Vijeta Gajra vs State Of Nct Of Delhi

2. The appellant herein challenges the order passed by the High

Court whereby the petition filed by her was dismissed. The said

petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read

with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the 2

FIR No. 138/08 dated 07.08.2008 for offences under Section 498A

and 406, Indian Penal Code in the Chitranjan Park Police Station.

3. This FIR was lodged by one Gunjan Sujanani, wife of one Rohit

Sujanani. It is a long document wherein the complainant Gunjan

Sujanani stated about her marriage with Rohit on 08.07.2003 and he

being a resident of Nigeria. It was claimed that before the marriage,

Rohit had introduced Gunjan to one Mr. Sham and Mrs. Lavina

Daswani as his foster parents and also said that he had two foster

sisters, namely, Vijeta Daswani (Vijeta Gajra-the appellant herein)

who is a resident of Indore, Madhya Pradesh and the other being one

Ms. Ritika Daswani, who resided with her mother in London. There

are allegations made about the demand of dowry against the

husband as also Mrs. Lavina Daswani. The demand included

diamond neckless for Vijeta Daswani/Gajra. There was reference to

subsequent behaviour of troubling the complainant on account of the

dowry demands. The First Information Report also made some

allegations regarding the relations of her husband Rohit Sujanani with

Mrs. Lavina Daswani and Vijeta Daswani/Gajra, the present

appellant. It was then contended that in December, 2003, when the

complainant had gone to Sierra Leone, Vijeta Dasawani/Gajra took 3

away her diamond encrusted heavy gold pendant and chain and

earring set on the pretext that she wanted to wear them once and she

would keep them at a safe place in her father's house. The

complainant also stated that she did not return these ornaments.

Further, it was stated that in May, 2004, Mr. Rohit Sujanani and Mrs.

Lavina Daswani insisted that the complainant should keep her

jewellery in London and claimed that she was slapped by her

husband on her refusal. It was further claimed that in November,

2004, the present appellant, Vijeta Gajra got married during which the

complainant had to beg for her ornaments for attending the marriage.

There was a reference in the FIR to the misbehaviour on the part of

Mrs. Lavina Daswani towards her and again the name of the present

appellant figured therein. At this time, the complainant claimed that

she was pregnant for the first time and yet she was given physical

and mental ill treatment because of which she had a mis-carriage.

There is a reference to the sexual behaviour of her husband with

reference to a pornographic website. It was claimed that the

complainant delivered a baby on 08.03.2007. Then there is reference

to the appellant visiting and staying with the complainant's parents for

three days and the allegation that her husband was having sexual 4

relations with Vijeta Gajra, the appellant herein and Mrs.Lavina

Daswani. There was a reference that during her stay the appellant

was wearing the diamond encrusted pendant and gold chain and

earring set which she had taken (practically stolen) in Sierra Leone.

4. In the last part of this lengthy FIR, there was a reference to the

demand of two crores of rupees having been made by Vijeta and her

mother over the phone to the complainant as a cost of peace and

marital happiness. There was a reference to a telephonic

conversation with Mrs. Lavina Daswani in this regard. There was a

further reference to an ugly scene on account of arguments.

However, there was also a reference to the presence of the brother of

the complainant on account of which further ugly scenes were

avoided. It was complained that, thereafter, the complainant and her

parents tried to contact Rohit Sujanani and the Daswanis who were

avoiding them and not returning jewellery which was with Vijeta

Gajra, Lavina Daswani and Rohit Sujanani.

5. This complaint dated 15.04.2008 seems to have been

registered as an FIR. It seems that on the basis of this FIR, the

appellant was sent a summons under Section 160, Cr. P.C. and she 5

moved the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi under

Section 438 Cr.P.C. for grant of anticipatory bail. In that application,

she had made a reference to the summons asking her to appear on

05.06.2008. It was claimed in the application that the complainant's

husband Rohit Sujanani was an employee of appellant's father who

has business in Sierra Leone and that he was employed on contract

basis for the period of three years in 1994. It was claimed in that

application that the appellant had met the complainant last in 2007. It

was also stated that the allegations made in the FIR were concocted,

false and baseless and she had no connection whatsoever with the

family of the complainant or her parents. She complained that her

own marriage was being tried to be destroyed by wild allegations.

There was a reference made in this application by the appellant for

quashing the summons arising out of the complaint dated 15.04.2008

and also to a Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 2153 of 2008. The

High Court had passed the order disposing it of since the State's

Counsel had agreed to provide copy of the complaint and had further

stated that in the event the FIR was registered, the applicant would

be informed of this fact and no coercive action would be taken

against her till then. In her application there was a statement that she 6

did not even belong to the family of the complainant, her husband or

any of their relatives and that all the allegations were palpably false.

