Vinod Kumar Pandey vs Seesh Ram Saini

REPORTABLE 2025 INSC 1095 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7900 of 2019)

VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SEESH RAM SAINI & ORS. RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. of 2025) (D.No. 10495 of 2019)

VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SHEESH RAM SAINI & ORS. RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7897 of 2019)

VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

VIJAY AGGARWAL & ANR. RESPONDENT(S) AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. of 2025) (D. No. 10508 of 2019)

VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by geeta ahuja Date: 2025.09.10 VIJAY AGGARWAL & ANR. RESPONDENT(S) 16:20:16 IST Reason: 2

JUDGMENT

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel,

Mr. S. V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General

and Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel for

the parties.

4. The cases are quite simple but have a chequered

history, involving the appellants, who are two

officers of the Central Bureau of Investigation1. One

is Vinod Kumar Pandey, the then Inspector of CBI,

and the other is Neeraj Kumar, the then Joint

Director of CBI.

5. The two petitions being Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 675

of 2001 and Writ Petition (Crl.) No.738 of 2001

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read

with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure2, 1973 came to be filed by one Vijay

Aggarwal and other by one Sheesh Ram Saini

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CBI’ 2 Hereinafter referred to as’Cr.P.C.’ 3

respectively, seeking directions for registration of

First Information Report3 against the above two

officers on deputation to the CBI, namely, Vinod

Kumar Pandey and Neeraj Kumar for committing

offences under Sections 506, 341, 342 and 166,

and Sections 218, 463, 465, 469, 166 and 120-B of

the Indian Penal Code4, 1860, as alleged in the writ

petitions respectively.

6. The aforesaid two writ petitions were decided by the

Single Judge of the High Court on 26.06.2006 but

by separate order(s) passed in identical terms. Both

the petitions were partly allowed and directions

were issued to the Delhi Police to register a case on

the basis of the allegations contained in the

complaint dated 05.07.2001 lodged by Sheesh Ram

Saini with PS Lodhi Colony and complaint dated

23.02.2004 addressed to Commissioner of Police,

Delhi by Vijay Aggarwal respectively, and to get the

matter investigated by the Special Cell of the Delhi

Police by an Officer not below the rank of Assistant

Commissioner of Police, uninfluenced by the

3 In short ‘FIR’ 4 In short ‘IPC’ 4

findings and the observations contained in the

Inquiry Report dated 26.04.2005 conducted by the

Joint Director, CBI.

7. In short, the writ petitions were partly allowed with

the direction to register the FIR with the finding

that prima facie cognizable offences are made out

for investigation against the appellant-officers.

8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment(s) and order(s)

of the High Court dated 26.06.2006, both the

officers of the CBI preferred separate Letters Patent

Appeal(s)5 before the Division Bench of the High

Court. The said LPAs were dismissed on 13.03.2019

on the ground of maintainability.

9. Out of the present four appeals, two appeals

[D.No.10495 of 2019 and D.No.10508 of 2019] are

against the order(s) of the learned Single Judge

dated 26.06.2006 partly allowing the petitions, and

other two appeals [S.L.P.(C) No. 7900 of 2019 and

S.L.P.(C) No. 7897 of 2019] are against the order of

the Division Bench of the High Court dated

13.03.2019 dismissing the LPAs as not

maintainable.

5 Hereinafter referred to as ‘LPA’ 5

10. We had made it clear to the parties in the very

beginning that we would not enter into the question

of maintainability of the LPAs so as to adjudicate

the appeals arising out of their dismissal for the

reason that we would consider the correctness of

the judgment and order(s) dated 26.06.2006 on

merits as would have been done in the LPAs by the

Division Bench. The counsel for the parties agreed

and proceeded to advance arguments accordingly

on merits.

11. A preliminary objection was raised with regard to

delay of more than 12 years in challenging the

judgment and order(s) of the Single Judge dated

26.06.2006.

12. The said delay has been explained taking the

ground that the appellants were bona fide pursuing

their LPAs before the Division Bench of the High

Court and once they realized that the LPAs are not

maintainable and they have been dismissed as not

maintainable, they decided to challenge the

judgment and order(s) passed by the learned Single

Judge before the Supreme Court.

