Vishwajeet Kerba Masalkar vs The State Of Maharashtra

2024 INSC 788 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 213 OF 2020

VISHWAJEET KERBA MASALKAR …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

B.R. Gavai, J.

1. The present appeal challenges the final judgment and

order dated 23rd July 2019, passed by the Division Bench of

the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Confirmation

Case No. 2 of 2016 filed by the State of Maharashtra, by

which it upheld the separate orders of conviction and

sentence dated 26th August 2016 and 31st August 2016

passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune1 in Sessions

Case No.64 of 2013, thereby convicting the appellant for the

Signature Not Verified offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 201 of the Digitally signed by Narendra Prasad Date: 2024.10.17 12:16:16 IST Reason:

1 Hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”.

1 Indian Penal Code, 18602 and sentencing him to death along

with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence punishable under

Section 302 of IPC, rigorous imprisonment for ten years

along with fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence punishable

under Section 307 of IPC and rigorous imprisonment of three

years along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence

punishable under Section 201 of IPC.

2. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal

are as under:

2.1 On 4th October 2012, the official at the police control

room was informed by the appellant about a robbery at his

house situated at Champaratna Society, Uday Baug,

Wanwadi, Pune and that his mother-Shobha Masalkar, wife-

Archana Masalkar and two-year old daughter-Kimaya

Masalkar had been killed. The appellant further informed

that his neighbourer-Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) had

also been injured. This information was transmitted to

Bajirao Dadoba Mohite ACP CID (PW-14), who was on duty at

Wanawadi Police Station, Pune, who lodged a complaint.

2 Hereinafter referred to as “IPC”.

2 2.2 Based on the complaint of the appellant, a First

Information Report No.196 of 2012 was registered for

commission of an offence punishable under Sections 302 and

397 of the IPC against unknown persons. It was stated by

the appellant in the complaint that one gold chain of 8 Tolas,

one gold Mangalsutra, cash amount of Rs.7,000/-, 3 small

rings and 2 almond shaped pendants having total value of

Rs.3,07,000/- were stolen. The three dead bodies were sent

to the hospital for post-mortem and the neighbourer

Madhusudan Kulkarni (PW-12) was also sent to the hospital

for medical treatment. The panchnama of the place of the

incident was recorded after Bajirao Dadoba Mohite ACP CID

(PW-14) had visited the place of occurrence.

2.3 While recording the spot panchnama, it was observed

by Bajirao Dadoba Mohite (PW-14) that there were no signs

of forced entry on both the doors as well as the safety doors

of the flat of the appellant. A gold Mangalsutra, 3 small gold

rings, 2 gold almond shaped pendants and cash amount of

Rs. 7,000/- in one red coloured money purse hidden behind

a photo frame hanging on the wall of the flat were also found

by Bajirao Dadoba Mohite (PW-14). Another ash-coloured

3 money purse was found in the flat as well. At the place of the

incident, near the main door of the flat of the appellant, few

pieces of bangles that were stained with blood and one blood

stained odhani were also found.

2.4 During investigation, it was revealed that appellant had

a love affair with one Gauri Londhe (PW-2). It was stated by

the appellant’s paramour Gauri Londhe (PW-2) that, when

she came to know about the appellant’s marriage, she

refused to marry him but the appellant was ready to leave his

wife and daughter in order to marry her. It was also seen

through the CCTV footage of the Saipras Society, which was

adjoining the flat of the appellant, that at 03:22 PM,

appellant’s mother (Shobha Masalkar) was seen going

towards the flat and at 04:28 PM, the appellant was seen

going out on his motorcycle. Based on these facts, the

appellant was suspected to have committed the murders by

the police and so he was arrested on 5th October 2012.

2.5 Post-Mortem of the three deceased persons was

conducted. In the post-mortem, it was opined that the cause

of death of the appellant’s daughter (Kimaya Masalkar) was

asphyxia due to smothering, the cause of death of the

4 appellant’s wife (Archana Masalkar) was traumatic and

hemorrhagic shock due to head injury and the cause of

death of the appellant’s mother (Shobha Masalkar) was

hemorrhagic shock due to head injury.

