Union Of India & Ors vs Vikrambhai Maganbhai Chaudhari

Union of India & Ors. .... Appellant (s)

Versus

Vikrambhai Maganbhai Chaudhari .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) This appeal by Union of India is directed against the

final judgment and order dated 12.08.2005 passed by the

High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil

Application No. 16575 of 2005 whereby the High Court

dismissed the application of the appellants herein

upholding the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal

(in short `the Tribunal') in O.A. No. 333 of 2004 wherein

the Tribunal by its order dated 20.04.2005 had quashed

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and set aside Notification No. C-11011/1/2001-VP dated

29.05.2001.

2) Brief facts:

(a) On 08.06.2000, Vikrambhai Maganbhai Chaudhari,

the respondent herein, while working as M.O. Postal

Assistant, Bardoli, refused to accept M.O. forms along

with the amounts tendered by Shri P.N. Singh, Shri H.K.

Tiwari and Shri R.C. Pande for booking of money orders.

Later, Mr. K.H. Gamit, Assistant Post Master, Bardoli and

his immediate supervisor instructed him to accept the

above said Money Orders in writing through office order

book but the respondent did not obey the orders.

Accordingly, departmental action was initiated against

him and he was suspended by order of Superintendent of

Post Office, Bardoli vide Memo No. B-1/PF/VMC/2000.

(b) However, on 23.06.2000, the suspension order of the

respondent was revoked and disciplinary action was

initiated against the respondent under Rule 16 of Central

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Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,

1965 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"). Vide Memo

No. P1/4(2)/05/01-02 dated 17.10.2001, the disciplinary

authority awarded punishment of `Censure' to the

respondent.

(c) Thereafter, the case was taken up for review by the

Chief Post Master General, Ahmedabad under Rule 29 of

the Rules and he directed the Superintendent of Post

Office, Bardoli to initiate disciplinary proceedings against

the respondent under Rule 14 of the Rules and on

completion send the matter to him for further action.

Accordingly, a notice was issued to the respondent.

(d) Challenging the proceedings, the respondent filed

Original Application No. 333 of 2004 before the Tribunal,

Ahmedabad Bench, Ahmedabad. By order dated

20.04.2005, the Tribunal allowed the application filed by

the respondent. Aggrieved by the said order, the

appellants herein filed Special Civil Application being No.

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16575 of 2005 before the High Court of Gujarat at

Ahmedabad. The High Court, by impugned order,

dismissed the application filed by the appellants herein.

Aggrieved by the said order and judgment, the appellants

herein have filed this appeal by way of special leave

petition before this Court.

3) Heard Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, learned ASG for the

appellants. Mr. Vishwajit Singh, learned counsel filed

appearance on behalf of the respondent but none

appeared at the time of hearing.

4) Mr. Chandhiok, learned ASG after taking us through

Rule 29 of the Rules submitted that the Tribunal was not

justified in quashing the Notification dated 29.05.2001 and

the High Court has also committed an error in confirming the

same. He further submitted that the High Court and the

Tribunal ought to have appreciated that the Notification in

question does not become bad merely because the time limit

has not been provided and according to him, even though Rule

29(1)(vi) provides that such order shall also specify the time

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within which this power should be exercised in view of Clause

(v) which provides six months' outer limit for reviewing the

order, the ultimate conclusion of the Tribunal and the High

Court cannot be sustained.

5) Inasmuch as the Tribunal and the High Court granted

relief in favour of the respondent on the basis of the

interpretation of Rule 29(1)(vi) and the Notification dated

29.05.2001, it is desirable to refer the same. The Notification

reads as under:-

"Ministry of Communications

[Department of Posts]

New Delhi, the 29th May, 2001

NOTIFICATION

No. So..... In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (VI)

of Sub Rule (1) of Rule 29 of the Central Civil Services

(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, the

President hereby specifies that in the case of a government

servant serving in the Department of Posts, for whom the

appellate authority is subordinate to the authority

designated as the Principal Chief Postmaster General or the

Chief Postmaster General (other than the Chief Postmaster

General of Senior Administrative Grade) of a Circle, the said

Principal Chief Postmaster General or the said Chief

Postmaster General, as the case may be, shall be the revising

authority for the purpose of exercising the powers under the

said Rule 29.

