Union Of India vs Glaxo India Ltd. & Anr

Union of India ..............Appellant

Versus

Glaxo India Ltd. & Anr. ..............Respondents

J U D G M E N T

H.L. Dattu, J.

1) The issues that arise for our consideration and decision in

this appeal are :-

i) Whether the Central Govt. was justified in issuing a demand

based on Drug Prices fixed on 02.01.1989, instead of drug

prices fixed on 20.11.1986.

ii) Whether the Central Government was justified in directing

Glaxo India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as, "Respondent-

Company") to deposit an amount of `71.21 crores in the

Drug Prices Equalization Account (in short, "DPEA").

1

iii) What is the effect of `supersession' of a notification and

when such supersession is made, would it have the

prospective or retrospective effect.

Factual Background

2) The Respondent-Company is engaged in manufacture and

sale of three bulk drugs, namely, Betamethasone Alcohol

(B.A.), Betamethasone 17 valerate (B.V.) and

Betamethasone di Sodium Phosphate (B.P.), and various

formulations based on these bulk drugs. They were sold at

the price that was declared by the Respondent-Company

under the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1970 [in short,

"DPCO 1970"]. The Central Government promulgated the

Drug (Price Control) Order, 1979, [in short, "DPCO 1979"],

replacing DPCO 1970 which included the above mentioned

bulk drugs in Schedule II to the order. The Central

Government is vested with the power under Para 3(i) of

DPCO 1979 to fix the maximum sale price of indigenously

manufactured bulk drugs in First or Second Schedule by

issuing a notification in the official gazette. Sub-Para 3(2)

provides that while fixing the price of a bulk drug, the

2

Government may take into account the average cost of

production of such bulk drug manufactured by an efficient

manufacturer and allow a reasonable return on net worth.

Sub-Para 3(3) prohibits any person from selling a bulk drug

at a price exceeding the price fixed under sub-para(1) and

other local taxes, if any, payable.

3) In exercise of the powers so conferred, the Central

Government had fixed the maximum price of the above

mentioned bulk drugs vide its order dated 12.05.1981.

4) The Respondent-Company had called in question the

legality and validity of the price fixation order dated

12.05.1981 before the High Court of Delhi in C.W.P No.

1551 of 1981, mainly on the ground that the price fixation

order did not take into account the cost of production of bulk

drugs as was required to be done. On 27.08.1981, the High

Court passed an interim order staying the implementation of

the bulk drug prices fixed as per order dated 12.05.1981 as

well as the prices of the formulations from the said bulk

drug, in view of the undertaking of the respondent company

to maintain the prices of both bulk drugs and its formulations

3

prior to the notification dated 12.05.1981. During the

pendency of the proceedings, the High Court, by order dated

13.05.1982, directed the parties to explore the possibilities of

a settlement, when it was brought to the notice of the High

Court that the Respondent-Company has filed a review

petition for review of the price fixation order dated

12.05.1981 passed by the Central Government in exercise of

its power under Para 3(1) of DPCO 1979.

5) Pursuant to the said direction, the Respondent-

Company made available the actual cost of production of

bulk drugs to the Central Government and also requested for

an oral hearing. After considering the material available on

the record and also the oral submissions made, the Central

Government re-fixed the price of the three bulk drugs

mentioned above by an Order dated 20.11.1986 with

retrospective effect from 12.05.1981. Aggrieved by the

same, the Respondent-Company amended the relief claimed

in the pending proceedings before the High Court.

4

6) The Division Bench of the High Court, by its

judgment and order dated 31.08.1987, disposed of the writ

petition. While doing so, the Court did not quash the

impugned price fixation order dated 20.11.1986 (made after

the first review) passed by the Central Government, but

directed the Respondent-Company to file another review

petition before the Central Government for reconsideration

of the price fixed by impugned price fixation order and the

Central Government to condone the delay and consider the

review petition on merits.

7) In the light of the said directions issued by the Delhi

High Court in CWP No.1551 of 1981, the Central

Government constituted the "Murthy Committee" consisting

of experts in the field. The Committee conducted the review

in accordance with directions issued by the High Court and

submitted its report dated 12.10.1988 to the Central

Government. The Government, vide its order dated

02.01.1989, issued price fixation order under DPCO 1989

fixing the price for three Bulk Drugs higher than the earlier

price fixed vide order dated 20.11.1986. For convenience,

5

we give below the price declared by the respondent company

under DPCO 1970 and the price fixed by the Government on

12.05.1981, on 20.11.1986 after first review and on

02.01.1989 after the second review.

Price Fixed by the Central Govt.

S. Name Declared Vide Vide Vide Notification

No. price Notification Notification dt. 02.01.1989

with dt. 12.05.81 dt. 20.11.86 (second review)

DPCO (first review)

1970

(`) (`) (`) (`)

1. Betamethasone 134.28 113.34 127.70 144.19

Alcohol

2. Betamethasone 220.00 105.85 122.00 136.58

17-Valerate

3. Betamethasone 225.00 126.23 135.00 144.58

D-Sodium

Phosphate

Pursuant to the order so passed, the Union of India had

issued tentative demand of `66.35 Crores, which was finally

revised to `71.21 Crores (towards the difference between the

formulation prices fixed in the price fixation orders and the

actual prices charged by the respondent company for the

period 12.05.1981 to 25.08.1987) to be deposited by the

respondent-company in the DPEA, by their letters dated

18.06.1990 and 16.11.1990.

6

8) Aggrieved by the demand so made by the Central

Government vide its letters dated 18.06.1990 and

16.11.1990, the Respondent-Company filed C.W.P. No. 2170

of 1990 before the High Court of Delhi, inter alia,

questioning the legality and validity of the demands raised

by the Central Government and for its deposit into DPEA.

The main issues raised therein were that the demand was

contrary to the directions issued by the High Court in CWP

No.1551 of 1981. Secondly, the demands were in violation

of para 7(2)(a) of the DPCO 1979 and further, the demands

were not based on the difference in prices of "common

selling prices" and "retention prices" of bulk drugs, but were

based on the difference between the "common selling prices"

and the "price of formulations". The writ petition was

contested by the Union of India, and it was contended that

the prices were fixed after taking into consideration all the

relevant data and the same was done in accordance with the

judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court

in C.W.P. No. 1551 of 1981.

7

9) The High Court, by its order dated 19.10.2001, allowed

the writ petition and quashed the demands made by the

Central Government as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the

directions issued by the Division Bench of the High Court in

C.W.P. No. 1551 of 1981. It was held that the price fixation

order dated 02.01.1989 was retrospective in its operation and

related back to the order dated 12.05.1981. It was also held

that the demand raised by the Central Government was in

violation of Para 7(2)(a) of the DPCO 1979, inasmuch as it is

not based on the "common selling prices" and "retention

prices of bulk drugs", but is based on the difference between

the "common selling prices" and the "price of formulations".

