Union Of India vs Man Singh Verma

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 77 OF 2025

UNION OF INDIA THR. I.O. NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

MAN SINGH VERMA …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

SANJAY KAROL J.

1. The present appeal arises from the impugned order dated

22nd May, 2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Crl. Misc. Bail Application Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by RAJNI MUKHI No.2812 of 2023, wherein the High Court directed the Director Date: 2025.02.28 18:26:32 IST Reason:

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 1 of 15

of Narcotics Control Bureau1, New Delhi, to pay a sum of

Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) as compensation to the

respondent for the alleged wrongful confinement. Aggrieved by

the said direction, the Union of India through NCB has

preferred the present appeal.

2. The brief facts leading to the present appeal are as

under :-

2.1. In a joint operation, the NCB seized 1280 grams of

brown powder (allegedly heroin) from the possession of

Man Singh Verma (respondent herein) and one Aman

Singh. Accordingly, Criminal Case No.02/2023 was

registered against the respondent under Sections 8(C), 21

and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 19852 on 6th January, 2023, consequently,

he was remanded to judicial custody.

2.2. NCB prepared an arrest memo on the same date

and drew four samples – SO1, SD1, SO2 and SD2 from

the recovered substance. Two of these samples (SO1 and

SD1) were sent to the Central Revenues Control

1 For short ‘NCB’ 2 Abbreviated as ‘NDPS’

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 2 of 15 Laboratory (CRPL), New Delhi, for chemical

examination.

2.3. While awaiting results from the laboratory, the

respondent filed B.A.No.251/2023 before Special Judge,

NDPS, Barabanki District, seeking bail. This application

was rejected vide order dated 24th January, 2023.

Consequently, the respondent approached the High Court

by filing Crl. Misc. Bail Application No.2812 of 2023. 2.4. On 30th January, 2023, CRPL issued its report

stating that the sample tested negative for heroin and

other narcotic substances. Following this, the

Investigating Officer (I.O.) moved an application before

the Special Court seeking permission to send a second set

of samples (SO2 and SD2) to the Central Forensic

Science Laboratory (CFSL), Chandigarh, for further

examination. The same was allowed by the concerned

Court.

2.5. On 5th April, 2023, the report received from CFSL,

Chandigarh, found that the second set of samples also

tested negative for any narcotic substance. As a result, on

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 3 of 15 6th April, 2023, NCB filed a closure report before the

Special Judge, NDPS, pursuant to which, the respondent

was released from District Jail, Barabanki on 10th April,

2023 under an order of the Additional District and

Sessions Judge.

2.6. Despite filing of the closure report and the

respondent’s release, the High Court proceeded to

adjudicate the pending bail application and vide the

impugned order observed that the respondent was a

young person who had been wrongfully confined for four

months despite the initial laboratory finding and,

therefore, directed the Director, NCB to pay

Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation to the respondent within a

period of two months and to file a compliance affidavit. 2.7. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant filed a

Modification Application before the High Court seeking

waiver of the compensation, which was rejected vide

order dated 16th July, 2024 on the ground that the

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 4 of 15 application is barred under Section 362 of Code of

Criminal Procedure, 19733.

2.8. An Application for Grant of Exemption (for paying

compensation) was also preferred by one Mr. Surendra

Kumar, Junior Intelligence Officer, NCB, which was

rejected by the High Court vide order dated 9th

September, 2024, observing that the order granting

compensation has not been challenged before a higher

Court.

3. We have heard Mr. Satya Darshi Sanjay, learned

Additional Solicitor General for the appellant, and Mr. Pijush K.

Roy, learned Senior Counsel appointed as Amicus Curiae in the

matter. The respondent, despite service, has not entered an

appearance. We have also perused the material placed on record

and the written submission filed by the Amicus Curiae. The

main contentions raised, as can be understood from the record,

have been recorded as under:

APPELLANTS:

(i) The High Court, while exercising its power under Section

439 CrPC, went beyond its jurisdiction by doing a detailed 3 For short ‘CrPC’

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 5 of 15 examination of evidence and awarding compensation for

alleged wrongful detention. Reliance was placed on Kalyan

Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan4, wherein it was observed

that at the stage of granting bail, a detailed examination of

evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of a case

need not be undertaken.

