with Section 167 of
the Act, by contending that the disqualification of a
director by virtue of Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act
did not result in vacation of the office of a director
under Section 283 of the said Act. But, under Section
167(1)(a) of the Act, a director would have to vacate
his office as a director in all other companies except
the defaulting company in the context of Section
164(2) of the Act. In the context of the aforesaid
provisions, learned senior counsel contended that the
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consequence of the default made by the company
being so serious and disproportionate, the provision
namely Section 164(2) of the Act and the proviso to
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act are manifestly arbitrary
and in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution and the same may be struck down.
21. It was further contended that in the
absence of any hearing before a disqualification
occurs, a director is visited with serious civil
consequences without being heard. There is also no
post decisional hearing and no provision under the Act
to remedy such a decision. That the ineligibility to be
reappointed in the company which is in default and
the ineligibility on prohibition of appointment in any
other company for a period of five years being harsh,
it virtually puts an end to a person's career as a
director of a company and hence, the said provisions
ought to be held to be unconstitutional. In support of
his submissions, he relied upon the following
decisions:
- 370 -
1. Shayara Bano vs. Union of India and others (Ministry of Women and Child Development Secretary and Others), [(2017)9 SCC 1] (Shayara Bano);
2. Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Association vs. Central Valuation Board and others, [(2007)6 SCC 668], (Bidhannagar Welfare Association);
3. Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, [(2015)5 SCC 1] (Shreya Singhal).
22. Dr. Aditya Sondhi, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition No.49124
of 2017 and connected matters and Writ Petition
Nos.53237-238 of 2017, contended the vires of
Section 164(2)(a) of the Act has been challenged.
That the object of the said provision could be seen
from the Press release issued by the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs. That it is in order to reign in shell
companies that such a provision has been made under
the Act. That action under Section 248 of the Act
could be initiated against the said companies, instead,
- 371 -
under Section 164(2) of the Act, disqualification of the
directors of such a company occurs, it is by operation
of law; without issuing notice or giving an opportunity
of hearing to a director who is visited with such
serious consequences, it is almost penal in nature and
hence, ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution.
23. Further, Section 164(2) of the Act is
retrospective in effect inasmuch as three continuous
years of non-filing of financial statements or annual
returns could extend to even prior to 01.04.2014 (on
which date the Act came into force). That there
cannot be a retrospective operation of Section 164(2)
of the Act resulting in such serious consequences.
That the material period of three years under Section
164(2) of the Act has to be construed with effect from
01.04.2014 onwards and cannot extend to any period
prior thereof.
24. Learned senior counsel also contended
that under Section 403 of the Act, there is provision
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for extension of time by two hundred and seventy
(270) days for filing of annual returns. That even if
the disqualification of a director of a company occurs
on account of the default of a company by operation
of law, there is no prior hearing thereof, or at least a
post-decisional hearing could have been provided
under the Act, which is not so. Therefore, Section
164(2)(a) of the Act has to be declared as being in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
25. Learned senior counsel drew my attention
to the judgment of the Madras High Court on a similar
controversy and contended that paragraph Nos.23 to
29 of the said judgment are relied upon. He
submitted that Sections 164(2) and 167(1)(a) of the
Act are hit by the doctrine of proportionality on
account of the grave consequences that they have on
the career of a person as a director of a company. He
further submitted that once a director is disqualified
by operation of law, then automatically, the Director
Identification Number (DIN) gets cancelled. He drew
- 373 -
my attention to Rule 11 of the Companies
(Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules,
2014 and contended that the same does not apply to
cancellation of DIN under the circumstances stated in
Section 164 (2) of the Act.
26. Learned senior counsel, Dr. Sondhi,
contended that in the absence of there being any
remedy under the Act or a forum, before which a
complaint could be filed, if a director is aggrieved by
the disqualification, except approaching the Hon'ble
High Court under Article 226 of Constitution, principles
of natural justice would apply. But in the absence of
there being an express provision, the same would
have to be read into the provisions so as to save it
from unconstitutionality and as it is ultra vires Article
14 of the Constitution, on account of severe, grave
consequences that occur on account of such a
disqualification. He relied upon the following decisions
in support of his submissions, namely:
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1. Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society vs. Registrar of Societies and Others, [(2000) 1 SCC 566], (Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society);
2. C.B.Goutam Vs. Union of India and others, [(1993) 3 SCC 259], (C.B.Goutam);
3. Modern Dental College and Research Centre and Others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, [(2016) 7 SCC 353], (Modern Dental College & Research Centre);
4. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. L.K.Ratna, [(1986)4 SCC 537], (Institute of Chartered Accountants of India).
27. Learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla,
appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.25683-
25684 of 2018 and other cases submitted that on
account of Company Law Board proceedings, the
Company in question could not file its financial
statements which has resulted in serious
consequences for the directors of the company who
have no forum before whom they could express their
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predicament. He contended that the directors of a
defaulting company are visited with a serious
consequence of disqualification without a prior or
post-decisional hearing. That the exclusion of
principles of natural justice vitiates the
constitutionality of Section 164(2) of the Act and
hence, this Court may read it into the said provisions
principles of natural justice.
28. Learned counsel, Sri Holla further
contended that Section 164(2)(a) of the Act has a
prospective operation and any period prior to
01.04.2014 cannot be reckoned for the purpose of
determining three continuous years, when there is
non-filing of annual returns. He submitted that this
Court may interpret Section 164(2)(a) of the Act in
such a manner so as to save it from the vice of
unconstitutionality. In support of his submissions, he
inter alia placed reliance on the following three
decisions namely:
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1. Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I and Another, [(2008) 14 SCC 151], (Shara India);
2. D.K.Yadav vs. J.M.A. Industries Limited, [(1993) 3 SCC 259], (D.K.Yadav).
29. Sri S.Vivekananda, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition No.55702
of 2017, 49062 of 2017 and other matters drew my
attention to the fact that the petitioner therein
resigned as director on 10.01.2013. That the Act
came into force with effect from 01.04.2014. Even
then the petitioner has been disqualified for a period
of five years from 01.11.2015 to 31.10.2020. That
the three continuous years of default under Section
164(2)(a) of the Act must be construed prospectively
and not include any period prior to 01.04.2014. The
said provision cannot have a retrospective
effect/operation. If so interpreted, there can be no
disqualification until the year 2017. But, in the instant
case, five years period of disqualification is even prior
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to that date by including a period as part of three
years prior to 01.04.2014 for reckoning three
continuous years. He submitted that the respondent
authorities have misunderstood the said provision and
therefore, this Court may interpret the same in its
proper perspective. Learned counsel also filed an
extract of the Law Commission Report to highlight on
the amendment made to the Act in the year 2015. He
contended that for a company, as well as a Limited
Liability Partnership (LLP), the DIN is common and
once it stands cancelled in respect of a company, it
also affects his position as a partner in an LLP. In
support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the
following judgments:
1. M/s.Mother Care (India) Limited (In Liquidation), Rep. by the Official Liquidator, Bangalore vs. Prof.Ramaswamy P.Aiyar, [ILR 2004 KAR 1081], (Mother Care (India) Ltd.);
2. Yenugu Krishna Murthy vs. Union of India and Another, [2018 (3) KLJ 619], (Yenugu Krishna Murthy).
- 378 -
30. Sri M.I.Arun, learned counsel appearing for
petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.44839 & 46210 of
2018 submitted that the constitutional validity of the
provisions have not been assailed in the aforesaid
petitions, but the disqualification of the director has
been challenged on two grounds: firstly, the three
financial years under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act
have to be considered with effect from 01.04.2014, on
which date the Act was enforced and therefore, no
period prior to that could be reckoned for computing
the three continuous financial years during which
there is non-filing of annual returns. If three years
are so reckoned, then it would be with effect from
01.04.2014 onwards. Therefore, the disqualification of
directors on 01.11.2016 is erroneous. The Department
has given a retrospective effect to the provision which
is impermissible. Secondly, he submitted that under
the provisions of the Act, there is extension of time
provided under Section 403 of the Act for filing of
annual returns and without considering the said period
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for extension to file the returns, the directors have
been visited with almost penal consequences of
disqualification. That the benefit of 270 days given for
filing annual returns provided under Section 403 of
the Act has not been taken into consideration. He
further submitted that prior to disqualification of a
director, no hearing has been provided and even a
representation made has not yet been considered.
Placing reliance on paragraph 25 of the judgment of
the Madras High Court, he submitted that the Writ
Petition Nos.44839 of 2018 and 46210 of 2018 may
be allowed.
31. Sri Uday Shankar, learned counsel
appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.52952 of
2017, 613 of 2018 and other cases also contended
that Section 164(2)(a) of the Act has been
implemented by the respondents with retrospective
effect which is unconstitutional. That under Section
274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act, the disqualification was
limited to a public company and it did not extend to a
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private company, that too it was with effect from
13.12.2000, though it had an express retrospective
effect from 01.04.1999. But, now Section 164(2)(a)
of the Act, without having any express intent, has
been given a retrospective effect or retrospective
operation by the respondent-authorities which is bad
in law.
32. He further compared Section 283 of the
1956 Act with Section 167 of the Act to contend that
under 1956 Act, a default under Section 274(1)(g) did
not result in vacating of office and that Section 283 of
the 1956 Act was restricted to a disqualification
affecting a particular director personally and not the
entire Board of Directors of a public company. He
contended that while Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956
Act was given a retrospective effect by expressly
stating so, Section 164(2)(a) of the Act has only a
prospective effect and cannot be construed as having
a retrospective operation having regard to the serious
consequences it entails.
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33. Learned counsel, Sri Uday Shankar
contended that the disqualification under Section
164(2)(a) of the Act being not personal to the director
but being vicarious in nature on account of the default
committed by the company, a remedy ought to have
been provided under the Act so that there could have
been an adjudicatory process, as the consequences of
disqualification are serious both under Section 164(2)
of the Act as well as by virtue of the proviso to Section
167(1)(a) of the Act. He contended that the
disqualification of a director being automatic or by
operation of law, the same is compounded by right to
hearing being conspicuous by its absence and
immediate vacating of office, by a director of a
defaulting company in all other companies. He
contended that proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act
is arbitrary inasmuch as vacating of office of director
in other companies has no nexus to the director
continuing in office of the defaulting company. Hence,
it is illegal and arbitrary. He drew my attention to the
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Report of the Companies Law Committee and also to
the counter or statement of objections filed by Union
of India and contended that the Company Law
Settlement Scheme and Amnesty Scheme envisage a
prospective operation of Section 164(2)(a) of the Act.
He relied upon the following decisions in support of his
submissions:
1. Govind Das and others vs. The Income Tax Officer and Others, [AIR 1977 SC 552] (Govind Das);
2. Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Vatika Township Private Limited, [(2014) 3 ITR 466 (SC)], (Vatika Township);
3. Jayam and Co. vs. Assistant Commissioner and Others, [AIR 2016 SC 4443], (Jayam).
34. Learned counsel, Sri C.K.Nanda Kumar,
appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.15616-
617 & 50103 of 2018 contended that the validity of
the proviso has been challenged in Writ Petition
No.50103 of 2018 but not in Writ Petition Nos.15616-
617 of 2018. He submitted that if the object of the
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proviso is to curtail a mischief, then the medicine is
worse than the disease. That merely because of a
default committed by a company, the director of such
a company cannot be tarnished with the same brush
vis-à-vis other companies wherein he is a director and
which are not in default. That the consequence of a
default under Section 164(2) of the Act is by a
legislative sword without there being any hearing,
which is illegal, as disqualification entails a serious
consequence for a director. He next submitted that
those directors who are disqualified with effect from
01.11.2016 up to 31.10.2021, have been so
disqualified for a period of five years by taking into
consideration three years being the material period of
non-filing of annual returns even prior to 01.04.2014
when the Act was not in force, which is not in
accordance with the settled principles of law as it
gives a retrospective operation to the provision which
is illegal.
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35. He further submitted that there are cases
where the names of the directors are not in the list of
disqualified directors, but they have been disqualified.
Learned counsel contended that the respondent
authorities have not applied the provision on an
uniform basis and the List is haphazard. Referring to
the meaning of the expression "disqualification", he
contended that it means an ineligibility and that
Sections 164 and 167 of the Act must be given an
interpretation which does not vitiate the fundamental
rights of directors under the Constitution and if a
harmonious interpretation cannot be given to save the
provisions from the vice of unconstitutionality, the
same would have to be struck down.
36. Smt. Gayathri Shridharan, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.24976
of 2018 also emphasized on the arguments of
retrospectivity vis-à-vis Section 164(2) of the Act and
contended that the principles of Article 20 of the
Constitution would apply by way of analogy.
- 385 -
Further in the absence of pre or post-decisional
hearing being provided under the Act in the context of
disqualification of a director, the provisions are
vitiated. In support of her submissions, she placed
reliance on Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of
India, [(1981) 2 SCC 664] (Swadeshi Cotton
Mills).
37. Sri Praveen Kumar, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition
No.52911/2017 contended that Section 164(2) of the
Act is not a reasonable restriction but in the nature of
a prohibition and it violates Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution as the career of a director is seriously
affected by Section 164(2) of the Act and that too, by
operation of law and without being given an
opportunity of being heard. Under Article 19(6) of the
Constitution, a reasonable restriction could be
imposed in the interest of general public, but in the
instant case, no such justification has been made out
by the respondents. That on account of the
- 386 -
consequences flowing from Section 164(2) of the Act,
it results in a total extinction of a right of a director,
which is in violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution. He submitted that there could have
been a less severe consequence under the Act and
that the provisions could be read down if not struck
down to save it from unconstitutionality. He relied on
the following judgments in support of his submissions:
1. Saghir Ahmad vs. State of U.P. and Others, [AIR 1954 SC 728], [Saghir Ahmad];
2. B.P. Sharma vs. Union of India & Others, [(2003) 7 SCC 309] [B.P.Sharma];
3. State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat and others, [(2005) 8 SCC 534], [Mirzapur Moti Kureshi];
Submissions of Respondents:
38. Sri Prabhuling K.Navadagi, learned
Additional Solicitor General appearing for Union of
India and other respondents at the outset drew my
attention to the Scheme of the Act revolving around
- 387 -
Sections 164(2) and 167 of the Act and made his
submissions with reference to the statement of
objections filed in the matter. He contended that the
Act was preceded by a Bill which was referred to a
Parliamentary Committee headed by Dr.J.J.Irani and
the Act has certain objects and features which have
been introduced for the first time with the object of
bringing about transparency in standard of corporate
governance in sync with international standards.
39. He submitted that Section 2(20) of the Act
defines a "Company" to mean a company incorporated
under the Act or under any previous company law.
That the expression "previous company law" is defined
under Section 2(67) of the Act which also includes the
1956 Act. That Section 164(2) of the Act refers to
filing of financial statements or annual returns. The
expression 'financial statement is defined in Section
2(40) of the Act while "annual return" is explained in
Section 92 of the Act. That an annual return gives an
encyclopediac information of the Company, while what
- 388 -
the financial statement should contain is delineated in
Section 129 of the Act.
40. He next submitted that Chapter XI of the
Act deals with the Appointment and Qualifications of
Directors. Section 152 deals with the appointment of
directors. Under Section 1(3) of the Act, it has been
indicated that various provisions of the Act would
come into force on different dates as may be
appointed and any reference in any provision to the
commencement of the Act shall be construed as a
reference to coming into force of that provision.
Sections 164 to 168 of the Act came into force on
01.04.2014 by issuance of a gazette notification in
that regard. That the Ministry of Corporate Affairs
identified 30,964 directors, who did not have the
eligibility to continue as directors as they were
disqualified. While Section 164(1) of the Act is in the
nature of a permanent disqualification, under Section
164(2) of the Act, it is only for a period of five years.
The genesis for the provision of Section 164(2) of the
- 389 -
Act lies in Section 274(1)(g) of 1956 Act which came
into force with effect from 13.12.2000. While Section
274(1)(g) of 1956 Act applied only to public
companies, Section 164 of the Act applies to both
public as well as private companies. There is a slight
difference between Section 274(1)(g) of 1956 of the
Act and Section 164(2) of the Act. That, Section
283(1) of 1956 Act was enforced from 28.12.1960,
but was not amended after the insertion of Section
274(1)(g) to the 1956 Act. Vacating of office of a
director on account of the disqualification due to a
default under Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act was
not contemplated under the 1956 Act. But under the
Act it is provided for in order to bring about strict
corporate governance and transparency.
41. Placing reliance on the interim order of the
Calcutta High Court in Nabendu Dutta vs. Arindam
Mukherjee and others, [2004 (121) Comp.Cases
150 (Cal)], [Nabendu Dutta], learned ASG
contended that Section 164(2)(a) of the Act does not
- 390 -
have a retrospective effect and it is prospective in
operation. That any person who intends to be a
director of a company with effect from 01.04.2014
must have possessed eligibility criteria on and from
that date. That the prescription of eligibility criteria
having regard to an antecedent period i.e., a period
prior to 01.04.2014 does not vitiate any provision of
law. He submitted that taking into consideration an
antecedent period, i.e., a period prior to coming into
force of the Act is permissible, when it comes to
construing the eligibility of a person to be appointed
as a director. In this regard, my attention was drawn
to the latter portion of Section 164(2) of the Act,
which prescribes the eligibility for reappointment of a
director of a defaulting company or of any other
company. That even under Section 274(1)(g) of the
1956 Act, such a provision existed. He submitted that
retrospectivity would impact a provision if the rights
acquired by a director are adversely affected
retrospectively, i.e., prior to 01.04.2014. That, no
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director has been disqualified for a period prior to
01.04.2014. That the disqualification is only after that
date. Therefore, any period prior to 01.04.2014 could
be taken into consideration in order to ascertain
whether a disqualification has been incurred under
Section 164(2) of the Act after its enforcement.
42. He further contended that no director has a
vested right to be continued as a director forever.
Such a right is not a fundamental right, it is only a
contractual right which can always be taken away by
statute. That the object of disqualifying a person as a
director of a company on account of circumstances
mentioned under Section 164 of the Act, is in order to
suppress the mischief and to bring in transparency in
corporate governance, which is necessary to protect
members of the general public. That Section 164(2)
of the Act is neither arbitrary nor its effect is
disproportionate and can never be stated to be
manifestly arbitrary. He submitted that the said
- 392 -
provision in no way violates Article 14 or Article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
43. Learned ASG further submitted that the
Condonation of Delay Scheme is not applicable to
companies which are struck off as per Section 248 of
the Act and that the petitioners could have availed the
benefit under the said Schemes at an appropriate
time. He emphasized that in today's world of
globalisation, strict corporate governance is the need
of the hour and it is necessary to have a provision
such as 164(2) in the Act. In this regard, he placed
reliance on the following decisions:
1. A.P.Dairy Development Corporation Federation vs. B.Narasimha Reddy, [(2011)9 SCC 286] (A.P.Dairy);
2. J.K. Industries Limited and Others vs. Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers, [(1996) 6 SCC 665], (J.K. Industries).
44. On the aspect of disproportionality,
learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the
- 393 -
object of the provision is to keep away directors of
defaulting companies from being reappointed as
directors in the same company or other companies.
He contended that if the said object and purpose is
not given its complete effect and meaning, then it
would be unviable. Placing reliance on Fertilizer
Corporation Kamgar Union (Reg.) vs. Union of
India, [(1981) 1 SCC 568], he contended that
holding the post of a director of a company is not
pursuant to any fundamental right. That it is a
statutory right or one arising under the Memorandum
of Association or Articles of Association of the
company and thus contractual. That Section 164(2)
of the Act is a reasonable restriction imposed in public
interest vide Article 19(6) of the Constitution. He
further contended that the disqualification being only
for a period of five years and not a permanent one the
provision is not vitiated as being disproportionate.
That the disqualification does not occur on account of
the non-filing of annual returns in a single year or for
- 394 -
that matter for two consecutive years. That
disqualification visits the director of a defaulting
company only after three years i.e., on the third
consecutive year of non-filing. That even if a director
is disqualified to be reappointed as a director or has to
vacate his office, it does not prevent him from
continuing as a share holder of a company. Hence,
there is no unreasonableness or arbitrariness in the
provision. He further submitted that the principles of
natural justice do not apply when the consequences
are on account of operation of law and that there is no
vested right in a person to be a director of a company.
45. Learned ASG referred to A.P.Dairy
Development Corporation Federation Vs.
B.Narasimha Reddy, (2011) 9 SCC 286
(A.P.Dairy) and submitted that even when there is
freedom of association under Article 19(1)(c) of the
Constitution, there is scope for regulation and
reasonable restriction under Article 19(4) of the
Constitution. That the right to form an association is
- 395 -
distinct from right as to running of its business by that
association. That once a co-operative society is
formed and registered, rights of the society and of its
members stand abridged by provisions of the Act
under which it is registered and activities of the
society are controlled by statute. There cannot be any
objection to the statutory interference with their
composition or functioning merely on the ground of
contravention of individual's rights to freedom to form
association be statutory functionaries.
46. Concluding his arguments, by placing
reliance on certain citations, learned Additional
Solicitor General reiterated that the Act has been
made with a view to bring about economic reforms in
light of globalisation and privatization of the economy
and for probity and transparency in corporate affairs.
In the circumstances, he submitted that several
enactments have been brought about recently such as
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and
amendments to Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
- 396 -
Income Tax Act, 1961 and enactment of Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to achieve transparency
in the economy, particularly in the field of corporate
governance. Learned Addl. Solicitor General
contended that this Court may hold the provisions to
be constitutional and dismiss all the writ petitions.
Reply arguments by petitioners:
47. By way of reply, Dr.Sondhi contended that,
in the recently delivered judgment of Gujarat High
Court is in the context of Section 248 of the Act, if a
company is struck off under Section 248 of the Act,
whether Section 164(2) of the Act would apply is a
moot point which arose for consideration in those
cases. That if a company is struck off, it would not
entail a disqualification of the directors of such a
company. That subsequent to the disqualification of
directors, some of whom are petitioners before this
Court, amendment has been effected to Section 167
of the Act in May 2018. That the amendment has been
enforced with retrospective effect which is bad in law.
- 397 -
That vacating of office in companies other than
defaulting company is with retrospective effect from
1st November 2016 when disqualification occurred, but
amendment has been enforced from May 2018. He
contended that as the DIN is struck off, the
Condonation Scheme also does not apply. That the
judgment of the Calcutta High Court cannot be a
precedent as it only expresses a prima facie view at
an interlocutory stage and it is not a final order.
48. Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, learned senior
counsel contended that the expression "he incurs"
under Section 167(1)(a) of the Act refers to a
disqualification arising only under Section 164(1) of
the Act. That the proviso cannot enlarge the scope of
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act so as to incorporate
something new into the main provision. That vacating
of office in companies other than the defaulting
company by a director of a defaulting company was
originally not envisaged under Section 167(1)(a) of
the Act, but it is included by way of a proviso inserted
- 398 -
by way of Amendment Act, 2017 enforced from 07th
May 2018. Since Section 164(1) of the Act concerns a
permanent disqualification, Section 167(1)(a) of the
Act, which deals with vacating of office is also to be
read in that context i.e., incurring a permanent
disqualification. That Section 164(2) of the Act deals
with only a temporary disqualification for a period of
five years and the same does not envisage vacating of
office in all companies other than the defaulting
company under Section 167(1)(a) of the Act.
Therefore, Section 167(1) of the Act does not take
within its ambit Section 164(2) of the Act. If the
proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act is to be read
as if Section 164(2) of the Act is also envisaged under
it, then the same is disproportionate to the object
sought to be achieved as the repercussions are
disastrous and therefore, also arbitrary in nature.
