Wikimedia Foundation Inc vs Ani Media Private Limited

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5391 OF 2025

WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION INC. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

ANI MEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

UJJAL BHUYAN, J.

This appeal by special leave is directed against the

order dated 16.10.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the

High Court of Delhi (‘High Court’ hereinafter) in FAO (OS)

No.146 of 2024 (Wikimedia Foundation Inc. Vs. ANI Media Signature Not Verified Private Limited and Ors.). Digitally signed by ASHISH KONDLE Date: 2025.05.09 14:29:13 IST Reason: 1

2. Order dated 16.10.2024 of the Division Bench of the

High Court reads as under:

1. On the last date of hearing, learned counsel for respondent No. l had drawn this Court's attention to a page published on the website 'Wikipedia 'wherein the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge in CS(OS)524/2024 was adversely commented upon. It was stated in the said publication that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge to release the identities of the editors who made the edits amounted to 'censorship and a threat to the flow of information’.

2. This Court is of the prima facie view that the aforesaid comment on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge amounts to interference in Court proceedings, and that too, on a website managed by Wikimedia Foundation Inc. who is a defendant in the suit. The subjudice principle, prima facie, seems to have been 'violated with impunity' by Wikimedia Foundation Inc. - the appellant herein.

3. This Court is also informed by the learned counsel for respondent No. l that after the last hearing, the observations made by this Bench have been 'opened up for discussion' on Wikimedia Foundation Inc. website which, according to us, complicates and compounds the issue at hand.

2 4. At this stage, Mr. Akhil Sibal, learned senior counsel for the appellant, on instructions, states that neither the pages wherein the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge have been commented upon nor the pages on which the discussion qua the observations made by the Division Bench have been created by the Wikimedia Foundation Inc. He further states that, in the event this Court were to direct to take down of the offending pages and discussions, the said order would be complied with.

5. Since this Court is of the prima facie view that the aforesaid comments on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and the discussion on the observations made by this Bench amount to interference in court proceedings and violation of the subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and borders on contempt, this Court directs Wikimedia Foundation Inc.- the appellant herein to take down/delete the said pages and discussion with regard to the observations made by this Court within thirty six (36) hours. List on 21st October, 2024.

3. When the related special leave petition was moved

on 17.03.2025, this Court while issuing notice to the first

respondent (ANI Media Private Limited) observed as follows:

3

We are concerned with the legality and validity of the directions issued by the High Court in paragraph 5 of the impugned order.

4. Therefore, in this appeal we are not concerned with

the inter se merit of the case between the parties. We are

primarily concerned with the legality and propriety of the

direction of the High Court to the appellant to take

down/delete the pages and discussion with regard to the

observations made by the High Court. That is the width and

scope of this appeal.

5. However to put the matter in proper perspective,

background facts may be briefly noted.

6. Respondent has instituted a suit before the High

Court against the appellant and others being CS (OS) No.

524/2024 (appellant is defendant No. 1 in the suit). Following

are the reliefs claimed in the suit:

In view of the above, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to:

a. Pass an order against the defendants, restraining them from posting, publishing, uploading, writing, speaking, distributing and/ or republishing

4 any false, misleading and defamatory content against the plaintiff on any platform, including the platform maintained by defendant No. 1;

b. Pass an injunction against the defendant No. 1 or its agents or any person acting on its behalf or under its authority, directing it to remove all false, misleading and defamatory content against the plaintiff available on its platform, which can tarnish the reputation of the plaintiff and further restrain its users and administrators from publishing anything defamatory against the plaintiff on its platform;

7. On 20.08.2024, a learned Single Judge of the High

Court passed the following order:

10. The learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are claimed to be the ‘Administrators' of defendant No. l.

11. Learned senior counsel for defendant No. l submits that they have no connection with defendant Nos. 2 to 4.

12. Keeping in view the above submissions, defendant No. l is directed to disclose the subscriber details of defendant Nos.2 to 4 to the plaintiff, through its counsel, within a period of two weeks from today. On receipt of the said information, the plaintiff shall take steps for

5 ensuring service of summons and notice on the application on the said defendants.

