Vice Chancellor, Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University vs Jitendra Singh

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026 (@ SLP (C) NO. 16265 OF 2024)

VICE CHANCELLOR, RAJIV GANDHI NATIONAL AVIATION UNIVERSITY ... APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS JITENDRA SINGH & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026 (@ SLP (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026) (DIARY NO. 38863 OF 2024)

JUDGMENT

ALOK ARADHE, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals assail the order dated 22.05.2024 passed by the

Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,

Lucknow Bench (“the High Court”), whereby the appeal preferred

by respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as “the First

Registrar”) was allowed and the order dated 25.04.2023, passed

by the learned Single Judge, as well as the order dated Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by KAPIL TANDON 27.04.2022 passed by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Civil Date: 2026.05.21 17:44:38 IST Reason:

Aviation, Government of India, were set aside.

1 FACTS

3. The relevant facts giving rise to the filing of the present appeals

are set out hereinbelow.

4. The Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act, 2013 (“the

Act”), was enacted to establish and incorporate a National

Aviation University for facilitating and promoting aviation

studies and achieving excellence in the fields of aviation

management, policy, science and technology, inter alia.

Pursuant thereto, the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University

(“the University”) was established under the provisions of the

Act.

5. In exercise of the powers under Section 27(1) of the Act, the

Central Government on 07.03.2016, framed the Rajiv Gandhi

National Aviation University, First Statute, 2016 (“the Statutes”).

The President of India, being the Visitor of the University, on

28.02.2019, conveyed approval for the appointment of the First

Registrar. Thereafter, on 01.03.2019, the Vice Chancellor issued

an offer of appointment to the First Registrar, appointing him on

probation for a period of one year. On 08.04.2019, the First

Registrar assumed charge as Registrar of the University.

2

6. During the period of probation, the services of the First Registrar

were terminated by order dated 08/09.01.2020 and he was paid

one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The First Registrar

thereafter instituted two writ petitions challenging the order of

termination, as well as the advertisement issued for filling up

the post of Registrar. The aforesaid writ petitions were

withdrawn on 13.01.2021 with liberty to file fresh petitions.

7. Thereafter, the First Registrar filed a writ petition on 22.01.2021

seeking quashing of the order of termination dated

08/09.01.2020 and the advertisement dated 04.05.2020 issued

for filling up the post of Registrar. The learned Single Judge by

an order dated 17.09.2021, directed the appellants to reinstate

the First Registrar to the post of Registrar of the University with

all consequential benefits, in terms of the appointment letter

dated 01.03.2019. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed.

8. The appellants challenged the aforesaid order before the Division

Bench. By an order dated 17.12.2021, the Division Bench, inter

alia, held that the order terminating the services of the First

Registrar during probation was ex facie stigmatic and the matter

was remitted to the University to proceed afresh in accordance

with law and to pass an appropriate order within a period of two

3 months. It was further directed that the entitlement of the First

Registrar to back wages would abide by the outcome of the

further action to be taken by the University. The order dated

17.09.2021, passed by the learned Single Judge, was modified

to the aforesaid extent and the appeal was partly allowed.

9. The First Registrar challenged the order dated 17.12.2021 before

this Court, by filing a Special Leave Petition, which came to be

dismissed on 04.02.2022, with liberty to the First Registrar to

raise all pleas and contentions before the competent authority

by way of representation.

10. On 31.12.2021, the First Registrar was reinstated in service. On

the very same day, he was placed under suspension in

contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. Subsequently, on

22.02.2022, a Memorandum of Charges was served upon him.

11. An Enquiry Committee comprising three members was

constituted on 25.02.2022, which submitted its Report on

23.03.2022. In the enquiry report, the charges pertaining to

indiscipline, gross insubordination, unprofessional conduct and

obstruction of public servants in discharge of official duties were

held to be proved. On 29.03.2022, the enquiry report was

forwarded to the Secretary of Ministry of Civil Aviation (“MOCA”),

4 who in turn submitted the proposal for approval of the Visitor,

who accorded the approval to the same on 20.04.2022.

Thereafter, by communication dated 27.04.2022, the Deputy

Secretary, MOCA conveyed the order terminating the services of

the First Registrar.

12. The First Registrar challenged the aforesaid order of termination

before the High Court by filing a writ petition. During the

pendency of the said writ petition, an advertisement was issued

for filling up the post of Registrar of the University.

Consequently, the First Registrar instituted another writ petition

seeking quashing of the fresh advertisement.

13. The learned Single Judge, by an order dated 25.04.2023, inter

alia, held that the services of the First Registrar had never been

extended beyond the initial period of probation of one year and,

therefore, he was only entitled to one month’s notice prior to

termination. Accordingly, the writ petition was disposed of with

a direction to the appellants to pay one month’s salary to the

First Registrar.

14. Aggrieved thereby, the First Registrar preferred an intra-court

appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court, by the impugned

order dated 22.05.2024, observed that the entire action against

5 the First Registrar had been undertaken by the officers of MOCA,

which had no role to play under the Act or the Statutes. It was

held that the Visitor had no role in disciplinary proceedings

concerning officers and employees of the University.