That even as per the proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of
the Act, a director in a defaulting company does not
vacate his office. But, such a director would vacate
- 399 -
his office in all other companies, although there may
be no default in those companies. The same has no
nexus to the object sought to be achieved.
49. Rebutting the arguments of learned ASG,
Sri Dhyan Chinnappa contended that events that have
occurred even prior to the enforcement of the Act
cannot be the basis for incurring a disability. In this
regard, he placed reliance on the judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Vatika
Township Privated Limited, [(2015) 1 SCC 1]. He
also drew my attention to Section 129(1) & (2) of the
Act to contend that it begins with a non-obstante
clause. The same deals with independent directors
and non-executive directors who are not promoters or
not managerial persons of a company. Such persons
cannot be disqualified under Section 164(2) of the
Act.
- 400 -
50. Learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla in
his reply reiterated that it is necessary to have at least
a post-decisional hearing if not a pre-decisional
hearing before disqualifying a director. That the
extended period to file annual report must be taken
into consideration and that Section 164(2)(a) of the
Act must be given a prospective operation.
51. Sri V.G.Prashanth, learned counsel
submitted that Section 167(1) of the Act uses the
expression "incurs any of the disqualifications". That
the expression "incur" cannot be by operation of law.
"To incur" means to bring on oneself which is only
referable to Section 164(1) of the Act and does not
extend to Section 164(2) of the Act thereof.
52. Sri C.K.Nanda Kumar submitted, with
regard to challenge made to the validity of proviso to
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act are, there is no response
by the Union of India or any other respondent.
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53. Smt. Gayathri Shridharan submitted that
the deactivation of DIN is contrary to proviso to
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, as a disqualified director
continues to be a director of the defaulting company.
Therefore, DIN cannot be cancelled, as compliances
under the Act becomes impossible. That there is no
provision for deactivation of the DIN nevertheless it
has been done by the respondent authorities, which is
contrary to the provisions of the Act. She relied upon
Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. and another vs. State
of Gurjarat and Another, [(1975) 1 SCC 199],
(Godhra Electricity) and J.S.Yadav vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and another, [(2011) 6 SCC 570],
(J.S.Yadav), in support of her submissions that the
contractual rights of a director are violated on account
of the implementation of Section 164(2) of the Act
and proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act. She also
contended that Section 164(2)(a) of the Act uses the
expression "has been" and not "had been" and
therefore, the provisions of the Act must be
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accordingly interpreted and therefore, past directors
who are not directors during the three years cannot be
visited with any disqualification.
54. Sri Praveen Kumar Hiremath, learned
counsel submitted that 30,964 directors have been
disqualified throughout the country. The adverse
impaction and effect ought to be appreciated. To
disqualify directors in such a mass scale adversely
affects the economy both horizontally and vertically
and the financial or commercial implication of such a
decision must be borne in mind. The cascading effect
of such directors vacating their offices in all other
companies other than the defaulting company has to
be understood while interpreting the provisions. In
this regard, he drew my attention to Shivashakti
Sugars Limited vs. Shree Renuka Sugar Limited
and others, [(2017) 7 SCC 729], (Shivashakti
Sugars Ltd.). He submitted that the expression "is"
or "has been" in Section 164(2) of the Act is in
present continuous tense, as opposed to "had been"
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which is a past continuous tense. He submitted that
the consequences envisaged under Section 164(2) of
the Act vis-à-vis director of a defaulting company has
to be restricted to that provision only and it cannot be
extended to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act resulting in
vacating of office.
55. Sri Raghuram Cadambi, learned counsel
appearing for some petitioners along with Sri
C.K.Nandakumar assisted this Court by placing on
record the scheme of disqualification in United
Kingdom, Singapore and Australia. He submitted that
in the instant case, it is by operation of law, but in
those countries, it is mainly due to intervention of the
Court.
Part - 6
Points for consideration:
56. Having heard learned senior counsel and
other counsel for the petitioners, learned Additional
Solicitor General and other counsel for Union of India
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and other respondents, the following points would
arise for my consideration:
(1) Whether Section 164(2) (a) of the Act is ultra vires Articles 14 and/or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution being manifestly arbitrary or on the principle of proportionality?
(2) Whether Section 164(2)(a) of the Act is in violation of principles of natural justice and hence ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution as it does not envisage any hearing prior to disqualification or post-disqualification?
(3) Whether Section 164(2)(a) of the Act has retrospective operation and therefore, is unreasonable and/or arbitrary as per Article 14 of the Constitution?
(4) Whether there has been any illegal exercise of power by the concerned respondent-authority in publishing the List of Directors, including the names of petitioners as disqualified directors, under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act?
(5) Whether Section 167(1)(a) of the Act is ultra vires Article 14 and/or Article
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19(1)(g) of the Constitution as being manifestly arbitrary?
(6) Whether proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act is ultra vires Articles 14 and/or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as being manifestly arbitrary?
(7) What order?
57. The aforesaid points shall be considered
and answered in seriatim.
Part - 7
Preliminary Aspects of the Matter:
58. It is not in dispute that the petitioners in
these writ petitions were all holding the position of
directors either in public limited companies or in
private limited companies or both, as the case may
be, and are all aggrieved by being disqualified by
operation of Section 164(2)(a) of the Act for a period
of five years, the details of which are mentioned in the
table above. It is also not in dispute that in some of
the writ petitions, orders have also been passed under
Section 248 of the Act and proceedings may/may not
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have been initiated under Section 252 of the said Act
in certain cases. Further, on account of the
amendment made to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act by
insertion of the proviso, the petitioner/Directors by
operation of law have to vacate their office as
directors in all companies other than the companies
which have defaulted under Section 164(2)(a) of the
Act. That this Court has issued interim stay of the
disqualification of the petitioners as directors of their
respective companies.
Background to the enactment of the Companies Act, 2013:
59. The Companies Act, 1956 provided the
legal regime for corporate governance in India.
During the course of time, several amendments were
made to the Act. They were on the recommendation
of the Sachar Committee and Eradi Committee. Many
countries worldwide have made reviews and revisions
of their respective Companies Act. With the
emergence of globalization, liberalization and
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privatization in India the need was felt to review
Companies Act, 1956 in a comprehensive manner and
to simplify corporate laws to facilitate faster economic
growth. A need was felt to encourage good corporate
governance and enable protection of the interests of
the investors and other stakeholders. The
Government of India initiated comprehensive revision
of the Companies Act, 1956 by having a consultative
process and for making way for emergence of new
ideas and appropriate legislative proposals to meet
India's growing economy in the years to come. The
Government of India set up the Expert Committee
under the Chairmanship of Dr.J.J.Irani, Director, Tata
Sons on 02.12.2004 seeking advice on the proposed
revisions to the Companies Act, 1956, bearing in mind
the changes taking place in the international scenario
so as to provide adequate flexibility for timely
evolution of new arrangements in response to the
requirements of the ever-changing and dynamic
business models. The Expert Committee consisted of
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thirteen members and six special invitees drawn from
various disciplines and fields. During the course of its
deliberations it inter alia considered the scope and
coverage of the Companies Act, 1956, the adaptation
to be made to changed circumstances; growth of the
corporation regulatory framework; regulatory overlap;
framework for small enterprises and institutional
structure. The Expert Committee submitted its report
on Company Law on 31.05.2005 to the Hon'ble
Minister for Company Affairs. It is noted that the Act
has incorporated recommendations made by various
Committees and after a rigorous review process in the
Parliament, after the Bill was first tabled in the year
2009, the Parliamentary Standing Committee of
Finance examined the Bill twice, during which,
extensive public consultations were also held. The
notifications of the provisions of the Companies Act,
2013 has been made in a phased manner with 283 out
of 470 provisions being enforced on 01.04.2014. The
Act has introduced significant changes in the Company
- 409 -
law in India, especially in relation to the
accountability, disclosure, investors protection and
corporate governance.
60. Sri Raghuram Cadambi, learned senior
counsel appearing for Sri C.K.Nandakumar, has drawn
my attention to the Company Directors
Disqualification Act, 1986 of the United Kingdom
which is an Act to consolidate certain enactments
relating to the disqualification of persons from being
directors of companies, and from being otherwise
concerned with a company's affairs. The Statutes of
the Republic of Singapore Companies Act has also
been cited with reference to Section 165 thereof.
Corporations Act, 2001 of Australia has also been
referred to on the aspect of disqualification of
directors wherein, under certain circumstances, there
is automatic disqualification and in other
circumstances, the Court has power to disqualify and
that a person who is disqualified from managing
Corporations under Part 2D.6, may only be appointed
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as Director of the Company if the appointment is
made with permission granted by Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (ASIC) under Section
206F or leave granted by the Court under Section
206G thereof.
61. Before considering the contentious issues,
it would be useful to refer to certain provisions of the
Act concerning the Board of Directors of a company.
(a) Section 2(10) of the Act defines "Board of
Directors" or "Board" in relation to a company, to
mean a collective body of the directors of the
company. Chapter XI of the Act deals with
appointment and qualification of the directors.
Section 149 of the Act states that every company shall
have a Board of Directors consisting of individuals as
directors and shall have (a) a minimum of three
directors in the case of a public company, two
directors in the case of a private company, and one
director in the case of a One Person Company; and (b)
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a maximum of fifteen directors after passing a special
resolution. Further, proviso states that such clause or
clauses of companies as may be prescribed shall have
at least one woman director. An "independent
director" in relation to a company means (a) a director
other than a managing director or a whole time
director or a nominee director subject to qualifications
and conditions mentioned under sub-section (6) of
section 149 of the Act. For the purpose of Section
149 of the Act, nominee director is defined to mean a
director nominated by a financial institution in
pursuance of the provisions of any law for the time
being in force, or of any agreement, or appointed by
any Government, or any other person to represent its
interests. The term of office of independent director is
prescribed in sub-section 10 of Section 149 of the Act
and the liability of an independent director and a non-
executive director not being promoter or key
managerial personnel, with regard to any acts of
- 412 -
omission or commissions by a company is
circumscribed.
(b) Section 150 of the Act deals with
appointment of directors while Section 151 deals with
appointment of directors elected by small share
holders. Section 152(3) of the Act states that no
person shall be appointed as a director of a company
unless he has been allotted the Director Identification
Number (DIN) under Section 154 of the Act. Sub-
section 6 of Section 152 of the Act states that unless
the articles provide for the retirement of all directors
at every annual general meeting, not less than two-
thirds of the total number of directors of a public
company shall (i) be persons whose period of office is
liable to determination by retirement of directors by
rotation; and (ii) save as otherwise expressly provided
in this Act, be appointed by the company in general
meeting. The remaining directors in the case of any
such company shall, in default of, and subject to any
regulations in the articles of the company, also be
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appointed by the company in general meeting. After
the first annual general meeting of a public company
held after the date of the general meeting at which
the first directors are appointed in accordance with
clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (6) of Section 152
of the Act and at every subsequent annual general
meeting, one-third of such of the directors of the time
being are liable to retire by rotation, or if their number
is neither three nor a multiple of three, then, the
number nearest to one-third, shall retire from office.
At the annual general meeting at which a director
retires as aforesaid, the company may fill up a
vacancy by appointing the retiring director or some
other person thereto.
(c) Section 153 of the Act states that every
individual intending to be appointed as a director of
the Company shall make an application for allotment
of Director Identification Number (DIN) to the Central
Government in such form and manner and along with
such fees as may be prescribed. The Central
- 414 -
Government shall within one month from the receipt
of the application under section 153 of the Act, allot a
DIN to an applicant in such manner as may be
prescribed (Section 154). No individual, who has
already been allotted a DIN under Section 154 of the
Act, shall apply for, obtain or possess another DIN
(Section 155). Every existing director shall, within
one month of the receipt of DIN from the Central
Government, intimate his DIN to the company or all
companies wherein he is a director (Section 156).
Every company shall, within fifteen days of the receipt
of intimation under Section 156, furnish the DIN of all
its directors to the Registrar or any other officer or
authority as may be specified by the Central
Government with such fees as may be prescribed and
on failure to do so, shall be liable for consequences
stipulated under Section 157(2) of the Act. The
punishment for contravention of Sections 152, 155,
156 is prescribed in Section 159 of the Act.
- 415 -
(d) Section 160 of the Act deals with right of
persons other than the retiring directors to stand for
directorship, while Section 161 deals with appointment
of additional director, alternate director and nominee
director. The manner of appointment of directors is
prescribed in Section 162 of the Act, while the option
to adopt principle of proportional representation for
appointment of directors is prescribed in Section 163
of the Act. The duty of directors is prescribed in
Section 166 of the Act, while resignation of directors
and removal of directors are prescribed in Section 168
and 169 respectively of the Act. The maintenance of
registers containing the particulars of its directors and
key managerial personnel as may be prescribed is
contemplated in Section 170 of the Act.
Part - 8
Re. Point No.1:
"Whether Section 164(2)(a) of the Act is ultra vires Articles 14 and/or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution being manifestly arbitrary or on the principle of proportionality?"
- 416 -
62. The rival arguments on this point have
been narrated above.
63. A comparison of Section 274(1)(g) of the
1956 Act with Section 164(2) of the Act has already
been made. To briefly revisit the same for the
purpose of answering point No.1, it is noted that
Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act was inserted by
virtue of an amendment made on 13.12.2000, but
having effect from 01.04.1999. The said sub-clause
concerned a director of a public company only. It did
not disqualify a director of any private company,
whereas Section 164(2) of the Act applies to a director
of a company which includes a private company as
well which is for the first time. Thus, Section 164(2)
applies to a private company also. Since Section
274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act was inserted by way of an
amendment with effect from 13.12.2000 a
disqualification due to non-filing of annual accounts
and annual returns for any continuous three financial
- 417 -
years was reckoned on and after the 01st day of April,
1999 as stated in the provision itself. Hence, the
provision had a retrospective operation by an express
intention. But, under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, the
phraseology is non-filing of financial statements or
annual returns for any continuous period of three
financial years. The phrase "continuous period of
three financial years" has not been defined under the
Act. One of the contentions raised by the petitioners
is, the said expression would not include any period
prior to the enforcement of the Act i.e., prior to
01.04.2014 i.e., if the financial statements or annual
returns had not been filed during any period prior to
01.04.2014, the said period cannot be considered
within the scope of the expression "any continuous
period of three financial years".
64. Another aspect of the matter is the use of
the expression "such person is already a director of a
public company" in Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act,
but under Section 164(2) of the Act, the expression is
- 418 -
"no person who is or has been a director of a
company". In other words, a distinction was sought
to be made by petitioners' counsel by contending that
under Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act, the default
arose when the person "is" a director of a public
company i.e., holding the position of a director, but
under Section 164(2) of the Act, a person "who has
been" a director of the company is also visited with
the disqualification on account of the default of the
company under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section
(2) of Section 164 of the Act. The contention was that
the expression would also take within its scope and
ambit a past director of a company who has ceased to
be a director even prior to the occurrence of the
default and whether such a past director could also be
visited with the consequences under Sections
164(2)(a) and 167(1)(a) of the Act.
65. The expression "has been" was debated
upon and it was contended that the same must be
given a limited meaning by referring to the three
- 419 -
financial years during which the financial statements
or annual returns are not filed i.e., material period of
three years which leads to a disqualification of a
director of a company. In other words, the contention
was that the expression "has been" cannot extend to a
person who was a director of a defaulting company
prior to the three material years or to a director who
has joined the company subsequent to the three
material years leading to the default and has since
ceased to be a director.
66. Further, it was submitted that both under
Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act as well as under
Section 164(2) of the Act, the disqualification vis-à-vis
re-appointment as a director of any other company for
a period of five years is identical. But, under Section
164(2) of the Act, the disqualification also extends to
re-appointment as a director of a company which has
defaulted for a period of five years. In other words,
all the directors of a defaulting company would have
- 420 -
to be changed once the default occurs and their term
ends.
67. On a consideration of the aforesaid
arguments, it is observed that Section 274(1)(g) of
the 1956 Act is a precursor to Section 164(2) of the
Act. The question to be considered is, whether,
Section 164(2) of the Act is manifestly arbitrary as it
is contended that it is in violation of Article 14 and/or
Article 19 of the Constitution. In this regard, it is
necessary to emphasize at the outset that the vires of
Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act was upheld by the
two Division Benches of two High Courts, namely by
the Bombay High Court in the case of Snowcem
India Limited vs. Union of India, [(2005) 124
Comp.Cases 161 Bom.] (Snowcem India Limited)
and Gujarat High Court in Sourashtra Cement
Limited and Another vs. Union of India (UOI),
[(2007)2 GLR 1384] (Sourashtra Cement
Limited).
- 421 -
68. In fact, the constitutional validity of Section
274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act was assailed before the
Bombay High Court in Snowcem India Limited. The
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court on noting
the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the
insertion of the said provision to the Act observed that
the amendment has been incorporated for better
corporate governance and the protection of the
investment of the depositors. That such a provision
would ensure transparency in the functioning of the
Company and would lead to the protection of the
investment of the investors and better corporate
governance. That Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act
does not violate Fundamental Rights guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, neither
does it violate the rules of natural justice. That
Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act does not penalize
the Company; it is only the directors that are
rendered incapable of functioning as directors for a
certain period. According to Bombay High Court, the
- 422 -
amendment has been carried out primarily to ensure
that directors of the company should discharge their
obligations properly. They should be more vigilant and
careful and ensure that investors do not lose their
lifetime savings. That it is desirable for the public to
know the names of some defaulting directors of the
other companies, so that they would be wary of such
persons who are directors of such companies. This can
also be justified in the larger public interest. The
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court also
observed that the amendment became absolutely
imperative to protect large number of investors,
particularly small and poor investors, who had
invested their lifetime savings in companies, and in a
majority of cases, neither the principal amount nor
interest was repaid. In the circumstances, it was held
that Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act did not violate
the fundamental rights or any other right of the
petitioners therein in any manner and the petition was
dismissed as being devoid of merit.
- 423 -
69. Similarly, in Sourashtra Cement Limited,
a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court considered
a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section
274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act as amended by the
Companies (Amendment) Act, 2000 with effect from
13.12.2000. The Gujarat High Court noted that the
purpose of Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act was to
disqualify certain persons from directorship in public
companies so as to protect the investors from
mismanagement, ensure compliance in filing annual
accounts and annual returns. The purpose of the said
provision was not to punish those who were
disqualified but to save the community from
consequences of mismanagement and also to
prescribe standards of corporate managership and to
protect the public against future conduct by persons
whose past record as directors had shown a great
danger to creditors and others. Thus, the object of
insertion of Clause (g) to Section 274(1) of the 1956
Act, according to the Gujarat High Court, was to
- 424 -
ensure proper governance of companies, transparency
in working of companies and also ensure more
effective enforcement. The said judgment enumerated
the intention and purpose of the said provision in the
following terms:
(i) disqualifying errant directors;
(ii) protecting the investors from mismanagement;
(iii) ensuring compliance and filing of annual accounts and annual returns which are the means of disclosure to all stakeholders;
(iv) increasing compliance rate of filing statutory documents; and
(v) infusing good corporate governance in the regulations of corporate affairs and to protect the interest of the investors.
70. Referring to the judgment of the Bombay
High Court in Snowcem India Limited, wherein the
vires of the said Section of the said clause was upheld,
it was observed as under:
"(1) The Statement of Objects and Reasons for enactment of Section 274(1)(g) is for better corporate governance and protection of investment of the depositors. Such amendment would ensure transparency in the functioning of the company and would lead to the
- 425 -
protection of investment and investors for better corporate governance.
According to the wisdom of the legislature, this can be achieved by enhancing penalty/punishment for contribution so as to ensure better compliance with the provision of the Act; (2) Article 21 of the Constitution is not at all attracted;
(3) Section 274(1)(g) of the Act does not violate the Directors' fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The amendment does not debar the petitioners from carrying on any business, trade or occupation, only that the person have been rendered incapable of becoming Directors in other companies and the said amendment became imperative in view of a large number of companies becoming defaulters.
(4) The said amendment does not violate the rules of natural justice;
(5) Section 274(1)(g) does not penalize the Company. It is only the Directors who are rendered incapable of functioning as Directors for certain period. The amendment has been carried out primarily to ensure that Directors of the Company discharge their obligation properly. They should be more vigilant and careful and ensure that investors do not lose their life time savings.
(6) Once a person becomes a Director, it is his primary duty to ensure that there is proper governance and investors' money is protected.
(7) The amendment is not violative of Article
14. (8) Amendment to Section 274(1)(g) has been made primarily in larger public
- 426 -
interest to protect large number of investors, particularly small and poor investors who had invested their life time savings with these companies and in majority of the case neither principal amount nor interest is paid. "
71. The Gujarat High Court nevertheless
considered additional submissions made and upheld the
constitutional validity of the said provision by holding
that it has been enacted in larger public interest. While
saying so, it observed that the object of the provision
was that the whole Board of Directors may act vigilantly
and that the affairs of the company are managed in such
manner that ultimately the deposits are repaid and/or
debentures are redeemed. Otherwise, no company
would try to improve their affairs and ultimately try to
protect the interest of the investors. That the object of
the provision is not to punish those who are so
disqualified only but to save the community from the
consequences of mismanagement and to protect the
public against future conduct of persons whose past
record as directors shows them to be a danger to
creditors and others.
- 427 -
72. The reasoning in the aforesaid judgments
could be squarely applied to Section 164(2) of the Act.
Though the aforesaid judgments have been delivered
vis-à-vis public companies, the ratio would squarely
apply even with regard to the private companies. It is
emphasized that under the Act, the Parliament has not
made any distinction between the public companies and
private companies vis-à-vis disqualification. That under
the 1956 Act, there was no disqualification of directors
of private companies. But, in order to achieve the
objects of the Act and to remove the mischief, the
Parliament has treated both public companies as well as
private companies on par. Financial disclosure
requirements supply the relevant data about the
functioning of the companies by way of information to
the general public. Secondly, it would enhance
confidence in the corporate sector and have
transparency in corporate enterprises. On a comparison
of the provisions, it is noted that under Section 164(2)
of the Act, while the director of a company which is in
default shall not be eligible to be re-appointed as a
- 428 -
director of the defaulting company and be appointed in
any other company for a period of five years from the
date of which the said company fails to do so, under
Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act, the director of a
defaulting company could be re-appointed as a director
of such a company, but not in any other company. Thus,
under the Act he cannot be re-appointed as a director of
even the defaulting company as well as any other
company for a period of five years from the date on
which the defaulting company has failed to comply with
Section 164(2) of the Act. It must be emphasized that
the consequences stipulated in Section 164(2) of the Act
applies not only to Clause (a) but also to Clause(b)
thereof.
73. Although, in almost all the present cases,
the reason for disqualification is under Section
164(2)(a) of the Act, and in some cases under
Section 248 of the Act (which aspect shall be dealt
with separately) one cannot lose sight of the fact that
the very same consequences of disqualification applies
even to a situation arising under Section 164(2)(b) of
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the Act. The reasons as to why a two-fold
consequence has been stipulated under section 164(2)
of the Act are for the very reasons already stated by
the Bombay High Court as well as Gujarat High Court.
They are in order to protect investors from
mismanagement, infuse good corporate governance,
regulation of corporate affairs and to protect the
interest of investors and ensure compliance in filing
the annual accounts and annual returns, which are a
means of disclosure to all stock-holders.
74. In this regard, what is to be noted is the
fact that the disqualification does not visit the director
of a defaulting company when the financial statement
or annual returns are not filed in the very first year
itself. It is only when, for a continuous period of three
financial years, when the company does not file
annual statements or annual returns that the
disqualification impacts its director. Similarly, under
Section 164(2)(b) of the Act, the reason for
disqualification being more serious, the disqualification
- 430 -
would visit when there is failure to repay the deposits
or redeem any debentures for a period continuous for
one year or more. Under Section 274(1)(g) of the
1956 Act, the disqualification was only with regard to
a director of a defaulting company being ineligible to
be appointed in any other company for a period of five
years from the date on which the company defaults,
but, under the Act, in addition, a director is ineligible
to be re-appointed as a director of the defaulting
company also.
