Y.P. Sudhanva Reddy vs Karnataka Milk Federation

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4412 -4413 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.28437-28438 of 2015]

Sri Y.P. Sudhanva Reddy & Ors. .. Appellant(s)

Versus

The Chairman And Managing Director, Karnataka Milk Federation Etc. .. Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) These appeals are filed against the final

judgment and order dated 16.12.2014 passed by the

Signature Not Verified High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Regular Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL Date: 2018.04.25

First Appeal No. 2096 of 2012 C/W RFA. CROB. No. 15:22:26 IST Reason:

27 of 2013 whereby the High Court dismissed the

1 Regular First Appeal filed by the appellants herein

and allowed the CROB. No.27 of 2013 and the

application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 read with

Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

(hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) filed by the

Respondent and set aside the findings recorded by

the Trial Court on Issue No.1 that the appellants

(plaintiffs) are the absolute owners of the Schedule ‘A’

and “B’ property.

3) In order to appreciate the issue involved in the

appeals, few relevant facts need to be mentioned

infra.

4) The appellants are the plaintiffs whereas the

respondent is the defendant in a civil suit out of

which these appeals arise.

5) The disputes in the civil suit out of which these

appeals arise relate to a land bearing Sy. No.2/1,

Koramangala Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South

2 Taluk measuring 1 acre 27 guntas (hereinafter

referred to as “suit land”). It is between the

appellants (plaintiffs) and the respondent (defendant)

which is a Co-operative Society engaged in the

business of manufacturing and selling of Milk.

6) One Mr. K.G. Yellappa Reddy was the original

holder of the suit land. In the year 1998, K.G.

Yellappa Reddy filed a civil suit (OS No. 4875/1998)

against the respondent for permanent injunction in

relation to the suit land. He claimed, inter alia, that

he is in possession of the suit land and the

respondent is trying to interfere in his possession.

7) The suit was, however, dismissed as being not

maintainable on 17.02.2001 by the Trial Court for

want of notice. Mr. K.G. Yellappa Reddy, in the

meantime, died leaving behind the appellants herein

as his legal representatives.

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8) On 14.03.2007, the appellants filed another civil

suit (No.2143/2007) against the respondent before

the City Civil Judge, Bangalore for a declaration and

permanent injunction in relation to the suit land.

9) In the suit, the appellants claimed title through

their ancestor (late K.G. Yellappa Reddy) and alleged

that the appellants are now the owners of the suit

land after the death of Mr. K.G. Yellappa Reddy by

inheritance and the respondent has no right, title

and interest in the suit land and nor has any right to

interfere in the possession of the appellants over the

suit land.

10) The respondent (defendant) denied the

appellants’ claim and, inter alia, alleged in the written

statement that they have been in possession of the

suit land in their own rights. It was alleged that the

State Government acquired the suit land a long back

for public purpose and allotted the suit land to the

4 respondent for a valuable consideration and since

then they are in possession of the suit land in their

own right and carrying on their business.

11) The respondent also contended that the suit

filed by the appellants is barred by the principle of

res judicata because of the dismissal of the previous

suit filed by their father (Mr. K.G. Yellappa Reddy)

against the respondent in relation to the suit land

wherein the same relief was claimed but was declined

to the appellants’ late father. The respondent also

raised other legal pleas, such as suit is barred by

limitation, it is neither properly valued and nor

proper Court Fees has been paid on the relief claimed

etc.

12) The Trial Court, by judgment/decree dated

13.08.2012, though dismissed the suit as being

barred by limitation but held the appellants to be the

owner of the suit land. In other words, the Trial Court

5 held that the appellants were able to prove their

ownership over the suit land but dismissed the suit

as being barred by limitation. It was also held that

the respondents failed to prove their case inasmuch

as they failed to file any document in support of their

stand that the suit land had been acquired by the

State.

13) The appellants felt aggrieved by the dismissal of

their case and filed first appeal in the High Court of

Karnataka at Bangalore whereas the respondent felt

aggrieved against the finding of ownership recorded

against them and filed cross objection under Order

41 Rule 22 of Code. The respondent also filed an

application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code in

the appeal and filed copy of the notification issued

under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (for

short, “the Act”) by the State by which the State had

acquired the suit land in support of their case.

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14) By impugned judgment, the High Court

dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants, allowed

the application filed by the respondent under Order

41 Rule 27 of the Code and also the cross objection

filed by the respondent and dismissed the appellants’

suit.

15) Against this judgment, the appellants(plaintiffs)

felt aggrieved and filed the present appeals by way of

special leave in this Court.

16) Heard Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned senior

counsel for the appellants and Mr. S.S. Naganand,

learned senior counsel for the respondent.

17) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

and on perusal of the record of the case, we are

constrained to dismiss the appeals finding no merit

therein.