8. Respondent filed an application under Order XXXIX

Rule 2A, Order X Rule 2 and Order XI read with Section 151 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘Civil Procedure Code’

hereinafter) in the suit seeking initiation of contempt

proceedings against the appellant for alleged willful

disobedience to the aforesaid order dated 20.08.2024. The

same has been registered as I.A. No. 38498 of 2024.

9. On 17.09.2024, an opinion piece was published in

the Indian Express (E-edition) titled why the case against

Wikipedia in India is a challenge to freedom of speech and

information. It was also hosted in the platform of the appellant.

10. In the piece it was mentioned that while issuing

contempt notice, the learned Single Judge had reportedly said:

If you don’t like India, please don’t work in India: we will ask

the Government to block your site. Observing that there could

be a failure to understand the nature of the medium i.e.

Wikipedia, it was commented upon that the court’s decision to

6 hold some members accountable and punish a community of

volunteers by disclosing their private information seems to be

a challenge to freedom of speech and information. The effect

this would produce is that any form of critical information that

a powerful organization does not like can be censored or

become grounds for punishment which would set a wrong

precedent.

11. Be that as it may, aggrieved by the order dated

20.08.2024 of the learned Single Judge, appellant preferred an

appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court under

Section 104 of the Civil Procedure Code read with Order XLIII

Rule 1(r) of the said Code for setting aside of the aforesaid

order.

12. On 10.10.2024 a video was posted by news agency

Medianama about the case. In this video again reference was

made to the learned Judge’s warning to the appellant and

discussed as to how the court’s decision can impact safe

harbor protection and information flow in India; it can stifle

the flow of information and knowledge, it being a form of

7 censorship. In the ultimate analysis, it is the people who

would suffer because of restrictions on knowledge and

information flow.

13. It appears that when the appeal was listed before

the Division Bench on 14.10.2024, respondent complained

that publishing of such a page on the platform of the appellant

was intended to pressurize the learned Single Judge. When

appellant sought for time to seek instructions the court

directed the matter to be listed for hearing on 16.10.2024.

14. On 14.10.2024, a talk page was hosted on the

appellant’s platform opening up discussions on the ongoing

proceedings between the parties before the High Court. Be that

as it may, on 16.10.2024, the impugned order was passed

which we have extracted above. In the impugned order

reference has also been made to the discussion page at

paragraph 3.

15. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits

that the Division Bench is palpably in error in holding that a

prima facie case of interference in court proceeding, violation

8 of the subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and

bordering on contempt was made out. He submits that High

Court failed to consider that appellant is merely an

intermediary having the limited role of providing technical

infrastructure to host the platform and does not edit, update,

maintain or monitor the contents on the platform. This was

applicable to the talk page as well as to the video. Appellant,

not being the author, cannot be said to have violated the sub

judice principle merely because the two pages were hosted on

its platform. In any case, what were being hosted were

secondary source material.

15.1. Insofar the subjudice principle is concerned,

learned senior counsel has referred to a Constitution Bench

decision of this Court in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation

Limited Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India 1 and

submits that the aforesaid decision provides for an order for

postponement of publication in the event of violation of the

1 (2012) 10 SCC 603

9 subjudice principle but for determining such violation, the

Constitution Bench set out the following criteria:

1. There is a real and substantial risk of prejudice to fairness of the trial or to the proper administration of justice;

2. Reasonable alternative methods will not prevent the risk to fairness of the trial.

15.2. He submits that there is no discussion at all by the

Division Bench as to how the pages hosted on the platform of

the appellant constitute a real and substantial risk of

prejudice to the pending proceedings before the learned Single

Judge. The impugned order is devoid of any reason.

15.3. He further submits that the direction to take down

the said pages is an unreasoned, unwarranted one and in

violation of the right to open justice guaranteed under Article

21 of the Constitution of India. Further, it impinges upon the

freedom of speech and expression, a guaranteed right under

Article 19(1)(a).

15.4. Learned senior counsel submits that the view taken

by the Division Bench that the contents of the pages hosted on

10 the appellant’s platform borders on contempt is wholly

unjustified. While observing so, the Division Bench failed to

consider that the said pages were derived from other published

secondary sources. Those were publicly available.