The Court further observed that even though the DPCO 1979

contained statutory provisions for fixation of formulation

prices, even if it is violated, the respondent company would

still be entitled to retain the excess amount over the statutory

maximum price and the only option available to the Central

Govt. was to initiate criminal proceedings. The High Court

directed the appellants to raise demands on the basis of the

revised prices of the bulk drugs as notified on 02.01.1989

8

and for the purpose of Para 7(2) (a) of DPCO 1979,

determine the excess amount not on the basis of the prices of

the formulations but on the basis of the prices of bulk drugs

used by the respondent company in its formulations. The

correctness of the said judgment and order is called in

question by the Union of India in this appeal.

10) Since we will be referring to two Division Bench

judgments and orders of the High Court of Delhi in the

course of our judgment, we will refer to the judgment in

C.W.P. 1551 of 1981 as the `first judgment' and the

judgment in C.W.P. No. 2170 of 1990 as the `impugned

judgment', to avoid any confusion.

Submissions of the Appellant - Union of India

11) The case of the learned Additional Solicitor General

Shri. Parag P. Tripathi is that the Division Bench of the High

Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the price fixed

by the Central Government on the bulk drugs manufactured

by the Respondent-Company is contrary to the statutory

provision and the direction issued by the High Court in the

first judgment. It is further argued that the Murthy

9

Committee constituted to examine the review petition filed

by the Respondent-Company considered the data between

1980-81 and 1984-85, which itself prima facie rules out that

the price fixation order was to be applied retrospectively and

should relate back to the order passed on 12.05.1981. It is

further submitted that that the decision of the executive in the

mechanics of price fixation is beyond the scope of judicial

review as held by this Court in the case of Union of India v.

Cyanamide India Ltd., (1987) 2 SCC 720. Our attention was

also drawn to the affidavit of the Union of India filed before

the Delhi High Court, and the file notings of Shri. R.N.

Tandon. By placing reliance on these material, he would

submit, that the recommendations of the Murthy Committee

were to come into effect prospectively, and not

retrospectively. Alternatively, it is submitted that the price

fixation order dated 2.1.1989 in the Review Petition filed by

the Respondent-Company was under the DPCO 1987 and

had nothing to do with the price fixation order dated

20.11.1986 and therefore, it should be presumed that the

Review Petition filed by the Respondent-Company was

10

impliedly rejected. It is also submitted that the intention of

the Central Government to fix the price of bulk drug and its

formulations prospectively could be clearly inferred from the

price fixation order itself. It is urged that the Review Petition

was impliedly rejected and the prices that were fixed on

2.1.1989 were to be given effect prospectively and did not

relate back to price fixation order dated 20.11.1986, which

has been retrospectively applied with effect from 12.05.1981.

12) With regard to the finding of the Division Bench in the

impugned judgment that the demands raised is in

contravention of Para 7(2)(a) of the DPCO 1979, it is

submitted that the Respondent-Company has already

benefited from the stay order passed by the High Court, and

the demand was based on the difference on the price of bulk

drug prevalent prior to the stay order and the prices fixed on

2.1.1989. It is further submitted that the stand of the

Respondent-Company that since there is no provision in the

DPCO 1979 for the deposit of the excess amount in the

DPEA, the Respondent-Company should be allowed to retain

11

the same, is against the basic principles of `unjust

enrichment' as held by this Court. In support of this

contention, our attention was drawn to observations made by

this Court in Mafatlal, (1997) 5 SCC 536; Concap

Capacitators (2007) 8 SCC 658, Swanstone Multiplex

Cinema, (2009) 10 SCALE 148]. It is argued that the Drugs

(Prices Control) Order is a socio-economic measure, and the

same has to be interpreted by this Court in the light of the

object sought to be achieved, viz. to ensure that there is a

proper availability of drugs at reasonable prices, which are

fair to the consumer as well as to the industry. It is also

contended that the phrase "excess amount to be determined

by the Government" in Para 7(2)(a) of the DPCO 1979, gives

a wide discretion to the Government to determine any

amount to be recovered, and that the demand made as

amount due is therefore justified. It is further submitted that

it is incorrect to proceed on the basis that the DPCO 1979

permitted such retention of excess money that was in excess

over the formulation price fixed under the price fixation

order and such an interpretation will be contrary to the object

12

of the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act and of

the DPCO 1979. It is further argued that since Para 7(2)(a)

dealt with DPEA only, and it is totally incorrect to interpret

the same in a manner that would permit drug companies to

violate price fixation order and get away with the same, by

stating that the Respondent-Company was liable only to

criminal proceedings, if any.

13) In the alternative, it is submitted that Para 14 of the DPCO

1987, provides for recovery of dues accrued under DPCO

1979 and deposit of the same into DPEA. In view of the said

provision, the Central Government has the power to direct

the drug companies to deposit such amounts in the DPEA. A

further reference is also made to Para 15 of the DPCO 1987,

which gives the power to the Central Government to recover

dues accrued due to charging of prices higher than those

fixed or notified by the Government as per the provisions of

the DPCO 1987.

Submissions of the Respondent-Company

13

14) Shri. T.R. Andhyarujina and Shri. S. Ganesh, learned

senior counsel, submitted that there is a basic difference

between `review' and `revision' under the DPCO 1979, and

that a `review' operates retrospectively from the date of

fixation of the drug price under review, whereas, the order

passed in a `revision' is prospective in its operation. It is

brought to our notice that in Cyanamide's case, it was held

that a review was in the nature of a post decisional hearing

that is granted to the manufacturers of bulk drugs. It is

argued that the review was filed by the Respondent-

Company for review of the bulk drug price fixation order

dated 12.05.1981 even before filing of the first writ petition

and the same was considered by the Central Government by

its order dated 20.11.1986, in which the price fixed were

considerably higher than those in 1981. It is also submitted

that this review was based on the Respondent-Company's

cost of production for 5 years from 1981 to 1985. It is further

submitted that the review conducted by the Government took

the actual cost of production between 1981 and 1985, instead

of the projected cost of production, as the normal practice

14

was, in the review that was conducted in 1986. It is further

argued that the Division Bench, in the first judgment, had

directed the Respondent-Company to file a review of the

price fixation order 1986, and, therefore, the same would

necessarily relate back to the price fixation order dated

12.5.1981. It is further argued by the learned counsel that the

price fixation order of 02.01.1989 had superseded the price

fixation order dated 12.5.1981 and, therefore, the same is

retrospective and not prospective as contended by the

Revenue. It is contended that the Murthy Committee carried

out the review strictly in conformity with the first decision of

the High Court and on the same basis as conducted in 1986,

i.e. the actual costs between 1981 and 1984-85 were

considered by the Murthy Committee. It is also brought to

our notice that though the Respondent-Company requested

the Committee to consider the costs up to 1986-87, the same

was not granted by the Committee, thereby bringing to our

notice that the Committee followed the directions issued by

the Division Bench of the High Court. It is further submitted

that the price fixation order passed by the Committee in

15

pursuance of the directions of the High Court in the first

judgment, were significantly revised upwards, though based

on the same data that was considered in the year 1986.

