Uco Bank vs Vijay Kumar Handa

2025 INSC 442 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5922 OF 2024

UCO BANK & ANR. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

VIJAY KUMAR HANDA RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

UJJAL BHUYAN, J.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This appeal by special leave is directed against

the judgment and order dated 11.01.2017 passed by the

High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh (briefly

‘the High Court’ hereinafter) dismissing Letters Patent

Appeal No. 1525 of 2016 preferred by the appellant.

2.1. Appellant herein is the United Commercial Bank

(briefly ‘the Bank’ hereinafter).

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by KAVITA PAHUJA Date: 2025.04.03

3. By the judgment and order dated 11.01.2017, the 17:37:47 IST Reason:

letters patent appeal filed by the appellant Bank against the 2

judgment and order of the learned Single Judge was

dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Learned

Single Judge vide the judgment and order dated 14.03.2016

had allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent being

Civil Writ Petition No. 2490 of 2014 by directing the

appellant to process the case of the respondent for pension

and to release the pensionary dues to him expeditiously.

4. Relevant facts may be briefly noted.

5. At the relevant point of time, respondent was

serving as a Clerk in the appellant Bank. A charge memo

dated 12.10.1998 issued by the disciplinary authority was

served upon him, charging him with having indulged in acts

of gross misconduct within the premises of the Gurmandi

Branch, Jalandhar of the appellant Bank. As per the

allegations, on 21.09.1998, at around 05:15 PM, respondent

alongwith another employee of the same branch Shri R.N.

Chopra had assaulted Shri J.B. Bansal, an officer of the

appellant Bank posted at the Raipur-Rasulpur Branch, in

the cabin of the senior manager of the Gurmandi Branch.

Officials of the branch had to intervene to separate Shri

Bansal from the respondent and Shri Chopra. 3

5.1. Before the respondent could file his response to

the charge memo, the disciplinary authority decided to

institute an enquiry. In this connection, Shri H.S. Saini, an

officer in Scale III, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and

Shri R.K. Kakkar, an officer in Scale II, was appointed as the

Presiding Officer vide the notification dated 18.12.1998.

5.2. The Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and

on conclusion of the same submitted his enquiry report to

the disciplinary authority alongwith his covering letter dated

09.10.1999. In the enquiry proceedings, stand of the

respondent was that no such incident of assault had taken

place; instead, it was a conspiracy hatched at the instance

of the rival union to falsely implicate the respondent and

Shri Chopra. Enquiry Officer concluded that the charges

against the respondent stood proved.

5.3. On going through the enquiry report, disciplinary

authority passed an order dated 18.10.1999 holding that

the charge against the respondent of indulging in riotous,

disorderly and indecent behaviour within the premises of

the Bank was proved. Therefore, as the disciplinary

authority, he proposed to impose the penalty of dismissal 4

from service. A copy of the enquiry report was forwarded to

the respondent with the intimation that a personal hearing

would be held on 29.10.1999 on the question of penalty.

5.4. It appears that respondent had appeared before

the disciplinary authority for personal hearing and also filed

a written submission. He reiterated that he was innocent

and was falsely implicated. He submitted he had two small

school going children besides his unemployed wife.

Therefore, he pleaded that the penalty as proposed should

not be imposed.

5.5. Disciplinary authority vide his order dated

14.12.1999 agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer

and held that the charge levelled against the respondent for

having indulged in riotous, disorderly and indecent

behaviour within the premises of the appellant Bank was

proved. Respondent thus committed an act of gross

misconduct within the meaning of Clause 19.5(c) of the

Bipartite Settlement dated 19.10.1966, as amended. He,

therefore, imposed the penalty of dismissal from service on

the respondent with immediate effect.

5

6. Respondent preferred an appeal against the

aforesaid order of dismissal from service before the appellate

authority. By order dated 16.02.2000, the appellate

authority while concurring with the finding of the

disciplinary authority qua the misconduct, however

modified the penalty to one of removal from service. It was

ordered that respondent be removed from the services of the

Bank with immediate effect; however, he would be entitled

to receive the terminal benefits for the period of service he

had rendered. It was clarified that removal from service

would not be a disqualification for the future employment of

the respondent.