Consequently, the Division Bench held that the entire action

taken against the First Registrar was without jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the order dated 25.04.2023 passed by the learned

Single Judge, as well as the order dated 27.04.2022 issued by

the Deputy Secretary, MOCA, were quashed. The First Registrar

was also held entitled to back wages/salary up to 07.04.2022

and the appeal was allowed. Being aggrieved, the University as

well as the Union of India have preferred these appeals.

SUBMISSIONS

15. Learned senior counsel appearing for the University, submitted

that the High Court erred in holding that while the appointment

of the First Registrar was made by the University, the

disciplinary action could not be undertaken by the Visitor. It was

contended that the First Registrar was admittedly the “First

Registrar” of the University and, therefore, his appointment was

governed by the transitional provisions contained in Section 46

of the Act. It was further submitted that the Hon’ble President of

6 India, being the Visitor of the University, had conveyed approval

for the appointment of the First Registrar and, therefore,

disciplinary action was rightly taken with the approval of the

Visitor.

16. It was urged that Clause 7 of the Statutes applies only to regular

appointments made by the University and not to the

appointment of the First Registrar. It is submitted that the High

Court failed to take note of Section 46 of the Act and erroneously

concluded that the Visitor lacked jurisdiction to take action

against the First Registrar.

17. It was contended that, pursuant to the liberty granted by the

Division Bench of the High Court, which was upheld by this

Court, the earlier order of termination had been revisited and a

fresh order had thereafter been passed in accordance with law.

It was argued that the High Court erred in granting back wages

to the First Registrar in the absence of any specific challenge to

the order denying the same. It was, therefore, submitted that the

impugned order deserved to be set aside.

18. Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union of

India, while adopting the submissions advanced on behalf of the

University, submitted that the Executive Council of the

7 University was constituted on 07.03.2016 and held its first

meeting on 19.12.2017. Inviting our attention to the proviso to

Section 20(1) of the Act, it was submitted that until the

constitution of the first Executive Council, the Steering

Committee of MOCA was required to function as the interim

Executive Council. It was, therefore, contended that the Visitor

was competent to take action against the First Registrar.

19. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the First

Registrar submitted that the Visitor is empowered to appoint the

Vice Chancellor but cannot exercise disciplinary authority on

the recommendation of MOCA, which has no statutory role in

disciplinary proceedings concerning employees of the University.

It was argued that the First Registrar was an employee of the

University and not of MOCA and, therefore, no disciplinary

action could have been initiated or undertaken by MOCA. It was

accordingly urged that the appeals deserved to be dismissed.

ANALYSIS

20. We have considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf

of the parties and have perused the record. From perusal of

Section 2(b), (l) and (x), Section 9(1), 9(2) to 9(12), Section 12,

8 Section 14 and Section 20 of the Act, the following conclusions

can be deduced:

(i) “academic staff” means such categories of staff as are

designated as academic staff by the Ordinances.

[Section 2(b)]

(ii) ‘employee’ means any person appointed by the

University and includes the teachers and other staff

of the University. [(Section 2(l)]

(iii) Teachers of the University means Professors,

Associate Professors, Assistant Professors, Readers,

Senior Lecturers, Lecturers and such other persons

as may be appointed or recognised for imparting

instruction or conducting research in the University

or in any college or institution maintained by the

University. [Section 2(x)]

(iv) The President of India is the Visitor of the University

and has the powers enumerated in Section 9(2) to

Section 9(12) of the Act. [Section 9]

(v) The Registrar has to be appointed by the Executive

Council and has such powers and duties which may

be prescribed by the Statutes. [Section 14]

9

(vi) The Executive Council is the principal Executive Body

of the University and till the First Executive Council

is formed, the Steering Committee of MOCA shall

function as an interim Executive Council. (Section 20)

21. Section 46 of the Act contains transitional provisions. The

relevant extract of Section 46 reads as under: -

“46. Transitional provisions.— Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act and the Statutes,—

(a) the first Chancellor and the first Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Visitor in such manner and on such conditions as may be deemed fit and each of the said officers shall hold office for such term, not exceeding five years, as may be specified by the Visitor;

(b) the first Registrar and the first Finance Officer shall be appointed by the Visitor on the recommendation of the Vice-

Chancellor and each of the said officers shall hold office for a term of three years.”

22. Statute No. 28 deals with the removal of employees of the

University. The relevant extract of Statute No.28 is extracted

below: -

10

“28. Removal of employees of University.— (1) Where there is an allegation of misconduct against a teacher, a member of the academic staff or other employee of the University, the Vice-Chancellor, in the case of the teacher or member of the academic staff, and the authority competent to appoint (here after in this Statute referred to as the appointing authority) in the case of other employee, may, by order in writing, place such teacher, member of the academic staff or other employee, as the case may be, under suspension and shall forthwith report to the Executive Council the circumstances in which the order was made:

Provided that the Executive Council may, if it is of the opinion, that the circumstances of the case do not warrant the suspension of the teacher or the member of the academic staff, revoke such order.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the terms of the contract of appointment or of any other terms and conditions of service of the employees, the Executive Council in respect of teachers and other academic staff, and the appointing authority, in respect of other employees, shall have the power to remove a teacher or a member of the academic staff or other employee, as the case may be, on grounds of misconduct.

