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V.Prabhakar & Ors vs Bangalore Mahanagara Palika & Ors

Supreme Court28 July 2008Aftab Alam · Tarun Chatterjee

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where an acquisition notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is challenged on the ground of mala fides on the basis that the acquired land is insufficient to fulfill all the stated public purposes, the acquisition will not be quashed if the land is capable of being used for at least one of those purposes, provided there is material on record demonstrating the bonafides of the acquisition authority and no substantive evidence of mala fides exists. A party challenging an acquisition in a subsequent writ petition is held to be under a duty to disclose material facts from an earlier writ petition on the same subject matter that was decided against it; suppression of such facts constitutes a material non-disclosure that affects the credibility of the challenge.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

NON REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO 4681 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP)No....................CC 5931 of 2008)

Sri V. Prabhakar and Ors. ...Appellant

VERSUS

Bangalore Mahanagara Palike Bangalore, Karnataka and Ors. ...Respondents

O R D E R

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. This appeal is directed against the

Judgment and order dated 19th of

September, 2007 of a Division Bench of

the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore

in Writ Appeal No. 6192 of 2002, whereby

the Division Bench of the High Court had

1 reversed the order of a learned Single

Judge of the High Court quashing the

acquisition proceeding in respect of the

land belonging to the appellants and

rejected the writ application of the

appellants.

4. The Bangalore Mahanagara Palike,

Bangalore, took a resolution to acquire

the property of the appellants bearing

No. 67/1 and 67/2 situated at 3rd Main

Road, Ramachandrapuram, Division No. 20,

Bangalore, which was purchased by the

appellants by registered deeds of sale

on 5th of December, 1996, to establish a

school with a playground and a hospital.

The purpose for which the land was

acquired could not be disputed that such

purpose was for a public purpose. The

State Government thereafter, after

approval of the resolution to acquire

the aforesaid property, issued a

notification on 18th of June, 1998 under

2 Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition

Act (in short the "Act"). Since the

appellants had purchased the acquired

property, they challenged the

notification under Section 4(1) of the

Act on the ground that the acquisition

was not bonafide. It was alleged by the

appellants that the acquisition was

malafide because the property was sought

to be acquired to start a school with a

playground and a hospital, which would

not be possible to establish on the

small piece of land measuring less than

half an acre belonging to the

appellants. Since the notification was

not withdrawn, the appellants moved a

writ application challenging the

acquisition on the ground that

acquisition was not bonafide. The

learned single Judge of the High Court

held that the area acquired was little

less than half an acre and, therefore,

3 it was not possible to establish school

with a playground and a hospital in such

a small area. Accordingly, the learned

Single Judge of the High Court held that

there could not exist a public purpose

for acquiring the property and,

therefore, quashed the acquisition

proceedings. An appeal was carried by

the respondents before the Division

Bench of the High Court which, by the

impugned order, had set aside the order

of the learned Single Judge holding that

the land so acquired was acquired for

public purpose for the establishment of

a school with a playground and a

hospital, and that if the area of the

acquired land which is half an acre is

not sufficient to satisfy all the three

requirements, namely-

(i) Establishment of a school;

(ii) A play ground;

(iii) A hospital,

4 at least one of such requirements could be

satisfied. Upon these findings, the Division

Bench of the High Court had set aside the

order of the learned Single Judge and held

that the notification under Section 4(1) of

the Act could not be quashed on the ground

of malafides. It is this order of the

Division Bench of the High Court, the SLP

was filed in this Court, which on grant of

leave was heard in presence of the learned

counsel for the parties.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the

parties and considered the entire

materials on record including the

contrary findings of the learned Single

Judge as well as of the Division Bench

on the question of malafides to acquire

the property of the appellant. It

appears from the record that there was

no material to substantiate the case of

malafides as made out by the appellants

in the writ application. It also

5 appears from the record that the Deputy

Commissioner (Administration) of the

State Government, by his letter dated 1st

of September, 1997, found the need for

acquisition of the acquired property for

the purpose of establishing a school

with a play ground and a hospital for

which necessary amounts have already

been deposited. The Division Bench of

the High Court, in our view, rightly

pointed out that if the area acquired

was not sufficient to satisfy all the

three requirements, then also, the

acquired land could be used for one of

the suitable purpose namely a school or

a playground or a hospital.

6. That apart, we also find that a writ

application was filed by the appellants

before the High Court earlier

challenging a resolution to acquire the

properties of the appellants for the

aforesaid public purpose. The High Court

6 rejected the writ application and held

that there was no ground to hold that

the acquired properties could not be

utilized for the purpose of establishing

a school with a playground and a

hospital. Unfortunately, it appears that

the appellants had suppressed the fact

of rejection of this earlier writ

petition in the subsequent writ

application challenging the notification

under Section 4(1) of the Act.

7. For the reasons aforesaid, there is no

merit in this appeal and the appeal

stands dismissed without any order as to

costs.

...................................................J. [TARUN CHATTERJEE]

New Delhi. .................................................J. July 28, 2008. [AFTAB ALAM]

7

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