7. On an industrial dispute being raised at the

instance of the respondent, the central government referred

the same to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-

cum-Labour Court, Jalandhar (for short ‘Labour Court’

hereinafter). The question referred was whether the action

of the Bank in dismissing the respondent from service was

legal and just. The supplementary question was as to what

relief the concerned workman (respondent) would be entitled

to and from which stage. Labour Court after hearing the 6

matter passed an award dated 13.02.2004 opining that the

penalty imposed was disproportionate to the gravity of the

alleged misconduct by taking into consideration the

involvement of the respondent in the alleged incident.

Invoking the provisions of Section 11A of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (briefly, ‘the Industrial Disputes Act’

hereinafter), the Labour Court substituted the penalty of

dismissal/removal from service with the penalty of stoppage

of four increments for one year. Respondent was directed to

be reinstated in service with 75 percent back wages and

other benefits. The reference was answered accordingly. The

aforesaid award was notified by the central government on

07.03.2004.

8. Appellant assailed the aforesaid award dated

13.02.2004 before the High Court by filing CWP No. 11806

of 2004. A learned Single Judge of the High Court vide the

judgment and order dated 25.03.2009 was of the view that

the award passed by the Labour Court was totally

unjustified and could not be sustained. Power under Section

11A of the Industrial Disputes Act ought not to have been

invoked by the Labour Court. Punishment of removal from 7

service with terminal benefits as imposed on the respondent

by the appellate authority could not be said to be

disproportionate. Therefore, the award dated 13.02.2004

was set aside.

9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of

the learned Single Judge dated 25.03.2009, respondent

preferred a letters patent appeal being LPA No. 928 of 2009

before the Division Bench of the High Court. Vide the

judgment and order dated 24.02.2010, the Division Bench

agreed with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that

power under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act

ought not to have been invoked by the Labour Court.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

10. Respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India before the High Court seeking a

direction to the appellant to release his retiral benefits. The

same was registered as Civil Writ Petition No. 2490 of 2014.

A learned Single Judge of the High Court vide the judgment

and order dated 14.03.2016 referred to the order of the

appellate authority wherein the latter had held that the

respondent would be entitled to receive the terminal benefits 8

for the period of service he had rendered and thereafter

allowed the said writ petition by directing the appellant

Bank to process the case of the respondent for pension in

pursuance of the option exercised by him and to release the

pensionary benefits due to him expeditiously.

11. Appellant preferred LPA No. 1525 of 2016 before

the Division Bench challenging the aforesaid decision of the

learned Single Judge dated 14.03.2016. A Division Bench of

the High Court vide the judgment and order dated

11.01.2017 placed reliance on a decision of this Court in

Bank of Baroda Vs. S.K. Kool1 and another decision of the

High Court in Hardial Singh Vs. Bank of Baroda2 and

thereafter affirmed the view taken by the learned Single

Judge. Consequently, the letters patent appeal of the

appellant was dismissed.

12. Hence the present appeal.

13. This Court by order dated 03.07.2017 had issued

notice and stayed the operation and implementation of the

1 (2014) 2 SCC 715 2 2012 SCC Online P&H 8059 9

impugned judgment and order dated 11.01.2017. When the

matter was heard on 23.04.2024, leave was granted.

14. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits

that respondent was not punished under Clause 6(b) of the

Bipartite Settlement. Therefore, the High Court was not

justified in applying the case of S.K. Kool (supra). That apart,

the decision in S.K. Kool (supra) was rendered in a different

factual context. The employee in the said case had opted for

pension before the penalty of removal from service was

imposed on him. In the present case, respondent never

opted for pension. Therefore, S.K. Kool (supra) is clearly

distinguishable in so far facts and circumstances of the

present case is concerned.

14.1. Learned senior counsel further submits that

respondent was not entitled to pension in as much as he did

not fulfil the requirements of pension in terms of the ninth

Bipartite Settlement dated 27.04.2010. The said settlement

did not include employees who had suffered the penalty of

removal from service as being eligible for pension.