6

13. In view of the above explanation, though

technically, pursuing the LPAs and the time spent

thereon may not be a very good cause to condone

the delay but since there is no willful or deliberate

delay or any default on part of the appellants in

assailing the judgment and order(s) of the Single

Judge dated 26.06.2006 rather they were all

thoroughly vigilant of their rights, we have ignored

the delay and have heard the parties on merits,

more particularly, on the correctness of the

judgment and order(s) of the Single Judge.

14. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the

appellants, argued that the information/complaint

submitted by Sheesh Ram Saini and by Vijay

Kumar Aggarwal does not make out a cognizable

offence for enabling the Court to direct for the

registration of the FIR. The High Court could not

have directed for the registration of the FIR as the

procedure laid down by the various decisions of this

Court was not followed before approaching the High

Court. Secondly, the High Court could not have

recorded a finding of commission of a cognizable 7

offence which leaves nothing for the Investigating

Officer6 to opine on after the completion of the

investigation, except to submit a chargesheet. He

further argued that in the so-called preliminary

inquiry conducted by the Joint Director, CBI, it has

been reported that no cognizable offence is made

out for the purpose of investigation, therefore, it

was not open for the High Court to have substituted

its own finding and to direct for the registration of

the FIR.

15. He emphasized that even if for the sake of argument

it is accepted that a case for investigation is made

out against Vinod Kumar Pandey, there is no

averment or iota of material to rope in Neeraj

Kumar, the other officer.

16. A further submission has been made by Mr. Ranjit

Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellants,

that the High Court manifestly erred in directing the

investigation to be conducted by the Special Cell of

the Delhi Police, which ordinarily investigates the

matters relating to terrorism. The High Court also

committed an error in directing the exclusion of

6 In short ‘I.O.’ 8

preliminary inquiry report dated 26.04.2005 of the

Joint Director, CBI from consideration during the

investigation.

17. Mr. S. V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General

for the respondents, pressed an application for the

impleadment of the CBI contending that as the

preliminary inquiry was conducted by an officer of

the CBI and the case involves allegations against

the officers of the CBI, therefore, the CBI is a proper

party so as to defend the inquiry report and its

officers.

18. On merits, he submitted that the complaints do not

make out any cognizable offence and are barred by

Section 197 Cr.P.C., as whatever acts have been

performed by the officers, they were in discharge of

their official duties. The complaints are also hit by

Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 and are

barred by limitation.

19. Admittedly, the CBI was a party in the writ petitions

before the High Court and had not chosen to assail

the impugned order(s), meaning thereby that the

CBI never felt aggrieved by the said order(s). The 9

CBI, even if impleaded, would be added as the

respondent or a proforma respondent. It is well

recognized in law that a respondent or a proforma

respondent may support the judgment impugned

but cannot assail the same in his capacity as a

respondent. The CBI has not independently

challenged the aforesaid order(s) of the High Court.

20. Moreover, the CBI is not the party actually

aggrieved by the direction given by the High Court

for the registration of the FIR against the two

officers. It is the officers who are aggrieved in their

personal capacity and not the institution to which

they are on deputation. It is, therefore, for the

officers to defend themselves by taking appropriate

legal remedies and the CBI has nothing to do with

it. This apart, the report of the CBI is not under

challenge, therefore, the contention that CBI has to

support the report of its officer is not appreciable.

Accordingly, we do not deem it necessary to permit

impleadment of the CBI and to consider any

objections as raised by the learned Additional

Solicitor General.

10

21. The plain reading of the impugned judgment and

order(s) of the Single Judge of the High Court dated

26.06.2006 reveals that the officers of the CBI in

the dock have committed irregularities, if not

illegality in discharge of their official duties and are

prima facie guilty of the commission of the offences

as alleged. This is clearly reflected from the

averments contained in the complaints and the

petitions. Both the officers have acted in

connivance, and it is alleged that one of the officers,

Vinod Kumar Pandey, had acted at the behest of the

Senior Officer, Neeraj Kumar. The question whether

Vinod Kumar Pandey acted on the advice or behest

of Neeraj Kumar or whether they were in

connivance, is a matter of fact which has to be

investigated.