75. Despite the aforesaid discussion, the vires
of Section 164(2) of the Act shall be considered in
light of submissions made by learned counsel for the
respective parties.
76. Petitioners have contended that Section
164(2)(a) of the Act is ultra vires Article 14 and/or
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as it is manifestly
arbitrary. Secondly, they have also argued that the
- 431 -
provision would have to be struck down on the
principles of proportionality.
77. Can it be held that Section 164(2)(a)
provision is manifestly arbitrary having regard to the
objects and reasons for engrafting Section 274(1)(g)
of the 1956 Act, which has been upheld by two High
Courts and the Objects and Reasons for the present
enactment and bearing in mind the recommendations
made by the Parliamentary Committee headed by
Dr.J.J.Irani.
78. Having noted the above, the specific
contentions of learned senior and other counsel and
learned ASG shall now be considered in light of the
case law cited at the Bar.
79. Learned counsel, Sri Dhyan Chinnappa
placed reliance on a recent judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Shayara Bano vs.
Union of India & others (Ministry of Women and
Child Development Secretary and Others)
- 432 -
[(2017)9 SCC 1] (Shayara Bano), to contend that
Section 164(2)(a) of the Act is manifestly arbitrary.
In the said case, the question was, whether divorce by
Triple Talaq had any legal sanctity. The said question
was considered in the context of Article 14 of the
Constitution, having as its facets, equality of status
and opportunity. Analysing Article 14 of the
Constitution, it was observed that it has both a
negative as well as a positive content: equality before
law has a negative content, but equal protection of
law has a positive content.
80. That the arbitrariness doctrine contained in
Article 14 would apply to negate legislation,
subordinate legislation and executive action, vide
E.P.Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(1974)4
SCC 3] (E.P.Royappa). The following decisions were
also referred to in the above context. In Ramana
Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport
Authority of India, [(1979) 3 SCC 489], (Ramana
Dayaram), it was observed that wherever there is
- 433 -
arbitrariness in State action, whether it be of the
legislature or of the executive or of an authority under
Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into action
and strikes down such State action. The concept of
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the
entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread
which runs through the whole fabric of the
Constitution. In Mithu vs. State of Punjab,
[(1983)2 SCC 277] (Mithu), a Constitution Bench
of the Supreme Court struck down Section 303 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860, by which a mandatory
sentence of death was imposed on life convicts who
commit murder in jail. In Sunil Batra vs. Delhi
Administration, [(1978)4 SCC 494] (Sunil
Batra), Section 30(2) of the Prisoners Act was read
down when a challenge was made regarding a
prisoner under sentence of death being confined in a
cell apart from all other prisoners, (under solitary
confinement). Thus, in the aforesaid cases, Article 14
was referred to in the context of constitutional
- 434 -
invalidity of statutory law as the same could be struck
down if found to be arbitrary. In Indian Express
News Papers (Bombay) (Pvt.) Limited vs. Union
of India, [(1985) 1 SCC 641] (Indian Express
News Papers), it was held that the test of manifest
arbitrariness would apply to invalidate a legislation as
well as subordinate legislation under Article 14 of the
Constitution.
81. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
arbitrariness in legislation is also a facet of
unreasonableness in Article 19(2) to (6) of the
Constitution and that arbitrariness could be used in
the aforesaid sense to strike down a legislation under
Article 14 as well. That legislation which arbitrarily or
excessively invade the fundamental rights could not
be said to contain the quality of reasonableness unless
it struck a proper balance between the rights
guaranteed and the control permissible under Articles
19(2) to (6) of the Constitution, though in State of
- 435 -
A.P. vs. McDowell and Co., [(1996) 3 SCC 709]
(McDowell), the aforesaid proposition was doubted
and not quite accepted. In Mardia Chemicals
Limited vs. Union of India, [(2004) 4 SCC 311]
(Mardia Chemicals Limited), sub-section(1) of
Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest
Act, 2002 was struck down as being unreasonable,
arbitrary and being violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Similarly, in State of Tamil Nadu vs.
K.Shyam Sunder, [(2011) 8 SCC 737] and
A.P.Dairy (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
reiterated that a legislation can be struck down on the
ground that it is arbitrary and therefore, violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution.
82. In Shayara Bano, it was observed that the
thread of reasonableness runs through the entire
fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution. What
is manifestly arbitrary is unreasonable and being
contrary to Rule of Law, would violate Article 14. In
- 436 -
the context of challenge being made to a legislation or
a provision of an Act, what is relevant is the law being
disproportionate, excessive or otherwise being
manifestly unreasonable.
83. Thus, according to the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, if a constitutional infirmity is found on the
touchstone of Article 14 the legislation is "manifestly
arbitrary"; i.e., when it is not fair, nor reasonable,
discriminatory, not transparent, capricious, biased,
with favoritism or nepotism and not in pursuit of
promotion of healthy competition and equitable
treatment. Positively speaking, it should conform to
norms which are rational, informed with reason and
guided by public interest. At the same time, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has cautioned that a Court
considering the validity of a legislation must be
mindful that a legislation does not become
unconstitutional merely because there is another view
or because there is another method which may be
considered to be as good or even more effective, like
- 437 -
any issue of social, or even economic policy. That the
Courts cannot substitute their views on what the
policy is, vide Dr.Subramanian Swamy vs.
Director, Central Bureau of Investigation,
[(2005) 2 SCC 317] (Dr.Subramanian Swamy).
84. Manifest arbitrariness, according to the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, must be something done by
the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without
adequate determining principle. Also, when something
is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation
would be manifestly arbitrary. Applying the aforesaid
test, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shayara Bano, by
a majority held that Triple Talaq being an incident and
irrevocable form of divorce, was manifestly arbitrary
as the marital tie could not be broken capriciously and
whimsically by a Muslim man, without any attempt at
reconciliation so as to save it. Hence, Triple Talaq was
said to be violative of the fundamental right contained
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and struck
down as being void. In the case of Shreya Singal
- 438 -
vs. Union of India, [(2018) 5 SCC 1] (Shreya
Singal), Section 66A of the Information Technology
Act, 2000 was struck down inter alia, on the ground of
uncertainty and vagueness and as being violative of
Article 19(1)(a) and not saved under Article 19(2) of
the Constitution.
85. On considering the aforesaid decisions, it
would be useful to recall that the 1956 Act was
enacted in order to consolidate and amend the law
relating to companies and certain other associations.
The said law was subjected to several amendments.
If the developments of the Indian economy is viewed
historically, it is observed that the year 1991 was a
water-shed year when a conscious decision was taken
by the Government of India to introduce liberalization,
privatization and globalisation in the economy.
Therefore, a need was felt for making several
amendments subsequent to the year 1991 to the 1956
Act with the changing national economic environment
and strides made in the international economic
- 439 -
scenario. For acceleration and expansion of the
national economy, Companies Bill, 2009 was
introduced in the Parliament. Several suggestions
were received and amendments were sought.
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance also
made numerous recommendations. Suggestions of
various stakeholders were considered. The Companies
Bill 2009 was withdrawn and after incorporating the
recommendations of the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Finance and suggestions of all
stakeholders, the Companies Bill, 2012 was introduced
in the Parliament. The said Bill was revised and
Companies Bill, 2011 incorporated several
amendments including enhanced accountability on the
part of the companies, which touched upon corporate
social responsibility, additional disclosure norms, audit
accountability, protection of minority shareholders,
and investors protection. National Company Law
Tribunal was also established. The Companies Bill was
thereafter passed by both Houses of the Parliament
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and received Presidential assent on 29.08.2013 and it
became the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013). The
Central Government by Notification in the Official
Gazette appointed different dates for enforcement of
various provisions of the Act. Sections 164 to 168 of
the Act (both inclusive) have been enforced with effect
from 01.04.2014.
86. According to the Report of SEBI
Committee on Corporate Governance headed by Sri
N.R.Narayana Murthy submitted on 08.02.2003,
Corporate Governance is about ethical conduct in
business. Ethical leadership is good for business as
the organisation is seen to conduct its business in line
with the expectations of all stake-holders namely,
customers, employees, investors, vendor partners,
government and society. Corporate governance is
beyond the realm of law and stems from the culture
and mindset of management, and cannot be regulated
by legislation alone. What legislation can and should
do, is to lay down a common framework - the "form"
- 441 -
to ensure standards. The "substance" will ultimately
determine the credibility and integrity of the process.
Substance is inexorably linked to the mindset and
ethical standards of management. One of the best
corporate governance practices is for the management
to act as trustees of the share-holders at large and
prevent asymmetry benefits between various sections
of share-holders especially, between the owner-
managers and the rest of the share-holders.
87. In this regard, it is noted that in India in
the year 1998 Desirable Code of Corporate
Governance - a voluntary Code published by
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), and the first
formal regulatory framework for listed companies
specifically for Corporate Governance, established by
the SEBI. This was on the recommendations of the
Kumarmangalam Birla Committee Report. According
to the latter report, which was submitted in February
2000, financial disclosure is a critical component of
effective corporate governance.
- 442 -
88. According to Dr.Umakanth Varottil,
National University of Singapore [B.A., LL.B (Hons.)
NLSIU, LL.M (Corporations) New York University School of Law,
Ph.D., National University of Singapore] "A Cautionary tale
of the transplant effect on Indian Corporate
Governance",
"The drive towards a more stringent corporate governance regime over the last decade can be attributed to two factors, viz., (i) the internationalization of Indian capital markets, and (ii) cross-listings by Indian companies. Beginning with the phenomenon of internationalization, a review of the pre-1991 era indicates that the capital markets were heavily regulated1, thereby impeding foreign investors from investing in the Indian markets. However, with the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991 and the consequent promotion of capital market activity by SEBI, a simplified process became available to Indian companies to access capital from the public2. Simultaneously, the foreign investment regime was relaxed thereby increasing the avenues available to foreign investors to participate in Indian capital markets3. These measures signify the objective of the Indian Government during the turn of the century to attract foreign capital so as to make its securities markets more competitive among emerging markets4.
- 443 -
In addition, Indian companies themselves found it essential to issue securities to investors in other countries to meet their capital needs. When Indian companies undertook public offerings of securities in India with listings on Indian stock exchanges, a significant portion of the investments came from offshore investors. Due to this phenomenon, Indian companies (at least those raising capital market finance) were persuaded to comply with corporate governance norms that most investors around the world understood in order for the securities offerings to be successfully marketed overseas5. Companies therefore had to depart from where they received investments. Since, a large portion of such foreign investment came from the developed world (primarily the U.S. and U.K.), it became convenient for companies to adopt standards with which investors from those countries were familiar." 1 All securities offerings to the public required the approval of the Controller of Capital Issues [hereinafter "CCI"], which effectively micro-managed offering including by reviewing the details such as price at which securities were to be offered rather than leaving those to the market forces to determine.], 2 The office of the CCI was abolished in 1992 by the Capital Issues (Control) Repeal Act, 1992. Furthermore, SEBI effected a series of capital market reforms in the late 1990s streamlining the public offering process. Significant measures include the introduction of the book-building process for price discovery, dematerialization of securities (and the consequent availability of scripless trading) and the use of "shelf prospectus". All these helped stimulate greater capital market activity in India. See, J.Armour & P.Lele, Law, Finance and Politics: The Case of India, 18-20 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No.107/2008, 2008) available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1116608.
- 444 -
3 Significant changes in the foreign investment regime include the enactment of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the availability of the automatic route for foreign investment in most sectors up to specified shareholding percentages. Government of India, Ministry of Industry, (Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion), Press Note No.2, 2000 Series). See also, R.Sachdev, Comparing the Legal Foundations of Foreign Investment in India and China: Law and the Rule of Law in the Indian Foreign Direct Investment Context, COLUM.BUS.L.Rev.167, 200-04 (2006). 4 See , Mazumdar, supra note 14, at 253. 5 See, R.Gupta, Reforms made and Reforms Needed in India's Capital Markets: Issues Facing U.S. Investors, 1650 PLI CORP.85 (2008)."
[Source: SCC Online: Page 9 of National Law School of India Review, Volume 21(1) (2009)]
He has further referred to SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley
Act) of U.S.A. and that, over the last decade, giant
strides have been taken by the Indian industry as well
as its securities regulator SEBI, to enhance measures
of corporate governance in India. These
developments have closely followed efforts in other
jurisdiction such as the U.K. (the Cadbury Committee
Report) and the U.S.A.(SOX). Globalisation and
Internationalisation of capital markets are said to be
the driving forces behind this phenomenon and that
- 445 -
the enhanced measures of corporate governance
would augur well for the Indian industry.
89. It would also be useful to extract the
relevant portions of the Report of Company Law
submitted by the Expert Committee on Company Law
headed by Dr. J.J.Irani:
"Vanishing companies 14.1 The Committee is seriously concerned at the phenomenon of companies that vanished after raising funds from the public, thereby cheating investors. This has resulted in a lack of credibility not only on the part of the companies but also of the institutional structure regulating such entities and enforcement agencies. We understand that the Central Government is now pursuing action against such companies through a coordinated mechanism involving both the Ministry of Company Affairs and SEBI. However, a lot requires to be done to prevent such phenomenon. We feel that such preventive action should begin with registration itself and should be sustained through a regime that requires regular and mandatory filing of statutory documents. With introduction of
- 446 -
electronic filing, this process would become convenient to companies as well as the stakeholders. Behaviour resulting in non-filing of documents or incorrect disclosures should be dealt with strictly.
14.2 Information provided at the time of registration should determine the addresses of the company as well as its directors. It should be the duty of the Company to intimate any change of address within a fixed time period.
14.3 There should also be a system of random scrutiny of filings of corporates to be carried out by the registration authorities with heavy penalties for the companies found inadequate in their disclosures and filings.
14.4 Inter agency coordination should be enabled to track down the persons behind such companies to bring them to book. Law should be amended to make them disgorge their ill- gotten gains by lifting the corporate veil.
x x x
Duties And Responsibilities Of Directors:
18.1 International practice (particularly in U.K.) recognizes a very wide spectrum of duties to be discharged by directors of a company. There is an obligation of obedience
- 447 -
to the constitution and decisions of the company lawfully taken under it, or under rules of law permitting such decisions to be taken, the duty of loyalty towards the company and, in good faith, to promote its success to the benefit of members as a whole, to exercise independence of judgment along with care, skill and diligence in exercise of duties, to disclose transactions involving conflict of interest and seek shareholders approval as relevant, not to exploit company assets or benefits from third parties for personal purposes, the duty of special care if a company is unable to pay its debts or is facing a likely prospect of an insolvent situation. The question is whether all such duties, and more, can be recognized in law.
18.2 The Committee is of the view that this aspect should be exposed to a thorough debate. The law may include certain duties for directors, with civil consequences to follow for non-performance. However, the law should provide only an inclusive, and not exhaustive list in view of the fact that no rule of universal application can be formulated as to the duties of the directors.
18.3 Certain basic duties should be spelt out in the Act itself such as,
- 448 -
(a) duty of care and diligence;
(b) Exercise of powers in good faith, i.e., discharge of duties in the best interest of the company, no improper use of position and information to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else;
(c) duty to have regard to the interest of the employees, etc.
Disqualification of Directors:
19.1 The conditions for disqualification of a director should be prescribed in the Act itself as they relate to the substantive law and may not require much change once the law is framed.
19.2 Director proposed to be appointed should be required to give a declaration to the Board that he is not disqualified to be appointed as a director under provisions of the Act.
19.3 Provision of Section 274 (1) (g) of the present Companies Act, prescribing the disqualifications of directors, inter alia, provides that a person is disqualified for being appointed as a director in other companies for a period of five years, if such person is a director of a public company which has failed to repay its deposits or interest thereon on due date or redeem its debentures on due date or pay dividend and such failure continues for one year or more. This disqualification should be retained.
19.4 In case of sick companies which have defaulted on payment of deposits/debentures etc., it is necessary to re-constitute its Board of Directors for the purpose of rehabilitation of such companies. The new directors who join boards of such companies are likely to attract
- 449 -
the disqualification under the present Section 274(1)(g) of the Companies Act. In order to encourage qualified professionals to join Boards of such companies, it is necessary to amend Section 274(1)(g) of the Companies Act to provide that such disqualification would not be applicable for new directors joining the boards of such sick companies which have failed to repay their deposits, debentures etc."
90. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
N.Narayanan vs. Adjudicating Officer, Securities
and Exchange Board of India, [(2013)12 SCC
152], (N.Narayanan), which is a matter that arose
under the provision of the Securities and Exchange
Board of India Act, 1992 (SEBI Act), pertaining to
public companies has observed as under:
"35. Gower and Davies on Principles of Modern Company Law, 9th Edition (2012) at page 751, reiterated their views on the scope and rationale of annual reporting required under the Companies Acts, as follows:
"On the basis that "forewarned is forearmed" the fundamental principle underlying the Companies Act has been that of disclosure. If the public and the members were enabled to find out all relevant information about the company, this, thought the founding fathers of our company law, would be a sure shield. The shield may not have
- 450 -
proved quite so strong as they had expected and in more recent times, it has been supported by offensive weapons."
36. The Companies Act casts an obligation on the company registered under the Companies Act to keep the Books of accounts to achieve transparency. Previously, it was thought that the production of the annual accounts and it preparation is that of the Accounting Professional engaged by the company where two groups who were vitally interested were the shareholders and the creditors. But the scenario has drastically changed, especially with regard to the company whose securities are traded in public market. Disclosure of information about the company is, therefore, crucial for the accurate pricing of the company's securities and for market integrity. Records maintained by the company should show and explain the company's transactions, it should disclose with reasonable accuracy the financial position, at any time, and to enable the Directors to ensure that the balance- sheet and profit and loss accounts will comply with the statutory expectations that accounts give a true and fair view."
- 451 -
91. On perusal of Section 164(2) of the Act, in
light of the above references, it is noted that a two-
fold consequence is prescribed if there is an infraction
of either Section 164(2)(a) or (b), or both. The first is
that a director of the defaulting company cannot be
re-appointed as a director of the said company.
Secondly, such a director cannot also be appointed as
a director of any other company for a period of five
years. The Parliament in its wisdom has prescribed
the two-fold consequence under the Act though as per
Section 274(1)(g) of 1956 Act, there was only one
consequence viz., that a director of a defaulting
company could not be appointed as director of any
other company for a period of five years. But under
Section 164(2) of the Act, a director of a defaulting
company cannot be re-appointed as a director of a
defaulting company for a period of five years. The
prescription of a two-fold consequence, in my view,
cannot be held to be manifestly arbitrary as the
Parliament in its wisdom has prescribed the same
- 452 -
having regard to the objects sought to be achieved
which have been elaborately stated by the Bombay
High Court as well as Gujarat High Court and which
are reiterated. The prescription of a two-fold
consequence is neither arbitrary nor manifestly
arbitrary. The additional reasons for stating so could
also be gathered while considering the validity of the
Section from the point of view of proportionality,
which aspect has also been discussed under point
No.1.
92. Further, it was brought to my notice that
the object of providing for stringent provisions under
Section 164(2) of the Act is in order to identify
directors of shell companies which are not engaged in
any business as such, but are used as a method for
dubious financial transactions. That some times shell
companies are involved in money laundering and
hardly have any operations as such. That such
companies are misused for tax evasion or other illegal
purposes, such as round tripping of products obtained
- 453 -
from illegal transactions and for converting them into
white money. That the expression "shell company"
does not find a place under the Act. It means that it
is a company which exists as an investment company
with dubious and oblique intentions having serious
economic consequences and offences. A discussion of
the above has been made by the Guwahati High Court
in Assam Company India Limited and another Vs.
Union of India and others, in WP (C) No.2572 of
2018 disposed of on 07.03.2019. Viewed in the
above perspective, I do not find the prescription under
Section 164(2) of the Act to be either arbitrary or
manifestly arbitrary.
93. Further, the judgments cited by learned
senior counsel for the petitioners, particularly, in the
case of Shayara Bano, Mithu, Sunil Batra and
Mardia Chemicals Limited are not applicable to the
facts of the case. On the other hand, it would be
necessary to reiterate what has been observed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
- 454 -
Dr.Subramanian Swamy to the effect that the Court
cannot, while considering the validity of the legislation
substitutes its view of what has been stated in the
provision or the policy of the Government. Further,
the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shreya
Singal turned on the nature of the provision 66A of
the Information Technology Act, 2000. The said
provision was struck down as offensive or a menace.
The said ground does not apply in the instant case.
94. In this regard, the only aspect that requires
further consideration is the expression "is or has been
a director of a company". On a reading of Section
164(2)(a) of the Act, it is clear that a person who is a
director of the company when the default occurs i.e.,
when for any continuous period of three financial
years, financial statements or annual returns are not
filed would be faced with the consequences mentioned
under the Section. But there has been a debate at the
Bar over the expression "has been a director of a
company". Petitioners' counsel contended that the
- 455 -
expression "has been" cannot extend to a person who
is a director of a defaulting company prior to the three
material years. There is force in the said contention.
The expression "has been" is not equivalent to the
expression "was". The phrase has to be interpreted to
mean a person was a director during the period of
three years i.e., continuous period of three financial
years during which financial statements or annual
returns were not filed and who may have since ceased
to be a director. Even if such a director has
subsequently ceased to be a director after the default
has occurred, he would be disqualified. In other
words, the expression "has been" is incorporated in
the provision to overcome a situation where directors
of the company could resign immediately before or
soon after the default occurs so as to escape the
consequences mentioned in the Section. In other
words, if a person has been a director of a company
which for a continuous period of three financial years
has not filed financial statements or annual returns
- 456 -
and has since resigned or ceased to be a director,
such a person would also be visited with the
disqualification. Therefore, the expression "has been"
also refers to a person who ceases to be a director of
the company once the default occurs. The reason
being, the default by the company would have
occurred when he was the director for a continuous
three financial years when financial statements or
annual returns were not filed. Therefore, the
expression "has been" must be interpreted
contextually with reference to the three material
years, which is continuous period of three financial
years during which period financial statements or
annual returns have not been filed by the company
resulting in a default. Any resignation of a director of
a defaulting company thereafter cannot escape the
consequences of the default.
95. Further, under 1956 Act, the words used
are "is already a director" which states that when the
default occurs, he continues to be a director. On the
- 457 -
other hand, the expression "has been a director"
under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act would also include
a director who has been disqualified in the provisions
of the 1956 Act and would then continue to face the
disqualification as per Section 164(2) under the new
Act. Thus, there is no reason to hold that the
provision is manifestly arbitrary or arbitrary in nature.
96. From the aforesaid discussion, it is noted
that the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court as
well as the Gujarat High Court upheld the vires of
Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act. They held that the
said provision did not violate any fundamental right
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Further, in
light of the judgments cited on behalf of the
petitioners on the point of Section 164(2)(a) of the
Act being manifestly arbitrary, the said provision has
been considered and compared with Section 274(1)(g)
of the 1956 Act. In view of the above discussion, it is
held that Section 164(2) of the Act is not manifestly
arbitrary.
- 458 -
97. The other limb of argument of the learned
senior counsel for the petitioners is based on the
principles of proportionality.
(a) In Om Kumar and Others vs. Union of
India, [(2001) 2 SCC 386], the doctrine of
proportionality was discussed at length. According to
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, under the principle of
proportionality, the Court would have to see that the
legislature and the administrative authority "maintain
a proper balance between the adverse effects which
the legislation or the administrative order may have
on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping
in mind the purpose which they were intended to
serve". The legislature and the administrative
authority are, however, given an area of discretion or
a range of choices but as to whether the choice made
infringes the rights excessively or not is for the Court
to determine. That is what is meant by
proportionality.