14.2. In any view of the matter, learned senior counsel

submits that a delinquent employee who has been imposed 10

the major penalty of removal from service is not entitled to

pension or other retiral benefits. The charge against the

respondent is very serious and that was proved in the duly

constituted enquiry. Regulation 22 of the UCO Bank

(Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995 (for short

'Regulations, 1995' hereinafter) also does not permit grant

of pension to such delinquent employees.

14.3. In such circumstances, learned senior counsel

submits that the High Court fell in error in directing the

appellant to grant pension to the respondent. Therefore, the

impugned order should be set aside.

15. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent

submits that both the learned Single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court had correctly appreciated the facts

and the law and thereafter upheld the claim of the

respondent.

15.1. Learned counsel for the respondent heavily relied

upon the decision of this Court in S.K. Kool (supra) and

submits that respondent having completed the minimum

pensionable years of service, he is entitled to the pensionary

benefits.

11

15.2. It is further submitted that the appellate

authority while maintaining the finding of the disciplinary

authority in so far the finding of misconduct of the

respondent is concerned, however held that the respondent

would be entitled to receive the terminal benefits for the

period of service he had rendered. Appellant did not

challenge this decision. On the contrary, appellant had

challenged the subsequent Labour Court award substituting

the same with a lesser penalty and directing re-instatement

in service. This challenge was sustained by the Single Judge

as well as by the Division Bench of the High Court, thus

restoring the appellate order. Therefore, the appellate order

had attained finality. On the strength of the appellate order,

respondent is entitled to pension and this is what the High

Court in the subsequent round has held. Learned counsel,

therefore, submits that there is no merit in the appeal and,

as such, the appeal should be dismissed.

16. Submissions made by learned counsel for the

parties have received the due consideration of the Court.

17. A Bipartite Settlement was arrived at between the

Indian Banks’ Association and the Banks’ Workmen Union 12

on 19.10.1966. This settlement was arrived at under Section

2(p) and Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act read

with Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957. This settlement therefore has a statutory backing and

is binding on the parties. Respondent was charged with

committing an act of gross misconduct as defined in Clause

19.5(c) of the aforesaid Bipartite Settlement which was

proved by the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the

disciplinary authority. On 10.04.2002, a further settlement

was arrived at between the Indian Banks’ Association,

representing the management on the one hand, and the

workmen represented by the All India Bank Employees’

Association, National Confederation of Bank employees and

Indian National Bank Employees’ Federation on the other

hand. Pursuant thereto, Clause 6(b) was inserted in the said

Bipartite Settlement providing for one of the penalties which

may be imposed on a delinquent employee found guilty of

gross misconduct. Clause 6(b) reads as follows:

6. An employee found guilty of gross misconduct may:

(a) * * * * *

(b) be removed from service with superannuation benefits i.e. pension and/or provident fund and 13

gratuity as would be due otherwise under the rules or regulations prevailing at the relevant time and without disqualification from future employment; or

17.1. Thus, as per the aforesaid clause, an employee

who is found guilty of gross misconduct may be removed

from service but would be provided with superannuation

benefits which would otherwise be due to him. Further, the

penalty of removal from service would be without

disqualification from future employment.

18. In the instant case, the initial penalty imposed on

the respondent by the appellant was dismissal from service

with immediate effect after having been found guilty of gross

misconduct as per Clause 19.5(c) of the Bipartite

Settlement. Appellate authority vide the order dated

16.02.2000 modified the penalty order dated 14.12.1999

passed by the disciplinary authority by substituting the

penalty of dismissal from service by removal from service

with terminal benefits. The substituted penalty in terms of

the appellate order dated 16.02.2000 reads as under:

Shri V.K. Handa (PFM No. 22488) is hereby removed from the bank’s service with immediate effect. However, he will be entitled to receive the terminal 14

benefits for the period of service he has rendered. Removal from service will not be a disqualification for his future employment.