15) The learned counsel submits that the contention of the

Central Government that the Review Petition filed by the

Respondent-Company was impliedly rejected by the

Government is incorrect, since no such order was ever

communicated to the Respondent-Company. It is submitted

that the order passed in review petition necessarily operates

retrospectively, and it is fallacious even to suggest that an

order passed in review petition operates prospectively. It is

further submitted that the Central Government, while issuing

the letter dated 16.11.1990 by way of demand notice

directing a particular amount to be paid to DPEA, considered

only the first review dated 20.11.1986, and ignored the

review of 02.01.1989 as though it never happened. Hence, it

is argued that the demand of `71.21 crores made by the

Central Govt. is illegal, arbitrary and in violation of the price

control order.

16

16) According to the learned counsel for the Respondent-

Company, the situation contemplated for deposit into the

DPEA is the profit earned by the manufacturer between the

formulation price that has been fixed on the basis of certain

bulk drugs and the bulk drug price, if in case, the

manufacturer of formulations procures and uses the bulk

drug at a price which is lower than the prices fixed. It is

urged that the same is clear from the combined reading of

Para 7(2)(a) and Para 17 of the DPCO 1979. It is contended

that this difference in bulk drug prices can be recovered by

the Central Government from the manufacturer by directing

them to deposit the excess amount in the DPEA. It is further

submitted that the phrase "excess amount" when read in the

context can only mean the difference in the prices of bulk

drugs and the same is clear from scheme of DPCO 1979.

17) It is further contended that the Central Government

entered into agreements with other drug companies for

recovery of the differential amounts, and no such agreement

was entered into with the Respondent-Company. It is

submitted that the doctrine of contemporaneous exposition

17

demanded that the settled understanding of Para 7(2)(a)

should be continued.

18) The learned counsel disputes that there was any unjust

enrichment by the Respondent-Company, as contended by

the learned counsel for the Revenue and to the contrary, the

returns filed by the Respondent-Company would amply

demonstrate that there was less margin of profit than what it

is entitled to under the Fifth Schedule of the DPCO 1979. It

is also stated that the Respondent-Company never charged

prices higher than those that were fixed by the Central

Government. It is also contended that the impugned demand

made by the Central Government is without the authority of

law and in total disregard to the directions contained in the

first judgment. It is submitted that Para 7 of the DPCO 1987

did not give any authority to recover the difference in

`notional' prices of formulation as the Central Government

sought to do vide letter dated 16.11.1990. It is further argued

that the only liability that the Respondent-Company had, was

the liability that accrued in respect of actions taken prior to

25.08.1987, which was nothing but the difference in bulk

18

drug prices. It is stated that only this amount could be

recovered by virtue of Para 14 of the DPCO 1987, unlike

what was claimed by the Central Government. It is also

argued that the High Court, in the impugned judgment, had

correctly decided the issue by quashing the demand for

payment of `71.21 crores made by the Central Government.

It is submitted that the demands made vide letter dated

16.11.1990 is liable to be set aside as the demand was made

on the prices based on notional formulation prices worked

out by the Bureau of Indian Standards, which were not

revealed to the Respondent-Company, and that these notional

formulation prices were in total disregard of the review of the

bulk drug prices notified on 02.01.1989, which were in

pursuance of the directions of the first judgment, but on the

basis of the previously fixed bulk drug prices of 20.11.1986.

In conclusion, it is argued that the Central Government

should recalculate the amount based on the difference in bulk

drug prices as reviewed and notified on 02.01.1989, in

compliance of the directions of the High Court.

19

The First Judgment of the Delhi High Court

19). The submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General is in

view of Para 17, 18 and 19 of the judgment in C.W.P. No. 1551 of

1981, it is clear that the Order dated 26-11-1986 was not quashed

and the Central Government was only asked to consider the review

petition filed by the Respondent-Company. At this stage, it is

useful to extract Para 17 and 18 of the Judgment to understand the

direction issued by the High Court:-

"17. We have come to the conclusion that the

interests of justice require that the respondents

should give the petitioner once more an

opportunity of being heard on the price fixation

order of 1986. We, however, wish to make it clear

that we are not setting aside the order dt. 20-11-

1986 for this purpose; nor do we, in view of the

categorical observations of the Supreme Court,

consider it necessary, proper or appropriate to stay

further implementation of the said order or to stay

any proceedings for fixation of prices of various

drug formulations of the petitioner which that

respondents might wish to initiate. We would only

direct the petitioner to file a formal application for

review and the Government to deal with the same

(condoning the delay in filing the same due to the

pendency of this writ petition) after giving the

petitioner a hearing on the lines indicated above

and, in the light of such hearing, to affirm or revise

the prices fixed by the order dt. 20-11-1986 and to

make consequent changes, thereafter, in the prices

for drug formulations, if fixed in the meanwhile.

20

18. We would also, as was done by the Supreme

Court, indicate a time bound schedule for the

course of action suggested above:

(a) Within ten days from the date of receipt of this

order, the applicants may request the department

to furnish such specific information as it may need

as to the basis on which the figures of net worth

of

assets, interest on borrowings and rate of return

have been taken by them in respect of each of the

drugs and the department should make the same

available to the petitioner within ten days

thereafter;

(b) Within ten days thereafter the petitioner may

file a formal application for review of the order dt.

20-11-1986 with an application to condone delay.

This application should not content itself with

criticising the department's figures but should

specifically set out petitioner's own detailed

working out of the price to be fixed on the basis of

the annual and cost audit reports of the Company

for the period 1981 to 1985;

(c) The respondent should fix a hearing within a

period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the

application and the petitioner may be heard

thereon;'

(d) Within two weeks thereafter, the respondents

may dispose of the application as they deem fit. In

case they allow it in whole or in part they should

pass an order notifying the revised prices under

para 3 of the 1979 DPCO.

21

19. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly

with no order as to costs. It is made clear that the

interim stay orders are vacated and the department

will be free to implement the order dt. 20-11-1986

as well as to proceed to fix the prices for the

petitioner's drug formulation, subject to the

outcome of the procedure indicated in the previous

para."