- 459 -
(b) In Modern Dental College and Research
Centre and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
and others, [(2016)7 SCC 353], the "doctrine of
proportionality" was applied in the context of Article
19(6) of the Constitution by quoting "Proportionality:
Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation (Cambridge
University Press 2012)", by Aharon Barak, former Chief
Justice, Supreme Court of Israel. It was noted that
there are sub-components of proportionailtiy which
need to be satisfied. That a limitation of constitutional
right will be constitutionally permitted if:
(i) it is designated for a proper purpose;
(ii) the measures undertaken to effectuate such a limitation are rationally connected to the fulfillment of that purpose;
(iii) the measures undertaken are necessary in that there are no alternative measures that may
similarly achieve that same purpose with a lesser degree of limitation; and finally,
(iv) there needs to be a proper relation ('proportionality stricto sensu' or 'balancing') between the importance of achieving the proper purpose and the social importance of preventing
- 460 -
the limitation on the constitutional right.
The doctrine of proportionality as delineated by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court are referred to in several
judgments.
98. In the context of the doctrine of
proportionality, it is noted that under Section
164(2)(a) of the Act and Section 274(1)(g) of the
1956 Act, the consequence regarding ineligibility to be
re-appointed as a director is for a period of five years
from the date of default committed by the Company,
in respect of companies other than the defaulting
company. But under the Act, the ineligibility to be re-
appointed as a director of the defaulting company for
a period of five years has also been stipulated. Can
this additional stipulation fall within the scope of the
doctrine of proportionality or, in other words, be held
to be disproportionate to the object sought to be
achieved? In my view, it cannot be held so for the
simple reason that the director of a company which
- 461 -
has defaulted under section 164(2)(a) or (b) of the
Act cannot be re-appointed as a director of that very
company although disqualification of a director of a
defaulting company occurs vicariously and as argued,
the director of such a company is not directly
responsible for causing the default. Nevertheless, a
director being a member of the Board of Directors
which is the supreme administrative body of a
corporate entity or company whether, public or
private, ought to face an ineligibility to be re-
appointed as director of the defaulting company also.
The ineligibility to be re-appointed as a director of the
defaulting company under Section 164(2) of the Act is
significant for, when juxtaposed with the fact that
such a director cannot be re-appointed in any other
company for a period of five years, (although any
other company may not be in default), it is logical that
such a director is also ineligible to be re-appointed as
a director of the company in default.
- 462 -
99. The ineligibility to be re-appointed as a
director of a defaulting company stems from the fact
that a director, being a member of the governing body
of a company, must ensure that the company does
not default either under Section 164(2)(a) or (b), as
the case may be. Further, the ineligibility to be re-
appointed is not in the nature of a disqualification as
under Section 164(1) of the Act, but only results in a
temporary suspension for a period of five years which
is in order to ensure compliances as stipulated under
Section 164(2) of the Act. Moreover, under Section
164(1) of the Act, the material period resulting in the
ineligibility is three years and not immediate which, in
my view, is a reasonable period. Thus, Section
164(2)(a) of the Act resulting in an ineligibility for a
director after a lapse of three consecutive financial
years cannot be held to be capricious or a
disproportionate repercussion, lacking in
reasonableness or any rationale. A director who is
part of a company, which is in default as per Section
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164(2)(a) of the Act cannot be perpetuated in the
same position by the company. If a remedy is not
provided in a manner as provided under Section
162(2) of the Act, the mischief of committing a default
would continue and it would appear as if the law
permeates such a default by, not only being passive,
but rather approving or giving its concurrence to such
a default. On the other hand, the reasons stated in
the judgments of the Bombay and Gujarat High Courts
are apposite. Merely because there is a two pronged
effect stipulated under the Act as opposed to Section
274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act, it cannot be held that
the same is hit by the doctrine of proportionality.
It is further observed that the consequence for
non-compliance of Section 164(2)(a) or (b) of the
Act is only a suspension by way of an ineligibility for
appointment of a director in the defaulting
company or any other company for a period of
five years only. It is not a permanent
disqualification to be appointed as a director at all in
- 464 -
future. Hence, it cannot be held that the said
provision is unreasonable or excessive in nature.
100. It is further noted that the aforesaid
provisions have been incorporated with a view to
deepen corporate governance. According to
J.Wolfensohn, Former President, World Bank,
"Corporate governance is about promoting corporate
Fairness, Transparency and Accountability." It is a
mechanism to safeguard the interest of the share-
holders. According to the Cadbury Committee (1992),
"corporate governance is the system by which
companies are directed and controlled. It is a simple
and concise definition that goes to the heart of the
matter. It talks about a system, direction and control
of business."
101. The principles of corporate governance,
inter alia, involves disclosure and transparency,
especially of finance and operating results, major
share ownership and voting rights. The Board of
- 465 -
Directors has an important responsibility of overseeing
the process of disclosure communication which is to
ensure transparency, accountability so as to bring
about a disciplined approach in the financial affairs of
the company. It is the duty of Board of Directors to
ensure that the object of the company are achieved in
the most ethical manner and one of the ways is by
adhering to the disclosure procedure as stipulated in
Section 164(2)(a) of the Act. In this regard it is also
necessary to mention about Naresh Chandra
Committee Report on Corporate Audit and
Governance.
102. It would also be useful to mention that the
Act has introduced several provisions with regard to
the composition of Board of Directors of a company,
by conferring responsibility on the directors,
introducing the concept of independent directors and
to make the directors report more informative
including several disclosures to be made. In light of
- 466 -
the above objects to be achieved, Section 164(2) of
the Act has been so provided.
103. I am of the view that the said provision is
not ultra vires Article 14 and/or Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution. Point No.1 is accordingly answered.
Part - 9
Re. Point No.2:
"Whether Section 164(2)(a) of the Act is in violation of principles of natural justice and hence ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution as it does not envisage any hearing prior to disqualification or post-disqualification?"
104. This point concerns the fact that the
disqualification under Section 164(2) of the Act is by
operation of law and without envisaging any hearing,
either a pre or post-decisional hearing and hence
according to the petitioners, is in violation of principles
of natural justice. In this regard, several decisions
have been cited at the Bar.
- 467 -
105. The crux of the matter according to the
petitioners is that a director of a defaulting company
is visited with disqualification without being given an
opportunity of hearing. In other words, it is simply by
operation of law and according to petitioners, is not
"fair play in action". Hence, it is contended that
Section 164(2)(a) of the Act violates Article 14 of the
Constitution as it is opposed to principles of natural
justice.
106. Having regard to the nuances of the
principles of natural justice, learned senior counsel for
the petitioners contended that the director of a
company cannot be visited with a serious consequence
of being disqualified as a director of a defaulting
company, without being given an opportunity of being
heard or explaining the fact that the default has
occurred due to bona fide reasons and it has not been
on account of negligence or carelessness. In other
words, the contention is that disqualification cannot be
- 468 -
by operation of law and the principles of natural
justice must be followed.
107. As opposed to this contention, learned
ASG appearing for the Union of India and others
submitted that Section 164(2) of the Act envisages a
situation whereby with effect from 01.04.2014, on
which date the section was enforced, if a person has
to be appointed as a director of a company, his
eligibility must be considered. Looked at in that
prism, question would arise, whether a person to be
appointed or re-appointed as a director has suffered
any disqualification and therefore, has become
ineligible to be so appointed. According to learned
ASG, Section 164(1) of the Act does not contemplate
any right of hearing as the said sub-section deals with
a person not being eligible for being appointed as a
director of a company if any of the conditions stated in
Clauses (a) to (h) apply. In such a case, the
requirement of hearing a director does not apply, as
Section 164(1) of the Act deals with the eligibility to
- 469 -
become a director of a company on account of the
disqualification sustained by him personally. The
argument of learned ASG is similar vis-à-vis under
Section 164(2) of the Act as eligibility to be re-
appointed as a director of a company which is in
default and eligibility for appointment in any other
company for a period of five years from the date of
default of a director who was or has been a director of
the defaulting company is contemplated.
108. Learned ASG further contended that
Section 164 of the Act prescribes eligibility to be
appointed as a director of a company and while
considering such eligibility, the question as to whether
a person has suffered any disqualification on account
of any of the circumstances stated in Section 164(1)
or (2) of the Act would have to be considered.
According to the ASG, when the Section is viewed
from the aforesaid perspective, the requirement of
hearing as per the principles of natural justice pales
into insignificance. It is emphasized that Section 164
- 470 -
of the Act applies only when a person has to be
considered for appointment as a director of a company
or whether he is eligible to be re-appointed as a
director of a company in default. That, when the
disqualification occurs by operation of law, the
principles of natural justice would not apply.
109. However, by contrast, the contention of the
learned senior counsel for the petitioners is not from
the point of view of eligibility to be appointed as a
director of any company for a period of five years,
which is a consequence of disqualification, but the fact
that when Section 164(2) of the Act is read along with
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, the serious
consequences of disqualification are enlarged. In this
regard, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners
that Section 164(1) of the Act does not contemplate
the right of hearing before a director of a company is
disqualified, which is an infraction of the principles of
natural justice. But on the other hand, a person who
is faced with any of the circumstances stipulated
- 471 -
under Section 164(1)(a) to (h) of the Act, the
requirement of following the principles of natural
justice may not arise; the reason being that if a
person who is already a director of a company incurs
disqualification on account of the grounds stated
under Section 164(1)(a) to (h) of the Act, he would,
having regard to those grounds, necessarily to vacate
his office. It is sought to be distinguished that the
incurring of a disqualification based on Section
164(1)(a) to (h) is personal to a director, but under
Section 164(2) of the Act, the disqualification results
in a director of the company being ineligible to be re-
appointed as a director of the defaulting company or
being appointed in any other company for a period of
five years from the date of default vicariously. It is
contended that before such ineligibility is thrust on the
directors of a company by the statute, an opportunity
ought to be given to explain as to why there has been
non-compliance of Section 164(2) of the Act. In other
words, the disqualification of a director of a company
- 472 -
in the form of ineligibility to be reappointed as the
director of a defaulting company or as a director of
any other company for a period of five years from the
date of default cannot be without hearing such a
director, is the contention of the petitioners. That it
cannot be by mere operation of law and in the
absence of hearing, the disqualification of a director of
a company, leading to the ineligibility to be re-
appointed as a director of a defaulting company or in
any other company for a period of five years, is
arbitrary and an infraction of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
110. Principles of natural justice are no doubt
important procedural safeguards against undue
exercise of power by an authority. The extension of
the right of hearing to a person affected by an
administrative process is an extension of the said right
applicable to judicial as well as a quasi-judicial
process. As a result, hearing becomes the norm
rather than the exception in administrative process
- 473 -
today. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
State of Orissa vs. Dr.Binapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC
1269] even an administrative order which involves
civil consequences must be made consistently with the
rules of natural justice. "Civil consequences cover
infraction of not merely property or personal rights
but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-
primary damages. In its comprehensive connotation,
everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a
civil consequence." vide State of Himachal Pradesh
vs. Raja Mahendra Pal [(1999) 4 SCC 43].
111. A.K.Kraipak vs. Union of India [AIR
1970 SC 150] is a celebrated decision which has
demolished the conceptualistic distinction between an
administrative and a quasi-judicial function in the
context of natural justice. It is, no doubt, true that
when a person has to be removed from an office,
elected or a statutory body, principles of natural
justice have to be followed. Similarly, under the Anti-
Defection law, a Member of the Legislature who
- 474 -
defects from his party loses his membership of the
House. Whether a Member had defected or not and
thereby become subject to the disqualification or not,
is a matter to be decided by the Speaker of the
House. It has been held that the Speaker acts in a
quasi-judicial manner, and has to follow natural
justice while adjudicating upon the matter; vide
Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillu [AIR 1993 SC 412].
112. On the aspect of exclusion of principles of
natural justice, the rule is that a statute can exclude
the right of hearing, either expressly or by necessary
implication. Whether or not it has been excluded
depends upon the language and scheme of the
provision conferring the power, the nature of the
power, the purpose for which it is conferred and the
effect of exercise of that power. For instance, under
Article 311(2) of the Constitution, an authority is
empowered to dismiss, remove a civil servant or
reduce him in rank, if satisfied and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to
- 475 -
hold such an enquiry. In interpreting the said
provision in Union of India vs. Tulasi Ram Patel
[AIR 1985 SC 1416], the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that the matter falls within the realm of the
principles applicable to discretionary powers, which is
in the realm of administrative functions. But, when it
comes to legislative functions, when the statute is of
general nature, and not applicable to a few persons, in
such a case, no hearing need be given unless the
statute expressly provides for such a course. The
justification of excluding hearing from the legislative
area is three-fold:
(a) Order affects large number of persons; and so hearing could not be given to them all;
(b) If natural justice is to be observed in this area, it may be difficult to take quick and timely action as and when necessary;
(c) The Legislature does not give a hearing while enacting the law. On the same analogy, the Administration need not give a hearing when it is acting legislatively.
- 476 -
113. Sometimes, the requirement of hearing is
excluded where prompt action needs to be taken.
Also, there may be cases where non observance of
natural justice would make no difference as admitted
or indisputable facts speak for themselves and in the
words of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, "where on
admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is
possible, and under the law only one penalty is
permissible, then the Court may not compel the
observance of natural justice" vide S.L. Kapoor vs.
Jagmohan [AIR 1981 SC 136]. Similarly, in
Aligharh Muslim University vs. Mansoor Ali Khan,
[(2000) 7 SCC 529, at 540], the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that where they have admitted undisputed
facts, where only one view is possible, natural justice
need not be applied.
[Source: Principles of Administrative Law by M.P.Jain & S.N.Jain, 7th Edition (2011)].
114. In this context, it would also be useful to
identify and classify the nature of the provision of
Section 164(2) of the Act. In Administrative Law, an
- 477 -
action is classified as legislative, administrative and
quasi-judicial i.e., by adjudication. Different
procedures are observed for making different kinds of
orders. The procedural difference depends upon the
nature of the order to be passed. However, there are
difficulties in distinguishing a legislative function from
other types of functions. A function may be
characterized as a legislative function or as an
administrative function depending upon the manner in
which such power is exercised. In United States of
America two tests have been propounded to identify
legislative functions: one test depends upon the
element of applicability, i.e., legislative function is
normally directed towards the formulation of
requirements having a general application to all
members of a broadly identifiable class. As against
this, an administrative decision is one which applies to
specific individuals or situations. In other words, a
power to take specific action is administrative; power
to take general action is legislative. Another test is, if
- 478 -
a rule prescribes future patterns and is applicable
generally it is legislative function, but an
administrative decision determines liabilities on the
basis of present or past facts.
115. In the context of complying with the
principles of natural justice in a situation where there
is removal from an office, it has been held in a catena
of cases, when a person is removed from a local
authority or a statutory body or by removal of a
person concerned is by way of a punishment, rules of
natural justice must be complied with, but suspension
of a person from the office does not require
observance of natural justice by an authority
concerned. Further, when a dismissal of an office
bearer is effected as a matter of policy and not on the
basis of misconduct, the principles of natural justice
are not be applicable vide Dr. D.C. Saxena vs. State
of Haryana & others [(1987) 3 SCC 251].
- 479 -
116. In Union of India & another vs.
W.N.Chadha [AIR 1993 SC 1082], the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has laid down a few propositions as
regards the exclusion of natural justice though in the
context of criminal justice. It has observed that the
rule of audi alteram partem is not attracted unless the
impugned order is shown to have deprived a person of
his liberty or his property. That the rule of audi
alteram partem cannot be applied to make the law
"lifeless, absurd, stultifying and self-defeating or
plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation"
and this rule may be jettisoned in very exceptional
circumstances where compulsive necessity so
demands. The question is not whether audi alteram
partem is implicit, but whether the occasion for its
attraction exists at all. Further, the denial of natural
justice may justify the fact when "the facts speak for
themselves". In such a case, no prejudice would be
caused to the affected person.
- 480 -
117. Moreover, hearing is excluded when the
administrative action in question is recorded as
legislative character as contrasted with an
administrative function. An order of general nature
and not applying to one person or a few persons may
be regarded as legislative. Thus, in the following
cases denial of natural justice has been upheld by
Courts as the function was considered to be
legislative. E.g. a notification issued by the Cane
Commissioner prohibiting power crushers and
khandsari units from making their units in any
reserved areas for a sugar mill for a few months with
a view to increase sugar production vide Laxmi
Khandsari vs. State of U.P. [AIR 1981 SC 873]; a
notification issued by the Government extending the
limits of the Town Area Committee vide The Tulsipur
Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. Notified Area Committee [AIR
1980 SC 882]; price fixation in Union of India vs.
Cynamide India Ltd. [1987 SC 1802]; declaration
of an area as a dry area in S.M. Mallewar & others
- 481 -
vs. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1993 Bombay
237]. The distinction is that where a number of
persons are affected and if the principles of natural
justice is to be observed, it would not be possible to
take timely action. Further, when the administration
is discharging a function by following the prescription
in the statute and on the occurrence of the
circumstances mentioned in the provision if a result
ensues, in such an event, the principle of audi alteram
partem is excluded.
[Source: Principles of Administrative Law by M.P.Jain & S.N.Jain, 7th Edition (2011)].
118. If the aforesaid principles are to be applied
in the instant case, it becomes apparent that under
Section 164(2)(a) or (b), if a person who is or has
been a director of a company which has not filed
financial statements or annual returns for a
continuous period of three financial years; or has
failed to repay the deposits accepted by it or pay
interest thereon or to redeem any debentures on the
- 482 -
due date or pay interest due thereon or pay any
dividend declared and such failure to pay or redeem
continues for one year or more, shall not be eligible to
be re-appointed as a director of the defaulting
company or appointed in any other company for a
period of five years from the date on which the said
default occurs. On a reading of the above, it
becomes clear that there would be no dispute with
regard to the fact that financial statements or annual
returns are not filed by a company for three
continuous financial years. Similarly, when there is a
failure to repay the debentures accepted by a
company or to pay interest thereon or to redeem
debentures on the due date or to pay interest due
thereon or to pay any dividend declared and such
failure to pay or redeem continues for one year or
more the ineligibility for re-appointment applies.
When such facts are apparent and show a failure by
the company, for whatsoever reason or cause, the
director of such a company sustains a disqualification
- 483 -
in the form of an ineligibility. There may be a variety
of reasons as to why there has been non-compliance
of Section 164(2)(a) or (b) of the Act by the company.
The said provision is not concerned with the reasons
for non-compliance by the company. But it is only
concerned with there being violation of Section
164(2)(a) or (b) of the Act, as the Act considers the
same to be a serious lapse on the part of the company
and it affects the directors of such a company.
119. The object and purpose of making such a
provision in the Act need not be reiterated as it has
been discussed while answering point No.1 above,
particularly with reference to the judgments of the
Bombay and Gujarat High Courts. When the making
of such a provision is justified, the consequences for
non-compliance of the same must follow. In this
regard the discussion on point No.1 above is relevant
and apposite. There may be a plethora of reasons for
non-compliance of Section 164(2) of the Act, the
section is not concerned with those reasons,
- 484 -
justification or explanations leading to non-compliance
of Section 164 (2)(a)or(b). The existence of the
circumstances mentioned under Section
164(2)(a)or(b) of the Act are sufficient for the
directors of defaulting company to be visited with an
ineligibility for re-appointment albeit, vicariously.
120. Thus, when the ineligibility for being
appointed as a director of the defaulting company or
in all the companies is for a period of five years from
the date of the default is by operation of law, there is
no necessity to give a prior hearing or comply with the
provisions of audi alteram partem before such
consequences visit a director of such a company. The
ineligibility is in the nature of suspension of a director
for a period of five years. Therefore, in my view, the
need to hear a director of a company before the
ineligibility to be reappointed as a director of a
company in default or to be appointed in any other
company on account of default of a company in which
he is a director, for a period of five years from the
- 485 -
date of default of the company is rightly not envisaged
under Section 164(2) of the Act. Even in the absence
of a prior hearing the section is valid and not in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
121. However, the controversy does not end, as
a contention raised by learned senior counsel, Sri
Holla is, if not a prior hearing at least a provision for a
post-decisional hearing ought to be read into Section
164(2) of the Act. In other words, the question is,
whether, a post-disqualification hearing, i.e., the need
to hear a director who has been disqualified under
Section 164(2) of the Act, is envisaged under Section
164(2) of the Act? The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
propounded the notion of post-decisional hearing, if,
for certain reasons, a pre-decisional hearing cannot be
envisaged. The leading cases in this regard are
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India [AIR 1978 SC
597] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of
India [AIR 1981 SC 818].
- 486 -
122. Learned senior counsel Dr.Aditya Sondhi
placed reliance on D.K.Yadav vs. J.M.A. Industries
Ltd. [(1993) 3 SCC 259] to contend that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed, where a private
employer terminated an employee under Certified
Standing Orders, due to absence from duty without or
beyond the period of sanctioned leave for more than
eight days, it is a case of automatic termination which
is in violation of principles of natural justice and a
duty to act in just, fair and reasonable manner, must
be read into Standing Orders. That termination under
the Standing Orders without holding any domestic
enquiry or affording any opportunity to the workman
was held to be violative of principles of natural justice.
Drawing my attention to Clause 13(2)(iv) of the
Standing Orders therein, he contended that under the
said Standing Orders, an opportunity to explain to the
employer his reasons for absence or inability to return
to duty on the expiry of leave was provided and
therefore, the principles of natural justice was read
- 487 -
into the same. Otherwise, it would be arbitrary, unjust
and unfair violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
123. Reliance was also placed on Hyderabad
Karnataka Education Society vs. Registrar of
Societies and Others, [(2000) 1 SCC 566] wherein
it was held that under Rule 7(A) of the appellant
Society therein, if an ordinary member did not pay his
annual subscription in advance in the month of
December and in case of his failure to pay subscription
before the end of March of any year, he automatically
ceased to be a member of the Society therein, was
contrary to Section 2(b) of the Karnataka Societies
Registration Act, 1960. In order to save the Rule from
the vice of unreasonableness and arbitrariness, it was
held that it would be open to the alleged defaulter-
ordinary member, to point out to the society relevant
grounds or defence before the year in question ran
out, and if his defence was accepted by the authorities
concerned of the society, then his membership would
not be hit by the provisions of Rule 7(A). The Hon'ble
- 488 -
Supreme Court stated that if an opportunity would be
given to the defaulting member to show sufficient
cause for non-payment of dues and once such a case
is made out by a defaulting member to the
satisfaction of the society then he would not have
incurred automatic cessation of his membership for
that year.
124. It was also thus contended by the learned
senior counsel that at least a post-disqualification
hearing must be provided under Section 164(2) of the
Act after a director is visited with disqualification on
the circumstances stated under the said provision.
However, the aforesaid cases deal with termination
from employment or cessation of membership of a
society, as the case may be, in which circumstances,
principles of natural justice must be complied with.
But the present case is not one of cessation of
directorship permanently, but it is only a suspension
for a period of five years on the coming into existence
the circumstances mentioned in the section. It is by
- 489 -
operation of law and not by passing of an
administrative order by exercise of discretion. No
order disqualifying a director of a defaulting company
need be made. It is not by an administrative process
but by a legislative intent and by operation of law.