15.5. Finally, learned senior counsel submits that passing

of orders like the impugned one would have a chilling effect

not only on free speech but also on the right to know. It would

impinge upon the right to freely access and use the medium of

internet.

15.6. He, therefore, submits that in any view of the matter

the impugned order cannot be sustained and is liable to be set

aside.

16. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent

vehemently argued that the impugned order is only in the

nature of an interim order. Appeal is pending as well as the

suit. Therefore, this Court should not entertain the appeal.

16.1. He further submits that such airing of adverse

comments, that too on the platform of a party to the suit,

11 certainly amounts to interference in court proceedings.

Therefore, the Division Bench was justified in directing the

appellant to take down/delete the offending pages. No

interference is called for.

17. Submissions made by learned counsel for the

parties have received the due consideration of the Court.

18. At the outset, it would be appropriate to advert to

the two pages which are the subject matter of the present

proceeding. The page hosted on the platform of the appellant

titled “Asian News International vs. Wikimedia Foundation

(article page) along with the discussions concerning the article

page hosted on its corresponding "talk page" (talk page)

(collectively hereinafter referred to as ‘impugned page’) contain

the details regarding the defamation case filed by respondent

No. 1 against the appellant and some comments allegedly

made by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in the

case.

19. There was also a talk page hosted on the appellant’s

platform on 14.10.2024, where discussions were held on the

12 ongoing proceedings between the parties before the High Court

which was noticed by the Division Bench in paragraph 3 of the

impugned order. Division Bench of the High Court in

paragraph 5 of the impugned order opined that the comments

and discussion on the observations made by the Bench

amounts to interference in court proceedings and violation of

the subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and

borders on contempt. It therefore directed the appellant to

take down/delete the said pages and discussion within thirty-

six (36) hours.

20. As noticed above, while directing the appellant to

take down/delete the concerned pages and discussion, the

Division Bench was of the prima facie view that those

amounted to interference in court proceedings, violation of the

subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and borders

on contempt.

21. Let us deal with the above grounds.

13

22. In Reliance Petrochemicals Limited Vs. Proprietors of

Indian Express Newspapers 2 , respondent had published

articles containing adverse remarks on the issue of debentures

by the appellant while the matter was subjudiced before this

Court. When this was complained of by the appellant who

sought initiation of contempt proceedings against the

respondent, this Court granted an injunction against the said

publication. At a later stage, this Court considered the

question as to whether there was need for continuance of the

order of injunction. It was in that backdrop that this Court

formulated the principle of preventive injunction. It has been

held that preventive injunction against the press can be

granted only if reasonable grounds for keeping the

administration of justice unimpaired necessitate so. This

Court accepted the test of present and imminent danger on

the basis of balance of convenience and clarified that it would

be justified to grant preventive injunction against the press

only if the danger apprehended is real and imminent.

2 (1988) 4 SCC 592

14 22.1. In the facts of that case, this Court reiterated that

continuance of the injunction would amount to interference

with the freedom of press in the form of preventive injunction.

People at large have a right to know in order to be able to take

part in a participatory development in the industrial life and

democracy. Right to know is a basic right which citizens of a

free country like ours aspire in the broader horizon of the right

to live in this age under Article 21 of our Constitution. This

right has reached new dimension and urgency.

23. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Sahara India

Real Estate Corporation Limited (supra) considered a gamut of

issues to find an acceptable constitutional balance between

freedom of the press and administration of justice; as to when

publishing matters relating to cases which are sub-judice

interferes with or obstructs or tends to obstruct with the due

course of justice. In that case, appellant was directed by the

respondent to refund amounts invested with the appellant in

certain optionally fully convertible bonds with interest. This

came to be challenged by the appellant. This Court had issued

15 notice to the respondent. While putting the appellant to notice

as to how it intended to secure the liabilities incurred by them

to the optionally fully convertible bond holders during the

pendency of the civil appeals, it was directed to file an affidavit

together with a valuation certificate indicating fair market

value of the assets proposed to be offered as security.