(3) Save as aforesaid, the Executive Council, or as the case may be the appointing authority, shall not be entitled to remove any teacher, member of the academic staff or other employee except for a good cause and after giving three

11 months’ notice or on payment of three months’ salary in lieu thereof.

(4) No teacher, member of the academic staff or other employee shall be removed under clause (2) or clause (3) unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.”

Thus, where there is an allegation of misconduct against a

teacher, a member of the academic staff, or other employee of

the University, the Vice-Chancellor, in the case of teacher and

member of the academic staff, and the appointing authority in

the case of other employee, may, by order in writing, place such

teacher, member of the academic staff or other employee, as the

case may be, under suspension and shall have the power to

remove on the ground of misconduct.

23. The necessity for transitional provision may arise either due to

change in law, whether the change in law is caused by new law,

or by repeal and substitution or modification of law. Section 46

of the Act is, undoubtedly, a transitional provision. The function

of a transitional provision is to make special provision for the

application of legislation to the circumstances which exist at the

time when the legislation comes into force1. One feature of a

1 Thornton on Legislative Drafting 3rd ed.; (1987), p.319

12 transitional provision is that its operation is expected to be

temporary, in that it becomes spent when all the past

circumstances with which it is designed to deal have been dealt

with, while the primary legislation continues to deal indefinitely

with the new circumstances which arise after its passage2. The

power under Section 46(b) of the Act, exhausts itself when it is

exercised by making an appointment.

24. Statute No.28(1) provides that power of removal of a teacher, a

member of academic staff or other employee of the University,

the Vice-Chancellor, on the ground of misconduct, is conferred

upon the appointing authority. The appointing authority for the

post of Registrar is the Executive Council, which has power to

take an action for removal of the Registrar on the ground of

misconduct.

25. However, the present case stands on a distinct footing, as, we

are concerned with the First Registrar and not the Regular

Registrar. Section 46(b) and Statute No.28(1) must, therefore,

be read in the light of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act,

1897, which provides that where, by any Central Act or

Regulation, a power to make appointment is conferred, then,

2 Britnell v. Secretary of State for Social Security; [1991] 2 All ER 726

13 unless a different intention appears, the authority having power

to make appointment shall also have power to suspend or

dismiss any person so appointed in exercise of that power. Thus,

the appointing authority necessarily possesses the power to

terminate the services of the employee appointed by it.

26. In the instant case, the First Registrar was appointed on

01.03.2019 and joined the services of the University on

08.04.2019. During the period of probation, by an order dated

08/09.01.2020, his services were terminated. The First

Registrar challenged the order of termination in a writ petition.

By an order dated 17.09.2021, the learned Single Judge directed

the appellants to reinstate the First Registrar to the Post of

Registrar with all consequential benefits in terms of appointment

letter 01.03.2019. Thereafter, the Division Bench of the High

Court by an order dated 17.12.2021 found the order of

termination to be stigmatic and remitted the matter to the

University, to proceed afresh. The aforesaid order of the Division

Bench has attained finality as Special Leave Petition preferred

by the First Registrar was dismissed. It is noteworthy that in the

aforesaid round of litigation, the First Registrar did not take the

plea that Visitor lacked authority to terminate his services.

14

27. Pursuant to the remand, an Enquiry Committee was

constituted. A Memorandum of Charges dated 22.02.2022 was

served on the First Registrar and an Enquiry Report was

submitted on 29.03.2022. The Visitor granted approval for

termination of services of First Registrar on 20.04.2022, which

was communicated to him on 27.04.2022. The tenure of the

First Registrar under Section 46(b) of the Act was three years

i.e., from 01.03.2019 till 28.02.2022. Therefore, in terms of

Statute No.28(1), the services of the First Registrar were

terminated by the Visitor who was also the appointing authority

of the First Registrar. The action terminating services of the First

Registrar appears to be in consonance with Statute No. 28(1).

CONCLUSION

28. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the exercise

of power by the Visitor appears to be just and proper. We are,

therefore, unable to concur with the finding recorded by the

Division Bench of the High Court in its judgment dated

22.05.2024 that the Visitor had no role in the disciplinary

proceedings against the First Registrar of University.

29. However, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances

of the case, namely, the expiry of period of appointment of the

15 First Registrar and the repeated rounds of litigation between the

parties, we are not inclined to interfere with the operative

directions issued by the High Court.

30. Accordingly, the appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

There shall be no order as to costs.

….………..…………….………….……….J. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

.....…….……………….………….……….J. [ALOK ARADHE]

NEW DELHI;

MAY 21, 2026.

16