V.S.R. Mohan Rao vs K.S.R. Murthy

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. _____ of 2025 (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.12570 OF 2025)

V. S. R. MOHAN RAO …APPELLANT

VERSUS

K. S. R. MURTHY & ORS. …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E NT

K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant is aggrieved with the fact that he

has been accused and termed to be a ‘land grabber’

without due cause and directed to be evicted from the

property which he duly acquired under a sale deed,

wherein he had been residing from the date of purchase; Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Jayant Kumar Arora Date: 2025.05.15 18:38:31 IST that is from 27.03.1997. The applicant before the Special Reason: Page 1 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 Court under the Land Grabbing Act1 was concerned with

252 square yards of land in occupation of the appellant,

which the applicant asserted, was a clear case of land

grabbing, of a portion of the land belonging to the

applicant admeasuring 555 square yards forming part of

survey no. 9 of Saroornagar Village, Ranga Reddy District;

which she purchased under a registered sale deed dated

01.01.1965.

3. Smt. Madhvi Diwan, learned Senior Counsel

argued that the provisions of the Land Grabbing Act could

not have been invoked against the appellant herein. The

appellant, if at all, was a simple trespasser, who had

bonafide purchased the property by way of a registered

sale deed dated 27.03.1997 and had been in residence in a

double storied building constructed on it. The appellant’s

case was that the land had changed hands, over the years,

he having purchased the land from his vendors who trace

their title to a Housing Society, the 11th respondent. If at all,

1 Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 Page 2 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 his title is in doubt, it is perfected by his predecessors-in-

interest by reason of the principle of adverse possession

since a two storied building occupied by his vendor was

existing in the land for very many years. Learned Senior

Counsel also took us to the decision in Konda Lakshmana

Bapuji v. Govt. of A.P.,2 to impress upon us the constricted

scope of the Land Grabbing Act and argued with specific

reference to paragraphs 37 and 38. To term an

encroachment or trespass as a ‘land grab’, under the Act,

there should be obvious criminality and clear mens rea

which is totally absent in the present case. It is argued

without admitting, that, if at all the appellant is guilty, it is a

simple trespass, for which the remedy under the Act cannot

be invoked and one has to go before the civil court. It is

argued that under the Act, a summary trial is conducted

and only on a prima facie finding of the title of the

applicant, the appellant is sought to be evicted.

2 (2002) 3 SCC 258 Page 3 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025

4. Learned Counsel Sh. P. V. Yogeswaran, entered

appearance for the respondents who are the legal heirs of

the original applicant before the Special Court. It is pointed

out that the Commissioner appointed by the Court, an

officer of the Survey Department, clearly found the

appellant having encroached into the property of the

applicant. The property owned by the applicant by virtue of

a deed of 1965 was in survey no. 9, while the sale deed

produced by the appellant showed his property to be in

survey no. 10. It is also argued that two suits filed by the

appellant, one against the applicant and the other against

the Municipality, failed miserably. The Land Grabbing Act

brings in any encroachment of land within its ambit and

scope, inter-alia, of a private individual and does not

specify any limit on extent for it to operate. It provides a

special remedy for evicting the person who has grabbed

the land, which is rightly availed by the applicant.

Page 4 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025

5. We refer to the contesting parties as the

applicant; who initiated the proceedings before the Special

Court and the one alleged as a land grabber: as the

appellant. We first looked at the decision in Konda

Lakshmana Bapuji2 to understand whether criminality and

mens rea is a requirement under the enactment. The

Learned Judges having looked at the definition of ‘grab’,

especially in the context of the statute having not provided

a definition for ‘grabbing’, found it literally to have a broad

meaning and a narrow one. The broader meaning being of

taking away unauthorisedly, greedily or unfairly and the

narrow meaning being of snatching forcibly, violently or by

unscrupulous means. It was held, with regard to the object

of the Act that it took within its scope and ambit both the

narrow as well as the broad meaning. It was held so in

paragraph 37:-

“… Thus understood, the ingredients of the expression “land grabbing” would comprise (i) the factum of an activity of taking possession of

Page 5 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 any land forcibly, violently, unscrupulously, unfairly or greedily without any lawful entitlement, and (ii) the mens rea/intention – “with the intention of with a view to” (a) illegally taking possession of such lands or (b) enter into or create illegal tenancies, lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or (c) to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or (d) to give such lands to any person on (i) rental, or (ii) lease and licence basis for construction, or (iii) use and occupation of unauthorised structures.”