125. Reliance has also been placed on another
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
C.B.Goutam vs. Union of India and others
[(1993) 1 SCC 78] wherein the constitutional
validity of Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961
was questioned. Section 269-UD of the said Act
permitted compulsory purchase by the Central
Government of immoveable property. The said
provision did not contain an opportunity to be heard
before an order for compulsorily purchase of property
by the Central Government was made. Although,
Chapter XX-C did not contain any express provision
for the affected parties being given an opportunity to
be heard before an order for purchase was made
under Section 269-UD of the said Act, by quoting
- 490 -
Judge Learned Hand of the United States of America,
it was observed, not to read the requirement of such
an opportunity would be to give too literal and strict
an interpretation to the provisions of Chapter XX-C "to
make a fortress out of the dictionary". The Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed that an opportunity to show
cause must be given before an order for purchase by
the Central Government was made by an appropriate
authority under Section 269-UD and same must be
read into Chapter XX-C. It was observed that even if
the reasons must be recorded in writing before the
purchase is made under Section 269-UD, the same is
not a substitute for a provision requiring a reasonable
opportunity of being heard, before such an order is
made. It was held that the requirement of an
opportunity to show cause being given before an order
for purchase by the Central Government was made by
an appropriate authority under Section 269-UD must
be read into the provisions of Chapter XX-C and that
there was nothing in the language of Section 269-UD
- 491 -
or any other provision in the said Chapter which would
negate such an opportunity of being heard is given. If
such a requirement was not read into the provisions of
the said Chapter, it would be open for challenge on
the ground of violation of Article 14 on the ground of
non-compliance with principles of natural justice. By
holding so, the vires of the said provision was upheld.
126. The aforesaid judgment is also not
applicable to the present case as in the aforesaid case,
an order had to be made giving reasons before taking
action under Section 269-UD of the Income Tax Act,
1961. But under the Act, the ineligibility to be re-
appointed or appointed as a director, as the case may
be, is by operation of law. It affects the entire class of
directors of all defaulting companies. It does not
affect an individual director or any particular company
as such. It is also not necessary to pass any
administrative order disqualifying a director of a
defaulting company. As already observed it is by
operation of law as per the intention of Parliament.
- 492 -
Further, the consequence is temporary, for a period of
five years and not a permanent one.
127. Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of
India [(1981) 1 SCC 664] is a leading judgment on
post-decisional hearing. In the said case, the facts
were that on 13.04.1978, the Government of India, in
exercise of power under Section 18-AA(1)(a) of the
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951,
passed an order for taking over the management of
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Limited by the National Textile
Corporation Limited, stating that the Central
Government was satisfied from the documentary and
other evidence in its possession, that the persons in
charge of the six industrial undertakings, had, by
creation of encumbrances on the assets of the said
industrial undertakings, brought about a situation
which had affected and was likely to further affect the
production of articles manufactured or produced in the
said industrial undertakings and that immediate action
was necessary to prevent such a situation. The
- 493 -
company assailed the said order on the ground that
compliance of principle of audi alterm partem was in-
built in Section 18-AA(1) of the said Act and its non-
observance had vitiated the order. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court by a majority judgment held that the
provision did not exclude audi alteram partem rule
and observed that it was not reasonably possible to
construe Section 18-AA(1) of the said Act as
universally excluding either expressly or by an
inevitable intendment, the application of audi alteram
partem rule of natural justice at the pre-taking-over
stage, regardless of the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. However, in the said case, Hon'ble
Chinnappa Reddy, J., dissented by observing that the
exclusion of natural justice, where such exclusion is
not express, has to be implied by reference to the
subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where
an express provision in the statute itself provides for a
post-decisional hearing, the other provisions of the
statute will have to be read in light of said provision
- 494 -
and the provision for post-decisional hearing may then
clinch the issue where pre-decisional natural justice
appears to be excluded on the other terms of the
statute.
128. In Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow Vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I and
Another, (2008) 14 SCC 151, [Shara India], the
question was whether in every case where the
assessing officer issues a direction under Section
142(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the assessee
has to be heard before such an order is passed. After
referring to the development of law on the principles
of natural justice, it was held that Section 142(2)(a)
of the said Act led to serious civil consequences and
therefore, even in the absence of express provision for
affording an opportunity of a pre-decisional hearing to
an assessee, the requirement of observance of
principles of natural justice had to be read into the
said provision. In the said case, it was held that the
- 495 -
proceedings before an assessing officer are deemed to
be judicial proceedings.
129. In Institute of Chartered Accountants
of India vs. L.K.Ratna & others [(1986) 4 SCC
537], the question inter alia, was whether a member
of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India was
entitled to a hearing by a Council of the Institute after
the Disciplinary Committee had submitted its report to
the Council of its enquiry into allegations of
misconduct against the member. It was held that a
member accused of misconduct was entitled to a
hearing by the Council when, on receipt of report of
the Disciplinary Committee, it proceeded to find
whether he is or is not guilty.
130. However, one significant aspect noted is
that a post-decisional hearing is envisaged when a
decision making authority in the first instance makes a
decision which is tentative and after giving an affected
person a right of hearing, makes a final decision. In
- 496 -
other words, a post-decisional hearing is normally
envisaged in the exercise of administrative power.
But, the question is as to whether a post-
disqualification hearing is envisaged when a
consequence occurs on account of an operation of law
as in Section 164(2) of the Act. Having regard to the
object and reasons of having a provision in the nature
of Section 164(2) of the Act, in my view, even a post-
decisional hearing, is not contemplated. Hence, in my
view, the need to provide or read the requirement of a
post-disqualification hearing under Section 164(2) of
the Act also does not arise.
131. The reasons for the same are not far to
see. In the circumstances, it is held that Section 164
of the Act applies by operation of law on the basis of
circumstances stated therein. The said provision does
not contemplate any hearing, either pre or post-
disqualification hearing. In fact, no decision in the
nature of administrative or quasi-judicial decision is
envisaged. It is by operation of law on the occurrence
- 497 -
of the circumstances mentioned in Section 164(2) of
the Act. The publication of the list of disqualified
directors is only a ministerial Act and not by an
administrative process involving the making of a
decision on the facts, by application of law or by
exercise of discretion; it is neither an adjudicatory
process. The disqualification is by operation of law on
an emerging and coming into existence of a set of
facts. There is no legal infirmity in the said provision
as there is no violation of principles of natural justice
and Article 14 of the Constitution is not violated.
Accordingly, point No.2 is answered against the
petitioners.
Part - 10
Re. Point Nos.3 & 4:
(3) "Whether Section 164(2)(a) of the Act has retrospective operation and therefore, is unreasonable and/or arbitrary as per Article 14 of the Constitution?
(4) Whether there has been any illegal exercise of power by the concerned
- 498 -
respondent-authority in publishing the List of Directors, including the names of petitioners as disqualified directors, under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act?"
132. The aforesaid points are inter-linked and
shall be considered and answered together.
133. As already noted, Section 274(1)(g) of the
1956 Act dealt with disqualification of a director only
of a public company on account of circumstances
stipulated therein. As a result, a director of such a
company in default was not eligible to be appointed as
a director of any other public company for a period of
five years from the date on which such public
company, in which he is a director, failed to comply
with sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Section 274(1)(g) of
the 1956 Act. But under Section 164(2) of the Act, a
director of a company, which is in default either under
sub-clause (a) or (b) thereof would be ineligible to be
re-appointed as a director in the defaulting company
and also appointed as a director of any other
- 499 -
company. The crux of the matter vis-à-vis Section
164(2)(a) of the Act is with regard to the argument
that Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, having a
retrospective effect is unreasonable and arbitrary as
per Article 14 of the Constitution. The said argument
is with regard to material period i.e., continuous
period of three financial years. The argument
proffered on behalf of the petitioners is that
continuous period of three financial years must be
with effect from 01.04.2014 onwards as on that date,
Section 164 was enforced as different Sections of the
Act were enforced on different dates. If it is so, then
a continuous period of three financial years must
commence from 01.04.2014 onwards i.e., 2014-15;
2015-16 and 2016-17 during which period there
would be non-filing of financial statements or annual
returns, in which event, the disqualification could
occur for the first time only in the year 2017 and
thereafter. But in the instant case, the disqualification
has been made on 01.11.2016 by taking into
- 500 -
consideration period prior to 01.04.2014. That the
respondent-authorities have given a retrospective
operation to the provision when it could not do so. In
other words, the argument is that for reckoning the
continuous period of three financial years, no period
prior to 01.04.2014 could be considered. That the
said Section having a prospective operation, the
continuous period of three financial years must
commence only from 01.04.2014 onwards. It is
contended by the petitioners that by taking into
consideration a period prior to 01.04.2014 and
reckoning continuous period of three financial years,
petitioners have been disqualified as directors, which
is illegal. In this regard, the distinction between
Section 274(1)(g) of 1956 Act and Section 164(2) of
the Act have been reiterated by petitioners' counsel.
134. It is thus contended by the petitioners that,
the respondent-authorities by giving a retrospective
effect to Section 164(2) of the Act have disqualified
the petitioners which is illegal. In support of their
- 501 -
submissions, they have relied upon the following
judgments:
(a) In Commissioner of Income Tax
(Central)-I, New Delhi vs. Vatika Township
Private Limited, [(2015) 1 SCC 1] (Vatika
Township), the facts were that a search and seizure
operation under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act,
1961 on the premises of the assessee was conducted.
Thereafter an order was made under Section 154 of
the said Act, by which the surcharge was levied by the
assessing officer, which was challenged in appeal by
the assessee. The said order was cancelled by CIT
(Appeals) I, New Delhi. The said order was sought to
be revised by the Commissioner of Income Tax
(Central-I), New Delhi and the order dated
09.09.2003 passed by the assessing officer by which
he had given effect to the order of CIT (Appeals) and
in the process did not charge any surcharge. That
order was cancelled as being erroneous and
prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The
- 502 -
assessee therein had filed an appeal before the
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) against the said
order. The ITAT by order dated 23.06.2006 allowed
the appeal, against which the Revenue had
approached the High Court of Delhi by way of an
appeal filed under Section 260-A of the said Act. The
appeal was dismissed by the Delhi High court, against
which the matter was before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court. The Delhi High Court had taken a view that the
proviso inserted to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act,
1961 by the Finance Act, 2002 was prospective in
nature and the surcharge as leviable under the
aforesaid proviso could not be made applicable to the
block assessment in question of an earlier period i.e.,
from 01.04.1989 to 10.02.2000 in the said case. The
question was whether the proviso to Section 113 of
the Act was clarificatory in nature and thereby having
retrospective effect.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that one of the
rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted
- 503 -
is, unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is
presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective
operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current
law should govern current activities. Law passed
today cannot apply to the events of the past.
According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, "if we do
something today, we do it keeping in view the law of
today and in force and not tomorrow's backward
adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is
founded on the bedrock that every human being is
entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the
existing law and should not find that his plans have
been retrospectively upset."
In the aforesaid decision, Phillips vs. Eyre,
[(1870) LR 6 QB 1] was relied upon to observe that
a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general
principle that legislation, by which the conduct of
mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the
first time to deal with future acts ought not to change
the character of past transactions carried on upon the
- 504 -
faith of the then existing law. That the principle
against retrospectivity is the principle of 'fairness',
which must be the basis of every legal rule. Thus,
legislations which modified accrued rights or which
impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a
new disability have to be treated as prospective unless
the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a
retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for
purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former
legislation or to explain a former legislation.
Sometimes, retrospective legislation, which would
confer a benefit on the community as a whole, may be
accepted as the same would not be opposed to the
doctrine of fairness. But, where the provision imposes
some burden or liability, it is always to be interpreted
as being prospective.
In the aforesaid decision, proviso to Sub-section
(3) of Section 2 of the Finance Act, 2003 was held to
be prospective in operation as the proviso was not
clarificatory giving it a retrospective effect.
- 505 -
(b) In Govind Das vs. ITO [(1976) 1 SCC
906], it was held that Section 171(6) of the Income
Tax Act, 1961 was prospective and inapplicable for
any assessment year prior to 01.04.1962, the date
when the Income Tax Act, 1961 came into force. In
the said case, it was held that if the enactment is
expressed in language which is fairly capable of either
interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective
only.
(c) Similarly, in C.I.T., Bombay vs. Scindia
Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. [1962 (1) SCR 788], it
was held that as the liability to pay tax is computed
according to the law in force at the beginning of the
assessment year, i.e., the first day of April, any
change in law affecting tax liability after that date
though made during the currency of the assessment
year, unless specifically made retrospective, does not
apply to the assessment for that year.
- 506 -
(d) Learned Senior Counsel, Sri Udaya Holla,
appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition
Nos.25683-684 of 2018 and connected cases placed
reliance on the judgment of the House of Lords in the
case of L'Office Cherifien Des Phosphates and
Another vs. Yamashita - Shinnihon Steamship
Co. Ltd. [(1994) 1 All.E.R. 20], wherein on the
question as to whether a provision has retrospectivity,
it has been observed as under:
"Parliament was presumed when enacting legislation not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions in a manner which was unfair to those concerned in them unless a contrary intention appeared. Accordingly, the question whether an Act was retrospective was to be determined according to whether in a particular case the consequences of reading the statute with the suggested degree of retrospectivity was, having regard to the degree of retrospectivity involved, the value of the rights affected, the clarity of the language used and the circumstances in which the legislation was enacted, so unfair that the words used by Parliament could not have been intended to mean what they might appear to say. ...."
- 507 -
(e) Reliance was also placed on the
Commissioner of Income Tax 5, Mumbai, vs.
Essar Tele Holdings Limited, through its Manager
[(2018) 3 SCC 253], wherein the question was,
whether Section 14-A(2) and (3) inserted to Income
Tax Act, 1961 with effect from 01.04.2007 would
apply to all pending assessments and whether Rule 8-
D was applicable retrospectively. Section 14-A of the
said Act dealt with expenditure incurred in relation to
income not being included in total income. Section 14-
A of the Act being retrospective in operation with
effect from 01.06.1962 was being used by the
Assessing Officers for reopening assessments and
Circular No.11 of 2001 dated 23.07.2001 was issued
by way of clarification. The said clarificatory Circular
was statutorily engrafted as a proviso by the Finance
Act, 2002 by stating that "provided that nothing
contained in the Section shall empower the assessing
officer either to reassess under Section 147 or pass an
order enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund
- 508 -
already made or otherwise increasing the liability of
the assessee under Section 154, for any assessment
year beginning on or before the 1st day of April 2001".
By Finance Act, 2006, Section 14-A was numbered as
sub-section (1) and after sub-section (1), sub-sections
(2) and (3) were inserted with effect from
01.04.2007. Also the Income Tax Rules, 1962 were
amended by notification dated 24.03.2008 by which
Rule 8-D was inserted. The same dealt with the
method for determining amount of expenditure in
relation to income tax not includable in total income.
While considering the same, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed that it is a well-settled
principle of statutory construction that every statute is
prima facie prospective in nature unless it is expressly
made to have retrospective operation. A new law
ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past,
contained in the principle of presumption of
prospectivity of a statute. Reference was made to
Govind Das wherein Halsbury Laws of England (III
- 509 -
Edition) was cited and observed that if the enactment
is expressed in a language which is fairly capable of
either interpretation, it ought to be construed as
prospectively only. That retrospective operation
should not be given to a statute so as to affect, alter
or destroy an existing right or create a new liability or
obligation unless that effect cannot be avoided without
doing violence to the language of the enactment.
Reference was also made to Vatika Township
and Jayam and Co. vs. CVAT, [(2016) 15 SCC
125], wherein reliance was placed on R.C.Tobaco
(P) Ltd. vs. Union of India, [(2005) 7 SCC 725].
In the latter case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated
the broad legal principles while testing a retrospective
statute in the following manner:
(i) A law cannot be held to be unreasonable merely because it operates retrospectively; (ii) The unreasonability must lie in some other additional factors; - 510 -
(iii) The retrospective operation of a fiscal
statute would have to be found to be unduly oppressive and confiscatory before it can be held to be unreasonable as to violate Constitution norms;
(iv) Where taxing statute is plainly discriminatory or provides no
procedural machinery for assessment and levy of tax or that is confiscatory, courts will be justified in striking down the impugned statute as unconstitutional;
(v) The other factors being period of retrospectivity and degree of
unforeseen or unforeseeable financial burden imposed for the past period;
(vi) The length of time is not by itself decisive to affect retrospecitivity."
It was further observed that it is well settled that
the mere date of enforcement of the statutory
provisions does not conclude that the statute is
prospective in nature. The nature and content of
statute have to be looked into to find out the
legislative scheme and the nature, effect and
- 511 -
consequence of the statute. In the said case it was
held that the methodology as provided under Rule 8-D
was neither a well-known nor well-settled mode of
computation. That no Assessing Officer could have
applied methodology, which was brought in place of
Rule 8-B. Thus, retrospective operation of Rule 8-B
was not accepted.
135. The aforesaid arguments made on behalf of
petitioners have been countered by learned ASG by
contending that it is immaterial whether the
disqualification occurs by taking into consideration any
period prior to 01.04.2014 while reckoning continuous
period of three financial years as what is pertinent to
be considered under Section 164(2) is eligibility to be
re-appointed as a director of a company which is in
default or in any other company after the coming into
force Section 164(2) of the Act.
136. In support of his submission, Learned
Additional Solicitor General, Sri Navadagi, relied upon
- 512 -
a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Ishwar Nagar Co-operative Housing Building
Society vs. Parama Nanda Sharma & Others
[(2010) 14 SCC 230] (Ishwar Nagar Co-
operative Housing Building Society). In the
aforesaid case, as per Rule 25 of the Rules made
under the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972, one
of the grounds for disqualification as a member of the
co-operative society was, in the case of membership
of a housing society, a person owned a residential
house or a plot of land for the construction of
residential house in any of the approved or
unapproved colonies or other localities in the National
Capital Territory of Delhi, in his own name or in the
name of his spouse or any of his dependent children,
on lease-hold or free-hold basis or on the basis of
power of attorney or on agreement for sale. The
question considered therein was, whether Rule 25 of
the Rules was retrospective or not, as the alleged
basis for disqualification was purchase of property
- 513 -
prior to the adoption of the Rules; whether the same
could be a basis of ineligibility for membership of a co-
operative society when the said rule was enforced. It
was held that a statute does not become a
retrospective one because a part of the requisites for
its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its
passing. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that all that
Rule 25(2) of the Rules did was that it operated in
future, though the basis for taking action is the factum
of acquiring a plot in the past. Thus, by virtue of Rule
25(2), a member was deemed to have ceased to be a
member of the society, but the cessation operated
from 02.04.1973, when the Rule came into force.
137. In the aforesaid case, reference was made
to Solicitor's Clerk, In Re. [(1957) 3 All. E.R.
617(DC)] (Solicitor's Clerk), wherein the bone of
contention revolved around Solicitor's Act of 1956
which provided that no solicitor should employ any
person who was convicted of larceny without the
permission of the Law Society. The clerk in that case
- 514 -
was convicted of larceny in 1953, while the ban was
imposed in 1956. It was urged that the provisions of
the 1956 Act cannot be applied to him because he was
convicted before that Act came into operation and to
do otherwise, it would make its operation
retrospective. The said contention was rejected by
Lord Goddard, C.J. by observing that the provision
enabled an order to be made disqualifying a person
from acting as a solicitor's clerk in the future and what
happened in the past as the cause or reason for the
making of the order; but the order has no
retrospective effect. It would be retrospective if the
Act provided that anything done before the Act came
into force or before the order was made should be
void or voidable, or if a penalty were inflicted for
having acted in this or any other capacity before the
Act came into force or before the order was made.
But it simply enables a disqualification to be imposed
for the future which in no way affects anything done
by the appellant therein in the past.
- 515 -
138. Reliance was also placed on State of
Bombay vs. Vishnu Ramachandra [AIR 1961 SC
307] (Vishnu Ramachandra), where Section 57 of
the Bombay Police Act, 1951 authorised removal of a
person from an area if he had been convicted
of certain offences including theft. It was held that
Section 57 of the said Act did not create a new offence
nor make punishable that which was not an offence. It
was designed to protect the public from the activities
of undesirable persons who had been convicted of
offences of a particular kind. The Section only enabled
the authorities to take note of their conviction and to
put them outside the area of their activities so that
the public may be protected against a repetition of
such activities. That so long as the action taken
against a person was after the Act comes into force,
the statute cannot be said to be applied
retrospectively.
- 516 -
139. Reliance was also placed on Lily Thomas
vs. Union of India and others [(2013) 7 SCC
653] (Lily Thomas), wherein Section 8(4) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short "RP
Act") was assailed on the ground that it was ultra
vires the Constitution. Section 8 of the aforesaid Act
deals with the disqualification on conviction for certain
offences, in the context of being chosen as, and for
being, a Member of either House of Parliament or of
the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a
State. Sub-section (1) of Section 8 and sub-section
(2) thereof deal with offences under the Acts specified
therein and conviction for the offences under any of
the Acts leading to disqualification. Sub-section (3) of
Section 8 of the RP Act deals with conviction for any
offences and for any other offences as per the
stipulation contained therein leading to
disqualification. Section 8(4) of the RP Act states that
notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section(1),
sub-section(2) or sub-section(3), a disqualification
- 517 -
under either sub-section shall not, in the case of a
person, who on the date of the conviction, is a
Member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State,
take effect until three months have elapsed from that
date or, if within that period an appeal or application
for revision is brought in respect of the conviction or
the sentence, until that appeal or application is
disposed of by the Court. The contention advanced
was that Section 8(4) of the RP Act did not provide a
rationale for making an exception in the case of
Members of Parliament or a Legislature of a State and
hence was arbitrary and discriminatory and violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was submitted that
persons elected as Members of Parliament and State
Legislature stand on the same footing as sitting
Members of Parliament and State Legislatures so far
as disqualifications are concerned and sitting Members
of Parliament and State Legislatures cannot enjoy the
special privilege of continuing as Members even
though they are convicted of the offences mentioned
- 518 -
in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the RP
Act.
140. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring
to Article 102(1)(e) and Article 191(1)(e) of the
Constitution regarding disqualification for being
chosen as, and for being, a Member of either House of
Parliament or Legislative Assembly or Legislative
Council of the State, mandating a law to be made in
that regard held, Parliament does not have the power
under Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) of the
Constitution to make different laws for a person to be
disqualified from being chosen as a Member and for a
person to be disqualified for continuing as a Member
of Parliament or the State Legislature. Relying on
Election Commission vs. Saka Venkata Rao [AIR
1953 SC 210] (Saka Venkata Rao), it held that the
same set of disqualification for election as well as for
continuing as a Member applied in both circumstances
and the disqualification has to be same.
- 519 -
141. Learned ASG also relied upon the order of
the Calcutta High Court in the case of Nabendu
Dutta and others vs. Arindam Mukerjee and
others, [(2004) 121 Comp.case 150 (Cal)]
(Nabendu Dutta), wherein Section 274(1)(g) of the
1956 Act came up for consideration. It was observed
that under the said provision, if a person was already
a Director in a defaulting company on the date of the
commencement of the Amendment Act (of 2000), he
would be affected by the said provision. That the
language of Section 274(1)(g) contextually made the
provision retrospective in operation. The expression
"is already a director" was interpreted to mean as one
who has continued to be a director till the date of
commencement of the Act. The expression "has failed
to repay its deposits" was observed to be in present
perfect tense, which suggested that the failure started
even before the commencement of the Act. According
to the Calcutta High Court, if the language was
intended to refer to a future event or occurrence, then
- 520 -
the words "has failed to deposit" or "is already a
Director" would not have been employed in the sub-
section. It was further observed that the amending
Act was enacted to protect the interest of deposit
holders by prohibiting the entry of tainted directors
against possible act of misappropriation and/or breach
of trust, meaning thereby to curb the wrong deeds,
mis-deeds to be perpetrated by wrongful act or
omission by the same directors. In order to check and
prevent public wrong the moment it is discovered,
which is part of good governance in any form of
Government by legislative or executive action, the
amendment to 1956 Act had been introduced. It was
further observed by the Calcutta High Court that if the
aforesaid words were to be treated for future
occurrence, then the amendment portion could not be
given any effect at all for a period of one year. One
year is the minimum period of default as far as non-
payment of deposits or interests is concerned. That if
the operation of the provision cannot be suspended
- 521 -
for a period of one year unless it is provided expressly
or at least by giving an interpretation of the words
and language of the Section itself. It was further
observed that interpretation of the words of any
statute cannot be to frustrate or defeat the object of
the Act or lead to an absurdity. While holding so, the
Calcutta High Court held at the interlocutory stage,
prima facie, that defendant No.1 therein was
disqualified to be appointed as a director in defendant
No.3/company therein.
142. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioners
contended that there is a distinction between Section
274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act and Section 164(2)(a) of
the Act. Firstly, that Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956
Act, applied only to public companies and not to
private companies. That for the first time, a director
of a private company is brought into the fold of such a
disqualification. Secondly, under Section 274(1)(g) of
the Act, the ineligibility was only with regard to
appointment as a director of any other company. But
- 522 -
under the Act, the ineligibility is two pronged: re-
appointment in the defaulting company as well as
appointment in any other company. That a director of
a defaulting company would also have to vacate his
office in all companies, where he is a director other
than in the defaulting company as per the proviso to
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act. The consequences of
the operation of Section 164(2) when read with
Section 167(1)(a) are harsh, almost penal and have
been introduced for the first time since the
enforcement of the Act. Therefore, if such severe
consequences have to be faced by a director of a
defaulting company, then the continuous period of
three years of default under Section 164(2)(a) of the
Act must be with effect from 01.04.2014 onwards and
no prior period that could be taken as the basis for
disqualifying of director of a company. It was contended
that, taking into consideration any period prior to
01.04.2014 as the basis for reckoning continuous
period of three financial years, which may extend to
- 523 -
after the enforcement of the Act (with effect from
01.04.2014) is illegal.
143. At this stage, it is necessary to delineate on
the concept of retrospectivity. The normal rule is
presumption against retrospective operation of a
provision of a statute. The said rule is a fundamental
rule of law to the effect that no statute shall be
construed to have a retrospective operation unless
such a construction appears very clearly in the terms
of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct
implication. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in State Bank's Staff Union vs. Union of India,
[AIR 2005 SC 3446], the Parliament or the
legislature has the power to legislate retrospective
statutes. But when a challenge is made to a
retrospective legislation, it is necessary to note the
distinction between retrospective and retroactive laws.
E.A. Driedger, in "Statutes: Retroactive
Retrospective Reflections" [(1978), 56 Can. Bar
- 524 -
Rev. 264] (Driedger), has arrived at the following
definitions:
(i) A retroactive statute is one that operates as of a time prior to its enactment, but a retrospective statute is one that operates for the future only. It is prospective, but it imposes new results in respect of a past event.
(ii) A retroactive statute operates backward, but a retrospective statute operates forward, but it looks backward in that it attaches new consequences for the future to an event that took place before the statute was enacted.
(iii) A retroactive statute changes the law from what it was; a retrospective statute changes the law from what it otherwise would be with respect to a prior event.
144. Applying the distinction, Driedger in
"Construction of statutes (2nd Edition 1983 @ page
192)" could be quoted as under:
"These past facts may describe a status or characteristic, or they may describe an event. It is submitted that where the fact situation is a status or characteristic (the being
- 525 -
something), the enactment is not given retrospective effect when it is applied to persons or things that acquired that status or characteristic before the enactment, if they have it when the enactment comes into force; but where the fact-situation is an event (the happening of or the becoming of something), then the enactment would be given retrospective effect if it is applied so as to attach a new duty, penalty or disability to an event that took place before the enactment."
(underlining by me)
145. In the words of Canadian Supreme Court
in Hornby Island Trust Committee vs. Stormwell
[1988 CanLII 3143 (BC C.A.)] retrospective statute
operates further in time, starting from a point back in
time than the date of its enactment as if the law
existed at the time the events occurred. But a
retroactive statute operates from the date of the
enactment and changes legal consequences of past
events in the future. According to the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India, a retroactive law "creates a
new obligation on transactions or considerations
- 526 -
already past or destroys or impairs vested rights", but
a retrospective law "takes away or impairs vested
rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new
obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability in respect or transactions or considerations
already past."
146. According to learned ASG, if after the
enforcement of the Act a person has to be appointed
as a director of a company, then the question as to
whether he has been a director of a defaulting
company would assume importance, as such a
director cannot be re-appointed as a director of the
defaulting company or any other company for a period
of five years. That while considering the qualifications
of a director, it is necessary to ascertain as to whether
a person has been a director of a company which has
violated Section 164(2) of the Act, in that the annual
returns or statements have not been filed by such a
company for a continuous period of three financial
years. According to learned ASG, while reckoning the
- 527 -
three financial years, it could be a period either prior
to 01.04.2014 or subsequent thereto. It makes no
difference. Once for a continuous period of three
financial years, a company has failed to file annual
returns or statements would result in the director of
that company being visited with an ineligibility of
being re-appointed as a director of that very company
or of any other company for a period of five years.
147. But, the contra contention of learned
counsel for the petitioners is that, while reckoning the
continuous period of three years, no financial year
prior to 01.04.2014 can be taken into consideration.
That having regard to the stringent, almost penal
consequences which follow under Section 164(2) of
the Act, the continuous period of three financial years
must commence from 01.04.2014 only. It is their
contention that if any period prior to 01.04.2014 is
taken into consideration, then the provision would
have a retrospective effect which is unreasonable and
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therefore, in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India.
148. On considering the aforesaid rival
submissions, it is noted that under the 1956 Act, if a
director was disqualified under Section 274(1)(g) of
the Act, it did not result in vacating office of the
director under Section 283 of the said Act. The only
consequence was that a director of such a defaulting
company could not be appointed as a director of any
other company for a period of five years. He could
however be re-appointed as a director of the
defaulting company. But under the Act, the
consequences are three-fold which can be categorized
as immediate and long term. The immediate
consequences are that a director of the default
company would have to vacate his office as a director
in all companies other than the company in default as
per the proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act.
Whereas the long term effect is that he cannot be re-
appointed as a director in the defaulting company. He
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is also not eligible to be appointed as a director in any
other company for a period of five years.
149. The other important distinction between
Section 274(1)(g) of the Act and Section 164(2) of the
Act is that the latter Section applies to both private as
well as public companies. Whereas, Section 274(1)(g)
of 1956 Act applied only to public companies. That
means for the first time, the disqualification in the
form of an ineligibility under Section 164(2) of the Act
is also applicable to private companies. When for the
first time under the Act the disqualification of a
director of a private company is stipulated under the
Act in the form of Section 164(2), the said provision
must be given only a prospective operation. In the
sense, that the continuous period of three financial
years must commence with effect from 01.04.2014
onwards. No period prior to 01.04.2014 can be taken
into consideration to be a part of the continuous
period of three financial years and thereby impact a
director of a defaulting private limited company.
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150. In my view, the same logic and reasoning
would also apply in respect of directors of public
limited companies also as the consequences that are
to be faced by directors of such companies under
Section 164 (2) read with Section 167(1)(a) of the Act
are as enumerated above. Whereas, the
consequences under Section 274(1)(g) read with
Section 283 of 1956 Act were less severe and almost
minimal.
151. In the circumstances, it is observed that if
the three years period is referable to a period prior to
the enforcement of the Act i.e., prior to 01.04.2014,
then Section 274(1)(g) would apply. This is having
regard to Section 465 of the Act which is the repeal
and saving provision. Further if the continuous three
financial years is with effect from 01.04.2014
onwards, then the provisions of the Act would apply.
But if the continuous period of three financial years
during which financial statements or annual returns
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are not filed by any company, which is the basis for
disqualifying the director of a company encompasses a
period prior to 01.04.2014 as well as subsequent to
01.04.2014, it is held that the period prior to
01.04.2014 cannot be reckoned for the purpose of
applying the disqualification under the said provision
along with a period subsequent thereto. If for
example, the three continuous period of three
financial years are with effect from 01.04.2013
onwards, then it will be up to 01.04.2016. In which
event, only two financial years would be subsequent
to the enforcement of the Act, which is from
01.04.2014. In such a situation, the consequences
envisaged under Section 164(2) read with Section
167(1)(a) of the Act cannot be applied.
152. Thus, if the default occurred in any
financial year prior to 01.04.2014, but such a director
seeks re-appointment in the defaulting company or in
any other company, the ineligibility as envisaged
under the Act would apply. Also, after the
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enforcement of the Act with effect from 01.04.2014
onwards, if a director is disqualified the consequences
that would follow is as per Section 164(2)(a) of the
Act. In other words, up to 31.03.2014, Section
274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act would apply, but with effect
from 01.04.2014, Section 164(2) of the Act would
apply if a director seeks re-appointment in the
defaulting company or appointment in any other
company. But, if the continuous period of three
financial years is spread prior to 01.04.2014 as well as
subsequent thereto, then the consequences under
Section 164(2) of the Act would not apply. This is so,
where the company is a public limited company. In
this regard, the judgments relied upon by the learned
counsel for the petitioners would apply.
153. However, it is necessary to distinguish the
cases relied upon by learned ASG. In Ishwar Nagar
Co-operative Housing Building Society, it was held
that Rule 25(2) considered thereunder operates in
future, though the basis for taking action was the
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factum for acquiring a plot in the past i.e., prior to the
introduction of the Rule. Applying the above to the
present case, learned ASG submitted that with effect
from 01.04.2014 onwards, if a person is to be
appointed as a director of a company, then he must
possess the eligibility as stipulated under Section
164(2) of the Act. That if a person is a director of a
defaulting company as per Section 164(2)(a) of the
Act, it does not matter whether the default has
occurred prior to the enforcement of the Act or
subsequent thereto and whether the basis of the
default is spread over a period either prior to
enforcement of the Act or subsequent thereto.
154. Further, reliance was also placed on
Solicitor's Clerk's case to contend that the said
decision is in support of the stand taken by the Union
of India and other respondents and hence, there is no
arbitrary action on the part of the respondents in
disqualifying the petitioners as directors on
01.11.2016 by taking into consideration a period prior
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to 01.04.2014 as part of continuous period of three
financial years during which the financial statements
or annual returns have not been filed by the company.
In the said judgment it has been observed that the
provision considered therein would have retrospective
effect if the Act provided that anything done before
the Act came into force or before the order was made
should be void or voidable, or if a penalty was inflicted
for having acted in a particular way before the Act
came into force or before the order was made or if a
disqualification to be imposed for the future which in
no way affects anything done by the appellant in the
past.
155. The aforesaid decisions no doubt state that
the respective rules considered therein were
prospective and they did not have any retrospective
effect inasmuch as they only took into consideration
action drawn from a time antecedent to the passing of
the rule and did not apply to any period prior to its
enforcement. The said cases are applicable to a case
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of disqualification of a director under Section 274
(1)(g) of the 1956 Act and Section 164(2) of the Act
(new law) being applicable to antecedent
situations/facts. As already noted, Section 164(2) of
the Act would apply to a director who has been
disqualified under the provisions of the 1956 Act (old
Act) if, after coming into force of the same i.e., with
effect from 01.04.2014, he seeks appointment as a
director in any company. Thus, where a
disqualification affects a director of a public company
under Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act and question
arises as to whether he could be appointed as a
director of the company after the enforcement of the
Act, the fact that he had sustained a disqualification
under the 1956 Act could be taken into consideration
after the enforcement of the Act from 01.04.2014.
Section 164(2) of the Act would accordingly apply.
Therefore, a past event can be taken into
consideration for the purpose of Section 164(2) of the
Act after it comes into effect. Therefore, if a past
- 536 -
event has to be taken note of while applying Section
164(2) subsequent to its enforcement and while
ascertaining the antecedents of a person, it is noted
that he had sustained a disqualification on account of
Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act, the said
disqualification under the 1956 Act would have a
bearing at the time of considering eligibility of a
person to be appointed as a director subsequent to
01.04.2014 by applying Section 162 of the Act. In
such a situation the application of Section 164(2) is
retroactive and not retrospective. In this regard, the
expression "has been" is significant. It means a
person who has been a director of a public company,
which has defaulted under Section 274(1)(g) of 1956
Act and who after the enforcement of the Act is
seeking re-appointment in the defaulting company or
in any other company. It is in such circumstances that
the cases cited by learned ASG discussed above in
Ishwar Nagar Co-operative House Building
Society and Soliciter's Clerk In Re. would apply.
- 537 -
156. There would also be no difficulty in
applying the Section if the three continuous financial
years are with effect from 01.04.2014 onwards, in
which event, if in the year 2017 it is found that a
company has for three continuous financial years
(with effect from 01.04.2014 onwards) not complied
with Section 164(2) of the Act, then a director of such
a defaulting company would suffer a disqualification or
an ineligibility as stated under Section 164(2) of the
Act when his case for re-appointment as a director of
the defaulting company or in any other company is to
be considered. In such an illustration also Section
164(2) has a prospective operation whether in respect
of a public company or a private company. Thus, with
effect from 01.04.2014 onwards if for three
continuous financial years, there is non-compliance of
Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, the disqualification
would occur by operation of law.
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157. But, the difficulty arises in those cases
where the continuous period of three financial years
spell over a period prior to enforcement of the Act i.e.,
01.04.2014 and a period subsequent thereto, during
which period of three continuous financial years a
company would not have filed its annual statements
or returns. What would be the position in such a
case? It is noted that in most of the cases herein, the
disqualification has been notified on 01.11.2016 and
the ineligibility is up to 01.11.2021. That means,
three continuous financial years prior to that date has
been reckoned during which period there has been
non-compliance of Section 164(2) of the Act. On
01.11.2016, the list of the disqualified directors has
been published. That means the period of three
continuous financial years is inclusive of not only a
period prior to 01.04.2014, but also subsequent
thereto, unless specifically stated otherwise. The
contention of the petitioners is that no period prior to
01.04.2014 could be reckoned for the purpose of
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counting three continuous financial years under
Section 164(2)(a) of the Act. That the said period of
three continuous financial years must have begun with
effect from 01.04.2014 onwards for the consequences
under Section 164(2) to apply. The reasons for such
a submission are two-fold: firstly, because of the
severity of the consequences envisaged under Section
164(2) of the Act as compared to the consequence
under Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act. Secondly,
for the first time, under the Act, a director of a private
company also sustains such a disqualification under
Section 164(2) of the Act, whereas under the 1956
Act, it was only a director of a public company who
could be visited with such a disqualification.
158. I find, substance in the contentions
advanced on behalf of the petitioners, inasmuch as
directors of private companies are concerned, a
provision like Section 164(2) is applicable for the first
time. Thus, no period antecedent 01.04.2014 could
be taken into consideration when there has been a
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default in the filing of the annual returns or the
statements by such a private company. This is
because, prior to the enforcement of the Act, such a
disqualification was not imposed on a director of a
private company under Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956
Act. Therefore, as far as private companies are
concerned, Section 164(2) being made applicable to
them for the first time under the Act, no period prior
to 01.04.2014 could be taken into consideration for
the purpose of reckoning three continuous financial
years under Section 164(2) of the Act.
159. As far as public companies are concerned,
though a disqualification as stated under Section
274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act applied to the directors of a
public company, which was in default, nevertheless,
the consequence was not to the extent stipulated
under the Act. Such a director became ineligible to be
appointed as a director in any other company, but he
could be re-appointed as a director in the defaulting
company. Moreover, under Section 283 of the 1956
- 541 -
Act, there was no vacation of the office of such a
director. But under the Act, a director of a defaulting
company becomes ineligible to be re-appointed as a
director of the defaulting company as well as any
other company. Moreover, in terms of the proviso to
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, such a director would
have to vacate office as a director in all companies
where he is a director other than the defaulting
company. The cumulative effect of the consequences
being greater than under the 1956 Act, in my
considered view, even in respect of a public company
while reckoning three financial years during which
annual returns or financial statements have not been
filed, no period prior to 01.04.2014 could be
considered while reckoning the continuous period of
three financial years i.e., commencing from prior to
the commencement of the Act and ending after the
coming into force of the Act.
160. It is necessary to reiterate and distinguish
the aforesaid position from the disqualification of a
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director of a public company under the provisions of
Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act which would have
occurred prior to the enforcement of the Act. In such
an event, the disqualification already sustained by a
director of a public company was prior to 01.04.2014
would have a bearing while applying Section 164(2) of
the Act when a director has to be re-appointed in a
defaulting company or in any other company. Thus,
the new law can be applied to an act or transaction
which has been completed before it is enforced. In
such a case, the provision is not retrospective because
a part of the requisite for its action is drawn from a
time antecedent to its passing. The new law imposes
consequences in respect of past events, with effect
from 01.04.2014 which is prospective. But on the
other hand, when the new law is applied to an act or
event or transaction which is in the process of
completion i.e., when the continuous period of three
financial years is spread prior to 01.04.2014 when the
Act was not in force and subsequent thereto, then in
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such a case, the consequences stipulated under
Section 164(2) of the Act would not apply to a director
of a defaulting company.
161. The reason for the same have been stated
above and are reiterated. As far as a private company
is concerned, till 01.04.2014, there was no provision
akin to Section 164(2) which applied to a director of
such a private company. In fact, Section 274(1)(g) of
the 1956 Act expressly stated that it applied only to a
public company. Secondly, as already indicated, the
severity of the consequences of a director of a public
company which is in default being apparent under the
Act, in my view, the said consequences cannot be
imposed on a director of a public company, which is in
default under Section 164(2)(1) of the Act by taking
into consideration any financial year prior to
01.04.2014. Doing so, would be unreasonable as a
retrospective effect would be given to Section 164(2)
of the Act so as to impose a higher degree of disability
or ineligibility by taking into consideration a period
- 544 -
prior to 01.04.2014, which is impermissible in law.
This is because a new law imposing a disqualification,
which is more severe cannot be applied to facts which
have not fructified so as to result in a concluded or
completed event i.e., when the time to apply it is not
ripe as on the date of the enforcement of the new law
i.e., the Act. It could be applied only after the
commencement of the new law, but not by taking into
consideration any period prior to the enforcement of
the law. This is because when the material period of
three continuous financial years is to be reckoned, no
period prior to 01.04.2014 can be taken into
consideration as and when such a period commenced
the new law with different consequences were not
envisaged. This is different from applying the new law
to an event which is a past, concluded one prior to the
enforcement of the new law as the same could be
taken into consideration. In such a case, the law is
being applied retroactively and not retrospectively,
which is permissible.
- 545 -
162. The learned ASG has relied upon the
interim order of the Calcutta High Court in the case of
Nabendu Dutta wherein Section 274(1)(g) of the
1956 Act came up for consideration. Under the said
provision, the expression was "is already a director".
The expression "has failed to repay its deposits" was
observed to be in present perfect tense with reference
to the date of commencement of the amendment. In
the said context, it was held that immediately after
the amendment being enforced, the said provision
would be effective and that if there was any
disqualification under Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956
Act, it would result in consequences as stipulated
under the Act pursuant to the amendment. The same
line of reasoning has been adopted in the instant case
while considering any disqualification which has
occurred on or before 31.03.2014 under the
provisions of the 1956 Act. Thus, even in respect of
such disqualification after the enforcement of Section
164(2)(a) of the Act, any such director who has been
- 546 -
disqualified cannot be reappointed in the defaulting
company or in any other company for a period of five
years.
163. In the circumstances, point No.3 is
answered by holding that Section 164(2) of the Act is
not unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution as it does not violate the rule against
retrospectivity.
164. The petitioners being directors of public
and/or private companies could not have been
disqualified on 01.11.2016 by taking into
consideration three continuous financial years prior
thereto, which includes a period prior to 01.04.2014,
on which date Section 164(2) was enforced as on that
date the basis for application of the provision did not
exist so as to disqualify the directors of public and/or
private company.
165. It may be that, after the coming into force
of the Act, if a person has to be considered to be
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appointed as a director of the company, then inter
alia, the ineligibility on account of the operation of
Section 164(2)(a) of the Act would apply and while so
considering, what has to be reckoned is, a default
made by the company in not filing financial
statements or annual returns for a continuous period
of three financial years. But what has to be seen is
that, the basis for the ineligibility has reference to the
date of enforcement of the Act. What is necessary to
bear in mind is, what the position of law upto
31.03.2014 was and how the provision has been
drastically altered with effect from 01.04.2014. The
consequences that would visit a director of a
defaulting company as per Section 164(2) of the Act
being distinct from what was envisaged under the
1956 Act, it is held that no period commencing prior
to 01.04.2014 and ending after the said date can be
the basis for reckoning the continuous period of three
financial years during which financial statements or
annual returns are not filed by any company. Thus,
- 548 -
point No.4 is answered by holding that the List of
directors disqualifying the petitioners herein with
effect from 01.11.2016 till 31.10.2021 could not have
published by taking into consideration a period prior to
01.04.2014 as well subsequent thereto while
computing continuous period of three financial years
under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act.
Part - 11
Re. Point Nos.5 & 6:
(5) "Whether Section 167(1)(a) of the Act is ultra vires Article 14 and/or Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as being manifestly arbitrary?
(6) Whether proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act is ultra vires Articles 14 and/or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as being manifestly arbitrary?"
166. The aforesaid points shall be considered
together. As already noted, a disqualification incurred
by a director of a public company under Section
274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act, did not result in vacating of
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the office of the director under Section 283 of the said
Act, either in the defaulting company or any other
company in which he was functioning as a director.
But, under Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, a director
who has incurred disqualification under Section 164 of
the Act would also have to vacate his office as a
director. However, by virtue of the Amendment Act,
2017 and by the insertion of the proviso to Section
167(1)(a) of the Act, a director of a defaulting
company would not have to vacate office in the
company which is in default under Section 164(2)
of the Act, but, he would have to vacate office in all
other companies where he is a director. On a reading
of Section 167 of the Act, it is evident that Section
167(1)(a) of the Act deals with the disqualifications
specified in Section 164. Section 164(1)(a) to (h) of
the Act deals with those grounds of disqualification,
which according to petitioners' counsel are personal to
a director of a company, but under Section 164(2) of
the Act, the disqualification occurs on account of the
- 550 -
default of the company, either under clause (a) or (b)
thereof, resulting in an ineligibility for a director to be
re-appointed as a director either in that company or in
any other company for a period of five years.
167. An argument advanced on behalf of the
petitioner is, under Section 167(1)(a) of the Act,
vacating of office of a director on account of the
disqualification is limited to only Section 164(1) of the
Act; it does not extend to Section 164(2) of the Act.
If it is interpreted otherwise, it would be in violation of
Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as the
said provision would be unreasonable and arbitrary.
168. The said argument is rebutted by learned
Additional Solicitor General and other counsel for
respondent-Union of India by contending that when
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act refers to Section 164 of
the Act, it would mean the entire Section 164, which
inter alia, includes both Section 164(1) as well as
164(2) of the Act. That the proviso applies only to a
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disqualification incurred by a director under Section
164(2) of the Act. Hence, it is not right to contend
that Section 167(1)(a) of the Act refers to only
Section 164(1) of the Act.
169. The aforesaid argument of learned ASG is
countered by Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, learned senior
counsel for the petitioners by contending that Section
167(1)(a) of the Act states that the office of a director
shall become vacant in case he incurs any of the
disqualifications specified in Section 164 of the Act.