2.6 The appellant made a disclosure about keeping his

blood-stained clothes and Mangalsutra of his wife at a place

in M.I.D.C., Hadapsar Area, Pune and he further disclosed

about throwing the hammer, used for committing the crime,

in a canal after keeping it in a blue bag. Another disclosure

was made by the appellant about a consent letter for divorce

by his wife which was found in a drawer inside his house.

2.7 After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was

filed against the appellant for the offences punishable under

Sections 302, 307 and 201 of the IPC in the Court of Judicial

Magistrate, First Class, Cantonment Court, Pune. Since the

case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, it was

committed to the Sessions Court for trial. Charges were

framed against the appellant by the trial court for the

commission of the offences punishable under Sections 302,

307 and 201 of IPC.

5 2.8 To bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution

examined 16 witnesses. At the conclusion of the trial, the

trial court found that the prosecution had proved the guilt of

the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

2.9 Vide judgment and order dated 26th August 2016, the

appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under

Sections 302, 307 and 201 of IPC and vide order dated 31 st

August 2016 he was sentenced to death along with a fine of

Rs. 5,000/-, in default whereof to suffer rigorous

imprisonment of one year for the offence punishable under

Section 302 of IPC; rigorous imprisonment for ten years

along with fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default whereof rigorous

imprisonment of one year for the offence punishable under

Section 307 of IPC and rigorous imprisonment of three years

along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default whereof rigorous

imprisonment of six months for the offences punishable

under Section 201 of IPC.

2.10 For confirmation of the execution of the death sentence,

a reference was made by the trial court to the High Court

which was numbered as Confirmation Case No. 2 of 2016.

6 2.11 Vide impugned judgment and order, the High Court

upheld the order of the trial court convicting the appellant

and also confirmed the death sentence imposed on him.

However, in view of Section 415(1) of Code of Criminal

Procedure, 19733 the operation and effect of the impugned

judgment was stayed till the expiry of period allowed for

preferring an appeal before this Court.

2.12 Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.

3. We have heard Ms. Payoshi Roy, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Siddharth

Dharmadhikari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent-State of Maharashtra.

4. Ms. Payoshi Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant submits that the High Court and the trial court

have grossly erred in holding the present appellant guilty for

the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. She

submits that the prosecution case mainly rests on the

evidence of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12). It is submitted

that, from the testimony of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12)

itself, it would be clear that his testimony is not sufficient to

3 Hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”.

7 base the order of conviction. She submits that, firstly, the

statement of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) recorded under

Section 161 of Cr.P.C. is recorded belatedly i.e. after 6 days.

She further submits that there is no explanation at all as to

why his statement was not recorded for 6 days. She submits

that even the testimony of the IO would show that the IO did

not find it necessary to go to the hospital for 6 days to record

the statement of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12). She

further submits that, from the evidence of Madhusudhan

Kulkarni (PW-12), it would also be clear that he has not

witnessed the incident. She submits that the statement of

Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) has been recorded by the

police after he was informed that an FIR has been registered

against the present appellant for committing the murder of

his wife, daughter and mother. As such, no credence could

be given to the testimony of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12).

5. Ms. Roy submitted that if the testimony of

Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) is discarded, then the only

circumstances upon which the prosecution relies are

recovery of hammer and clothes at the instance of the

present appellant on a memorandum under Section 27 of the

8 Evidence Act, 1872. It is however submitted that the said

recoveries are all farcical and cannot be relied on. She

therefore submitted that the present appeal deserves to be

allowed.

6. Ms. Roy submits that, in the event this Court finds that

the prosecution has proved that the present appellant has

committed the offence, then the death penalty would not be

warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. She

submits that there are various mitigating circumstances as

to be found from the various reports placed on record that

the appellant was not a hardened criminal. She submits that

there is nothing on record to establish that there is no

possibility of the present appellant being reformed. She

therefore submits that the present case would fall under the

middle path as laid down by this Court in a catena of

judgments including Swamy Shraddananda (2) alias

Murali Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka4.