6. We are in respectful agreement with the above

proposition especially looking at the definition of ‘land

grabber’ and ‘land grabbing’ as is seen from clauses (d)

and (e) of Section 2 of the Act, the ambit of which also has

been delineated in paragraph 38 of the cited decision:-

“A combined reading of clauses (d) and (e) would suggest that to bring a person within the meaning of the expression “land grabber” it must be shown that : (i)(a) he has

Page 6 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 unauthorisedly, unfairly, greedily, snatched forcibly, violently or unscrupulously any land belonging to the Government or a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person; (b) without any lawful entitlement; and (c) with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands or to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation of unauthorised structures; or

(ii) he has given financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon; or (iii) he is collecting or attempting to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation; or (iv) he is abetting the doing of any of the abovementioned acts; or (v) that he is the successor-in-interest of any such persons.”

Page 7 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025

7. The definition under clause (cc) of Section 2 of

‘land belonging to a private person’ includes a land

belonging to (i) an evacuee, (ii) a military personnel, or (iii)

any private individual. Clause (e) is an inclusive definition

which takes in every activity of grabbing of any land

whether belonging to the Government , a local authority or

even a private person. The definition of ‘land grabber’

under clause (d) also takes in a person who commits land

grabbing and includes any organised activity for the

purpose of land grabbing. As has been held in the cited

decision, the term ‘land grabbing’ is employed in the

statute, conferring on it both a narrow and broad

connotation and it cannot be said that there should

necessarily be criminality insofar as the encroachment or

trespass carried out. The mens rea or intention required is

only of illegally taking possession of land, through unlawful

or arbitrary means, by oneself or through others, for

Page 8 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 creation of third party rights, carrying out constructions or

use and occupation unauthorisedly.

8. Konda Lakshmana Bapuji2 has also held that

the allegation of any act of land grabbing is the sine qua

non for maintaining an application under the Act and not

the truth or otherwise of such an allegation. However, to

hold that a person is a land grabber, it is necessary to find

that the allegations satisfying the requirement of land

grabbing are proved to make out a case that the appellant

is a land grabber. The applicant should include both the

ingredients, the factum as well as the intention, that the

person accused of land grabbing falls under the definition

clause (d) of section 2 of the Act and that the intention was

to illegally take possession of such land, as required under

clause (c) of Section 2.

9. A reading of the complaint filed as LGC No. 121

of 1999 would clearly indicate that the applicant had

asserted her ownership over 555 sq. yards of land in survey

Page 9 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 no. 9, having obtained it by virtue of a registered sale deed

of 09.01.1965 which was purchased by her vendor Valluru

Venkateshwarlu who purchased the land through a

registered deed dated 29.01.1962. The Society which is

said to have purchased the land from the legal

representatives of the very same person, purchased land

that existed in survey no. 10. The applicant had asserted

before the Special Court that the vendors of the appellant

had trespassed into the land and the appellant too was

occupying the land illegally with a view to grab lands over

which the applicant had a valid title, especially since the

continuance of the appellant’s possession was based on a

sale deed wherein the property scheduled is said to be

existing in survey no. 10.

10. The ingredients required under the Land

Grabbing Act definitely are pleaded in the application,

which remain an allegation till it is proved before the

Special Court. The applicant proved her possession by

Page 10 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 virtue of the title deed and also took out a Commission

which identified the property in the possession of the

appellant to be clearly in survey no. 9 and not survey no. 10.

The Special Court also spoke of the suits filed by the

appellant, one of which, seeking injunction against the

applicant was rejected and the other, seeking injunction

against the Municipality, was withdrawn when the applicant

sought to implead herself in the said suit.

11. Admittedly, the appellant’s land; more fully

described in the application, is existing in survey no. 9 and

it is not disputed that the appellant’s purchase was of a land

in survey no. 10. The learned Senior Counsel had argued

that there was lack of clarity in the Commission Report. We

have looked at the report produced as annexure P-10 in the

SLP records. In fact, the lack of clarity is insofar as

identification of properties in survey no. 10. The

Commission Report specifically records that survey no. 9

has a total extent of 462 acres and 28 guntas and there are

Page 11 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 several survey numbers lying scattered and aloof, in which

is comprised survey no. 10 admeasuring 6 acres and 7

guntas. As per the inspection, the schedule property clearly

falls within survey no. 9 and not in survey no. 10. The

Commission Report, by the Assistant Director, Survey and

Land Records according to us, clearly identifies the

property of the applicant, in the survey number. 9 as

revealed from her document of 1965.

