Union Of India vs Giani

Union of India .... Appellant

Versus

Giani .... Respondent

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1885 OF 2011

[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21344 of 2004]

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1886 OF 2011

[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22631 of 2004]

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1887 OF 2011

[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 14207 of 2005]

JUDGMENT

Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.

1. Leave granted in all the petitions.

2. We propose to dispose of all these appeals by this

common judgment and order. In all these appeals not

only the issues arising for our consideration on merit are

identical but also all these appeals were filed by the

appellants herein after considerable delay.

3. Having examined the averments made in the applications

for condonation of delay in filing all the appeals and after

hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are

satisfied that the application for condonation of delay in

preferring the appeals must be allowed as the statements

in the applications for condonation of delay, in our view,

do constitute sufficient cause in not preferring the

appeals within the period of limitation. We, therefore,

condone delay in all the appeals. We have taken such a

view in this matter as we feel that there is a strong

arguable case on behalf of the appellants and, therefore,

it is felt necessary that the court should decide the

matter on merit by giving the expression sufficient cause

a pragmatic justice oriented approach.

4. In all these appeals counsel appearing for the appellant

has raised just one issue, namely, that the respondent in

each of the appeals is not entitled to receive

2

compensation under Section 23 (1A) of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 [for short "the Act"] which has been

granted in their favour by the orders of the High Court.

5. On 06.03.1995 by issuing notification under Section 4 of

the Act, land situated in village-Ziauddinpur, Delhi was

sought to be acquired for public purpose, namely,

planned development of Delhi. The aforesaid notification

was followed by issuance of a declaration under Section 6

of the Act which was issued on 07.01.1969. The Collector

passed the award on 09.07.1980 vide his award No.

39/80-81.

6. Section 23 (1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was

inserted, w.e.f., 24.9.1984, by way of amendment to the

Act which was made applicable to proceedings pending

on or after 30.04.1982. The said sub-section (1A)

provides that in additional to the market value of the

land, the Court would in every case award an amount

calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on

such market value for the period commencing on and

from the date of the publication of the notification under

3 Section 4, sub-Section (1), in respect of such land to the

date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking

possession of the land, whichever is earlier. In sub-

section 2 of Section 23 of the Act the words "thirty per

centum" replaced the words "fifteen per centum", w.e.f.,

24.09.1984 and it was also made applicable to certain

awards made and order passed after 30.04.1982. The

specific and the only issue which was agitated by the

counsel appearing for the appellant before us, during the

course of hearing was that, since the aforesaid

amendment by Act No. 68 of 1984 inserted a new

provision in the nature of sub-section (1A), which was

inserted, w.e.f., 24.09.1984 [and was made applicable to

proceedings pending on or after 30.04.1982] sub-section

(1A) would not be applicable in the present case. In

support of the said contention reference was made to the

decision of the Constitutional Bench of this Court in K.S.

Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and others reported in

(1994) 5 SCC 593 in which this Court upon a combined

reading of Section 23(1A) and Section 30(1) of the Act

held as follows: -

4 "74. .......... A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section

30 of the amending Act shows that it divides the

proceedings for acquisition of land which had

commenced prior to the date of the commencement

of the amending Act into two categories,

proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-

1982 and proceedings which had commenced

after 30-4-1982. While clause (a) of Section 30(1)

deals with proceedings which had commenced

prior to 30-4-1982, clause (b) deals with

proceedings which commenced after 30-4-1982.

By virtue of clause (a), Section 23(1-A) has been

made applicable to proceedings which had

commenced prior to 30-4-1982 if no award had

been made by the Collector in those proceedings

before 30-4-1982. It covers (i) proceedings which

were pending before the Collector on 30-4-1982

wherein award was made after 30-4-1982 but

before the date of the commencement of the

amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein

award was made by the Collector after the date of

the commencement of the amending Act. Similarly

Section 30(1)(b) covers (i) proceedings which had

commenced after 30-4-1982 wherein award was

made prior to the commencement of the amending

Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was

made after the commencement of the amending

Act. It would thus appear that both the clauses (a)

and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 cover

proceedings for acquisition which were pending on

the date of the commencement of the amending

Act and to which the provisions of Section 23(1-A)

have been made applicable by virtue of Section

30(1). If Section 23(1-A), independently of Section

30(1), is applicable to all proceedings which were

pending on the date of the commencement of the

amending Act, clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1)

would have been confined to proceedings which

had commenced prior to the commencement of the

amending Act and had concluded before such

commencement because by virtue of Section 15 5

the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would have been

applicable to proceedings pending before the

Collector on the date of commencement of the

amending Act. There was no need to so phrase

Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section

23(1-A) to proceedings which were pending before

the Collector on the date of the commencement of

the amending Act. This only indicates that but for

the provisions contained in Section 30(1) Section

23(1-A) would not have been applicable to

proceedings pending before the Collector on the

date of commencement of the amending Act."

7. A similar issue again came up for consideration before

this Court in Pralhad and Others v. State of

Maharashtra and another reported in (2010) 10 SCC

458 wherein reference was made and reliance was placed

in the decision of K.S. Paripoornan (supra).

8. In the present case the acquisition proceeding

commenced with the notification under Section 4 issued

on 06.03.1965 and it culminated in passing of the award

by the Collector on 09.07.1980, i.e., before 30.04.1982,

the date from which the amending Act 68 of 1984 was

made applicable to the pending and subsequent

proceedings. Therefore, in terms of the law laid down by

the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case

6

of K.S. Paripoornan (supra) the respondents are not

entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1A).

9. All the appeals, therefore, are partly allowed to the

aforesaid extent and disposed of leaving the parties to

bear their own costs.

............................................J

[Dr. Mukundakam Sharma ]

............................................J

[ Anil R. Dave ]

New Delhi,

February 17, 2011.

7