Assuming for the sake of argument, it also
encompasses within its scope a disqualification
incurred under Section 164(2) of the Act, it would
mean that such a director would vacate his office from
the defaulting company also, which would lead to a
situation where the entire Board of Directors would
have to vacate office resulting in the company not
having any Board at all! In this context, my attention
was drawn to clauses (b) to (h) of Section 167(1) of
the Act, wherein even without incurring a
- 552 -
disqualification, the office of the director would
become vacant for the reasons, such as, on account of
the absence of the director from all the meetings of
the Board of Directors held during a period of twelve
months with or without seeking leave of absence of
the Board; if he acts in contravention of the provisions
of Section 184 of the Act relating to entering into
contracts or arrangements in which he is directly or
indirectly interested; if he fails to disclose his interest
in any contract or arrangement in which he is directly
or indirectly interested, in contravention of the
provisions of Section 184 of the Act; if he becomes
disqualified by an order of a court or the Tribunal; he
is convicted by a court for any offence, whether
involving moral turpitude or otherwise and sentenced
in respect thereof to imprisonment for not less than
six months; (provided that the office shall be vacated
by the director even if he has filed an appeal against
the order of such Court); he is removed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Act; he, having
- 553 -
been appointed a director by virtue of his holding any
office or other employment in the holding, subsidiary
or associate company, ceases to hold such office or
other employment in that company. That, clauses (b)
to (h) of Section 167(1) of the Act deal with the
conduct of a director in the discharge of his duties as
a director of the Board of Directors whereas Clause (a)
of Section 167(1) deals with incurring a
disqualification specified in Section 164 of the Act. It
was contended on behalf of the petitioners that under
Clauses (b) to (h) of Section 167(1) of the Act, a
director would vacate his office as a director only from
the Board of Directors of that company in which his
conduct contravenes or comes within the scope and
ambit of clauses (b) to (h). But, under clause (a) of
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, the director would
vacate his office if he incurs any of the
disqualifications specified in Section 164 of the Act in
respect of all companies where he is a director. But,
under Section 167(1)(b) to (h) of the Act, he would
- 554 -
vacate office as a director of that company only which
has defaulted under Section 164(2) of the Act. That
there is also a distinction between Section 164(1) and
(2) of the Act. Under Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, if
the director has to vacate office on account of
disqualification incurred under Section 164(2) of the
Act, it could only be as a director of the company
which is in default. But, any disqualification under
Section 164(1) of the Act would entail a vacation of
office in respect of all companies where he is a
director. That, for all the aforesaid reasons, Section
167(1)(a) of the Act is manifestly arbitrary and has to
be struck down was the submission.
170. That under the newly inserted proviso to
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act (by the Amendment Act,
2017), the director who has incurred disqualification
under Section 164(2) of the Act would not vacate his
office as Director of the company in default, but would
have to vacate the office in all other companies in
which he is a director. It was contended that the
- 555 -
proviso is manifestly arbitrary, as a director, who does
not vacate his office as a director of a defaulting
company, cannot vacate the office of the director in all
other companies in which he is a director, as there is
no nexus between the directorship of a defaulting
company and directorship in all other companies,
where there is no default. It was contended that by a
proviso, a distinction could not have been made,
insofar as Section 164(2) of the Act is concerned.
That a proviso cannot enlarge the scope of the main
provision. That Section 167(1)(a) of the Act does not
extend to Section 164(2) at all. In this context, it was
contended that the reason as to why Section
167(1)(a) has to be restricted to only disqualification
incurred under Section 164(1) of the Act is because a
director who is disqualified under Section 164(1)(a) to
(h) of the Act cannot continue to remain in office on
account of the very nature of the disqualification and
hence, Section 167(1)(a) of the Act has to be read
only in the context of Section 164(1)(a) to (h) of the
- 556 -
Act as such a director would have to vacate office in
all companies. This is having regard to the basis or
grounds for incurring a disqualification under Sections
164(1)(a) to (h) of the Act, namely on account of the
director being declared by a competent court to be of
unsound mind; or he is an un-discharged insolvent; or
he is adjudged as an insolvent; or he has applied to
be adjudged as an insolvent; he is convicted by any
court for an offence, etc. But, Section 164(2) of the
Act is a disqualification incurred by a director
vicariously on account of the company being in
default. In such an event, even according to the
proviso, he continues to hold office of the director in
the defaulting company. It was contended on behalf
of the petitioners that, when such a director could
continue to hold office in a company which is in
default under Section 164(2) of the Act, there is no
reason as to why he should vacate office of the
director in all other companies in which he is a
director, which are not at all in default under Section
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164(2) of the Act. In other words, the disqualification
under Section 164(1)(a) to (h) of the Act would
render a director being disqualified vis-à-vis all
companies in which he is holding office of a director
and he has to vacate the said office. But, when
disqualification is on account of Section 164(2)(a) or
(b) of the Act, the same is not in the nature of a
disqualification which is "incurred" by a director as
under Section 164(1) of the Act, as contended by Sri
Prashanth.
171. Therefore, the plausible interpretation
suggested by petitioners' counsel at the Bar is that a
director who incurs disqualification on account of
Section 164(2) of the Act, does not vacate his office
under Section 167(1)(a) of the Act. If so interpreted,
Section 167(1)(a) is valid and constitutional, but not
otherwise. Further, if Section 167(1)(a) of the Act
does not per se take within its ambit Section 164(2) of
the Act, then by a proviso, the main provision cannot
be enlarged. In other words, it is contended on behalf
- 558 -
of the petitioners, while the proviso inserted by the
Amendment Act 2017 categorically states that a
director who has incurred a disqualification under sub-
section (2) of Section 164 of the Act, does not vacate
the office of the company which is in default, by the
same logic, he cannot also vacate the office of a
director in all other companies in which he is director.
172. Bearing in mind the aforesaid arguments,
it is noted that, under 1956 Act, a disqualification of a
director under Section 274(1)(g) which was in respect
of public companies did not result in vacation of office
of the defaulting company. Therefore, insofar as any
disqualification which has occurred under the provision
of 1956 Act would not, on the coming into force of
2013 Act, result in vacating the office of the director
as Section 167(1)(a) of the Act cannot have a
retrospective operation. But, insofar as any
disqualification which takes place subsequent to the
enforcement of the Act, the same would result in a
two-fold consequence. What is stated in Section
- 559 -
164(2) of the Act is a long term consequence. But,
the short term consequence is that the director of a
defaulting company has to vacate his office as
director. In this regard, it has been contended that
the vacation of office of a director is per se a harsh
consequence and is disproportionate to the object
sought to be achieved and therefore, Section
167(1)(a) must be struck down as being arbitrary and
being in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution.
173. However, I do not find that the said
provision is arbitrary inasmuch as a director who
suffers disqualification as per Section 164(2) of the
Act cannot be re-appointed as a director of the
defaulting company as well as any other company for
a period of five years. The said consequence stems
immediately after the company in which a person is a
director does not comply with Section 164(2) of the
Act. When a director cannot be re-appointed in the
defaulting company or in any other company for a
- 560 -
period of five years from the date of disqualification,
by the same logic, the director cannot be permitted to
continue as a director in any other company. The
short term effect of the non-compliance of Section
164(2) of the Act by a company is that the director of
such a defaulting company would have to vacate his
office as a director in all companies where he is a
director. The whole object and purpose of such a
provision is to ensure that a director of a defaulting
company does not continue to hold the office of the
director in any company, while at the same time, he is
ineligible to be appointed as a director in the
defaulting company or in any other company. In
other words, when there is ineligibility for a director of
a defaulting company to be re-appointed as a director
of the defaulting company or appointed as a director
of any other company, then by the same logic he
cannot be permitted to be continued as a director in
the defaulting company or in any other company. The
disqualification on account of non-compliance under
- 561 -
Section 164(2) of the Act implies that the director is a
part of the Board of Directors of a company who has
not complied with the requirements of Section 164(2)
of the Act. Such a director cannot be permitted to
hold the office of a director in any other company
also. In other words, the object and purpose of
vacating the office of a director of a defaulting
company in the defaulting company and in all other
companies in which he is a director is in the interest of
transparency, probity and protection of share-holders'
rights. It is also in order to achieve greater
accountability in corporate governance. For the same
reason, it is held that Section 167(1)(a) of the Act is
also not unreasonable as it has been made in public
interest and is not in violation of Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution as it is saved under Article 19(6) of
the Constitution.
174. The alternative contention of the
petitioners is that Section 167(1)(a) of the Act is
restricted to a disqualification incurred under Section
- 562 -
164(1)(a) to (h) of the Act and does not refer to a
disqualification under Section 164(2) of the Act no
doubt is attractive. Such a line of argument is also in
consonance with the fact that under Section 283 of
the 1956 Act, a director who incurred disqualification
under Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act did not have
to vacate the office of the director. In fact, on other
hand, a reading of Section 283(1)(a) to (l) of the 1956
Act would clearly indicate that the director would have
to vacate the office on the grounds mentioned under
Section 274(1)(a) to (f) of the 1956 Act, which are
almost in pari materia with Section 164(1)(a) to (h) of
the Act.
175. Further, it is noted that Section 167(1)(a)
of the Act is also distinct from Section 167(1)(b) to
(h) of the Act, which deal with the conduct of a
director vis-à-vis a company. Therefore, it is deduced
by petitioners that Section 167(1)(a) of the Act per se
refers to only Section 164(1) of the Act, which are
grounds for disqualification personal to a director and
- 563 -
which grounds are distinct from Section 164(2).
Hence, the latter provision which would not result in
the director who has incurred disqualification on
account of the default committed by the company to
vacate office of the said company or of other
companies in which he is a director. It is no doubt
true that under Section 167(1)(b) to (h) of the Act, a
director has to vacate office on the grounds stated
therein, but only from that particular Board of
Directors where he is a director and on account of his
acts of commission or omission, as the case may be.
But, the same is not extended to all other companies
in which such a director holds the position of a
director. In other words, absenteeism, contravention
of the provisions of the Act etc. mentioned under
Section 167(1)(b) to (h) of the Act would result in
vacating the office of only the Board of Directors of
that company in respect of which the misconduct or
omission has occurred and not in other companies in
- 564 -
which such a director is also holding the office of a
director.
176. Section 167(1)(a) of the Act uses the
expression "any of the disqualifications specified in
Section 164". On a plain reading of the same, it
cannot be restricted to only Section 164(1) of the Act.
177. While holding so, reliance could be placed
on the guiding principles of interpretation of statute.
One such principle is that the Court is not entitled to
ignore words or read words into a provision of an Act,
for the meaning is to be found within the four corners
of the provision of the Act, as in the instant case.
Therefore, while it is not permissible to add words or
to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other hand effort
should be made to give meaning to each and every
word used by the legislature.
178. Thus, the golden rule of construction is that
the words of the statute in the instant case must be
first understood in the natural or ordinary sense.
- 565 -
Phrases and sentences must be construed according
to their complete grammatical meaning, unless that
leads to some absurdity or unless there is something
in the context, or in the object of the statute to
suggest the contrary. In other words, the golden rule
is that the words of a statute prima facie be given an
ordinary meaning. Natural and ordinary meaning of
words should not be departed from "unless it can be
shown that the legal context in which the words are
used requires a different meaning". Such a meaning
cannot be departed from by the judges "in light of
their own views as to policy" unless it is shown to
adopt a purposive interpretation of the statute.
However, if the words used in the statute would result
in injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of
statutory objective, the language may be modified
sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage and no further.
179. Further, when Section 167(1)(a) of the Act
is juxtaposed with Section 167(1)(b) to (h) of the Act,
it would imply that the disqualification is only in
- 566 -
respect of the office of a director of that particular
Board of Directors wherein a person has incurred
disqualification or has committed acts of omission or
commission. While a disqualification incurred by a
director under Section 164(1)(a) to (h) would result in
that particular director vacating the office in all
companies where he is a director. In other words, he
has to vacate office of director in the company, which
is in default as well as in all other companies as
ineligibility to be appointed occurs in all the above
companies. Hence, vacating the office of a director
who has incurred the disqualification in all other
companies where he is a director would arise is the
argument of respondents. Therefore, such a director
would have to vacate office in the defaulting company
as well as in all other companies.
180. If indeed by the proviso, a director who is
disqualified, by virtue of Section 164(2) of the Act has
to vacate his office in all other companies in which he
is a director, other than the defaulting company, then
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the same logic could have extended to clauses (b) to
(h) of Section 167(1) of the Act also, which deal with
the misconduct of a director of Board of Directors is
the argument proffered on behalf of the petitioners.
But, in such a situation, the director who has
misconducted himself by being absent or failing to
disclose his interest, etc., does not lose his position as
a director in all other companies. In other words, he
will have to vacate the office of the director in only
that company in respect of which he has
misconducted himself. Hence, it is contended by
petitioners that there can be no vacation of office for a
disqualification incurred under Section 164(2) of the
Act under Section 167(1)(a) of the Act. If the
aforesaid logic is now applied, in a reverse manner, to
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, the director who has
incurred a disqualification under Section 164(2) of the
Act, under the proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act,
while he continues to be in office in the defaulting
company, according to the petitioners, for no reason
- 568 -
or in the absence of any nexus has to vacate his office
in all other companies wherein he is a director.
Hence, in the proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act,
the words "the office of the director shall become
vacant in all the companies" is assailed by the
petitioners.
181. But, by insertion of the proviso to Section
167(1)(a) of the Act, a director who has incurred
disqualification under Section 164(2) of the Act would
continue being in office in the defaulting company, but
in all other companies (other than the company which
is in default) he would vacate office. It is contended
that the insertion of the proviso by an amendment
cannot seek to enlarge the scope of the main
provision being Section 167(1)(a) of the Act. If really,
the disqualification incurred under sub-section (2) of
Section 164 of the Act results in vacating the office of
the director, then the same ought to have been stated
expressly under Section 167(1)(a) of the Act itself, is
the contention.
- 569 -
182. But, it is observed that if indeed Section
167(1)(a) of the Act resulted in vacation of all the
directors on account of Section 164(2) of the Act, then
the company would be bereft of directors on the
Board. Such a company cannot function at all!
Keeping in mind the said aspect, even under Section
283 of the 1956 Act, disqualification of a director
under Section 274(1)(g) of the said Act did not result
in vacating of office in the defaulting company. But,
Section 167(1)(a) also encompasses Section 164(2) of
the Act. The reasons are already stated while
considering point No.1 but it can be emphasized
further with reference to a judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court.
183. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
N.Narayanan vs. Adjudicating Officer, Securities
and Exchange Board of India, [(2013)12 SCC
152], (N.Narayanan) has observed as under:
- 570 -
"30. Responsibility is cast on the Directors to prepare the annual records and reports and those accounts should reflect "a true and fair view". The over-riding obligation of the Directors is to approve the accounts only if they are satisfied that they give a true and fair view of the profits or loss for the relevant period and the correct financial position of the company.
31. A company though a legal entity cannot act by itself, it can act only through its Directors. They are expected to exercise their power on behalf of the company with utmost care, skill and diligence. This Court while describing what is the duty of a Director of a company held in Official Liquidator v. P.A. Tendolkar (1973) 1 SCC 602 that:
"45.....A Director may be shown to be placed and to have been so closely and so long associated personally with the management of the Company that he will be deemed to be not merely cognizant of but liable for fraud in the conduct of business of a Company even though no specific act of dishonesty is provide against him personally. He cannot shut his eyes to what must be obvious to
- 571 -
everyone who examines the affairs of the Company even superficially."
184. But, in order to avoid an incongruent
situation where all the directors of a defaulting
company would have to vacate their office, the
proviso has been added, by which the directors who
incur disqualification on account of Section 164(2) of
the Act would not vacate their office in the defaulting
company. The proviso to the said extent is
clarificatory in nature and would apply to any
disqualification that occurs after the enforcement of
the Act. Even according to the petitioners, the
remedy provided in the proviso to that extent is just
and proper.
185. But the further grievance of the petitioners
is, by a proviso, the directors who incur
disqualification under Section 164(2) of the Act in
respect of a defaulting company would have to vacate
their office of director in all other companies other
than the defaulting company which is manifestly
- 572 -
arbitrary. It is contended that while on the one hand,
the amendment is made by the insertion of a proviso
to set right an absurdity which is justified, the
question is as to whether by a proviso, the directors,
who are disqualified on the ground of Section 164(2)
of the Act in respect of the defaulting company, ought
to vacate the office of directors in all other companies
where they hold such office.
186. As already noted, such a proviso did not
find a place under Section 283 of the 1956 Act, as well
as when the Act was enforced. As a result of default
committed by the company under Section 164(2) of
the Act, the directors of such a company are
disqualified. The consequence of such disqualification
are mentioned in Section 164(2) of the Act, which
could be termed as a long term consequence or effect,
but the immediate or the short term effect is vacating
of office of a director. While the directors of a
company, which is in default under Section 164(2) of
the Act, would not vacate their office as per the
- 573 -
proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act on account of
the said disqualification, nevertheless have to vacate
their office as directors in all other companies even
where there is no default in those companies. In
other words, whether the provision is unreasonable
having no nexus to the object sought to be achieved is
the pertinent question to be answered.
187. At the outset, it would be relevant to
delineate on the scope and object of a proviso to the
provision.
(a) The normal function of a proviso is to
except something out of the provision or to qualify
something enacted therein which, but for the proviso,
would be within the purview of the provision. As a
general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to
qualify or create an exception to what is in the
enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted
as stating a general rule. In other words, a proviso
qualifies the generality of the main enactment by
providing an exception and taking out as it were, from
- 574 -
the main enactment, a portion which, but for the
proviso would fall within the main enactment.
Further, a proviso cannot be construed as nullifying
the enactment or as taking away completely a right
conferred by the enactment.
(b) In this regard, learned Author, Justice
G.P.Singh has, in "Principles of Statutory
Interpretation", enunciated certain rules collated from
judicial precedents. Firstly, a proviso is not to be
construed as excluding or adding something by
implication i.e., when on a fair construction, the
principal provision is clear, a proviso cannot expand or
limit it. Secondly, a proviso has to be construed in
relation to which it is appended i.e., normally, a
proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which
it is a proviso. A proviso carves out an exception to
the main provision to which it has been enacted as a
proviso and to no other. However, if a proviso in a
statute does not form part of a section but is itself
enacted as a separate section, then it becomes
- 575 -
necessary to determine as to which section the
proviso is enacted as an exception or qualification.
Sometimes, a proviso is used as a guide to
construction of the main section. Thirdly, when there
are two possible construction of words to be found in
the section, the proviso could be looked into to
interpret the main section. However, when the main
provision is clear, it cannot be watered down by the
proviso. Thus, where the main section is not clear, the
proviso can be looked into to ascertain the meaning
and scope of the main provision.
(c) The proviso should not be so construed as
to make it redundant. In certain cases, "the
legislative device of the exclusion is adopted only to
exclude a part from the whole, which, but for the
exclusion, continues to be a part of it", and words of
exclusion are presumed to have some meaning and
are not readily recognized as mere surplusage. As a
corollary, it is stated that a proviso must be so
construed that the main enactment and the proviso
- 576 -
should not become redundant or otiose. This is
particularly so, where the object of a proviso
sometimes is only by way of abundant caution,
particularly when the operative words of the
enactment are abundantly clear. In other words, the
purpose of a proviso in such a case is to remove any
doubt. There are also instances where a proviso is in
the nature of an independent enactment and not
merely, an exception or qualifying what has been
stated before. In other words, if the substantive
enactment is worded in the form of a proviso, it would
be an independent legislative provision concerning
different set of circumstances than what is worded
before or what is stated before. Sometimes, a proviso
is to make a distinction of special cases from the
general enactment and to provide it specially.
(d) At this stage, the construction or
interpretation of a proviso could be considered. In
Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula vs. Motibhai
Nagjibhai [AIR 1966 SC 459], while dealing with
- 577 -
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1948, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, that a proper
function of a proviso is to except or qualify something
enacted in the substantive clause, which but for the
proviso, would be within that clause. In Kaviraj
Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma vs. Navaratna
Pharmaceutical Laboratories [AIR 1965 SC 980],
while considering proviso to Section 6 of Trade Marks
Act, 1940, it was observed that it would not be a
reasonable construction for any statute, if a proviso
which in terms purports to create an exception and
seeks to confer certain special rights on a particular
class of cases included in it should be held to be otiose
and to have achieved nothing. In Kedarnath Jute
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. The Commercial Tax
Officer and Others, [AIR 1966 SC 12], it was
observed that "the effect of an excepting or qualifying
proviso, according to the ordinary rules of
construction, is to except out of the preceding portion
of the enactment or to qualify something enacted
- 578 -
therein, which, but for the proviso, would be within it".
[See "Craies" on Statute Law - 6th Edition - P.217].
In this case, the Court was considering Section 5(2)
(a) (ii) of Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act, 1941 and
Rule 27-A of Bengal Sales Tax Rules. In Dattatraya
Govind Mahajan and Others Vs. The State of
Maharashtra and another, [AIR 1977 SC 915], a
Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, while
considering the amendment made to Maharashtra
Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, in
the context of Article 31B of the Constitution and the
second proviso thereto, reiterated what was stated in
Ishverlal's case, supra. In S.Sundaram Pillai, etc,
vs. V.R.Pattabiraman, [AIR 1985 SC 582], while
dealing with the scope of a proviso and explanation to
sub-section (2) of Section 10 of Tamil Nadu Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that a proviso may have three
separate functions. Normally, a proviso is meant to
be an exception to something within the main
- 579 -
enactment or qualifying some thing enacted therein
which, but for the proviso, would be within the
purview of the enactment. In other words, a proviso
cannot be torn apart from the main enactment, nor
can it be used to nullify or set at naught the real
object of the main enactment. Sometimes, a proviso
may exceptionally have the effect of a substantive
enactment.
(e) After referring to several legal treatises and
judgments, the Apex Court held in the above
judgment as under:-
"43. We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this point because the legal position seems to be clearly and manifestly well established. To sum up, a proviso may serve four different purposes:
(1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment;
(2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in
- 580 -
order to make the enactment workable; (3) it may be so embedded in the
Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and
(4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision."
(f) The approach to the construction and
interpretation of a proviso are enunciated in the
following cases. In M.Pentiah & others vs.
Muddala Veeramallappa & others, [AIR 1961 SC
1107], it was observed that while interpreting a
section or a proviso, if the choice is between two
interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to
achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, one
should avoid a construction which would reduce the
legislation to futility and should rather accept the
bolder construction based on the view that Parliament
would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about
an effective result. In Superintendent &
- 581 -
Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to Govt. of West
Bengal vs. Abani Maity, [AIR 1979 SC 1029], the
Apex Court observed that the statute is not to be
interpreted merely from the lexicographer's angle. The
Court must give effect to the will and inbuilt policy of
the Legislature as discernible from the object and
scheme of the enactment and the language employed
therein. The words in a statute often take their
meaning in the context of a statute as a whole. They
are, therefore, not to be construed in isolation.
188. The further argument of learned counsel
for the petitioners is that the petitioners herein were
disqualified on 01.11.2016. On that date, they did not
have to vacate office as it was not envisaged under
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act. But, by the Amendment
Act, 2017, by insertion of a proviso, the petitioners
who were disqualified on 01.11.2016 cannot now be
forced to vacate the office of director in all other
companies in which they are holding the position of
- 582 -
directors as the said provision cannot have a
retrospective operation.
189. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the
operation of the proviso in question and as to whether
it has a retrospective operation or a prospective one.
190. It is noted that the amendment to Section
167(1)(a) of the Act by the Amendment Act, 2017 has
been with effect from 07.05.2018. However, the
disqualification in most of these cases has been with
effect from 01.11.2016. The question then is whether
the proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act inserted by
virtue of the Amendment Act, 2017 can be made
applicable to the petitioners herein, in which event,
the petitioners who have been disqualified as on
01.11.2016 would not vacate the office of the
directors in the defaulting company, but would vacate
the office of director in all other companies. In other
words, whether the proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of
the Act has a retrospective operation? In this regard,
- 583 -
the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners is that the said proviso cannot be
construed to have retrospective operation so as to be
applicable to the petitioners herein, but it operates
only prospectively, in which case, the petitioners
would not have to vacate their office either in the
defaulting company or in any other company.