7. Per contra, Shri Siddharth Dharmadhikari, learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-State submits

that the learned trial court and the High Court have

4 (2008) 13 SCC 767 : 2008 INSC 853 9 concurrently on the basis of the evidence placed before them

come to a considered conclusion that the prosecution has

proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. He submits that

the ocular testimony of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) is

corroborated by the other circumstantial evidence. He

submits that the hammer used in the crime has been

recovered on the statement of the present appellant recorded

under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. He further submits

that one chhanni is also recovered on the basis of the

memorandum of the appellant under Section 27 of the

Evidence Act. The recovery of blood-stained clothes,

according to the learned counsel, is another circumstance

which establishes the complicity of the present appellant

with the crime in question. He further submits that

Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) is an injured witness and

therefore a greater credence would be attached to his

testimony.

8. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the

parties, we have perused the evidence on record.

9. The prosecution case mainly rests on the ocular

testimony of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12). Madhusudhan

10 Kulkarni (PW-12) is the neighbour of the appellant and the

deceased. In his testimony, Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12)

stated that he knew all the three deceased persons as well as

the appellant. He states that the deceased persons as well as

the appellant used to reside in his neighbourhood. He stated

that deceased Shobha Masalkar i.e. the mother of the

appellant used to do the work of cleaning utensils and she

was also working in his house. He further stated that

deceased Shobha had one daughter namely Aboli and that he

had helped Shobha in the marriage of her daughter Aboli. He

further stated that there used to be quarrels between the

appellant on one hand and his mother and wife on the other.

He stated that the appellant was intending to marry another

lady and that he was intending to give divorce to his wife

Archana. He stated that, he as well as deceased Shobha were

against this as the appellant was already married.

10. Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) further stated in his

examination-in-chief that on the date of the incident, he was

in his house and at around 12:00 Noon, he heard the noises

of shouts and cries. When he came out, he saw deceased

Archana along with her daughter Kimaya crying outside their

11 house. He further stated that he asked them as to why they

were crying outside their house. Thereafter, he came into his

house. At that time, someone hit on his backside with some

weapon. Due to which, he fell down and saw that the

appellant was holding a hammer and was going away.

Thereafter, he became unconscious. He further stated that

he was admitted in the hospital for 6 days. He stated that he

could not identify the hammer as to whether it was the same

hammer used by the appellant for the commission of the

crime.

11. The testimony of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) is full

of contradictions. Though, he stated in his examination-in-

chief that the appellant was holding hammer in his hand and

he was going away, the same did not find place in the

statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. by Judicial

Magistrate, First Class. He stated that he did not remember

as to whether he was conscious or not when he was admitted

in the hospital. In the next breath, he admitted that after the

incident, some people came to his flat and he asked them to

call the doctor there only.

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12. It will be relevant to refer to the testimony of Dr. Abhijit

Sudhakr Bele (PW-13) who was attached as Junior Resident

Doctor in Sassoon Hospital. He stated that on 4th October

2012, when he was on duty, Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12)

was admitted in the hospital. He stated that he gave the

history of assault. He stated that on 10th October 2012, the

statement of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) was recorded

in his presence and at that time, he was conscious and

oriented.

13. PW-16 is Dr. Tushar Madhavrao Kalekar. He stated

that, on 4th October 2012, when he was on duty,

Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) was referred to his

department from the surgery department for the purpose of

CT Scan of the brain. He admitted that, initially the patient

was treated in casualty section and then referred to the

surgery department. He further admitted that, as per the first

noting dated 4th October 2012 at 09:55 PM, the case paper

Exhibit 93-A indicated that the appellant was conscious and

oriented. He further admitted that the doctor who at the first

instance examined the patient is an important person who

can opine about the nature of injuries.