18) In our considered opinion, the filing of the two

suits, namely, first by the appellants’ father, Mr. K.G.

7 Yellappa Reddy, (O.S.No.4875/1998) and later by the

appellants out of which these appeals arise were

wholly misconceived in nature and were not

maintainable as would be clear from the following

reasons.

19) It is not in dispute that once the respondent

filed a copy of the notification in appeal before the

High Court bearing No.L-5468-MI 10-4-15 dated

22.01.1941 issued under Section 4 of the Act by the

State Government, which was taken on record as

additional evidence by the High Court, showing that

the suit land was acquired by the State in the year

1941, the legal position arising in the case in relation

to the suit land became clear.

20) Indeed, as a matter of fact, consequent upon

issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the

Act, which was followed by declaration under Section

6 and then by an award under Section 11 of the Act

8 and lastly, by taking over of the possession of the suit

land from the owner of the suit land (appellants’

father) under Section 16 of the Act, the suit land

stood vested in the State absolutely free from all

encumbrances as provided under Section 16 of the

Act.

21) In other words, on and after issuance of the

notifications under the Act and initiation of

acquisition proceedings by the State which

culminated in passing of the award as far back as in

the year 1941, the appellants’ predecessor-in-title

ceased to be the owner of the suit land and lost all

his rights to hold the suit land and claim possession

over it.

22) The only legal remedy available to the

appellants’ predecessor-in-title (Mr. K.G.Yellappa

Reddy) in such case was to challenge the legality and

correctness of the notifications issued under Section

9 4 or/and 6 of the Act and that too within a

reasonable time after their issuance in the year 1941.

It is not in dispute that the landowners, admittedly,

did not challenge the validity and correctness of the

notifications and, on the other hand, by suppressing

the fact of acquisition proceedings from the Court

filed two suits one after the other and claimed title

over the suit land.

23) In our considered opinion, neither the

predecessor-in-title of the appellants and nor the

appellants had any subsisting right, title and interest

in the suit land on and after 1941 consequent upon

issuance of the notifications by the State under the

Act. The reason was that all the ownership rights of

the appellants’ predecessor-in-title in the suit land

stood vested in the State once the acquisition

proceedings were completed under the Act. As

mentioned above, the appellants’ only right was to

10 either challenge the land acquisition proceedings as

being against the provisions of Act or to claim

compensation payable under the Act in relation to

the suit land under Section 11 of the Act followed by

reference proceedings under Section 18 of the Act

and lastly, in appeal before the High Court for its

re-dertermination.

24) We find from the record that the appellants

failed to file any document in rebuttal to the

documents filed by the respondent in appeal by way

of additional evidence with a view to show that the

notifications issued under the Act for acquiring the

suit land, which were relied on by the respondent in

appeal, were either withdrawn or set aside or not

given effect to. Such fact, in our view, alone would

have enabled the appellants to claim and assert their

right of ownership over the suit land. Such was,

however, not the case of the appellants.

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25) In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are

of the considered opinion that the suit filed by the

appellants seeking therein a declaration of their title

over the suit land and further claiming permanent

injunction was wholly misconceived and was liable to

be dismissed.

26) Indeed, no declaration of title over the suit land

could be claimed or/and granted by the Civil Court

and nor any suit of such nature could be filed in the

Civil Court in the light of background facts brought

on record by the respondent by way of additional

evidence in appeal. These documents fully establish

that neither the appellants’ predecessor and nor the

appellants had any subsisting prima facie title in

their favour over the suit land on the date of filing the

two suits.

27) Learned counsel for the appellants, however,

argued that there was non-compliance of the

12 provisions of Order 41 Rule 27-A of the Code and

hence the application filed by the respondent ought

not to have been allowed by the High Court. The

submission, in our opinion, has no merit for the

following reasons.

28) In the first place, the documents sought to be

filed by the respondent, namely, notifications issued

under the Act were relevant and also necessary for

deciding the rights of the parties involved in the

suit/appeal. Second, these documents did not

require any proof being public documents in nature.

Third, the respondent had already made reference of

these documents and laid foundation in the

pleadings and lastly, the first Appellate Court has

jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code to

allow the parties to file additional evidence, if such

documents are required to decide the suit/appeal

provided satisfactory explanation is given as to why

13 the documents could not be filed in the suit and why

they are filed in appeal. The respondent, in this case,

did give the explanation, which found acceptance to

the High Court and, in our opinion, rightly.

29) Learned counsel for the appellants (plaintiffs)

argued some issues but they did not impress us in

the light of the settled legal position taken note of us

supra.

30) In the light of the foregoing discussion, we

concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived

at by the High Court and find no merit in the

appeals.

31) The appeals thus fail and are accordingly

dismissed.

………………………………..J (R.K. AGRAWAL)

…..………………………………J. (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE) New Delhi, April 25, 2018

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