Pursuant thereto, appellant filed an affidavit before this Court

explaining the manner in which it proposed to secure its

liability. While the matter was subjudiced, this Court

communicated to the parties that they should try to reach a

consensus with respect to an acceptable security in the form

of an unencumbered asset. Learned counsel for the appellant

addressed a letter to the learned counsel for the respondent

enclosing the proposal with details of security to secure

repayment to the bond holders as a pre-condition for stay

during the pendency of the appeals. There were also

correspondences between the respective Advocates-on-Record.

A day prior to the hearing, one of the news channel flashed on

television the details of the said proposal which was a

16 confidential communication, obviously not meant for public

circulation. The television channel concerned also named the

valuer who had done the valuation of assets proposed to be

offered as security. There was no information forthcoming

from the respondent either of acceptance or rejection of the

proposal. In the hearing it was complained on behalf of the

appellant that disclosure of such details to the media by the

respondent was in breach of confidentiality which was of

course denied by the learned counsel for the respondent. It

was in that context that this Court rendered its decision in

Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited (supra).

23.1. This Court examined the interplay between the

constitutional safeguard of free speech on the one hand and

the doctrine of prior restraint on the other hand. It was

observed that Supreme Court is not only the sentinel of the

fundamental rights but is also a balancing wheel between the

rights, subject to social control. Freedom of expression is one

of the most cherished values of a free democratic society.

Freedom of the press which is a facet of freedom of expression

17 includes the right to receive information and ideas of all kinds

from different sources. In essence, freedom of expression

embodies the right to know. After noticing the development of

law on the issue of prior restraint, this Court observed that

while open justice is the corner stone of our judicial system as

it instills faith in the judicial and legal system, it is not

absolute. It can be restricted by the court in its inherent

jurisdiction as done in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs.

State of Mahrashtra3 wherein this Court upheld the decision of

the High Court directing that deposition of the defence

witnesses should not be reported in the newspapers. An order

of a court passed to protect the interest and administration of

justice cannot be treated as violative of Article 19(1)(a). This

Court held that there is power in the courts to postpone

reporting of judicial proceedings in the interest of

administration of justice but burden lies on the applicant to

demonstrate substantial risk of prejudice to the pending trial

which would therefore justify postponement of offending

publication.

3 AIR 1967 SC 1

18 23.2. This Court posed the question as to whether a

postponement order constitutes a restriction on Article 19(1)(a)

and whether such restriction is saved under Article 19(2).

Answering the above question, this Court observed that a

postponement order is actually a balancing measure. It seeks

to balance the right to free speech as well as the right to

information on the one hand and the presumption of

innocence of the accused on the other hand. However, this

Court cautioned that given that postponement orders curtail

the freedom of expression of third parties, such orders

have to be passed only in cases in which there is real and

substantial risk of prejudice to fairness of the trial or to the

proper administration of justice. Therefore, such orders of

postponement should be ordered for a limited duration and

without disturbing the content of the publication. It should be

passed only when necessary to prevent real and substantial

risk to the fairness of the court proceedings. The order of

postponement will only be appropriate in cases where the

balancing test otherwise favours non-publication for a limited

19 period. If a High Court or the Supreme Court, being courts of

record, pass postponement orders under their inherent

jurisdiction, such orders would fall within ‘reasonable

restrictions’ under Article 19(2).

23.3. This Court concluded that a postponement order is

a neutralizing device evolved by the courts to balance interests

of equal weightage viz freedom of expression vis-a-vis freedom

of trial. However, this Court observed that keeping in mind the

important role of the media, such a postponement order

should be subject to the twin tests of necessity and

proportionality to be applied only in cases where there is real

and substantial risk of prejudice to the proper administration

of justice or to the fairness of the trial. However, it would be

open to the media to challenge such an order in appropriate

proceedings. A postponement order is not a punitive measure

but is a preventive measure.

24. A three-Judge Bench of this Court was considering

the issue of live streaming of court proceedings in Swapnil

20 Tripathi Vs. Supreme Court of India4. The Bench observed that

our legal system subscribes to the principle of open justice

and highlighted that right to access justice flowing from Article

21 of the Constitution would be meaningful only if the public

gets access to the proceedings unfolding before the courts.

Right to know and receive information is a facet of Article

19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Therefore, the public is entitled to

witness court proceedings involving issues having an impact

on the public at large or even on a section of the public.