[No. C-11011/1/2001-VP]

Sd/-

[B.P. Sharma]

Director (VP)"

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The relevant clauses of Rule 29 are as under:-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules.

(i) the President; or

(ii) The Comptroller and Auditor-General, in the case of a

Government servant serving in the India Audit and Accounts

Department; or

(iii) the Member (Personnel) Postal Services Board in the

case of a Government Servant serving in or under the Postal

Services Board and (Adviser (Human Resources

Development), Department of Telecommunication) in the

case of Government Servant serving in or under the

Telecommunication Board); or

(iv) the Head of a Department directly under the Central

Government in the case of a Government Servant serving in

a department or office (not being the Secretariat or the Posts

and Telegraphs Board) under the control of such head of a

Department; or

(v) the appellant authority, within six months of the date

of order proposed to be (revised); or

(vi) any other authority specified in this behalf by the

President by a general or special order, and within such time

as may be specified in such general or special order;

may at any time either on his or its own motion or otherwise

call for the records of any inquiry and revise any order made

under these rules.....

(2) No proceeding for revision shall be commenced until after

(i) the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal, or

(ii) the disposal of the appeal, where any such appeal has

been preferred."

6) As rightly observed by the Tribunal, the above sub-Rule

(1) of Rule 29 indicates 6 categories of revisional authorities.

6 If we go further it shows that while no period is mentioned in

sub-clauses (i) to (iv), sub-Clause (v) refers to a period of six

months from the date of order proposed to be revised. Since

order was passed by exercising power under sub-Clause (vi),

we have to see whether in the Notification specifying an

authority a time limit has been mentioned or even in the

absence of the same, the outer limit can be availed by

exercising power under sub-Clause (v). According to learned

ASG, there is no need to specify the period in the Notification

authorizing concerned authority to call for the record for any

enquiry and revise any order made under the Rules. We are

unable to accept the said claim for the following reasons.

7) It is to be noted that in cases where the appellate

authority seeks to review the order of the disciplinary

authority, the period fixed for the purpose is six months of the

date of the order proposed to be revised. This is clear from

sub-Clause (v) of sub-Rule 1 of Rule 29. On the other hand,

Clause (vi) confers similar powers on such other authorities

which may be specified in that behalf by the President by a

general or special order and the said authority has to

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commence the proceedings within the time prescribed therein.

Even though Rule 29(1)(vi) provides that such order shall also

specify the time within which the power should be exercised,

the fact remains that no time limit has been prescribed in the

Notification. We have already pointed out that no period has

been mentioned in the Notification. The argument that even in

the absence of specific period in the Notification in view of

Clause (v), the other authority can also exercise such power

cannot be accepted. To put it clear, sub-Clause (v) applies to

appellate authority and Clause (vi) to any other authority

specified by the President by a general or special order for

exercising power by the said authority under sub-Clause (vi).

There must be specified period and the power can be exercised

only within the period so prescribed.

8) Inasmuch as the Notification dated 29.05.2001 has not

specified any time limit within which power under Rule

29(1)(vi) is exercisable by the authority specified, we are of the

view that such Notification is not in terms with Rule 29 and

the Tribunal is fully justified in quashing the same. The High

Court has also rightly confirmed the said conclusion by

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dismissing the Special Application of the appellants and

quashing the Notification on the ground that it did not specify

the time limit. Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is

dismissed. No order as to costs.

..........................................J.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

..........................................J.

(A.K. PATNAIK)

NEW DELHI;

JULY 1, 2011.

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