13

14. Therefore, a million-dollar question that would arise is if

Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) was conscious and oriented

at the time of admission in the hospital, then why was his

statement not immediately recorded. Another question that

would arise is if Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) had asked

the neighbourers, who had come to his flat, to call for the

doctor, then he naturally would have informed about the

incident to the neighbourers. However, not a single

neighbourer is examined to corroborate the version of

Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12). On the contrary, his

evidence would show that he had admitted that he came to

know from the police on 4th October 2012 that in the

afternoon of 4th October 2012, the appellant, on account of

his desire to marry Gouri Londhe (PW-2), he had fought with

his wife Archana and mother Shobha and killed them with a

hammer and had smothered by a pillow to death his

daughter Kimaya. He also stated that the appellant came and

assaulted him with the hammer so as to prevent him from

telling it to the neighbourers. If that be so, if the

neighbourers arrived immediately on the scene of occurrence,

then the question would be, what prevented Madhusudhan

14 Kulkarni (PW-12) from informing about the incident to the

neighbourers. Even if his testimony is taken at its face value,

it only suggests that he heard the noises of shouts and cries,

then he immediately came out and saw Shobha and Kimaya

crying. He only stated that he asked them as to why they

were crying outside the house. He did not state that the wife

of the appellant told him that there was a fight between the

appellant and his wife. From the evidence, it is also not clear

as to whether the appellant was present in the house or not.

15. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the

testimony of Bajirao Dadoba Mohite (PW-14), Investigating

Officer (IO). His testimony would reveal that, on the basis of

suspicion, the appellant was arrested on 5th October 2012 at

09:05 PM. It will also be relevant to refer to his cross-

examination which reads thus:

“It is true to say that on 4th itself I realized that the alive injured is the important witness in this case. I went on 10th in the hospital to meet that injured. Before that I did not go to the hospital. That injured was not in a position to speak and therefore, I have not visited the hospital before 10th. Prior thereto I have not written letter to the doctor It is true to say that till 10th. I have not received information from the hospital about the state of that injured.”

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16. It can be seen that PW-14 has admitted that on 4th

October 2012 itself, he realised that Madhusudhan Kulkarni

(PW-12) was an important witness in this case, but he did

not go to the hospital before 10th October 2012 and for the

first time, he went to the hospital on 10th October 2012. He

further admitted that prior to 10th October 2012, he did not

write a letter to the doctor as well.

17. Thus, the delay of 6 days in recording the statement of

Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) particularly when the

evidence of Dr. Abhijit Sudhakar Bele (PW-13) shows that

Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) had given the history of the

incident and Dr. Tushar Madhavrao Kalekar (PW-16)

admitted that Exhibit 93-A showed that Madhusudhan

Kulkarni (PW-12) was conscious and oriented casts a serious

doubt on the testimony of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12).

No doubt that a conviction could be based solely on the basis

of the evidence of a solitary witness, however, the testimony

of such a witness is required to be found to be credible and

trustworthy. It is also necessary to examine the testimony of

such a witness critically. A reliance in this respect could be

placed on the three-Judges Bench judgment of this Court in

16 the case of Chuhar Singh v. State of Haryana5 which has

been followed in a catena of cases.

18. As discussed hereinabove, on a deeper scrutiny of the

testimony of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12), we do not find

that the testimony of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) is one

which would inspire confidence in the mind of the Court to

base the conviction for the offence punishable under Section

302 of IPC. Firstly, the statement of Madhusudhan Kulkarni

(PW-12) is recorded after 6 days. Secondly, when the

evidence shows that he was conscious and oriented on the

date of the incident, no neighbourer has been examined to

corroborate the testimony of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12)

though even according to Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12),

after the incident, the neighbourers had come and he himself

had asked them to get the doctor there only. Thirdly, his

testimony does not show that he has witnessed the incident

and he himself admitted that he had given the statement

after he was informed by the police that the present appellant

had committed the crime.

5 (1976) 1 SCC 879 17

19. If the testimony of Madhusudhan Kulkarni (PW-12) is

discarded, then the case would become the one of

circumstantial evidence.

20. The law with regard to conviction on the basis of

circumstantial evidence has very well been crystalised in the

judgment of this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand

Sharda v. State of Maharashtra6, wherein this Court held

thus:

“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] . This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC 656] . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :

“It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so 6 (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121 18 established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 :

1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the

19 guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.”

21. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the

prosecution that the circumstances from which the

conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

The Court held that it is a primary principle that the accused

‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved guilty before a court

can convict the accused. It has been held that there is not

only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be

proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held

that the facts so established should be consistent only with

the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be

20 explainable on any other hypothesis except the one where

the accused is guilty. It has further been held that the

circumstances should be such that they exclude every

possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been

held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as

not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion

consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show

that in all human probabilities, the act must have been done

by the accused.

22. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it

may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable

doubt. An accused cannot be convicted solely on the ground

of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is

presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.

23. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to

examine the present case.

24. The circumstances which have been relied on by the

learned trial court are – (i) recovery of hammer; (ii) recovery of

blood-stained clothes; and (iii) CCTV Footage which shows

that deceased Shobha had come in the building at 03:22 PM 21 and where the appellant was seen going out of his motor-

cycle at 04:28 PM. However, the High Court itself has

disbelieved the said circumstance in paras 58-59 of its

judgment.

25. Insofar as the first circumstance i.e. recovery of the

hammer alleged to have been used in the crime is concerned,

according to the prosecution, the said hammer was recovered

at the instance of the appellant on a statement recorded

under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Firstly, it is to be noted

that the said recovery is from a canal. The recovery

panchnama shows that the said hammer was having blood-

stains. It is the prosecution case that the hammer was

packed in a bag which was put in water. It is to be noted that

the hammer was recovered from a place which is open and

accessible to one and all. It is improbable that a hammer

which was soaked in water for 3 days would still retain the

blood-stains. It is to be noted that the investigating agency

had to take the service of two swimmers to take the bag out

from the canal. The evidence of Santosh Bhau Awaghade

(PW-11) who is a panch witness would show that when the

police along with the appellant reached the spot, two persons

22 were already there and they were searching as per the say of

the police party. It is thus clear that the place where the

accused had taken the police party to show where he had

concealed the incriminating article was already within the

knowledge of the police. It is also difficult to believe that, in

flowing water where two swimmers were required to find out

the incriminating material, the said article would remain at

the same place after 3 days. We therefore find that it cannot

be said that the prosecution has proved the said

circumstance beyond reasonable doubt.

26. Insofar as the circumstance regarding the recovery of

the appellant’s clothes is concerned, even according to the

prosecution, it is the appellant who had informed the police

about the crime and he was present there. As such, the

presence of blood-stains on his clothes cannot be said to be

unnatural. Again, the recovery is from a place which is open

and accessible to one and all. Same is the case with regard to

the recovery of jewellery. In any case, the recovery

panchnama does not show that the clothes were sealed. As

such, the possibility of tampering cannot be ruled out.

Insofar as the recovery of jewellery (mangalsutra) is

23 concerned, the said mangalsutra was not shown either to

Vijaykumar Kisanrao Sonpetkar (PW-5), father of deceased

Archana or to the appellant’s sister so as to identify that the

same belong to deceased Archana.

27. That leaves us with the circumstance of motive. We find

that solely on the basis of circumstance of motive, a

conviction cannot be based. As held by this Court in the case

of Sharad Birdhichand Sharda (supra), a suspicion,

however strong it may be, cannot take the place of a proof

beyond reasonable doubt. As has been held by this Court in

the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sharda (supra), there is

not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may

be proved” and “must be or should be proved”. It is a

primary principle that the accused “must be” and not

merely “may be” guilty before a court can convict and every

possible hypothesis except the guilt of the accused has to be

ruled out. In our considered opinion, in the present case, the

prosecution has failed to do so. We are therefore of the

considered view that the impugned judgment and order of

the High Court as well as the trial court are not sustainable

in law.

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28. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeal is allowed;

(ii) The judgment and order of the High Court dated 23rd

July 2019 in Confirmation Case No. 2 of 2016 and

the judgment and order of conviction and sentence

dated 26th August 2016 and 31st August 2016 passed

by the trial court in Sessions Case No.64 of 2013 are

quashed and set aside; and

(iii) The appellant is directed to be set at liberty if not

required in any other case.

29. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

..............................J. (B.R. GAVAI)

.............................................J (PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

................................J. (K.V. VISWANATHAN) NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 17, 2024.

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