Vinod Gupta vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

2024 INSC 181 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3431 OF 2023

XXXX … Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANOTHER … Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Rajesh Bindal, J.

1. The appellant in the present case is aggrieved of the order1

passed by the High Court2 whereby a petition3 filed by him under Section

482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR4 was dismissed.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the FIR in the

case in hand, which was got registered by respondent No.2/complainant

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Dr. 1 Naveen Rawal Order dated 01.08.2022 Date: 2024.03.06 16:01:04 IST Reason: 2 High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur 3 M.CR.C. No. 15992 of 2021 4 FIR No. 52 dated 11.12.2020 registered at P.S. Mahila Thana, Dist. Satna, (M.P.) under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC

Page 1 of 11 is nothing else but an abuse of process of law. The complainant was a

married lady having a grown up daughter of 15 years of age living with

her parents. Claiming that in the same house, the appellant was having

physical relations with her with the consent of her parents and daughter

will be hard to believe that too when she was already married. There

could not be any question of promise to marry given by the appellant to

her at that stage. There are large discrepancies in the complaint made to

the police on the basis of which the FIR was registered if considered in

the light of the statement which the complainant got recorded under

Section 164 Cr.P.C. The relations between the parties are shown to be

consensual, if any. The mis-statement by the complainant is evident from

the fact that she claimed to have got divorce from the earlier marriage on

10.12. 2018 and married with the appellant in a temple in January 2019 but

it is belied from the fact that decree of divorce from the earlier marriage

of the complainant was passed only on 13.01.2021. There was no question

of any marriage prior thereto. The initiation of proceedings against the

appellant being an abuse of process of law deserve to be quashed. In

support of the arguments, reliance was placed upon the decisions of this

Page 2 of 11 Court in Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi)5 and Prashant Bharti v.

State (NCT of Delhi)6.

3. Learned counsel for the State submitted that after

investigation, charge-sheet has already been filed. The Courts are

normally slow to quash the FIR at that stage. In the case in hand, allegation

of rape on false promise to marry is clearly made out. At the stage of

quashing, only the contents in the FIR could be seen. On a perusal thereof,

a clear case is made out against the appellant.

4. Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that on

account of dispute with her husband from the earlier marriage, the

complainant was living with her parents. She, at that time, was having a

grown up daughter aged 15 years. The appellant was living in their house

as a tenant. Finding that the complainant in disturbed matrimonial life,

from the advances made by the appellant, the complainant fell in the trap.

On a false promise to marry, both had started having physical relations.

They had even solemnized marriage in a temple in January 2019. Even

her family also knew about their relations and marriage. It was all in good

faith on the promise made by the appellant as the appellant had even

5 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89 6 (2013) 9 SCC 293

Page 3 of 11 shown the complainant as a nominee in an insurance policy purchased by

him. With these facts on record, a clear case of rape on false promise to

marry is made out against the appellant. The FIR does not deserve to be

quashed at the initial stage.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper

book.

6. Firstly, we refer to the stand taken by the complainant in the

FIR and the statement she got recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. There

are discrepancies therein.

6.1 In the FIR, she stated that she was managing her own cloth

shop. As there was a dispute with her husband, she was living separately.

On 10.12.2018, she got divorce from her husband. She has a daughter

aged 15 years. In 2017, Sadbhav Company had taken first floor of their

house on rent in which the appellant, who was working with the company,

stayed. During spare time, he would come and sit on her shop. Gradually,

the relations developed. As she was living separate from her husband,

the appellant proposed that in case she takes divorce, he will marry her.

After the divorce of the complainant, on 10.01.2019, at about 11.00 PM, the

appellant came to her room and had physical relations. He did not stop

Page 4 of 11 even when she said that they were yet to be married. Further, on a

promise to marry, he had relations with her on 06.06.2020. When she

insisted for marriage, the appellant said that his family was not agreeing.

Finally, he refused on 11.12.2020. Thereafter, the FIR was got recorded on

11.12.2020.

6.2 While getting her statement recorded under Section 164

Cr.P.C., she admitted that she knew the appellant since 2017. On account

of dispute with her husband, she was living with her parents. As she got

acquainted with the appellant, they fell in love. In 2018, the appellant went

to Maharashtra for job. However, he used to visit her home and take care

of the complainant as well as her daughter. In 2019, the appellant assured

the complainant that he will marry her in case she takes divorce from her

husband who used to harass and beat her. For this reason, she divorced

her husband and solemnized marriage with the appellant in a temple in

January 2019. Thereafter, they started living together with her daughter

born from the previous marriage. Despite assurance, the appellant did

not solemnize court marriage. After marriage was solemnized in temple,

treating the appellant as her husband, they both started leading a married

life having physical relations from January 2019 till June 2020. The

Page 5 of 11 appellant treated the complainant as his wife. Thereafter, the appellant

refused to respond to her calls and even marry her.

