Vaneeta Patnaik vs Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti

2025 INSC 1106 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 17936 of 2025)

VANEETA PATNAIK …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

NIRMAL KANTI CHAKRABARTI & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

ORDER

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. Leave granted

2. Heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, senior counsel and Ms.

Madhavi Divan, senior counsel, appearing for the

appellant and the respondent no.1 respectively.

3. The appellant-Ms. Vaneeta Patnaik is a faculty member of

the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences1, Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by geeta ahuja Date: 2025.09.12 16:26:27 IST Kolkata. Dr. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, respondent no.1 Reason: 1 Hereinafter referred to as “NUJS” or “University”

1 was appointed as a Vice Chancellor of NUJS on

03.07.2019

4. The appellant lodged a formal complaint on 26.12.2023

with the Local Complaint Committee2 alleging sexual

harassment on part of respondent no.1. The LCC rejected

the complaint as barred by time inasmuch as the last

alleged incident of sexual harassment occurred in April

2023; whereas the complaint was filed on 26.12.2023

which was not only beyond the prescribed period of

limitation of three months but also beyond the extendable

period of limitation of six months.

5. The appellant, aggrieved by the rejection of her complaint,

preferred a writ petition before the High Court. The single

Judge of the High Court vide judgment and order dated

22.05.2024 quashed the order of the LCC and directed for

rehearing of the complaint on its merit. The single Judge

held that the appellant was subjected to threat of

detrimental treatment in her employment even after April

2023 and as the Vice-Chancellor created an intimidating,

offensive and hostile work environment for her, as such

2 Hereinafter referred to as “LCC”

2 the complaint was within time, taking the subsequent

event as the last incident of sexual harassment.

6. The aforesaid judgment and order of the single Judge of

the High Court was taken up by the Division Bench in a

writ appeal, FMA No. 873 of 2024 (M.A.T. No. 1295 of

2024) and the same was allowed by the impugned

judgment and order dated 23.12.2024.

7. The Division Bench held that administrative actions taken

against the appellant after April 2023 were collective

decisions of the Executive Council, consisting of eminent

academicians, jurists and even Supreme Court Judges

and were not just personal actions of the Vice-Chancellor.

It was improbable for the Vice-Chancellor to have prevailed

over the decision of the Executive Council, exerting his

pressure. He was not in a position to manipulate the

decision of the Executive Council. The alleged incidents of

harassment, if any, after April 2023, did not constitute

sexual harassment and that even the appellant in all her

communications to the Chancellor and Executive Council

prior to December 2023, had not made any allegation of

such sexual harassment against the Vice-Chancellor.

3 Therefore, the complaint filed on 26.12.2023, after the last

incident of sexual harassment that took place in April

2023, is beyond the normal period of limitation and even

the extended period. It was, therefore, rightly rejected by

the LCC as barred by time and the Single Judge of the High

Court was not justified in overturning the said decision.

8. The neat question which falls for consideration of this

Court is: whether the Division Bench of the High Court is

justified in non-suiting the appellant on the ground that

her complaint was barred by limitation.

9. To decide the above issue in the facts of the present case,

it would be beneficial to first consider not only the

definition of ‘sexual harassment’ but also what other

circumstances, acts or behaviours would constitute as

sexual harassment, vis-a-vis the period of limitation

provided for making complaint in that regard.

10. ‘Sexual harassment’ is defined in Section 2(n) of the Sexual

Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,

Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 20133 to include any one

or more of the unwelcome act or behaviour (whether

3 Hereinafter referred as the “POSH Act”

4 directly or by implication) such as physical contact and

advances; or a demand or request for sexual favours; or

making sexually coloured remarks; or showing

pornography; or any other unwelcome physical, verbal or

non-verbal conduct of sexual nature.

11. Section 3 of the POSH Act, while providing that no woman

shall be subjected to sexual harassment at any workplace,

describes certain circumstances that would amount as an

act or behaviour of sexual harassment, i.e., implied or

explicit promise of preferential treatment in her

employment; or implied or explicit threat of detrimental

treatment in her employment; or implied or explicit threat

about her present or future employment status; or

interference with her work or creating an intimidating or

offensive or hostile work environment for her; or

humiliating treatment likely to affect her health or safety.