24.1. In his concurring opinion Justice Dr. D.Y.

Chandrachud (as His Lordship then was) referred to the

observations of Lord Diplock in the following manner:

69. Lord Diplock, speaking for the House of Lords in Attorney General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd., remarked that open courts are a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy.

Open courts, in his view, help build public confidence in the administration of justice. The public's trust in the judicial system depends on their perception of how courts function. Open courts make it possible for the public to develop

4 (2018) 10 SCC 639

21 reasonable perceptions about the judiciary, by enabling them to directly observe judicial behaviour, and the processes and outcomes of a case.

24.2. He also referred to what Jeremy Bentham had said

regarding publicity about courtroom proceedings as a

mechanism to prevent improbity of Judges: it is the surest of

all guards against improbity. It keeps the Judge himself, while

trying, under trial.

24.3. Referring to Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra), it was

observed that various judgments of this Court have reinforced

the importance of open courts. Public trial in open court is

undoubtedly essential for the healthy, objective and fair

administration of justice. Trial held subject to the public

scrutiny and gaze naturally acts as a check against judicial

caprice or vagaries and serves as a powerful instrument for

creating confidence of the public in the fairness, objectivity

and impartiality of the administration of justice. Public

confidence in the administration of justice is of such great

significance that there can be no two opinions on the broad

22 proposition that in discharging functions as judicial tribunals,

courts must generally hear causes in open and must permit

the public admission to the court-room. Publicity is the very

soul of justice.

24.4. Justice Chandrachud concluded that live streaming

of court proceedings is a significant instrument for enhancing

the accountability of judicial institutions and of all those who

participate in the judicial process. It will result in the

dissemination of information in the widest possible sense,

imparting transparency and accountability to the judicial

process. Above all, sunlight is the best disinfectant.

25. In a recent decision, this Court in Imran

Pratapgadhi Vs. State of Gujarat5 highlighted the importance of

freedom of expression and the duty of the courts to uphold

such freedom. This Court observed that sometimes Judges

may not like spoken or written words but still it is the duty of

the courts to uphold the fundamental right under Article

19(1)(a). Except the courts there is no other institution which

5 2025 SCC OnLine SC 678

23 can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens. The courts

must not be seen to regulate or stifle the freedom of speech

and expression. This Court held thus:

38. Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or groups of individuals is an integral part of a healthy, civilised society. Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing another point of view. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected. Literature including poetry, dramas, films, stage shows, satire and art, make the life of human beings more meaningful. The Courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Sometimes, we, the Judges, may not like spoken or written words. But, still, it is our duty to uphold the fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a). We Judges are also under an obligation to uphold the Constitution and respect its ideals. If the police or executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights

24 guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step in and protect the fundamental rights. There is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens.

39. Courts, particularly the constitutional Courts, must be at the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. It is the bounden duty of the Courts to ensure that the Constitution and the ideals of the Constitution are not trampled upon. Endeavour of the courts should always be to protect and promote the fundamental rights, including the freedom of speech and expression, which is one of the most cherished rights a citizen can have in a liberal constitutional democracy. The Courts must not be seen to regulate or stifle the freedom of speech and expression. As a matter of fact, the Courts must remain ever vigilant to thwart any attempt to undermine the Constitution and the constitutional values, including the freedom of speech and expression.

26. Ramesh Kumaran Vs. State 6 is a case which arose

out of a dispute between two lawyers of the same Bar leading

to lodging of first information reports (FIRs) by both the sides.

6 2025 SCC OnLine 667

25 While hearing the matter, this Court impressed upon the

parties to put an end to the entire controversy. It was observed

that the second respondent had tendered an apology to the

first appellant. Thereafter, he tendered a sincere and

unconditional apology not only to this Court but also to the

first appellant, Bar Council and to the Bar Association. This

Court therefore suggested an amicable settlement. However,

the first appellant was unwilling to accept such apology and

thereby compromise the proceedings. Not only that, he even

went to the extent of threatening the court that if the FIR filed

by him against the second respondent was quashed, he would

commit suicide. It was in that context the Bench observed as

under:

13.…………….In normal course, such threats must be taken very seriously by the Courts.