The Impugned Judgment

20). The issue decided by the Division Bench in the impugned

judgment is whether the demands made by the Central Government

for deposit of `71.21 crores was on the basis of the prices notified

vide Order dated 2.1.1989 or Order dated 20.11.1986. The High

Court, apart from others, has concluded that from a combined

reading of paragraphs 15 to 19 of the directions of the Division

Bench in the first judgment, it is clear that the High Court has

neither upheld the Order dated 26.11.1986 nor given any finality to

the same; that the Central Government, for the purpose of

considering the Review Petition filed, pursuant to the directions

issued in the first judgment, the matter was referred to the Murthy

Committee and that the Murthy Committee has conducted the price

re-fixation of bulk drugs in accordance with the directions that was

issued by the High Court. The Murthy Committee has taken into

22

consideration the weighted average figures from 1980-81 to 1984-

85 and refused the request of the Respondent-Company to consider

the cost of production for the later years, which clearly shows that

the Committee focused only on the Order dated 26.11.1986 and not

thereafter; that it was apparent that the prices fixed by the order

dated 20.11.1986 were based on the costing of the year 1981 only,

whereas the one dated 2.1.1989 was based on the weighted average

cost figures from the year 1981 to 1985; that the notings on the file

and the statements of the Hon'ble Minster on the floor of

Parliament indicate that the prices that were re-fixed by the Murthy

Committee were accepted.

21). The High Court has also rejected the contention of the Central

Government that there was an implied rejection of the review as

there was no notification to that effect. It is also noted that there

was no communication from the Central Government to the

Respondent-Company expressing that the review had been rejected

at any stage. The Court has also observed that there was a letter

dated 20.3.1989 by the Central Government to the Respondent-

Company informing them that the revised prices of bulk drugs was

with effect from 12.5.1981, and this was enough to show that the

23

Respondent-Company was notified that the order dated 2.1.1989

held the field in place of the order dated 26.11.1986. It was also

noted by the High Court that even though the word `retrospective'

was not mentioned in the notification dated 02.01.1989, if it were

not construed retrospectively, the order impugned would be in

violation of the directions of the Division Bench in the first

judgment.

22). The High Court, after considering the language of para 3 to 17 of

the DPCO 1979, has taken the view that the Central Government

was not justified in considering the prices of the formulations under

Para 7(2)(a) of the DPCO 1979 for determining the excess amount.

The reasons and conclusion so reached by the Delhi High Court is

the subject matter of this appeal.

Our Conclusion

23) To our mind, after hearing the learned counsel, the undisputed

facts appears to be that the Respondent-Company, as required

under para 5 and 14 of DPCO 1970, had informed the Central

Government the selling prices/notional prices of their bulk drugs

manufactured and sold and also the retail prices of the formulation

of these drugs. The maximum selling prices of these drugs so

24

informed/proposed by the respondent-company was approved by

the Central Government.

The Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred

under para 3(1) of the Price Control Order 1979 by its order dated

12.05.1981 had fixed the maximum selling prices of these bulk

drugs manufactured and sold by Respondent Company. After

receipt of the said order, the Respondent-Company had filed a

Review Petition dated 23.06.1981. May be prior to or after the

receipt of this representation, the Central Government, by its letter

dated 29.06.1981, had informed the Respondent-Company of its

liability to pay into DPEA the difference between the prices that the

company was enjoying under Prices Control Order 1970 and the

prices as notified by the Central Government with effect from

12.05.1981. The Respondent-Company filed CWP 1551 of 1981

before the High Court of Delhi, inter alia, seeking a writ of

certiorari of the notification issued by the Central Government on

the ground that the notification issued by the Central Government

fixing the maximum selling prices of the three bulk drugs

manufactured and sold by them as illegal, arbitrary and

unconstitutional. The High Court, while issuing notice of the

25

petition to the Respondents therein, granted the interim order dated

01.07.1981, inter alia, staying the implementation of any

formulation prices for the three bulk drugs. On a later date, the

High Court, after recalling its earlier order dated 01.07.1981,

granted stay of the implementation of the bulk drug prices notified

by the Central Government by its order dated 12.05.1981. Since

the Central Government passed yet another order dated 20.11.1986,

the Respondent-Company by way of amendment of the relief

sought in the writ petition, questioned the said order also. The High

Court, by its order dated 31.08.1987, disposed of the petition with

certain observations and directions, which we have already noticed

in extenso. Pursuant to the directions so issued, the Respondent-

Company filed review petition dated 09.03.1988 to review the order

dated 20.11.1986. The Central Government, by its order dated

02.01.1989, in exercise of its power conferred by Sub-para (1) of

para 3 of the Control Order 1987 and in supersession of the order

dated 12.05.1981 in so far as the three bulk drugs, has fixed the

maximum price at which the indigenously manufactured drugs

should be sold. After issuing the aforesaid notification, the

Government by its letter dated 18.06.1990, after referring to the

26

Judgment of Delhi High Court dated 31.08.1987, has stated that the

Respondent-Company has not been authorized to retain the

amounts over charged by the company. It is also stated that the

prices of the bulk drugs fixed on 20.11.1986 based on the direction

issued by the High Court is also not disturbed and the Court is also

authorized to fix the prices of the formulations. Accordingly, the

Central Government, vide their letters dated 18.06.1990 and

16.11.1990, made a tentative demand of `66.35 crores, which was

subsequently revised based on the data made available by the

Respondent Company to `71.21 crores payable by the Respondent-

Company to be deposited into DPEA. These were those

orders/letters which were impugned by the Respondent-Company

by filing CWP 2170 of 1990 before the High Court.

24). The Central Government, exercising its powers under the

Essential Commodities Act, 1955, had promulgated DPCO 1970.

Para 3 of this order empowered the Central Government to fix the

maximum selling price of an essential bulk drug specified in

Schedule-I appended to the order. However, the three bulk drugs

manufactured by the Respondent-Company were covered under

DPCO 1979, and empowered the Central Government to fix the

27

maximum prices thereof. Para 17 authorized the Central

Government to maintain a Drug Prices Equalization Account

comprised of the Grants as may be made by the manufacturers,

importers and distributors of the drugs. The purpose and object of

this account was to control and maintain the prices of drugs by

getting the amounts determined under Para 7(2) and the excess of

the common selling price over retention price deposited into this

account from those manufacturers who were selling or utilizing the

bulk drug in their formulations. This provision appears to be a

beneficial provision. The reason being, if the "common selling

price" happens to be less than the "retention price", the

manufacturer could be paid out of DPEA. This provision applies

equally both to indigenously manufactured drugs as well as the

drugs imported, so as to maintain uniformity in the price of bulk

drugs.