(ii) The officers of NCB acted in bonafide manner on

credible intelligence and initial test results. Section 69 of the

NDPS Act offers protection to officers for acts done in good

faith, thus prohibiting prosecution as well as imposition of fine

without proof of malafides.

(iii) It was further submitted that the respondent had been

released from custody on 10th April, 2023, almost a year before

the High Court passed the impugned order, rendering the bail

application infructuous. Consequently, the award of

compensation was unwarranted.

AMICUS CURIAE:

(i) It was submitted that re-testing the second sample of the

same alleged contraband, which had already been tested

4 (2004) 7 SCC 528

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 6 of 15 negative in its previous sample sent for analysis, was

impermissible under the NDPS Act and the guidelines laid

down in Thana Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics5. In the

present case, the concerned authority should have filed an

application for closure before the Special Judge upon receiving

the first negative report from CRPL on 30th January, 2023.

However, instead of filing such an application, the authority

proceeded with re-testing of second sample, which was illegal

and led to an unjustified extension of the respondent’s custody.

(ii) It was urged that the principle of awarding compensatory

relief for the violation of fundamental rights by public officials

as recognized in Rudal Sah v. State of Bihar6; Nilabati Behera

v. State of Orissa7; and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal 8 – all

adjudicated under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, should

be extended to bail proceedings under Section 439 CrPC.

(iii) Protection under Section 69 NDPS Act to the authorities

is not absolute. The re-testing of second sample was done due to

malice, as no exceptional circumstances as per Thana Singh

5 (2013) 2 SCC 590 6 (1983) 4 SCC 141 7 (1993) 2 SCC 746 8 (1997) 1 SCC 416

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 7 of 15 (supra) were present to justify the second examination by a

laboratory.

4. The sole issue, which arises for consideration of this

Court, is whether the contours of Section 439 CrPC permit the

grant of compensation by the High Court to the appellant.

5. To answer this issue at hand, it is imperative for this

Court to discuss the scope of jurisdiction of the Court while

exercising its power under Section 439 CrPC. Section 439 of

CrPC reads as:

“439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.—(1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct,—

(a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section;

(b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified:

Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which, though not so triable, is punishable with 184 imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice.

Provided further that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 8 of 15 accused of an offence triable under sub-section (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section 376DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice of such application.

(1A) The presence of the informant or any person authorised by him shall be obligatory at the time of hearing of the application for bail to the person under sub- section (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]

(2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody.”

6. It is a settled principle of law that the jurisdiction

conferred upon a Court under Section 439 CrPC is limited to

grant or refusal of bail pending trial. In the following decisions,

this Court has time and again held that the sphere of

consideration, when exercising power under this Section

pertains only to securing or restricting liberty of the person in

question.

6.1. In RBI v. Cooperative Bank Deposit A/C HR.

Sha9, this Court held that the High Court order, directing

the Cooperative Bank to distribute the money recovered

9 (2010) 15 SCC 85

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 9 of 15 from the accused, to persons who had made deposits less

than Rs.10,000/- as and when such recoveries are made,

passed in a Bail Application had far-reaching

consequences and was beyond the scope of Section 439

CrPC. The Court held as under :

“6. We are of the opinion that the far-reaching consequences of the directions of the High Court are in a way beyond the scope of an application for bail filed by an accused under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court, as much as anyone else, must stay confined to the issues relevant to the matter before it. It was thus not open to the High Court to pass orders which could affect the working of banks all over the country. It has been pointed out by Mr Basava Prabhu S. Patil, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that it is for this reason that Reserve Bank of India had filed this appeal.”

6.2. This Court in Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v.

State of Gujarat10, while examining a case wherein the

High Court had ordered the accused as well as the relatives

of the victim to undergo scientific tests, viz., lie detector,

brain mapping and narco-analysis, held that, by ordering

such tests the High Court has converted the adjudication of

a bail matter to that of a mini-trial and was in

contravention of the first principles of criminal law 10 (2019) 14 SCC 522

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 10 of 15 jurisprudence and the statutory requirements. The Court

held as under:

“6. Having heard the counsel for the parties, it is surprising to note the present approach adopted by the High Court while considering the bail application. The High Court ordering the abovementioned tests is not only in contravention to the first principles of criminal law jurisprudence but also violates statutory requirements. While adjudicating a bail application, Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the guiding principle wherein the court takes into consideration, inter alia, the gravity of the crime, the character of the evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and obstructing the course of justice and such other grounds. Each criminal case presents its own peculiar factual matrix, and therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court. However, the court has to only opine as to whether there is prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police, or rather order specific tests as done in the present case.