191. This argument is countered by learned ASG
by contending that the proviso inserted by virtue of
the Amendment Act, 2017 is only clarificatory in
nature and therefore, it has retrospective operation by
which the petitioners herein would continue as
directors of the defaulting company but they would
vacate office in all other companies. He submitted
that the said position is envisaged even under Section
167(1)(a) of the Act and therefore, the proviso only
clarifies that the directors of the defaulting company
would not vacate office in the defaulting company in
order to ensure that the defaulting company is not left
without any director.
- 584 -
192. By way of reply, learned counsel for the
petitioners relied upon the following decisions
touching upon the rule against retrospectivity in the
context of an amendment made to a provision:
(a) In Union of India vs. Tushar Ranjan
Mohanty, [(1994) 5 SCC 450], the Hon'ble
Supreme Court declared that when an amendment
has a retrospective operation and takes away vested
rights, it is unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution.
(b) Similarly, in P.D. Aggarwal vs. State of
U.P., [(1987) 3 SCC 622], it was held that
amendment to Rules which have a retrospective
operation and take away the vested rights are
arbitrary and not reasonable and such retrospective
amendments are subject to judicial scrutiny.
(c) In J.S.Yadav vs. State of U.P., [(2011) 6
SCC 570], it was observed that a vested right is a
right independent of any contingency, which can arise
- 585 -
from a contract, statute or by operation of law. A
vested right can be taken away only if the law
specifically or by necessary implication provides for
such a course.
(d) Reference could also be made to Railway
Board Vs. C.R.Rangadhamaiah, (1997) 6 SCC
623, wherein it has been held that an amendment
having retrospective operation which has the effect of
taking away a benefit already available to the
employee under the existing rule is arbitrary,
discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed
under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution."
(e) Similarly in P.Tulsi Das V. Government of
A.P., (2003) 1 SCC 364, it has been held that
wherever the amendment purports to restore the
status quo ante for the past period taking away the
benefits already available, accrued and acquired by
them, the law may not be valid.
- 586 -
193. But, I find much force in the argument of
learned ASG that the proviso is only clarificatory in
nature as Section 167(1)(a) of the Act categorically
states that the office of the director shall become
vacant in case he incurs "any of the disqualification
specified in Section 164 of the Act". The aforesaid
expression cannot be read down to refer only to those
disqualifications under Section 164(1)(a) to (h) of the
Act. It even incorporates a disqualification incurred
under Section 164(2) as well as (3) of the Act. Thus,
the object of introducing Section 167(1)(a) of the Act-
when such a provision was conspicuous by its absence
in 1956 Act-is to bring in higher degree of
transparency and accountability in corporate
governance so as to ensure control over the
companies in the interest of share-holders and the
public in general and in the interest of Indian
economy. Therefore, I do not think that it could be
contended by the petitioners that Section 167(1)(a) of
- 587 -
the Act did not envisage vacation of office of a director
under Section 164(2) of the Act.
194. However, the submission of the learned
counsel for the petitioners that Section 167(1)(a) of
the Act did not specifically refer to vacating of office of
a director of a defaulting company in all other
companies in which he is a director and that has been
incorporated by a proviso which cannot be applied to
the petitioners herein retrospectively, as the said
proviso has been enforced from May 2018 and the
petitioners have all been disqualified prior to that date
requires consideration.
195. I find considerable force in the argument of
petitioners' counsel as, on 01.11.2016, when the
petitioners were disqualified, while they had to vacate
the office of the director, it necessarily referred to the
defaulting company under Section 164(2) of the Act.
But, realizing the fact that if all the directors in the
defaulting company had to vacate office, then such
- 588 -
Board of Directors would be bereft of directors and
would lead to an absurd situation, the proviso was
inserted to the effect that a director of a defaulting
company shall not vacate office of the director in the
defaulting company. Therefore, the said portion of
the proviso could be construed to be clarificatory in
nature and therefore, would have a retrospective
effect.
196. But, while saying so, the proviso also
states that a director of a defaulting company would
vacate office of the director in all other companies in
which he is a director. The same was not envisaged
under Section 167(1)(a) of the Act prior to insertion of
the proviso, but by the insertion of the proviso such
an immediate consequence is also envisaged. It has
also been held above that such a consequence cannot
be held to be arbitrary or in violation of Article 14 and
19(1) of the Constitution, but the proviso having come
into force on 07th May 2018 cannot have a
retrospective operation so as to affect the petitioners
- 589 -
herein who were all disqualified on 01.11.2016 i.e.,
prior to 07th May 2018. That, on account of such
disqualification, they cannot be made to vacate the
office of the director in all other companies in which
they are directors while continuing as a director in the
defaulting company. That part of the proviso has to
be construed to be prospective and it would imply that
the petitioners herein would continue as directors of
the defaulting company and would not have to vacate
office of the director in all other companies in which
they are directors. The proviso would therefore apply
only to those directors who sustain disqualification
subsequent to 07.05.2018 when the proviso was
introduced. Consequently, under Section 167(1)(a) of
the Act, a director of a defaulting company who has
been disqualified prior to 07.05.2018 would not have
to vacate his office of such a company or in any other
company. Further, the petitioners who were also
protected by the interim order passed by this Court
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would continue to be the directors of the defaulting
company till their term of office ends.
197. In the result, point No.6 is answered by
holding that the proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the
Act is not ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution. The words "provided that where he
incurs disqualification under sub-section (2) of
Section 164, the office of the director shall
become vacant ......., other than the company
which is in default under that sub-section" being
clarificatory in nature has retrospective operation,
while the words "in all the companies" being
introduced for the first time by way of proviso,
pursuant to Amendment Act, 2017, has prospective
operation and the proviso would apply only to those
directors who sustain a disqualification pursuant to
07.05.2018. While saying so, the doctrine of
severability as applicable to interpretation of statutes
is applied.
- 591 -
198. In view of the fact that under the proviso to
Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, the director of a
defaulting company continues to hold the office of
Director despite disqualification, his DIN cannot be
cancelled. On the issue of cancellation of DIN,
reference was made to Companies (Appointment and
Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014. Under Rule
14, the consequences of disqualification of directors
under Section 164(2) of the Act are mentioned. That
every director shall inform to the company concerned
about his disqualification under sub-section (2) of
Section 164 of the Act in Form DIR-8 before he is
appointed or re-appointed. Further, whenever a
company fails to file the financial statements or
annual returns, or fails to repay any deposit, interest,
dividend, or fails to redeem its debentures, as
specified in sub-section (2) of section 164, the
company shall immediately file Form DIR-9, to the
Registrar furnishing therein the names and address of
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all the directors of the Company during the relevant
financial year.
199. That cancellation or surrender or
deactivation of DIN is stipulated in Rule 11. It is
contended that Rule 11 does not permit cancellation of
or deactivation of DIN on account of disqualification of
a director under Section 164(2) of the Act at all. That
DIN could be cancelled on account of the death of a
director or a director being declared as a person of
unsound mind by a competent Court or being
adjudicated as a insolvent or for other reasons, but,
not for suffering a disqualification under Section
164(2) of the Act.
200. I find sufficient force in the contention of
the learned counsel for the petitioners in that regard.
Hence, DIN cannot be cancelled on account of a
disqualification sustained under Section 164(2) of the
Act, but at the same time the company must comply
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with filing Form DIR-9. Point Nos.5 and 6 are
accordingly answered.
Part-12 Judgments of Madras and Gujarat High Courts:
201. At this stage, it is necessary to refer to the
judgments of Madras High Court and Gujarat High
Court.
202. The Madras High Court in Bhagavan Das
Dhananjaya Das vs. Union of India & Others,
[(2018) 210 Comp. Cases 151 (Mad), at
paragraphs 29 & 30 of the judgment has summarized
its conclusions as under:
" 29. In fine,
(a) When the New Act 2013 came into effect from 1.4.2014, the second respondent herein has wrongly given retrospective effect and erroneously disqualified the petitioner-directors from 1.11.2016 itself before the deadline commenced wrongly fixing the first financial year from 1.4.2013 to 31.3.2014.
(b) By virtue of the new Section 164(2)(a) of the 2013 Act using the expression for any continuous period of three financial years' and in the light of Section 2(41) defining 'financial year' as well as their own General Circular
- 594 -
No.08/14 dated 4.4.2014, the first financial year would be from 1.4.2014 to 31.3.2015, the second financial year would be from 1.4.2015 to 31.3.2016 and the third financial year would be from 1.4.2016 to 31.3.2017, whereas the second respondent clearly admitted in paras 15 and 22 of the counter affidavit that the default of filing statutory returns for the financial years commenced from 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16 i.e., one year before the Act 2013 came into force. This is the basic incurable legal infirmity that vitiates the entire impugned proceedings.
(c) By virtue of the first proviso to Section 96(1) of the 2013 Act, Annual General Meeting for the year ending on 31.3.2017 can be held within six months from the closing of financial year i.e., 30.9.2017, additionally in the light of Section 164(2)(a) referring to 'annual return' and 'financial statement', the time limit to file annual return under Section 92(4) of 2013 Act is sixty days from Annual General Meeting or the last date on which Annual General Meeting ought to have been held, hence, the time limit to file balance sheet under Section 137(1) of the 2013 Act is again thirty days from Annual General Meeting. Therefore, in view of these legal position, the disqualification could get triggered off only on or after
- 595 -
30.10.2017 only, if any company fails to file annual forms for three financial years. Importantly, it is to be borne in mind that even beyond that time limit, additional time limit of 270 days was available by virtue of the then first proviso to Section 403.
(d) Although there is no statute or provision expressly spelling out the observance of the principles of natural justice against disqualification of directors, as the legal right of the petitioners to continue as director in other company or to be reappointed in any other company, which are scrupulously following the provisions of the Companies Act, have been deprived of, the principles of natural justice should have been adhered to by issuing proper notice to all the directors.
(e) When the disqualification clause was not attracted to the directors of private companies under the old Act of 1956, the same cannot be allowed to take a retrospective effect under the new Act, when the provision of Section 164(2)(a) came into force only from 1.4.2014. This is also for one more reason that the failure to file the annual returns has been adequately taken care of by the penal provision under Section, making it clear that every officer of the company who is in default shall be
- 596 -
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both. Again under Section 137, the failure to file the financial statement visits punishment with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both. Further, under Section 441(4), the default in filing returns or accounts compoundable by Tribunal or Regional Director or by any officer authorized by the Central Government.
(f) In view of the above legal position, when the default in filing the accounts or returns are made as compoundable offence, Section 164(2)(a) providing the disqualification of director of private company not only in the defaulting company, but also from other company in which the petitioner is a director, diligently and meticulously following every provision of law, is certainly disproportionate to the lapse, as it is only regulatory in nature, because, notice to be sent under Section 248(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 by the Registrar of Companies for striking off the name of the company from the Registrar of Companies on the premise
- 597 -
that the company has not been carrying on any business for a period of two financial years, is different from the disqualification under Section 164(2)(a), inasmuch as a company can be struck off, if the company has not been carrying on any business for a period of two financial years, whereas for disqualification, the criteria is three financial years. Therefore, in my considered opinion, although the petitioners have not challenged the provision of Section 164(2)(a), as the respondents have not followed the principles of natural justice, extinguishing the corporate life of the directors to the extent of disqualifying them to hold the directorship in the other companies, the said provision is liable to be read down, hence, Section 164(2)(a) is read down to the extent it disqualifies the directors in other companies which are scrupulously following the requirements of law, making it clear that no directors in other companies can be disqualified without prior notice.
(g) However, it is made clear beyond any pale of doubt that the mischief of removal of the names of the companies by the Registrar of Companies and the disqualification of the directors in the defaulting company will go together, as it is inseparable, and the Registrar of
- 598 -
Companies need not give fresh notice to the directors for their disqualification from the dormant company, if there is a failure to file the financial statement or annual return for any continuous period of three financial years as per Section 164(2)(a).
30. For all the aforementioned reasons, the impugned orders are set aside and the writ petitions shall stand allowed. Consequently, all the connected writ miscellaneous petitions are closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs."
203. I respectfully agree with the summary of
conclusions at paragraph (a), (b) and (e). I do not
wish to make any observations regarding paragraphs
(c) and (g). However, I respectfully disagree with the
conclusions at paragraph (d) in view of my conclusion
on point No.2 and (f) in view of my conclusion on
point Nos.1 and 2 above.
204. The judgment of the Gujarat High Court in
the case of Gaurang Balavantlal Shah S/o.
Balavantlal Shah vs. Union of India, [Spl. Civil
- 599 -
Application Nol.22435/2017 disposed of on
18.12.2018] is based on the challenge made to the
action of respondent No.1 therein-Ministry of
Corporate Affairs, Union of India, in publishing the list
dated 12.09.2017 of directors associated with "Struck
off Companies" under Section 248 of the Companies
Act, 2013 on the website of the Ministry of Corporate
Affairs, Government of India to the extent, the said
list shows the status of the petitioners as "disqualified"
Directors. At paragraph Nos.33 to 35 of the
judgment, Gujarat High Court has observed as under:
"33. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion and findings may be summarized as under:-
a. Section 164(2) of the Act of 2013, which had come into force from 1.1.2014 would have prospective and not retrospective effect.
b. The defaults contemplated under Section 164(2)(a) with regard to non- filing of financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years would be the defaults to be counted from the financial year 2014-15 only and not 2013-14.
- 600 -
c. The respondents could not have treated the Directors as disqualified/ ineligible for a period of five years from 1.11.2016 to 1.11.2021, while publishing the impugned list under Section 248 of the Act of 2013.
d. Even if the Registrar removes the name of a company from the register of companies, and even if such company would stand dissolved under Section 248, the statutory liabilities/obligations of such struck of company and its Directors would still remain to be discharged, in view of Section 250 of the said Act of 2013.
e. The respondents could not have deactivated the DINs allotted to the Directors under Section 154 of the said Act, except under the circumstances mentioned in Rule 11 of the said Rules of 2014.
34. In view of the above, the impugned list dated 12.9.2017 of the Directors associated with the "struck off companies"
under Section 248 published by the respondent No.1 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to activate the respective Director Identification Numbers of the petitioners forthwith, if not activated so far. However, it is clarified that the respondents shall be at liberty to take legal action against the
- 601 -
petitioners for any statutory default or non-compliance, in accordance with law.
35. All the petitions stand allowed accordingly."
205. I respectfully agree with paragraphs (i),
(ii), (iii), (v), while Point No.(iv) is not relevant for the
purpose of these cases. However, I have observed
that Section 164(2)(a) of the Act has retro-active
effect.
206. The only other aspect that remains for
consideration is with regard to those writ petitions
which have been filed by petitioners assailing the
order passed under Section 248 of the Act, as a result
of which the companies have been struck off from the
list of Companies. Any challenge to the said order
could be made under Section 252 of the Act. In the
circumstances, those writ petitions are entertained
reserving liberty to the petitioners therein to approach
the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). It is
further clarified by following the judgment of the
- 602 -
Gujarat High Court in Gaurang Balavantlal Shah
S/o. Balavantlal Shah vs. Union of India referred
to above, that in striking off the companies under
Section 248 of the Act would not result in an
automatic disqualification of the directors of such
companies under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act.
207. Before parting, I wish to observe that the
underlining theme in these cases is about transparent
corporate governance, the importance of which is not
just in its form, but also of substance. Legislation
can, to some extent, impose accountability but the
substance of it must be ingrained in all persons in the
corporate world. I would, in fact, state that every
citizen in all walks of life must endeavour to bring in
transparency and accountability in his / her work if
our country, India or Bharat is to endure. Thus, the
time has come for us citizens, to transform ourselves
ethically by erasing all dark spots in our minds and
hearts and to work towards a resurgent Nation.
Article 51A of the Constitution of India which deals
- 603 -
with fundamental duties states that, it shall be the
duty of every citizen of India to strive towards
excellence in all spheres of individual and collective
activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher
levels of endeavour and achievement, but by ethical
means. The Act and the amendments made to it are
only small steps taken towards that goal. It is only
when a strict implementation of the same by all the
stake-holders in the corporate world as well as the
authorities concerned is made, that the aims and
objects of the legislation could be achieved.
Part-13 Summary of Conclusions:
208. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have
arrived at the following conclusions:
(a) It is held that Section 164(2)(a) of the
Act is not ultra vires Article 14 of the
Constitution. The said provision is not
manifestly arbitrary and also does not fall
within the scope of the doctrine of
- 604 -
proportionality. Neither does the said provision
violate Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as it
is made in the interest of general public and a
reasonable restriction on the exercise of the
said right. The object and purpose of the said
provision is to stipulate the consequence of a
disqualification on account of the circumstances
stated therein and the same is in order to
achieve probity, accountability, and
transparency in corporate governance.
(b) That Article 164(2)(a) of the Act applies
by operation of law on the basis of the
circumstances stated therein, the said provision
does not envisage any hearing, neither pre-
disqualification nor post- disqualification and
this is not in violation of the principles of
natural justice and hence, is not ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution.
- 605 -
(c) That Section 164(2)(a) of the Act does
not have a retrospective operation and is
therefore, neither unreasonable nor arbitrary,
in view of the interpretation placed on the
same.
(d) That there has been an arbitrary
exercise of power by the respondent authority
in disqualifying the petitioners as directors of
public companies by taking into consideration
the period prior to 01.04.2014 as well as
subsequent thereto for the purpose of
reckoning the continuous period of three
financial years. It is observed that even in
respect of public companies, having regard to
the nature of the consequences envisaged
under Section 164(2) of the Act as compared to
Section 274(1)(g) of the 1956 Act, the period
prior to 01.04.2014 and subsequent thereto
could not have been considered for reckoning
three continuous financial years for
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disqualifying the directors of public companies.
Such disqualification is hence quashed.
(e) Insofar as the private companies are
concerned, disqualification on account of the
circumstances stated under Section 164(2)(a)
of the Act has been brought into force for the
first time under the Act and the consequences
of disqualification could not have been imposed
on directors of private companies by taking into
consideration any period prior to 01.04.2014
for the purpose of reckoning continuous period
of three financial years under the said
provision. The said conclusion is based on the
principle drawn by way of analogy from Article
20(1) of the Constitution as, at no point of time
prior to the enforcement of the Act, a
disqualification based on the circumstances
under Section 164(2) of the Act was ever
envisaged under the 1956 Act vis-à-vis
directors of private companies. Such a
- 607 -
disqualification could visit a director of only a
public company under Section 274(1)(g) of
1956 Act and never a director of a private
company. Such disqualification of the
petitioners who are directors of private
companies is hence quashed.
(f) But, if any disqualification of directors of
public companies has occurred under the 1956
Act, i.e., prior to 01.04.2014, the same would
result in an ineligibility under Section 164(2) of
the Act on account of the retro-active operation
of the Section.
(g) Consequently, where the disqualification
under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act is based on
a continuous period of three financial years
commencing from 01.04.2014, wherein
financial statements or annual returns have not
been filed by a public or private company, the
directors of such a company stand disqualified
and the consequences of the said
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disqualification would apply to them under the
Act.
(h) That Section 167(1)(a) of the Act is not
ultra vires Article 14 and/or Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution. The said provision is saved
under Article 19(6) thereof.
(i) The proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the
Act is not ultra vires Articles 14 or 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution as being manifestly arbitrary
having regard to the interpretation made
above.
(j) Further, the amendment to Section
167(1)(a) of the Act, by insertion of the proviso
is by virtue of the Amendment Act, 2017 is
subsequent to the date on which the petitioners
were disqualified, which in most cases is
01.11.2016 or at any rate prior to May 2018.
That the said proviso has only a prospective
effect and cannot have a retrospective
operation. Thus, in respect of the petitioners
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who were disqualified prior to the date of
enforcement of the amended provision, that
portion of the proviso namely "office of the
director shall become vacant in all the
companies" is not applicable to those
petitioners. Hence, the petitioners herein,
(who may have also been granted interim
orders by this Court) continue to hold office as
directors in the defaulting company as well as
all other companies. This is in consonance with
the interpretation placed on the proviso and
petitioners would not vacate the office in all
other companies in which they are directors as
the proviso does not apply to the petitioners
who were all disqualified prior to 07th May
2018, as the amendment, by way of an
insertion of proviso, has only a prospective
operation.
(k) It is clarified that the operation of the
proviso under Section 167(1)(a) of the Act
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being prospective in nature, any disqualification
of any director of a public company or a private
company prior to 07th May 2018, would not
result in such director vacating the office of the
director in all other companies in which the
disqualified director is a director. However, the
director of the company in default would
continue to hold office as a director even in
respect of the defaulting company. The proviso
to the above extent only is by way of a
clarification so as to avoid an absurdity as
otherwise, all the directors of the defaulting
company would have to vacate office which
would result in the company being bereft of
directors and have a cascading effect and there
would be no compliance of Section 164(2)(a)
by such a company. Hence, the expression
"other than the company which is in default" in
the proviso to Section 167(1)(a) would imply
that the director of a defaulting company who
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has suffered disqualification need not vacate
his office of the director in the defaulting
company.
(l) Consequently, proviso to Section
167(1)(a) of the Act having a prospective
operation would affect only those directors who
are disqualified on or after 07th May 2018
insofar as vacating office of director other than
the defaulting company is concerned.
(m) It is held that the directors of the struck
off companies under Section 248 of the Act do
not per se get disqualified. But, if the said
company has also not complied with Section
164(2)(a) of the Act, then the said company
being a defaulting company, the directors of
such a company get disqualified in terms of the
discussion made above.
Re. Point No.7:
209. In the result, I pass the following order:
- 612 -
ORDER
(i) Where the disqualification of the petitioners is based by taking into consideration any financial year "prior to 01.04.2014 as well as subsequent thereto" while reckoning continuous period of three financial years under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, irrespective of whether the petitioners are directors of public companies or private companies, such a disqualification being bad in law, the Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned List is quashed to that extent only;
(ii) If the disqualification of the directors is based by taking into consideration any financial year prior to 01.04.2014 only i.e., the disqualification has occurred under the provisions of the 1956 Act in respect of the public companies, the writ petitions are dismissed;
(iii) If the disqualification of the directors is based by taking into consideration three continuous financial years subsequent to 01.04.2014, irrespective of whether the petitioners are directors of public
- 613 -
companies or private companies, they stand disqualified under the Act;
(iv) Where the disqualification of the petitioners is based by taking into consideration any financial year prior to 01.04.2014 in respect of private companies, such disqualification being bad in law, the writ petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent only;
(v) The Writ Petitions, wherein the challenge is also made to the vires of Section 164(2)(a), and/or 167(1)(a) and/or proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Act, are dismissed to the aforesaid extent;
(vi) The respondents are directed to restore the DIN of those directors whose disqualification has been quashed by this Court;
(vii) Those petitioners who have challenged only the striking off of the companies in which they are directors have an alternative remedy of filing a proceeding before National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 252 of the Companies Act, 2013, which provides for an appeal to be filed within a period of
- 614 -
three years from the date of passing of the order dissolving the company under Section 248 of the Act. Hence, those Writ Petitions are dismissed reserving liberty to those petitioners who are aggrieved by the dissolution of the companies under Section 248 of the Act (Struck off companies) to approach NCLT, if so advised;
(viii) Parties to bear their own costs.
Interim orders passed in these writ petitions stand
vacated. All pending applications stand disposed.
The appreciation for the assistance rendered by
the learned senior counsel and the learned counsel for
the petitioners, learned ASG and other counsel for Union
of India and other respondents is placed on record.
Sd/-
JUDGE
S*/RK/-
Ct: RM
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