Union Of India vs Managobinda Samantaray
- Neutral2022 INSC 231
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
An appellate authority exercising power under Rule 52 of the CISF Rules, 2001 must not equate its appellate power with the power of judicial review; while it may consider whether a penalty is excessive, adequate, or inadequate, the decision-making authority's discretion in awarding punishment is exposed to judicial interference only if exercised in a manner grossly disproportionate to the fault, and courts exercising writ jurisdiction do not interfere on the merits of quantum of punishment unless the exercise of discretion is perverse in that sense. The assault of a superior officer by a constable in a specialized police force responsible for security of strategic establishments, without any expression of remorse or good ground offered for such conduct, is not gross disproportionality warranting setting aside a punishment of dismissal when discipline is paramount to the police force and condoning such misconduct would have ramifications. Where a penalty of dismissal is set aside on appeal and the case is remitted for fresh action, Rule 33(3) of the CISF Rules, 2001 deems the order of suspension to have continued in force from the date of the original dismissal order until a fresh order is passed, and the employee is entitled to subsistence allowance at 50% of salary for this period of suspension. An employee suspended and later subjected to disciplinary proceedings is entitled to subsistence allowance for the period of suspension preceding the initial disciplinary order at 50% of salary if not already paid, full salary in accordance with the disciplinary order during the period between the original order and its setting aside on appeal, and subsistence allowance at 50% of salary for the period between the first dismissal order and the final dismissal order passed after remand.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1622-1623 OF 2022 (@SLP (C) No(s). 18110-18111/2018
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
MANAGOBINDA SAMANTARAY Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Leave granted.
2. This case has a checkered history. The respondent -
Managobinda Samantaray, a constable in the Central Industrial
Security Force (CISF), detailed on a ‘C’ shift duty on the
intervening night of 3rd and 4th of January 2000, for
patrolling between Watch Tower No. 5 and Watch Tower No. 6 of
National Thermal Power Corporation Plant, Kaniha was found to
be sleeping at Watch Tower No. 5 by Officer ASI/Exe. B.
Panda. It is alleged that the respondent had abused,
misbehaved and assaulted the officer on the right shoulder
with a short lathi. ASI/Exe. B. Panda was taken to the
hospital for treatment.
3. The respondent was placed under suspension on 4 th January
2000, and was served with the charge sheet. In the enquiry Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Dr. the charges were established and proved. The Disciplinary Mukesh Nasa Date: 2022.03.04 17:24:52 IST Reason: Authority vide order dated 15th July 2000 while agreeing that
the charges were proved, took a lenient view and imposed
Page 1 of 11 penalty of reduction of pay by two stages, from Rs. 3425/- to
Rs. 3275/- in the time scale of pay for a period of three
years with immediate effect. Further, it was directed the
respondent would not earn any increment of pay during the
period of reduction and that on the expiry of three years,
the reduction would have the effect of postponing his future
increments of pay. The period of suspension commencing from
4th January 2000 till the receipt of the order would be
treated as non-duty for all purposes. For this period the
respondent would not be entitled to any more pay and
allowances except the subsistence allowance.
4. The respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate
Authority. The Appellate Authority on consideration issued
Show Cause Notice dated 21st November 2000, under Rule 47(2)
(c)(i)1 read with 31(a)2 of Central Industrial Security
Force, Rules 1969 for enhancement of punishment to that of
dismissal from service. The respondent was directed to
explain why the proposed enhancement of punishment should not
be imposed. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority passed an
order dated 23rd January 2001, dismissing the respondent from
service.