It was then stated that the writ petition was filed which came to be

disposed of by the High Court. It seems that the complainant sought

the direction to implead herself in the writ petition-cum-Section 482

Cr.P.C application filed by the appellant.

6. Following are the prayers in the said writ petition under Article

226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482, Cr.P.C.:

"a) Quash the FIR NO. 138/2008 dated 07.08.2008 under Sections 498A/406, IPC at Police Station Chitranjan Park registered against the petitioner;

b) Direct the police not to take any coercive action against the petitioner in respect of the above said complaint:

c) Pass such other and further orders which may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."

It is on this backdrop that we have to see as to whether it would

be expedient to continue the criminal prosecution against the

appellant.

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7. Shri U.U. Lalit, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of

the appellant argued that in U. Suvetha v. State By Inspector of

Police & Anr. [(2009) 6 SCC 757], it was specifically held that in

order to be covered under Section 498A, IPC one has to be a

`relative' of the husband by blood, marriage or adoption. He pointed

out that the present appellant was not in any manner a `relative' as

referred to in Section 498A, IPC and, therefore, there is no question

of any allegation against her in respect of the ill-treatment of the

complainant. The Court in this case examined the ingredients of

Section 498A, IPC and noting the specific language of the Section

and the Explanation thereof came to the conclusion that the word

`relative' would not include a paramour or concubine or so. Relying

on the dictionary meaning of the word `relative' and further relying on

R. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advance Law Lexicon, Volume 4, 3rd Edition,

the Court went on to hold that Section 498A, IPC being a penal

provision would deserve strict construction and unless a contextual

meaning is required to be given to the statute, the said statute has to

be construed strictly. On that behalf the Court relied on the judgment

in T. Ashok Pai v. CIT [(2007) 7 SCC 162]. A reference was made

to the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma & Anr. v. State of M.P. 8

[(2007) 15 SCC 369]. After quoting from various decisions of this

Court, it was held that reference to the word `relative' in Section

498A, IPC would be limited only to the blood relations or the relations

by marriage.

8. Relying heavily on this, Shri Lalit contended that there is no

question of any trial of the appellant for the offence under Section

498A, IPC. The argument is undoubtedly correct, though opposed by

the Learned Counsel appearing for the State. We are of the opinion

that there will be no question of her prosecution under Section 498A,

IPC. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the

complainant, Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, also did not seriously dispute this

proposition. Therefore, we hold that the FIR insofar as it concerned

Section 498A, IPC, would be of no consequence and the appellant

shall not be tried for the offence under Section 498A, IPC.

9. That leaves us with the allegation under Section 406, IPC for

the offence of criminal breach of trust as there are allegations in

respect of the jewellery. We desist from saying anything at this

juncture. We also desist from going into the correctness or otherwise

of these allegations as they will have to be proved by evidence. Shri 9

Lalit pointed out that on the face of it the allegations are wild and

baseless as the appellant herself comes from a wealthy background

and is a married lady having settled down in Indore and is also

mother of a child. He pointed that the FIR is calculated to destroy her

marital life with the wildest possible allegations and, therefore, we

should quash the entire FIR as not being bona fide and actuated by

malice.

10. There can be no doubt that the allegations made are extremely

wild and disgusting. However, how far those allegations can be used

to meet the requirements for the offence under Section 406, IPC is a

moot question. For obvious reasons, we will not go into that exercise.

Whatever the form in which the allegations under Section 406, IPC

are made, the fact of the matter is that there is an FIR and the Court

concerned has taken cognizance thereof. Under these

circumstances, we would only protect the interest of the appellant by

directing that she would not be required to attend the proceedings

unless specifically directed by the Court to do so and that too in the

case of extreme necessity. Similarly, no coercive step shall be taken

against her. She shall be granted bail by the Court trying the case if it 1

decides to try the offence by framing the charge. We expect the

Court to be careful while considering the framing of charge.

11. We, therefore, hold that the appellant shall not be tried for

offence under Section 498A, IPC. However, we desist from quashing

the FIR altogether in view of the allegations made under Section 406,

IPC with the protection that we have granted to the appellant. With

these observations, the appeals are disposed of.

...............................J. [V.S. Sirpurkar]

................................J. [Cyriac Joseph]

New Delhi;

July 8, 2010.

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