25). As of now, we have three notifications. The first one is dated

12.05.1981, wherein the Central Government fixed the maximum

sale prices of the aforesaid three bulk drugs. The second

notification is dated 21.11.1986, whereby the Central Government

has fixed the revised prices of the aforesaid three bulk drugs. These

28

notifications were subject matters of the writ petitions filed before

the Delhi High Court. Pursuant to the directions issued in the

aforesaid writ petition, the Central Government has now issued the

notification dated 02.01.1989. It is this notification which the

Central Government contends is prospective in its operation but the

Respondent-Company claims that it relates back to the notification

dated 12.05.1981.

26). To appreciate the controversy raised in this appeal, it would be

useful to extract the Gazette Notification dated 02.01.1989 issued

by the Central Government under Drugs (Prices Control) Order

1987 :-

S.O.6(E) - In exercise of the powers conferred by

sub paragraph (1) of paragraph 3 of the Drugs (Prices

Control) Order, 1987, and in supersession of the order of

the Government of India in the erstwhile Ministry of

Petroleum, Chemicals and Fertilizers (Department of

Chemicals and Fertilizers) No. S.O. 373 (E) dated the 12th

May, 1981, in so far as it relates to the drugs

`Betamethesone Alcbhol', `Betamethasone' '17-Valerate'

and `Betamethasone Di-sodium Phosphate' against serial

numbers 1 to 3, the Central Government hereby fixes the

prices specified in column (3) of the Table below as the

maximum price at which the indigenously manufactured

bulk drug specified in the corresponding entry column (2)

thereof shall be sold :-

29

TABLE

S.No Name of the Bulk Drug Maximum price

(Rs. Per gramme)

1. Betamethasone Alcohol 144.19

2. Betamethasone Valerate 136.50

3. Batemethasone Di-Sodium 144.58"

Phosphate

27). The aforesaid notification is issued by the Central Government

in supersession of the earlier Notification issued by the Government

of India No. S.O. 373(E) dated the 12th May, 1981. By this

notification, the Government has fixed the maximum price at which

indigenously manufactured bulk drugs shall be sold by the

Respondent-Company and others. According to the Revenue, the

notification is prospective and the notification issued earlier would

hold the field till the impugned notification is issued. However, it

is the stand of the Respondent-Company that the notification dated

02.01.1989 is retrospective in its operation and relates back to first

notification issued by the Central Government dated 12.05.1981.

28). The impugned notification uses the expression "supersession"

of the earlier notification. Therefore, the first question that requires

to be considered and answered by us is, what is the meaning of the

30

expression "supersession" and what is its effect. Webster's Third

New International Dictionary defines the word "supersession" to

mean `the State of being superseded', `removal' and `replacement'.

P. Ramanathan Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon defines

`superseded' as `set aside' and `replaced by'. The view of this

Court in some of the decisions is that the expression "supersession"

has to be understood to amount `to repeal' and when notification is

repealed, the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act

would not apply to notifications. The question whether statutory

obligations subsist in respect of a period prior to repeal of a

provision of a Statute or any subordinate legislation promulgated

thereunder has to be ascertained on legal considerations apposite to

the particular context. The matter is essentially one of construction.

Such problems do not admit of being answered on the basis of any

single principle or legal consideration. When the fresh notification

was issued on 02.01.1989, the earlier notifications were superseded,

could it be said that they became non est for all purposes and were

unable to support the proceedings for the enforcement of liability

incurred for the period prior to 1989. To hold so, would produce

the anomalous results. The answer, in our opinion, must depend on

31

proper construction to be placed on the notification themselves.

The point to be noted is that the notification dated 26.11.1986

became effective from 12th day of May, 1981. This notification,

fictionally must be held to have subsisted and were operative from

such points of time of their commencement upto the date it was

superseded. The position here is somewhat analogous to the one

considered in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Titaghur Paper Mills

Company Ltd. AIR 1980 SC 1293. In the said decision, the effect of

supersession of notifications under Orissa Sales Tax Act came up

for consideration. Referring to the effect of supersession of the

notification, this Court observed :-

"The word "supersession" in the notifications

dated December 29, 1977 is used in the same

sense as the words "repeal and replacement'

and therefore, does not have the effect of wiping

out the tax liability under the previous

notifications. All that was done by using the

words in supersession of all previous

notifications in the notifications dated December

29, 1977, was to repeal and replace previous

notifications and not to wipe out any liability

incurred under the previous notifications."

29). In Titaghur's case, the specific question whether on

"supersession" of a notification, the liability to tax for a period

prior to the supersession was wiped out or not, directly arose and

32

was considered. This Court came to the conclusion that the

previous liability to tax for a period prior to the supersession was

not wiped out. In our view, the results that flow from changes in

the law by way of amendment, `repeal', `substitution' or

`supersession' on the earlier rights and obligations cannot be

decided on any set formulae. It is essentially a matter for

construction and depends on the intendment of the law as could be

gathered from the provisions in accordance with accepted cannons

of construction. The question whether the liability for payment of

difference amount incurred by the respondent-company could be

enforced after the order dated 02.01.1989 passed under DPCO

1987, when the notification was superseded clearly falls within the

principles laid down in Titaghur Mills case. It is no doubt true that

in some cases, there are statements which admit the construction

that once a notification is `superseded', it amounts to repeal and

that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application to such

cases. If that principle is applied, then after 12th day of May, 1981,

the notification becomes unavailable to Central Govt. to give effect

to the notification issued under DPCO 1979, even in respect of the

period when the notification must be deemed to have been in force.

33

The notification in this case is close to the consequences arising out

of repeal without the benefit of a saving clause in respect of the

obligations previously incurred, but for saving principle in the

Titaghur's case. We may also usefully refer to the observations

made by Kaul, J. in Nand Kishore Vs. Emperor, AIR 1945 Oudh

214. It is stated "that the effect of an Act or an order which is

superseded is not to obliterate it altogether. An Act or order is said

to be superseded where a later enactment or order effects the same

purpose as an earlier one by repetition of its terms or otherwise. In

Syeda Mustafa Mohamed Gouse Vs. State of Mysore (1963) 1

Crl.L.J. 372 (Mys), the Sugar (Movement Control) Order 1959, of

6th November, 1959 was passed in supersession of the Sugar

(Movement Control) Order, 1959, dated 27th July, 1959. It was

held that in law `supersession' has not the same effect as repeal and

proceedings of a superseded order can be commenced. In R.S.

Anand Behari Lal Vs. Government of U.P. (AIR 1955 NUC 2769

All), it was held that in case of supersession of a notification, the

objections and liabilities accrued and incurred under the earlier

notification remain unaffected, since the supersession will be

effected from the date of second notification and not

34

retrospectively, so as to abrogate the earlier notification from the

date of its commencement. In view of the above discussion, we are

of the view that the appellants are well within their rights to raise

demands for making deposit into DPEA on the basis of the prices

notified by their notification dated 20.11.1986.