Action for criminal contempt against the person giving such a threat must be initiated, which should be taken to its logical end, especially when the first appellant is a member of the Bar.

14. However, we believe that if magnanimity is to be shown by someone, the same should be done by the persons holding the highest constitutional

26 office. Moreover, the first appellant has shown some repentance by tendering an unconditional apology and by giving an undertaking not to repeat such misconduct. In view of this apology and in the peculiar facts of this case, we deem it proper not to initiate any action against the first appellant.

27. The contours of criminal contempt are well

delineated. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

defines criminal contempt as under:

(c) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which— (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;

28. Definitely, if a member of the public or a litigant or

for that matter even the media tries to scandalize the court by

making sweeping unfounded allegations against the court or

27 the Judge(s) or by imputing motives against the Judge or

Judges who had passed a judicial order or had conducted the

court proceedings, certainly the courts would be justified to

initiate criminal contempt proceedings against such

contemnors. This would also be a ground to direct

postponement of publication as contempt of court is a

reasonable restriction enumerated under Article 19(2) on the

freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).

29. In Re S. Mulgaokar7 is a classic case qua attitude of

Judges towards contempt of court. Speaking for the Bench,

Chief Justice Beg in his opening remarks said that if criticism

of court proceedings or court orders is done in a reasonable

manner, which pre-supposes accuracy of information about a

matter on which any criticism is offered, and arguments are

directed fairly against any reasoning adopted, I would,

speaking for myself, be the last person to consider it

objectionable even if some criticism offered is erroneous. In the

ultimate analysis, the Bench while dropping the proceedings

7 (1978) 3 SCC 339

28 observed that the need for appropriate norms of conduct exist

in practically every sphere of life in which enlightened people

strive to attain exalted ends irrespective of consequences.

29.1. In his concurring opinion Justice Krishna Iyer culled

out several principles. Relevant portion of his opinion reads

thus:

27. The first rule in this branch of contempt power is a wise economy of use by the court of this branch of its jurisdiction. The court will act with seriousness and severity where justice is jeopardised by a gross and/or unfounded attack on the Judges, where the attack is calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial process. The court is willing to ignore, by a majestic liberalism, trifling and venial offences — the dogs may bark, the caravan will pass.

The court will not be prompted to act as a result of an easy irritability. Much rather, it shall take a noetic look at the conspectus of features and be guided by a constellation of constitutional and other considerations when it chooses to use, or desist from using, its power of contempt.

28. The second principle must be to harmonise the constitutional values of free criticism, the

29 Fourth Estate included, and the need for a fearless curial process and its presiding functionary, the Judge. A happy balance has to be struck, the benefit of the doubt being given generously against the Judge, slurring over marginal deviations but severely proving the supremacy of the law over pugnacious, vicious, unrepentant and malignant contemners, be they the powerful press, gang-up of vested interests, veteran columnists of olympian establishmentarians. Not because the Judge, the human symbol of a high value, is personally armoured by a regal privilege but because “be you — the contemner — ever so high, the law — the people's expression of justice — is above you”. Curial courage overpowers arrogant might even as judicial benignity forgives errant or exaggerated critics. Indeed, to criticise the Judge fairly, albeit fiercely, is no crime but a necessary right, twice blessed in a democracy For, it blesseth him that gives and him that takes. Where freedom of expression, fairly exercised, subserves public interest in reasonable measure, public justice cannot gag it or manacle it, constitutionally speaking. A free people are the ultimate guarantors of fearless justice…………..

30 29.2. Justice Iyer culled out four more principles. The

third principle is to avoid confusion between personal

protection of a libeled Judge and prevention of obstruction of

public justice (and the community’s confidence in that great

process). While the former is not contempt, the latter is

although there can be an overlapping between the two

situations. According to him, the fourth functional canon

which controls discretionary exercise of the contempt power by

the court is that the media which is an indispensable

intermediary between the state and the people and a

necessary instrumentality in strengthening the forces of

democracy, should be given free play within responsible limits

even when the focus of its critical attention is the court,

including the highest court. The next normative guideline

i.e. the fifth is that Judges should not be hypersensitive even

when distortions and criticisms overstep the limits;

Judges should deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified

bearing, condescending indifference and repudiation by

judicial rectitude. Finally, and that is the sixth principle, after

31 evaluating the totality of factors, if the court considers the

attack on the Judge or Judges scurrilous, offensive,

intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, the strong

arm of the law must strike a blow. This is to uphold public

interest and public justice.