22. The Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition

(Crl.) No. 738 of 2001, upon consideration of the

material on record including the inquiry report

dated 26.04.2005 of the Joint Director of CBI,

found that cognizable offences were prima facie

made out against the officers of the CBI i.e. the 11

appellants. The allegation that the documents were

seized on 26.04.2000 without preparation of the

seizure memo stood substantiated even in the

inquiry report, which recorded that the memo of

seizure was prepared only on 27.04.2000 and not at

the time of seizure on 26.04.2000. The Court

disagreed with the explanation that the documents

were taken for scrutiny on 26.04.2000 noting that

such a version was contrary both to the records and

the findings of the inquiry itself. The Single Judge

also refused to accept that it was a procedural

irregularity and held that the preparation of seizure

memo in the facts and circumstances of the case

was not in accordance with the CBI Crime Manual

and attracted penal provisions of Sections 218, 463,

465, 469, 166 and 120-B IPC.

23. The High Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.675 of

2001, preferred by Vijay Aggarwal, observed that

V.K. Pandey had summoned Vijay Aggarwal on

07.06.2001 and 11.06.2001 in clear derogation of a

bail order dated 27.11.2000 passed by the Special

Judge, which prima facie indicated a mala fide and 12

malicious exercise of authority.

24. The Court held that the allegations of abuse,

intimidation, and threats, including use of vulgar

language to coerce Vijay Aggarwal to ensure

withdrawal of his brother’s complaint against Neeraj

Kumar, were serious and not unfounded. The Court

observed that such conduct was grave in nature

and prima facie disclosed the commission of

cognizable offences under IPC.

25. The High Court rejected the conclusion reached by

the CBI’s enquiry officer that no offence was made

out and that the allegations of abuse and coercion

were unsubstantiated. It was observed that the

correctness or veracity of the allegations could not

have been gone into at the stage of a preliminary

enquiry and that such allegations, being serious in

nature, could not be brushed aside lightly. The

Court clarified that Vijay Aggarwal’s failure to file

objections to the enquiry report could not amount

to acceptance of its findings.

26. The Writ Court emphasized that CBI officers, being

public servants, cannot claim immunity if they 13

knowingly prepare false or incorrect records during

the course of seizure or abuse their official position.

Such acts on their part are serious acts and are not

capable of being ignored and therefore, investigation

in the matter is necessary.

27. In Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of

Gujarat,7 this Court, in a very recent judgment

held, that where the allegations pertain to the abuse

of official position and corrupt practices while

holding public office, such actions fall squarely

within category of cognizable offences and therefore,

they are to be inquired into, and holding of any

preliminary inquiry before the registration of the

FIR is not necessary. If the information provided to

the police or the preliminary report discloses a

commission of a cognizable offence, the police is

duty bound under Section 154 Cr.P.C. to register

an FIR without any delay.

28. The report of the CBI at best is a preliminary

enquiry report submitted before the registration of

the FIR. However, such an enquiry is not ordinarily

contemplated in law before registration of FIR, and

7 (2025) 4 SCC 818 14

hence is not a conclusive report to be relied upon to

oust the power of the Constitutional Court to record

its own conclusion about commission of a

cognizable offence, if any, on the material or the

allegations in the complaints.

29. Undoubtedly, the High Court(s) should discourage

writ petitions or petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

where alternative remedies are available.

Nonetheless, as observed even in Sakiri Vasu v.

State of U.P.,8 it is equally true that alternative

remedy is not an absolute bar for invoking the

extraordinary jurisdiction or the inherent

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of

the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.

30. In Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi)9, the

Court denounced the dismissal of the petition

seeking registration of the FIR, solely on the ground

of alternative remedy, and held that ground of

alternative remedy would not be a substitute in law

for refusing to register a case when the complaint of

the citizen makes it a cognizable offence.

8 (2008) 2 SCC 409 9 (2006) 2 SCC 677 15

31. In a recent landmark decision, Anurag Bhatnagar

& Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.10, this

Court held that although the complainant

approached the Court, in that case the Magistrate,

without exhausting the alternative remedies

available, it was a mere procedural irregularity and

not illegality, as the Court was competent to order

registration of the FIR. It was further observed that

when information disclosing commission of

cognizable offence is conveyed to the police, they

cannot refuse to register the FIR.

32. Since, it is the duty of the police to register an FIR if

a prima facie cognizable offence is made out, the

police is not required to go into the genuineness

and credibility of the said information. It has been

so laid down very clearly in Ramesh Kumari

(Supra) that the genuineness or credibility of the

information is not the condition precedent for

registration of an FIR.