1 47. Consideration of Appeals – (2) In case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 31 the appellate authority shall consider, -
(i) setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty;
2 31. Nature of Penalties – The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a member of the Force, namely –
a) Dismissal;
Page 2 of 11
5. The respondent had, thereupon, preferred a Writ Petition
before the High Court of Odisha- O.J.C. No. 556 of 2001,
which was allowed vide judgment dated 17th October 2011,
inter-alia, holding that the order dated 23rd January 2001
was improper and had violated the principles of natural
justice as the Appellate Authority had failed to notice and
consider the application filed by the respondent seeking
extension of time to file reply to the Show Cause Notice. On
perusal of the records it was noticed that as per the order
sheet the draft order was prepared by the subordinate staff
and was simply approved by the Appellate Authority without
due consideration and application of mind. The matter was
remitted to the Appellate Authority to re-examine the case
afresh after giving an opportunity to the respondent to file
reply. The respondent was given six weeks’ time to file
reply. The judgment of the High Court dated 17.10.2001 was
not challenged and has attained finality.
6. Pursuant to the remand, the Appellate Authority examined the
matter and, on consideration, passed an order of dismissal on
18th February 2012. This order on the question of the charges
and quantum of punishment observed:-
“6...the fact remains that the conclusion reached by the enquiry officer on the charges framed against him are duly supported by the depositions of PW-I, PW-II, CW-I, CW-II and medical report dated 04.01.2000. As regards second article of charge. Based on the evidences of PW-I and PW-II and medical report dated 04.01.2000, the fact is established well that on 04.01.2000 at about 0020 hrs, the appellant while being on duty in night
Page 3 of 11 shift for patrolling from Tower No.5 to 6 had misbehaved and assaulted ASI/Exe B Panda (PW-2) when he was on night checking duty of his duty post. Further plea taken by the appellant that it crucial material like X-ray and medical report were not provided to him, does not have legs to stand on the face of the material facts held in the case file. On contrary, the fact remains that soon after the appellant had misbehaved and assaulted ASI/Exe B Panda (PW-II) while he on checking duty of his duty post, his X-ray was done and treated hi the TTPS, Kaniha Hospital and a copy of the such X-ray report was provided to him on 11.05.2000 as requested by him as to facilitate him to use it as his effective defence. Likewise, the contention of the appellant that the appellate authority invoked colorable exercise of power by denying the legitimate claims in terms of reasonable opportunity being afforded to him, does not have any merit and hence not tenable. Since during the entire process of departmental enquiry, the appellant did not raise such issue of being deprived of reasonable opportunity, the allegation now raised by him at belated stage that he was denied reasonable opportunity, the allegation now raised by him at belated stage that he was denied reasonable opportunity is nothing but after thought. On contrary, what transpires from the material facts held in the case flies is that the departmental enquiry was conducted strictly as per laid down procedure in which the appellant was afforded all reason opportunities to defend his case, His further contention that the show cause notice has been issued upon the appeal preferred by him wherein he had prayed for exoneration of the punishment and the principle of equity warrants that there should not be any enhancement of punishment upon the appeal, is not tenable and appears to be misleading in as much as in the light of provision contained under rule 52 of CISF Rules, 2001 (Amended rules, 2003), the appellate authority is vested with the powers either to appellate authority is vested with the powers either to enhance or reduce the penalty imposed the disciplinary authority and therefore, there was nothing wrong on the part of appellate authority, if he proposed to enhance the penalty after, in his considered opinion, the punishment awarded to him was found disproportionately on lesser side vis-à- vis- the gravity of the poverty charges against him.
Page 4 of 11 7. In view of foregoing discussions, I find that none of the contention raised by the appellant in his reply to the show cause notice is convincing. Also the appellant has not produced any plausible ground to discredit the evidences held in the case file. On contrary, the charges are held duly proved against him based on the clinching evidences held on record. In my considered opinion, since the act of misdemeanor that he misbehaved and assaulted his senior while on duty comes within the preview of serious misconduct, he deserves to be dealt with sternly. In these circumstances, the proposal made vide show cause notice dated 21.11.2000 to enhance the penalty from ‘Reduction of pay by two stages i.e from Rs. 3425/- to Rs. 13275/- in the time scale of pay for a period; of 03 years with Immediate effect, with further direction that he will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction and that on expiry of this period the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future Increment of pay to that of ‘Dismissal form service’ hereby confirmed.”