30). We now deal with the concept of `review' that finds a place in

para 27 of the DPCO 1979. What is contemplated in this provision

is that any person aggrieved by any notification or order under

paragraphs 3,4,5,6,7,9,12,13,14,15 or 16, may apply to the

Government for a review of the notification or order within fifteen

days of the date of the notification in the Official Gazette. After

receipt of the application/review petition, the Government may

make such order on the application as it may consider necessary.

What is the scope of the review that is contemplated under Drugs

(Prices Control Order) is explained by this Court in Cyanamide's

case (supra). It is observed that the review in para 27 of DPCO

1979 is in the form of a post decisional hearing which is sometimes

afforded after the making of some of the administrative orders, but

not truly so. "It is a curious amalgam of a hearing which

occasionally precedes a subordinate legislative activity such as the

35

fixing of municipal rates etc. that we mentioned earlier and a post-

decision hearing after the making of an administrative or quasi-

judicial order. It is a hearing which follows a subordinate legislative

activity intended to provide an opportunity to affected persons such

as the manufacturers, the industry and the consumer to bring to the

notice of the subordinate legislative body the difficulties or

problems experienced or likely to be experienced by them

consequent on the price fixation, whereupon the government may

make appropriate orders. Any decision taken by the Government

cannot be confined to the individual manufacturer seeking review

but must necessarily affect all manufacturers of the bulk drug as

well as the consumer. Since the maximum price of a bulk drug is

required by Para 3 to be notified, any fresh decision taken in the

proceeding for review by way of modification of the maximum

price has to be made by a fresh notification fixing the new

maximum price of the bulk drug. In other words, the review, if it is

fruitful, must result in fresh subordinate legislative activity. The

true nature of the review provided by Para 27 insofar as it relates to

the fixation of maximum price of bulk drugs under Para 3 and

leader price and prices of formulations under Paras 12 and 13 is

36

hard to define. It is difficult to give it a label and to fit it into a

pigeonhole, legislative, administrative or quasi-judicial. Nor is it

desirable to seek analogies and look to distant cousins for guidance.

From the scheme of the Control Order and the context and content

of Para 27, the review insofar as it concerns the orders under Paras

3, 12 and 13 appears to be in the nature of a legislative review of

legislation, or more precisely a review of subordinate legislation by

a subordinate legislative body at the instance of an aggrieved

person."

31). In the present case, the Central Government was directed by

the High Court in the first judgment to consider certain grievances

of the Respondent-Company regarding working out of certain

weighted averages, such as rate of income tax being taken low, the

packaging and distribution expenses taken lower than the actual

cost, etc., by the Central Government while the prices of the bulk

drugs were being fixed. The Court specifically observed that in the

interest of justice, the Respondent-Company should be given one

more opportunity of being heard on the price fixation order of

1986. The Court further made it clear that they are not setting aside

the order dated 20.11.1986 or staying further implementation of the

37

said order or stay any proceedings for fixation of prices of various

drug formulation of the Respondent-Company of which the

appellants - Central Government may wish to initiate. The Court

had permitted the Respondent-Company to file review petition, if

they so desire and further had directed the Central Government to

pass an order as they deem fit, that is, either affirming or reviewing

the prices fixed by order dated 20.11.1986 and to make consequent

changes in the prices for drug formulations, if fixed in the

meanwhile.

32). In our view, a reading of the observations made by the Court,

would indicate that it had reserved liberty to the Central

Government either to affirm or review the prices of the bulk drugs

fixed by order dated 20.11.1986 and to make consequent changes

in the prices for drug formulations. The Central Govt., taking clue

from the directions issued by the Court, which order has become

final, has passed the impugned Notification dated 02.01.1989, by

refixing the prices of drug formulations by applying the provisions

contained in DPCO 1989. In view of the above, it is difficult for us

to find fault with the exercise done by Central Government while

notifying the impugned notification. In our considered view, the

38

notification so issued is in accordance with the observations made

by this Court in Cyanamide case (supra) wherein it is stated :-

"...............since the maximum price of a bulk

drug is required by paragraph 3 to be notified

any fresh decision taken in the proceeding for

review by way of modification of the

maximum price has to be made by a fresh

notification fixing the new maximum price of

the bulk drug. In other words, the review if it

is fruitful it must result in fresh subordinate

legislative activity."

These observations of this Court in Cyanamide case, in our

view, supports the stand of the Revenue, that once a review petition

filed by the manufacturer of a bulk drug is considered and a fresh

notification is issued, the same would be prospective and it does not

relate back to the notification fixing the prices of bulk drugs issued

earlier.

33). It is no doubt true that the Murthy Committee was constituted

pursuant to the direction issued by the High Court to look into the

data that may be furnished by the Respondent-Company and give

its report for the purpose of fixing the prices of the bulk drugs

manufactured by the Respondent-Company. It is also not in

dispute that the prices fixed by the Murthy Committee was much

higher than those notified by the Central Government, while

39

issuing the notification dated 20.11.1986. In our view, that itself

will not make any difference for the reason, the Central

Government, after taking into consideration the report and the

recommendations made by the Murthy Committee, has issued a

notification which we have already said is only prospective and

not retrospective as contended by learned counsel for the

Respondent-Company. Hence, we are of the view that there was

no implied rejection of the recommendations of the Murthy

Committee.

34) Therefore, firstly, it cannot be said that the Central

Government while considering the review petition filed by the

Respondent-Company had disregarded the direction issued by the

Delhi High Court in its first judgment. Secondly, the contention of

the respondent-company that the price fixation order of 02.01.1989

was the result of decision taken by the Central Govt. on the review

petition filed by the respondent-company and therefore, the

demands raised as per the price fixation order dated 20.11.1986 had

to be revised according to the price fixation order dated 02.01.1989,

cannot be accepted. We also add, since the notification dated

40

02.01.1989 fixing prices of bulk drugs is prospective, the earlier

notification would operate during the intervening period.

To sum up, our findings in regard to the first and third issues

are as under :-

i) The demand to be raised on the respondent-company for

the period 12.05.1981 to 25.08.1987 is to be based on the

prices fixed under the notification dated 20.11.1986 and

not on the drug prices fixed on 02.01.1989.

ii) The supersession of a notification does not obliterate the

liability incurred under the earlier notification.