12. On a combined reading of both the above provisions, it is

manifest that not only the unwelcome act or behaviour in

the form of physical contact or advances, a demand or

request for sexual favours, making sexually coloured

remarks, showing pornography or any unwelcome

5 physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature

but also any other circumstances connected with the act

or behaviour of sexual harassment, like implied or explicit

promise of preferential treatment in employment, threat

about the present and future employment status,

interference with work or creating an intimidating,

offensive or hostile work environment or subjecting to

humiliating treatment which may likely affect her health

or safety, would also amount to acts or behaviour of sexual

harassment.

13. Section 9 of the Act postulates that any aggrieved woman

may make a complaint, in writing, of sexual harassment at

the work place to the Local Committee within a period of

three months from the date of incident, and in the case of

series of incidents, within a period of three months from

the date of the last incident. The second proviso to Section

9 provides that the LCC may for reasons to be recorded in

writing, extend the time of making the complaint not

exceeding three months, if it is satisfied that the

circumstances prevailing prevented the woman from filing

of the complaint within the period prescribed.

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14. In other words, a complaint of sexual harassment is

mandatorily required to be filed within a period of three

months from the date of the last incident of such

harassment or within a further extended period of three

months, i.e., within a maximum period of six months from

the date of the last incident of sexual harassment.

15. No doubt, the issue of limitation is ordinarily a mixed

question of fact and law and it may not be possible to throw

out a complaint at the threshold without collecting

material on the factual aspects relating to the limitation.

Nonetheless, where a complaint on the simple reading of

the averments made therein appears to be patently barred

by limitation, it can be rejected at the very first instance

on the analogy of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, without even

calling the other side to participate in the proceedings.

16. In view of the above, it would be prudent to consider the

averments made in the complaint which admittedly was

filed by the appellant on 26.12.2023. The said complaint,

apart from other things, inter alia, alleges that respondent

no. 1 joined the University as the Vice-Chancellor in July

2019. He called her (the appellant herein) in his office in

7 September 2019, and insisted that she should accompany

him for dinner, which would greatly benefit her personally.

He even touched her hand in a manner that made her

extremely uncomfortable, whereupon, she left his office

quietly.

17. The Vice-Chancellor again called her in his office in

October 2019. He asked her whether she (the appellant)

has thought over his proposal for going out for a dinner.

The appellant told him that she is not comfortable and

wants to keep the relationship professional only. He,

thereafter, demanded sexual favour from her and

threatened her if the offers are declined.

18. In October 2019, her promotion was put on hold by the

Executive Council. Finally, the Executive Council in its

meeting held on 02.04.2022 accepted the

recommendations of the Selection Committee and cleared

her for promotion.

19. The appellant was called upon by the Vice-Chancellor in

his office again in April 2023, where he asked the appellant

to accompany him on a trip to a resort which the appellant

flatly refused. Thereupon, he threatened the appellant that

8 her career would suffer badly. On 29.08.2023, the

appellant received a letter from the Vice-Chancellor

removing her as Director, Centre of Financial, Regulatory

and Governance Studies4.

20. In the meantime, some complaints by the faculty members

were made against her, whereupon the Executive Council

resolved to appoint the Principal Secretary, Law,

Government of West Bengal as a ‘one-man enquiry

commission’ for conducting preliminary enquiry into the

issue of misutilisation of the grant received from UGC and

with regard to the issue of National Foundation of

Corporate Governance5. The Executive Council resolved

that a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- be refunded immediately by

the NUJS. Thereafter, the appellant allegedly made

complaints of harassment and victimisation to the

members of the Executive Council through e-mails and

even to the Chancellor.

21. A plain reading of the entire complaint would reveal that

the sexual harassment, if any, of the appellant at the

hands of respondent no.1 commenced sometime in

4 Hereinafter referred to as “CFRGS” 5 Hereinafter referred to as “NFCG”

9 September 2019, and the last incident in that connection

took place in April 2023. Thereafter, no incident of sexual

harassment is alleged to have taken place except for the

fact that on 29.08.2023, the appellant was removed from

the post of Director, CFRGS or that a preliminary inquiry

was instituted against her by the Executive Council.

22. The complaint of the appellant from the last incident of

sexual harassment of April 2023, is certainly beyond time.