7. Thereupon, the respondent had preferred Writ Petition (C) No.
5515/2012 before the High Court of Orissa, which was allowed
vide order dated 7th November 2014 on the ground that the
punishment of dismissal was shockingly disproportionate to
the quantum of the offence. The respondent would be entitled
to 50% back wages for the period 23rd January 2001, till the
order of dismissal passed on 18th February 2012 along with
interest @ 8%. Order of reinstatement of service was passed.
8. The respondent and the appellant preferred cross-appeals
before the Division Bench of the High Court of Orissa, which
were disposed of by the impugned judgment dated 11 th January
2018. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal preferred by
the Union of India and affirmed the order passed by the
Single Judge, setting aside the punishment of dismissal
Page 5 of 11 passed by the Appellate Authority and restored the punishment
of reduction of pay etc. imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority. In other words, the order of reinstatement of the
respondent was upheld. Directions given for payment of 50%
back-wages from 23rd January 2001 to 18th February 2012 have
not been commented upon and set aside. In other words, these
directions have been upheld.
9. Impugned judgment by the Division Bench is difficult to
sustain as it equates appellate power under Rule 52 of the
CISF Rules, 2001, with power of judicial review exercised by
constitutional courts. Rule 523 of the CISF Rules, 2001
empowers the appellate authority to examine whether the 3 Rule 52 - Consideration of appeals - (1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of rule 33 and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly.
(2) In the case of an appeal against the order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 34, or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rules, the appellate authority shall consider –
(a) Whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice;
(b) Whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted on the basis of the evidence on the record ; and
(c) whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is excessive, or adequate, or inadequate and pass orders;
(i) Confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty; or
(ii) Remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty, or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case.
(iii) No order imposing enhanced penalty shall be made in any other case unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity as far as may be in accordance with the provisions of rule 37, of making a representation against such enhanced penalty.
Provided that - (i) If such enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (v) of rule 34 and an inquiry under rule 36 has not already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall, subject to the provisions of rule 39, itself hold such an inquiry or direct that such inquiry be held in accordance with rule 36 and thereafter on a consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry make such orders as it may deem fit; and
(ii)If the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clause (i) to (v) of rule 34 and an inquiry under rule 36 has already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall make such orders as it may deem fit.
Page 6 of 11 penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate and pass
consequential order confirming, enhancing, reducing or
setting aside the penalty. In the present case, the procedure
requiring issue of show-cause notice and compliance with the
principles of natural justice is made. Quantum of punishment
is within the discretionary domain and the sole power of the
decision-making authority once the charge of misconduct
stands proved. Such discretionary power is exposed to
judicial interference if exercised in a manner which is
grossly disproportionate to the fault, as the constitutional
courts while exercising the power of judicial review do not
assume the role of the appellate authority. Writ jurisdiction
is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law,
procedural error leading to manifest injustice or violation
of principles of natural justice.4 The decision are also
disturbed when it is found to be ailing with perversity. 5 On
the question of quantum of punishment, the court exercising
the power of judicial review can examine whether the
authority has been a reasonable employer and has taken into
consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and
all other relevant circumstances and excluded irrelevant
matters.6 In the context of quantum of punishment these
aspects are examined to consider whether there is any error
in decision making process. On merits of the quantum of
4 B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 5 Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 6 Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. & Another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri & Others, (2009) 15 SCC 620
Page 7 of 11 punishment imposed, the courts would not interfere unless the
exercise of discretion in awarding punishment is perverse in
the sense the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate.