7. In the instant case, by ordering the abovementioned tests and venturing into the reports of the same with meticulous details, the High Court has converted the adjudication of a bail matter to that of a mini trial indeed. This assumption of function of a trial court by the High Court is deprecated.”

6.3. In State v. M. Murugesan11, this Court again

reiterated that the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to grant or

11 (2020) 15 SCC 251

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 11 of 15 refusal to grant bail, pending trial. In this case, the High

Court, while taking a decision on bail application, had

retained the file and directed the State to form a committee

and seek its recommendations on the reformation and

rehabilitation of convict/accused persons. The Court held

that while ordering such directions the High Court has

committed grave illegality and held that the jurisdiction

under Section 439 CrPC ends when the bail application is

finally decided. The Court held as under :-

“11. We find that the learned Single Judge [M. Murugesan v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414] has collated data from the State and made it part of the order after the decision [M. Murugesan v. State, Criminal Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019, order dated 18-2-2019 (Mad)] of the bail application, as if the Court had the inherent jurisdiction to pass any order under the guise of improving the criminal justice system in the State. The jurisdiction of the court under Section 439 of the Code is limited to grant or not to grant bail pending trial. Even though the object of the Hon'ble Judge was laudable but the jurisdiction exercised was clearly erroneous. The effort made by the Hon'ble Judge may be academically proper to be presented at an appropriate forum but such directions could not be issued under the colour of office of the court.”

7. Time and again, the act of Courts overstepping the bounds

of jurisdiction, has clearly been frowned upon. The instant case

is another such example. It is undisputed that the application for

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 12 of 15 bail filed before the High Court had become infructuous since

the District Court had already released the respondent herein.

The straightforward course of action that ought to have been

adopted, therefore, was that the bail application would have

been dismissed as such. No occasion arose for the Court to pass

an order delving into the aspects of impermissibility of re-

testing and/or wrongful confinement. Not only was the same

outside the bounds, as discussed above, but it is erroneous on a

further count that since the application was infructuous, the

exercise of jurisdiction was entirely unjustified and contrary to

law.

8. Regarding the submission pertaining to Section 69 of the

NDPS Act, it is submitted that the actions of the authorities are

protected from prosecution, in the absence of malafide intention.

We refrain from making any comment on this issue for reasons

that shall come to light later in this judgment.

9. The learned Amicus Curiae in his submissions has

referred to judgments of this Court in Rudal Sah (supra), D.K.

Basu (supra) and Nilabati Behera (supra). As has already been

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 13 of 15 noticed, these judgments were rendered by this Court under

Article 32 jurisdiction, which is a remedy available to any

person whose fundamental rights have been violated. So,

whereas the Court has indeed held permissibility of grant of

compensation, it has so done in the context of violation of

fundamental rights. The undue restriction of liberty, i.e., without

the backing of procedures established by law is unquestionably

an affront to a person’s rights but the avenues to seek recourse

of law in connection therewith are limited to remedies as per

law. However, none was availed in the present facts.

10. As such, we accept the submission of the Union of India

that grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- was

without the authority of law. The order of the High Court,

therefore, to this extent has to be set aside. Ordered accordingly.

Appeal is allowed partly. The observations made hereinabove

should not be taken to preclude any remedy that may be

available to the respondent as per law. Hence, our observations

are limited only to the correctness of the grant of compensation

in the adjudication of a bail application.

Crl.A.No.77/25 Page 14 of 15

11. We place on record our appreciation for the able

assistance rendered by Mr. Pijush K. Roy, learned Senior

Counsel, Amicus Curiae.

Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

…………………………J. (SANJAY KAROL)

…………………………J. (MANMOHAN)

New Delhi;

February 28, 2025.

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