12. Further as found by the Special Court and the

High Court, two suits were filed by the appellant, both for

injunction; one against the applicant and the other against

the Municipality. The first suit against the applicant was

dismissed and the second suit was withdrawn, when the

applicant sought impleadment.

13. Much was argued about the summary manner in

which an enquiry is conducted in a proceeding before the

Special Court under the Act which however does not come

out from a plain reading of the Land Grabbing Act or the

Page 12 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 decision cited for the appellant. This Court in Konda

Lakshmana Bapuji2 emphasised the object of the Act

which was to curb the increasing trend in grabbing the

lands of the government and the other public authorities as

also private persons by unscrupulous, but resourceful

persons. The intention was to immediately detect such

instances of land grabbing and deal with it sternly and

swiftly by specially devised adjudicating forums to ensure

that the evil subsides and social injustice will not be

perpetrated with impunity. The Special Court is constituted

with both civil and criminal jurisdiction; which consists of a

serving or retired Judge of a High Court as Chairperson,

two serving or retired District Judges and two serving or

retired Civil Servants not below the rank of a District

Collector, as members; as is seen from the statute produced

in the SLP. The Special Court constituted is also an appellate

forum as against the orders passed by a Special Tribunal,

constituted under the Act which is the Court of the District

Page 13 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 Judge having jurisdiction of the area, including the Chief

Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.

14. Under Section 10 of the Act the initial burden,

prima facie, to prove the ownership of the land is on the

person who asserts it by way of an application alleging an

act of land grabbing. On prima facie proof being offered

the onus will shift to the land grabber, since there is a

presumption arising if the ownership of the subject land is

proved prima facie. The allegation of land grabbing by

itself does not give rise to the presumption, which arises

only when prima facie the ownership is established, at

which point the alleged land grabber can lead evidence to

rebut the presumption. Merely because of the shifting of

the onus, on the initial prima facie burden being

discharged, it cannot be said that there is a prejudice

caused to the respondent before the Special Court.

15. As has been held in Konda Lakshmana

Bapuji2, an allegation is a requirement to maintain a

Page 14 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 petition but however, proof should be offered insofar as the

claim of title asserted by the applicant in which context

only the onus of proof shifts to the alleged land grabber.

Even then, there is ample opportunity for the land grabber

to rebut the presumption, which the appellant herein has

not been able to do before the Special Court.

16. The survey numbers evidenced in the sale deed

produced by the applicant and the appellant, as also the

failed attempts of the appellant to obtain an injunction

against the applicant and the Municipality; in suits wherein

the claim raised was against the very same property,

together establish the allegation of land grabbing. We

cannot but observe that though a claim is raised on adverse

possession, by reason only of a building constructed on the

subject land, no proof was offered as to the date on which

such construction was commenced and concluded. We say

this, despite having noticed that the applicant has a case

that on being aware of the commencement of construction,

Page 15 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025 the applicant had moved the Registrar of Co-operative

Societies seeking action against the Housing Society, the

13th respondent, which purchased the property in survey

no. 10 from Valluru Venkateshwarlu, the vendor of the

applicant as also the Society; the predecessor in interest of

the appellant too. This puts to peril the plea of adverse

possession since it puts paid the foundation of a hostile

animus.

17. We find absolutely no reason to interfere with

the judgment impugned specifically noticing that the

decision cited, in paragraph 17 held that:-

“The purpose of the Act is to identify cases involving allegation of land grabbing for speedy enquiry and trial. The courts under the Act are nonetheless civil courts which follow the Code of Civil Procedure and are competent to grant the same reliefs which can be obtained from ordinary civil courts.”

18. The appeal stands dismissed.

Page 16 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025

19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

…………..……………, J.

[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

……………..……………, J.

[K. VINOD CHANDRAN] NEW DELHI;

MAY 15, 2025.

Page 17 of 17 CA @SLP(C) No. 12570/2025