6.3 There was complete change in the stand of the complainant in

her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The fact remains that

the parties admittedly were in relations from 2017 onwards. Some alleged

promise to marry came in January 2019, from where they started having

physical relations. It has also come on record that it is not only the consent

of the complainant which is clearly evident but also of the parents and

daughter of the complainant as they were living in the same house, where

allegedly the appellant and the complainant were having physical

relations.

7. Further, in the FIR the complainant stated that she got divorce

from her earlier husband on 10.12.2018. In the statement under Section

164 Cr.P.C., she stated that marriage between the appellant and the

complainant was solemnized in a temple in January 2019. However, the

date of divorce as claimed by the complainant is belied from the copy of

the decree annexed with the appeal as Annexure P-9, where divorce by

mutual consent was granted to the complainant and her husband vide

judgment dated 13.01.2021. The aforesaid fact could not be disputed.

Page 6 of 11 Meaning thereby, the complainant besides the facts in the FIR and also in

the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. regarding her divorce from the

earlier marriage, sought to claim that she had re-married with the

appellant during subsistence of her earlier marriage.

8. From the contents of the complaint, on the basis of which FIR

was got registered and the statement got recorded by the complainant, it

is evident that there was no promise to marry initially when the relations

between the parties started in the year 2017. In any case, even on the

dates when the complainant alleges that the parties had physical

relations, she was already married. She falsely claimed that divorce from

her earlier marriage took place on 10.12.2018. However, the fact remains

that decree of divorce was passed only on 13.01.2021. It is not a case

where the complainant was of an immature age who could not foresee her

welfare and take right decision. She was a grown up lady about ten years

elder to the appellant. She was matured and intelligent enough to

understand the consequences of the moral and immoral acts for which she

consented during subsistence of her earlier marriage. In fact, it was a case

of betraying her husband. It is the admitted case of the prosecutrix that

even after the appellant shifted to Maharashtra for his job, he used to

Page 7 of 11 come and stay with the family and they were living as husband and wife.

It was also the stand taken by the appellant that he had advanced loan of

₹1,00,000/- to the prosecutrix through banking channel which was not

returned back.

9. Similar issue was considered by this Court in Naim

Ahamed’s case (supra) on almost identical facts where the prosecutrix

herself was already a married woman having three children. The

complaint of alleged rape on false promise of marriage was made five

years after they had started having relations. She even got pregnant from

the loins of the accused. Therein she got divorce from her existing

marriage much after the relations between the parties started. This Court

found that there cannot be any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix

had given her consent for sexual relationship under misconception. The

accused was not held to be guilty. Relevant paragraph 21 thereof is

extracted below:

“21. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who

herself was a married woman having three children,

could not be said to have acted under the alleged false

promise given by the appellant or under the

Page 8 of 11 misconception of fact while giving the consent to have

sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly,

she continued to have such relationship with him at least

for about five years till she gave complaint in the year

2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her

deposition before the court, are taken on their face

value, then also to construe such allegations as ‘rape’

by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far.

The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother

of three children was matured and intelligent enough to

understand the significance and the consequences of

the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting

to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the

course of such relationship with the accused, is closely

seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and

three children by having relationship with the accused,

for whom she had developed liking for him. She had

gone to stay with him during the subsistence of her

marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the

accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the

Page 9 of 11 accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male

child through the loin of the accused, she did not have

any complaint against the accused of he having given

false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She

also visited the native place of the accused in the year

2012 and came to know that he was a married man

having children also, still she continued to live with the

accused at another premises without any grievance.

She even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual

consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her

husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some

disputes must have taken place between them, that she

filed the present complaint. The accused in his further

statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. had

stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused to

fulfill her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having

regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it

could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the

prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual

relationship with the appellant under the misconception

Page 10 of 11 of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having

committed rape within the meaning of Section 375 of

IPC.”

9.1 The aforesaid arguments squarely cover the legal issue raised

by the appellant.

10. For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned order passed

by the High Court is set aside. FIR No.52 dated 11.12.2020, registered

under Section 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC at Police Station, Mahila Thana,

District Satna (M.P.) and all subsequent proceedings thereto are quashed.

11. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

……………….……………..J. (C.T. RAVIKUMAR)

……………….……………..J. (RAJESH BINDAL)

New Delhi March 6, 2024.

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