35) Now to answer the second issue, viz. whether the demand

raised under para 7(2)(a) of DPCO 1979, should be computed on

the basis of difference in bulk drug prices or on the basis of

difference in formulation prices, it is necessary to extract para 7 of

DPCO 1979 and the other relevant paras in DPCO 1979. Para 7

reads:

"7. Power to fix retention price and pooled price for

the sale of bulk drugs specified in First Schedule or

Second Schedule indigenously manufactured as

well as imported - (1) Where a bulk drug specified

in the First Schedule or the Second Schedule is

manufactured indigenously and is also imported,

the Government may, having regard to the sale

41

prices prevailing from time to time in respect of

indigenously manufactured bulk drugs and those of

imported bulk drugs, by order, fix, with such

adjustments as the Government may consider

necessary -

(a) retention prices for individual manufacturers,

importers, or distributors of such bulk drugs;

(b) a pooled price for the sale of such bulk drugs

(2) Where a manufacturer of formulations utilises

in the formulations any bulk drug, either from his

own production or procured by him from any other

source, the price of such bulk drug being lower

than the price allowed to him in the price of his

formulations the Government may require such

manufacturer -

(a) to deposit into the Drug Prices Equalisation

Account referred to in paragraph 17 the excess

amount to be determined by the Government; or

(b) to sell the formulations at such prices as may be

fixed by the Government".

36) Para 8 speaks of prices of bulk drugs produced through

indigenous research and development, Para 9 authorises the Central

Government to direct manufacturer of bulk drugs to sell bulk drugs

to manufacturers of formulations, Para 10 provides for the

calculation of retail prices of the formulations, Para 12 authorises

the Central Government to fix retail prices of formulations

specified in Category III of Third Schedule, Para 14 provides for

general provisions regarding prices of formulations, Para 15 speaks

42

of power of the Central Government to revise prices of

formulations, Para 17 speaks of Drug Prices Equalisation Account

(DPEA). The other paras may not be relevant to be noticed for the

purposes of this case.

37) Para 7 of the DPCO, 1979 is in two parts. Sub-para (1) of

Para-7 authorises the Central Government to fix retention price and

pooled price for the sale of Bulk drugs specified in First Schedule

or Second Schedule indigenously manufactured and those of

imported bulk drugs. Sub-Para (2) of Para 7 speaks of a situation

where a manufacturer of formulations sells the formulations of any

bulk drug, either manufactured by him or procured by him from

other sources, being lower than the price allowed to him in the price

of his formulations, the Government may require such

manufacturer of formulations to deposit into DPEA the excess

amount as determined by the Central Government. Sub Para

7(2)(b) mandates the manufacturer of the formulations to sell such

formulations as fixed by the Central Government. Para 7 of DPCO

1979 provides two different situations, one based on the difference

in the common selling prices of bulk drugs and the second the

difference based on common selling prices of the formulations.

43

Para 17 of DPCO 1979, as we have already stated, authorizes the

Central Government to maintain DPEA comprised of the grants

made by the Government, deposits to be made by the

manufacturers, importers and distributors of the drugs.

38) The Respondent-Company in the month of June, 1990 and

November, 1990 received a demand on the allegations that the

Respondent-Company had over charged for the bulk drugs as

well as formulations being manufactured by it. These demands

are based on the prices fixed by order dated 20.11.1986. The

Respondent-Company had questioned this demand before the

High Court primarily on the ground that the sale prices of the

formulations cannot not be taken into consideration and only the

cost of bulk drugs consumed in those formulations could be

taken into consideration for making calculations. The prayer in

the writ petition was to direct the Central Government to

reassess and calculate the demand on the basis of the revised

bulk drug prices fixed on 02.01.1989, instead of taking into

consideration the prices of the formulations and to consider the

excess amount on the basis of prices of bulk drugs used in the

formulations. The stand of the Central Government in the

44

affidavit filed before the High Court was that the prices of the

bulk drugs had been fixed vide their order dated 12.05.1981 and

20.11.1986, but the prices of the formulation could not be fixed

because of the stay granted by the Court and as such the

Respondent-Company was bound to charge only prices as were

liable to be fixed under the DPCO 1979. They had also stated

that the Respondent-Company was entitled to charge such prices

for its bulk drug as was fixed by the price fixation order dated

20.11.1986 or liable to be fixed for formulations under DPCO of

1979 and was bound to deposit the over charged amounts to

DPEA.

39) The learned senior counsel Shri. Andhyarujina submits

that Para 7(2)(a) read with Para 17 of DPCO 1979 makes it clear

that the Scheme of the DPCO 1979 was to encourage domestic

production of bulk drugs through a system of retention and

pooled pricing. It is also submitted that para 17(2) and (3) sets

out the manner in which the DPEA was to be utilized and how a

manufacturer of bulk drugs could make a claim in respect of

bulk drugs manufactured by it from DPEA. Therefore, para

7(2)(a)was never intended to cover prices of formulation but

45

only the differences in the price of bulk drugs used in

formulations which the manufacturer can be asked to deposit

into the DPEA under para 7(2)(a). However, it is argued by

learned counsel for the Central Government that the expression

"excess amount to be determined by the Government" in para

7(2)(a) of DPCO 1979 gives a wide discretion to the

Government in the matter of determining the amount

recoverable under the para and, therefore, the Government was

justified in raising the demand taking into consideration the

difference between the common selling prices and the price of

the formulations.

40) It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that a statute must

be read as a whole. Lord Herschell in the case of Colguhoun v.

Brooks, (1889) 14 AC 493, aptly pointed out:

"It is beyond dispute, too, that we are entitled, and

indeed bound, when construing the terms of any

provision found in a statute, to consider any other

parts of the Act which throw light on the intention

of the legislature, and which may serve to show

that the particular provision ought not to be

construed as it would be alone and apart from the

rest of the Act."

46

41). This Court in the case of Phillips India Ltd. v. Labour

Court, (1985) 3 SCC 103 has observed :

"15. No canon of statutory construction is more

firmly established that the statue must be read as a

whole. This is a general rule of construction

applicable to all statutes alike which is spoken of as

construction ex visceribus actus......The only

recognized exception to the well-laid principle is

that it cannot be called in aid to alter the meaning

of what is of itself clear and explicit. Lord Coke

laid down that: "it is the most natural and genuine

exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a

statute by another part of the same statute, for that

best expresseth meaning of the makers" (Quoted

with approval in Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v.

Suresh Chand, [(1978) 2 SCC 144])"

42). To our mind, the grievance of the respondent-

company which was projected before the High Court and also

before us is that the impugned demands were in violation of Para

7(2)(a) of DPCO 1979, mainly for the reason that they were not

computed on the basis of difference in the prices of bulk drugs

but on the difference between the prices of bulk drugs and the

prices of formulations in which the company had used those

bulk drugs. The appellants/Central Government while justifying

the impugned demand had contended before the High Court and

even before us, that the prices of bulk drugs were fixed vide

47

orders dated 12.05.1981, which were revised by order dated

20.11.1986, but the formulations could not be fixed because of

the interim order granted by the High Court and, ergo, the

respondent-company is liable to deposit into DPEA the over

charged amount in respect of their formulations also.