19. We have already seen that respondent had raised

an industrial dispute which culminated in an award dated

13.02.2004. As per this award, Labour Court had invoked

the provisions of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act

and substituted the penalty of removal from service with

terminal benefits by the penalty of stoppage of four

increments for one year with further direction for

reinstatement in service with 75 percent back wages. This

award of the Labour Court failed to stand judicial scrutiny

as learned Single Judge of the High Court set aside the same

which decision was affirmed by the Division Bench in letters

patent appeal. This sequence of events demonstrates that

the modified penalty as imposed by the appellate authority

attained finality as this appellate order was not questioned

by the appellant.

20. Learned senior counsel for the appellant in the

course of her submissions placed reliance on Regulation 22 15

of the Regulations, 1995. Regulation 22(1) of the aforesaid

regulations reads thus:

22. Forfeiture of service.-(1) Resignation or dismissal or removal or termination of an employee from the service of the Bank shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits.

20.1. According to her, in view of Regulation 22, the

respondent would not be entitled to pension.

21. Interplay of Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite

Settlement and Regulation 22 of the Regulations, 1995 was

examined by this Court in S.K. Kool (supra) and after due

consideration answered the same in the following manner:

13. …….From a plain reading of the aforesaid Regulation, it is evident that removal of an employee shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently such an employee shall not qualify for pensionary benefits. If we accept this submission, no employee removed from service in any event would be entitled for pensionary benefits. But the fact of the matter is that the Bipartite Settlement provides for removal from service with pensionary benefits "as would be due otherwise under the rules or regulations prevailing at the relevant time". The consequence of this construction would be that the words quoted 16

above shall become a dead letter. Such a construction has to be avoided.

14. The Regulations do not entitle every employee to pensionary benefits. Its application and eligibility is provided under Chapter II of the Regulations whereas Chapter IV deals with qualifying service. An employee who has rendered a minimum of ten years of service and fulfils other conditions only can qualify for pension in terms of Regulation 14 of the Regulations.

Therefore, the expression "as would be due otherwise"

would mean only such employees who are eligible and have put in minimum number of years of service to qualify for pension. However, such of the employees who are not eligible and have not put in required number of years of qualifying service shall not be entitled to the superannuation benefits though removed from service in terms of Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement. Clause 6(b) came to be inserted as one of the punishments on account of the Bipartite Settlement. It provides for payment of superannuation benefits as would be due otherwise.

15. The Bipartite Settlement tends to provide a punishment which gives superannuation benefits otherwise due. The construction canvassed by the employer shall give nothing to the employees in any event. Will it not be a fraud Bipartite Settlement? Obviously it would be. From the conspectus of what we have observed we have no doubt that such of the employees who are otherwise eligible for superannuation benefit are removed from service in 17

terms of Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement shall be entitled to superannuation benefits. This is the only construction which would harmonise the two provisions. It is well-settled rule of construction that in case of apparent conflict between the two provisions, they should be so interpreted that the effect is given to both. Hence, we are of the opinion that such of the employees who are otherwise entitled to superannuation benefits under the Regulations if visited with the penalty of removal from service with superannuation benefits shall be entitled for those benefits and such of the employees though visited with the same penalty but are not eligible for superannuation benefits under the Regulations shall not be entitled to that.

22. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division

Bench had followed the aforesaid decision of this Court.

Learned Single Judge noted that respondent had submitted

his option for pension on 05.10.2010. Learned Single Judge

also held that objection of the appellant to the claim of

pension by the respondent was without any basis in as

much as the appellate authority had specifically held that

respondent would be entitled to receive terminal benefits for

the period of service he had rendered. This order of the

appellate authority has attained finality. Therefore, it was 18

held that respondent was entitled to receive pension in view

of the order passed by the appellate authority. This view of

the learned Single Judge has been endorsed by the Division

Bench in the impugned judgment. The decision in S.K. Kool

(supra) is binding on us. Therefore, we do not find any

compelling reason to interfere with the concurrent findings

of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench while

exercising our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India.

23. Accordingly, the civil appeal is dismissed.

However, there shall be no order as to cost.

………………………………J. [ABHAY S. OKA]

.……………………………J. [UJJAL BHUYAN]

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 03, 2025.