However, the issue is whether the subsequent event of

removal of the appellant from the post of the Director,

CFRGS or initiation of inquiry by the Executive Council are

in any way linked to sexual harassment or amounts to

sexual harassment as described under Section 3(2) of the

POSH Act.

23. The last incident of actual sexual harassment took place

in April 2023. The subsequent incident of August 2023,

whereunder the appellant was removed as Director of

CFRGS, with no financial implications arose out of a

complaint received from the Central Government

undertaking i.e. NFCG wherein appellant was specifically

named. The said action was taken completely

10 independently on the basis of the complaint of NFCG

alleging that the project report was not submitted within

time and that the amount sanctioned for the project be

refunded. It may be pertinent to note that the MoU was

signed by the appellant with the NFCG and the bank

account was also under her control.

24. In view of the above, the incident of removal of appellant

as the Director of CFRGS cannot be attributed as an act of

sexual harassment in connection with the previous

incidents. It was based upon the report of NFCG, an

independent body.

25. The inquiry into the project funds was taken up by the

Executive Council and it was a collective decision and not

a unilateral action of the Vice-Chancellor. Thus, the said

act would also not amount to an act of sexual harassment

in conjunction with the previous reported acts.

26. The actions taken against the appellant in August 2023,

are administrative in nature and does not create a gender

based hostile environment, and hence, fall short of being

actions amounting to acts of sexual harassment.

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27. It would be important to refer to the expressions “in

relation to” or “connected with” used in Section 3(2) of the

Act. The use of the above expression clearly demonstrates

that there has to be a direct link between the action

complained of and an overt act of sexual harassment. In

view of what has been said above, we find no such direct

link between the last incident of sexual harassment which

happened in April 2023, and those referred to

subsequently in August 2023 or December 2023.

28. A distinction has to be made between a “continuing wrong”

and a “recurring wrong”. The difference between the two

has been clarified in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh6

where it has been held that a “continuing wrong” is when

the injury itself persists, whereas a “recurring wrong” is

when a fresh cause of action arises each time.

29. The alleged act of harassment of April 2023, was a

complete act in itself and had not continued thereafter.

The administrative measures of August 2023, were

independent and were collective decisions of the NFCG and

the Executive Council which cannot be solely attributed to

6 (2008) 8 SCC 648

12 the Vice-Chancellor. The said decision may have caused

inconvenience to the appellant or may have given an

impression that they are in line with previous acts of

harassment, but they were not part of the continued

sexual harassment. The subsequent events have no

connection to the earlier act of sexual misconduct and as

such, fall clearly out of the preview of acts or behaviours

amounting to sexual harassment. In this way, the incident

of April 2023, remains the last event related to sexual

harassment.

30. The appellant, in addressing her grievances to the

Chancellor, had not made any mention whatsoever of the

sexual harassment which may have taken place in August,

2023 onwards. The appellant initiated the complaint on

26.12.2023, immediately after the Executive Council

meeting on 21.12.2023, which had resolved to inquire into

diverse acts of misconduct on part of the appellant, that

could give an impression that the complaint was filed in

retaliation.

31. The appellant, in filing the complaint, also moved an

application for condonation of delay stating that there were

13 “mitigating circumstances” which she had attempted to

resolve within the institution and when she failed, she then

filed the complaint. The very fact that the appellant was

conscious of the fact that her complaint was delayed,

proves that she herself treated the act of April 2023, to be

the last incident of sexual harassment and as such, tried

to explain the delay in filing the complaint.

32. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as

the discussion, we are of the view that the Division Bench

of the High Court committed no error of law in restoring

the decision of the LCC that the complaint of the appellant

is time barred and is liable to be dismissed.

33. It is advisable to forgive the wrongdoer, but not to forget

the wrongdoing. The wrong which has been committed

against the appellant may not be investigated on technical

grounds, but it must not be forgotten.

34. In this view of the matter, we direct that the incidents of

alleged sexual harassment on part of respondent no.1 may

be forgiven but allowed to haunt the wrongdoer forever.

Thus, it is directed that this judgment shall be made part

14 of the resume of respondent no.1, compliance of which

shall be strictly ensured by him personally.

35. The appeal is dismissed with the observations made above.

36. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

.............……………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

.............……………………………….. J.

(PRASANNA B. VARALE) NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 12, 2025.

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