29.3. Justice Krishna Iyer referred to a judgment of Lord

Denning and observed that it was a very valuable and

remarkably fresh approach to the question of criticism of

courts in intemperate language and invocation of contempt of

court against the contemnor. Justice Krishna Iyer highlighted

a few observations of Lord Denning as under:

40. A very valuable and remarkably fresh approach to this question of criticism of courts in intemperate language and invocation of contempt of court against the contemner, a person of high position, is found in Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex. p. Blackburn. Lord Denning's judgment is particularly instructive in the context of the obnoxious comments made by Quintin Hogg in an article in the “Punch” about the members of the Court of Appeal. The remarks about the

32 Court of Appeal were highly obnoxious and the barbed words thrown at the Judges obviously were provocative. Even so, in a brief but telling judgment, Lord Denning held this not to be contempt of court. It is illuminating to excerpt a few observations of the learned Judge:

This is the first case, so far as I know, where this Court has been called on to consider an allegation of contempt against itself. It is a jurisdiction which undoubtedly belongs to us but which we will most sparingly exercise:

more particularly as we ourselves have an interest in the matter.

Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself.

It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal

33 faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.

Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism, nothing which is said by this person or that, will deter us from doing what we believe is right; nor, I would add, from saying what the occasion requires, provided that it is pertinent to the matter in hand. Silence is not an option when things are ill done.”

30. Thus, the judicial attitude to the subjudice principle

or interference in court proceedings or contempt of court have

been clearly spelt out by this Court which we have noted.

Further accretion to the analysis would only be repetitive

which we should avoid. However, before moving on, we may

once again remind ourselves of the profound words of this

34 Court expressed through the nine-Judge Bench decision in

Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra): trial held subject to the

public scrutiny and gaze naturally acts as a check against

judicial caprice or vagaries and serves as a powerful

instrument for creating confidence of the public in the fairness,

objectivity and impartiality of the administration of justice.

Courts, as a public and open institution, must always remain

open to public observations, debates and criticisms. Infact,

courts should welcome debates and constructive criticism.

Every important issue needs to be vigorously debated by the

people and the press, even if the issue of debate is subjudice

before a court. However, those who offer criticism should

remember that Judges cannot respond to such criticism but if

a publication scandalizes the court or a Judge or Judges and if

a case of contempt is made out, as highlighted by Justice Iyer

in the sixth principle, certainly courts should take action. But

it is not the duty of the court to tell the media: delete this, take

that down.

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31. For the improvement of any system and that

includes the judiciary, introspection is the key. That can

happen only if there is a robust debate even on issues which

are before the court. Both the judiciary and the media are the

foundational pillars of democracy which is a basic feature of

our Constitution. For a liberal democracy to thrive, both must

supplement each other.

32. The above position has become more nuanced in

the digital age. Though the contention of the appellant is that

it is an intermediary in terms of Section 2(1)(w) read with

Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 providing

only technical infrastructure that host the platform and does

not (a) publish, add or remove content on the platform, (b)

decide which users are vested with certain technical privileges

or (c) continually judge and censor the content posted on the

platform, thereby not liable for any third party information,

data, or communication link made available or hosted by it, we

are not inclined to examine this aspect of the matter since it

may have a bearing on the proceedings of the pending suit.

36 Nonetheless, we are of the firm view that the Division Bench

had reacted disproportionately while issuing the impugned

directions.

33. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above,

we have no hesitation in our mind that such directions could

not have issued. Accordingly, the impugned directions

contained in para 5 of the impugned order dated 16.10.2024

are hereby set aside.

34. Appeal is allowed. However, there shall be no order

as to costs.

………………………………J. [ABHAY S. OKA]

.……………………………J. [UJJAL BHUYAN] NEW DELHI;

MAY 09, 2025.

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