43) To resolve the controversy on this issue, it is necessary to

notice the impugned demands raised by the appellants/Central

Government dated 16th November, 1990. The relevant portion is

extracted by omitting what is not necessary for the purpose of

considering the issue before us. They are as under:-

"Subject: Recovery into the Drug prices Equalisation

Account in respect of Betamethasone and its

formulations.

Dear Sirs,

I am directed to refer to your letter dated the

17th September, 1990 on the above subject and to say

that the liability of your company upto 25th August,

1987 has since been determined based on the

available data. The details are as under:-

(i) Bulk drugs sold to others

(a) Attached statement at Annexure-I gives

the details of your liability of Rs.23.62 lakhs in

respect of the bulk drug.

(ii) Formulations and bulk drug captively used.

48

(b) The liability in respect of 16th packs of

formulations has been determined at Rs.7121.03

lakhs as per details annexed.

(c) Liability in respect of 8 packs of

formulations have been worked out at Rs.33.53

lakhs subject to your company making available

the details of the packs produced and sold

during 12th May, 1981 and 30th June, 1981. The

liability in respect of these 8 packs would be

finalized after these details are received.

2. While determining the liability the prices

charged by your company based on the stay granted

by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and the prices to

which your company would have been entitled had the

stay not been granted have been taken into

consideration. The prices to which your company was

entitled to are shown in column 5 of the statement and

these prices have been worked out by the Expert Body,

namely, Bureau (sic.) of Industrial Costs and prices

based on the price of the bulk drug as upheld by the

High Court and other parameters like conversion cost,

packing charges, packing materials excipients (sic.)

etc. As prevalent in May, 1981, the norms of

conversion cost and packing charges for formulations

have also been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

3. Liability in respect of two packs of formulations

indicated at S.No.17 and 18 (sic.) would be

communicated to you after the details of the price

prevailing on 12th May, 1981 and the basis thereof are

communicated to the Government.

4. The liability in respect of 6 packs of

formulations would be finalized after the details of

packs produced/sold during 12th May, 1981 to 30th

June, 1981 are made available. It is brought to your

notice once again that as already advised in this

Ministry's letter of even number dated the 20th

September, 1990 and as directed by the Hon'ble High

49

Court vide its orders dated the 9th August, 1990 your

company is still to make available the details in

respect of bulk drug Betamathasone and its

formulations after 25th August, 1987. Please expedite

these details also so that your liability can be finalized

for this period as well.

Yours faithfully,

Sd./-

(J.L. Sharma)

UNDER SECRETARY TO

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA"

44). Now let us see how the High Court has decided this

issue. The Court after noticing elaborately the intent, object and

the possible construction that could be placed on paras 3 to 9

and para 17 has observed that:

"Neither paras 3 to 9 nor para 17 of DPCO 1979

suggest that the amount to be deposited in DPEA

had anything to do with the prices of the

formulations which were being fixed in terms of

paras 10 and 11 of the said order. Para 7(2) of

the order, which speaks of utilization of bulk

drugs in the formulations, makes it abundantly

clear that the amount to be deposited into DPEA

in this regard related only to the common selling

price of bulk drug which was lower than the price

allowed to him in the price of his formulations.

As a natural consequence, therefore, the demand

for the amount to be deposited in DPEA account

could be based and calculated only on the basis

of the prices of the bulk drugs consumed in the

formulations and not on the basis of notional

prices of formulations. The prices of the

50

formulations, therefore, were not at all relevant

for the purpose. Thus the impugned demands,

which were based on the formulations prices

suffer from the vice of considering the

formulations prices and not the quantity and the

price of the bulk drugs consumed therein."

(Emphasis supplied)

45). In our view, the fallacy in the impugned judgment appears

to be in not properly analyzing the clear meaning of the

expressions used in para 7(2)(b) of DPCO 1979.

46) A plain reading of Para 7(2)(a) of the DPCO 1979 shows

what can be directed by the Central Government to be deposited

into DPEA by the manufacturer of bulk drugs and any

formulations using those drugs or procured from outside, as in

the present case. Firstly, Para 7(2)(a) applies to a manufacturer

of formulations. The manufacturer must utilize in the

formulation(s) any bulk drug. The bulk drug could be either

from his own production or procured from any other sources. If

the price of such bulk drugs is notified as lower than the price

allowed to him in the price of his formulations, the Central

Government may require the manufacturer of formulation the

excess amount determined to be deposited into DPEA. Under

Para 7(2)(b), the Central Government may direct the

51

manufacturer of formulations to sell the formulations at such

prices as may be fixed by the Government.

47) The Central Government, while issuing the

letters/demand dated 18.06.1990 and 16.11.1990, has

specifically bifurcated the differential amount that requires to be

paid by the respondent-company on the bulk drugs and their

formulations. In the letter, it is made clear that in view of the

notification dated 20.11.1986, the respondent-company has to

deposit into DPEA the difference between the retention price

and pooled price for the sale of bulk drugs. Similarly, since the

respondent-company manufactures drug formulations by captive

consumption of the bulk drugs, the Central Government initially

could not fix the retention price of the formulations in view of

the interim orders passed by the High Court while admitting the

writ petition filed by the respondent-company. After disposal of

the writ petitions filed and in view of the specific liberty that

was granted by the High Court in the petitions filed by the

respondent-company, the Central Government directed the

company to pay not only the difference amount payable for the

price of bulk drugs but also those drugs which are utilized in

52

their formulations over and above the prices fixed by the Central

Government. In our view, since the para 7(2)(a) of DPCO 1979

does not admit a construction which the respondent-company

suggests, it is difficult to hold that under para 7(2)(a) of DPCO

1979, the Central Government could issue demand on the basis

of bulk drugs only and not on the basis of difference between the

prices of bulk drugs and the prices of the formulations in which

the company had used those bulk drugs.

48). Before we conclude, it is important to mention that the

respondent company (and similar companies) not only

manufacture bulk drugs but also use them for their drug

formulations for its supply in retail vending and thereby, the

ordinary consumer is burdened with a higher price than what

they could have got at a lesser price. Since that is taken care of

in para 17 of DPCO 1979, it may not be necessary to lean

towards the submissions made by learned counsel for the

respondent-company.

49) In conclusion, we would only say that none of the

submissions made by learned counsel for the respondent-

company were worth accepting. Accordingly, we allow this

53

appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court and

thereby, we confirm the demands raised by the Central

Government. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we

deem it proper that the parties will bear their own costs.

....................................J.

[ R.V. RAVEENDRAN ]

....................................J.

[ H.L. DATTU]

New Delhi,

March 30, 2011.

54