33. The complainants Sheesh Ram Saini and Vijay

Kumar Aggarwal have approached the police

authorities by means of complaints dated

10 2025 INSC 895 16

05.07.2001 and 23.02.2004 to get the matter

investigated, but as no action was purportedly

taken thereof rather it is alleged that the police

authorities expressed reluctance to entertain the

complaints as it would not be proper on part of the

police to investigate against the officers of the CBI,

the complainants approached the Constitutional

Court for necessary action.

34. Therefore, if the Constitutional Court has exercised

its discretion in entertaining the petitions and

directing for the registration of the FIR against the

two officers, on being satisfied that the commission

of a cognizable offence is prima facie made out

against them, we see no good reason to interfere

with such discretion. At best, as argued by Mr.

Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the

appellants, we can say that the opinion expressed

by the High Court in regard to commission of the

cognizable offences is only a prima facie opinion and

has to be treated as such, so as not to affect the

discretion of the I.O., subsequent to the

investigation.

17

35. The registration of the FIR against the two officers is

not likely to cause any prejudice to them. They will

have the right to participate in the investigation to

establish that they have not committed any offence,

as alleged. Thereupon, the I.O. on consideration of

the material collected during investigation, may

submit a closure report or file the chargesheet. In

the event, a closure report is filed and accepted by

the Magistrate, the appellants will have no

grievance. On the other hand, in the event, a charge

sheet is submitted, the appellants will have an

opportunity to assail the same before the

appropriate forum.

36. It would however, not be a prudent exercise at this

stage to scuttle the registration of the FIR or the

investigation, when the High Court in exercise of its

constitutional powers had opined that prima facie, a

cognizable offence is made out against the two

officers, that too upon elaborate consideration of

the preliminary inquiry report of the Joint Director

of CBI.

37. It is trite to point out that the offence is alleged to 18

have been committed in the year 2000 and till date

the matter had not been allowed to be investigated.

It would be dichotomy of justice if such an offence

is allowed to go uninvestigated particularly when

there is involvement of the officers on deputation to

CBI. It is cardinal in law that justice must not only

be done, but must also be seen to be done. It is

high time that sometimes those who investigate

must also be investigated to keep alive the faith of

the public at large in the system.

38. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we

do not consider it appropriate to interfere with the

impugned judgment and order(s) of the High Court

in exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under

Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

39. However, we make it clear that since the Special

Cell of the Delhi Police is supposed to investigate

the matters concerning terrorism, upon registration

of the FIR in the case at hand, the investigation

would be conducted by the Delhi Police itself but by

an officer not below the rank of Assistant

Commissioner of Police.

19

40. Secondly, in view of the law laid down in Lalita

Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and

Ors.11, and reiterated thereafter to the effect that

registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154

Cr.P.C. if the information discloses commission of a

cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry before

FIR is permissible in such a situation; however, if

the information received does not disclose a

cognizable offence but indicates necessity of an

inquiry being conducted, a preliminary inquiry may

be conducted only to ascertain facts disclosing

cognizable offence, if any. Thus, treating the inquiry

conducted by the Joint Director, CBI as a

preliminary inquiry, we permit the same to be

looked into, if necessary, by the I.O. during the

investigation by him, but not to treat it as

conclusive. The I.O. would conduct the investigation

strictly in accordance with law without being

influenced by any finding or observation made by

the High Court in the impugned order(s) or by this

Court hereinabove and shall conclude the same as

expeditiously as possible, preferably within three

11 (2014) 2 SCC 1 20

months as the matter is quite old.

41. The appellants are directed to join the investigation

and to cooperate with the I.O. by appearing before

him, as and when called upon. In the event they

join the investigation and appear before the I.O.

regularly, no coercive steps shall be taken against

them, including that of arrest, until and unless the

I.O. records satisfaction that custodial interrogation

at any stage is necessary.

42. The two appeals [S.L.P.(C) No. 7900 of 2019 and

S.L.P.(C) No. 7897 of 2019] stand disposed of in the

above terms and the two appeals [D.No.10495 of

2019 and D.No.10508 of 2019] are partly allowed by

modifying the judgment and orders of the High

Court dated 26.06.2006 as indicated above.

43. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

…………………………………...J. [PANKAJ MITHAL]

…………………………………...J. [PRASANNA B. VARALE]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 10, 2025.