10. In the instant case, the respondent was a constable in CISF,
a specialized police force responsible for providing security
to strategic establishments like the Department of Space, the
Department of Atomic Energy, and premises of establishments
fundamental to Indian economy. Given the nature of the
appellant’s force, sense of integrity, commitment,
discipline, and camaraderie is paramount. Discipline is the
essence of the organization and structure of police force.7
No indulgence or latitude can be granted when the case is of
violence and assault on the officer who had checked and
reprimanded the respondent. To condone the misconduct will
have ramifications. Discipline in the police force cannot be
compromised.8 In the background of facts, and as the
respondent had not even expressed any remorse or pleaded a
good ground for having acted in the manner he did, we do not
accept that the punishment of dismissal imposed by the
Appellate Authority by order dated 8th February 2012 was
grossly disproportionate to the quantum of the offence.
11. The next issue relates to payment of subsistence allowance
during the period from 4th January 2000, the date on which the
respondent was suspended, till 15th July 2000, the date on
which the Disciplinary Authority had passed an order for
7 Supra note 4, at page 10 8 Arashdeep Singh v. Armed Forces Medical College (2005 SCC OnLine Bom 198)
Page 8 of 11 reduction of payment. The appellants have to pay subsistence
allowance to the respondent for this period in accordance
with the CISF Rules. It is unclear whether, in fact, the
respondent was paid subsistence allowance for this period.
12. On or after 16th July 2000 till the first order of dismissal
was passed on 23rd January 2001, the respondent would be
entitled to payment of salary in terms of the order passed by
the Disciplinary Authority on 15th July 2000. It appears that
this payment has not been made. The appellants would be
liable to make this payment.
13. In view of the judgment of the High Court of Orissa dated 17 th
October 2011, the order passed by the Appellate Authority
dismissing the respondent from service was set aside with an
order of remit to the Appellate Authority for a fresh
decision. Rule 33 (3) of the CISF Rules, 2001, which applies
reads:-
“33. Suspension
xx xx xx
3. Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon an enrolled member of the Force under suspension is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for further enquiry or action or with any other directions, the orders of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in [force] on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in [force]9 until further order.”
14. In terms of Rule 33(3) of the CISF Rules, 2001, the
9 Subs. By G.S.R. 462(E), dated 23rd May, 2003 (w.e.f. 9-6-2003).
Page 9 of 11 respondent is to be treated as being under suspension from
23rd January 2001 when the first order passed by the
Appellate Authority dismissing the respondent from service,
till 18th February 2012, when the second and final order was
passed by the Appellate Authority dismissing the respondent
from service.
15. The respondent for this period being under suspension would
be entitled to subsistence allowance. The appellants have not
paid the subsistence allowance for this period, which must be
paid to the respondent.
16. Accordingly, we dispose of the present appeals on the
following terms and directions: -
16.1. The Order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 18 th
February 2012 dismissing the respondent from service is
upheld.
16.2. The respondent would be entitled to subsistence allowance
already paid or if not paid @ 50% of his salary etc. for
the period 4th January 2000 till 15th July 2000. 16.3. The respondent would be entitled to his salary in terms
of the order dated 15th July 2000 as passed by the
Disciplinary Authority till the order dated 23rd January
2001 passed by the Appellate Authority. 16.4. The respondent would be entitled to subsistence allowance
@ 50% of his salary etc., for the period between 24 th
January 2001 to 18th February 2012.
16.5. As there has been delay on the part of the appellants in
payment of the subsistence allowance/ and salary, they
shall make the payment within six weeks from today along
Page 10 of 11 with interest @ 7% per annum from the date payment was
due and payable, till payment is made. The respondent
would provide details of his bank account to which the
said payment would be electronically made. The appellants
will also furnish to the respondent a detailed
calculation, with regard to the computation made towards
the subsistence allowance, salaries and the interest
component as awarded above.
17. The appeals are partly allowed and disposed of in the
aforesaid terms.
18. Pending application(s) stands disposed of.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . J.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . J.
(BELA M. TRIVEDI)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 24, 2022.
Page 11 of 11
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