Trishala Jain & Anr vs State Of Uttaranchal & Anr

Smt. Krishna Devi and Others ....Appellants

Versus

State of Uttaranchal & Anr. ...Respondents

JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. By this common judgment, we propose to dispose of

the afore-noticed six Civil Appeals as they arise from

different judgments of the High Court of Uttaranchal

but are result of a common Notification issued under

Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short

the `Act') and thus are based upon similar facts and

documentary and oral evidence.

FACTS:

C. A. Nos.7496-7497 of 2005 and 7498-7499 of 2005

On 30th January, 1992, the Government of Uttar

2.

Pradesh (now the State of Uttaranchal) issued a

Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquiring

3

some land for a public purpose, namely the

construction of Government Polytechnic Institute in

the District of Dehradun. This Notification came to be

published in the Official Gazette on 22nd February,

1992. On 18th April 1992, declaration under Section

6(1) of the Act was issued which was published in the

Official Gazette on 12th May, 1992 identifying the land

admeasuring 12.85 acres for acquisition for the said

purpose in village Sewala Kalan, Pargana Kendriya

Doon, District Dehradun, out of which lands

admeasuring 4.58 acres and 3.031 acres belonged to

the first and the second claimant respectively. In

furtherance to this Notification, possession of the

acquired land was taken on 7th July, 1992. The Special

Land Acquisition Officer (in short the `SLAO')

pronounced his award on 8th June, 1993. While

determining compensation, the SLAO applied belting

system to the acquired land and assessed the market

value of the first belt admeasuring 0.56 acres at the

rate of ` 9,78,223.40 per acre, second belt

admeasuring 1.38 acres at the rate of ` 6,52,482.27

4

per acre and for the third belt admeasuring 10.91

acres at the rate of ` 4,39,362.70 per acre. However,

the claimants, being dissatisfied with the award of the

SLAO, filed applications under Section 18 of the Act

which in turn came to be referred to the Court of

competent jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the

`Reference Court').

The Reference Court, in LA Case No. 386 of 1993,

3.

considered the list of 140 sale instances attached with

the award of the SLAO. It noticed that the SLAO had

relied on sale instance at serial no. 43 related to land

admeasuring 0.094 acre for a total consideration of `

92,000 and assessed the market value of acquired

land at the rate of ` 9,78,723 per acre before applying

the belting system. This sale deed was executed on

10th June, 1991 and the land was from the revenue

estate of the same village but at some distance from

the acquired land. The Reference Court also noticed

the evidence of DW 1, Ram Singh, who had stated that

ITBP quarters are located to the north of the acquired

5

land; and to the east of ITBP Colony, is a 20 feet wide

passage which ends on the acquired land. A high

tension line of 1100 K.V. also runs near the acquired

land. This witness admitted that the land in question

was full of residential potentialities. Reliance was also

placed upon the statements of PW7 and PW8 in regard

to the urbanization of the surrounding areas and the

potential of the land in question for building

construction and residential purposes.

Out of those 140 sale instances, sale instance at

4.

serial Nos. 109 and 110 are stated to be the sale deeds

executed on 26th November, 1991 and 27th November,

1991, which were heavily relied upon by the Reference

Court. The Reference Court vide its judgment-cum-

award dated 12th May, 1995 held application of belting

system improper as entire land was acquired for one

purpose, i.e. construction of Government Polytechnic

Institute. It determined the market value of the land at

the rate of ` 6,40,000 per bigha and after applying 20%

deduction, enhanced compensation to flat rate of `

5,12,000 per bigha along with other statutory benefits.

6

The State, aggrieved by the enhancement of

5.

compensation awarded to the claimants by the

Reference Court, preferred appeals being First Appeal

Nos. 920-921 of 2001, before the concerned High

Court. The High Court vide its judgment dated 20th

July, 2005, primarily accepted the findings recorded

by the Reference Court on merits and merely raised

the deduction from 20% to 33.33% thus awarding the

compensation at the rate of ` 4,26,667 per bigha. The

High Court recorded a definite finding that the

Reference Court was fully justified in setting aside the

order of the SLAO applying belting system for

determination of compensation in relation to the

acquired land. It also did not consider it appropriate

to rely upon the sale instances placed on record by the

State and practically affirmed the findings of the

Reference Court including finding based upon sale

instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110 for determining

the market value of the acquired land. The High Court

modified the order of the Reference Court only by

raising the deduction on account of development

7

charges and fixing of the final amount of compensation

as afore-indicated.

6. Against the above judgment of the High Court, Civil

Appeal Nos.7498-7499 of 2005 have been preferred by

the State of Uttaranchal while Civil Appeal Nos. 7496-

7497 of 2005 have been preferred by the claimants.

C.A. No. 1122 OF 2011

Civil Appeal No. 1122 of 2011 has been preferred by

7.

the State of Uttaranchal against the judgment of the

Uttaranchal High Court dated 9th March, 2006 passed

in First Appeal Nos. 918 and 919 of 2001. Vide that

order the Court had primarily relied upon another

judgment of the Division Bench of that Court passed

in First Appeal Nos. 920-921 of 2001 (in the case of

State of U.P. through Collector, Dehradun v. Smt.

Trishla Jain) and awarded compensation at the rate of

` 4,26,667 per bigha reducing the compensation of `

5,12,000 per bigha as awarded by the Reference

Court. The High Court in this case had echoed in

entirety the reasoning and compensation awarded by

8

the other Bench in the case of Trishala Jain (supra).

This judgment of the High Court, impugned in Civil

Appeal No. 1122 of 2011, therefore has to be treated at

parity for all intents and purposes with the impugned

judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 7496-7497 of 2005 and

Civil Appeal Nos. 7498-7499 of 2005.

C.A. No. 3613 of 2008

8. Civil Appeal No. 3613 of 2008 is directed against the

judgment of the Uttaranchal High Court dated 11th May,

2006 passed in First Appeal Nos. 60-63 of 2001. It is

necessary for us to notice the facts giving rise to this appeal

separately because there are certain distinguishing features

with regard to factual matrix as well as evidence of this

case. The land in question in this case also forms part of

the land admeasuring 12.85 acres sought to be acquired by

the Notification dated 30th January, 1992 issued under

Section 4(1) of the Act and is covered by the common award

passed by the SLAO on 8th June, 1993 awarding the

compensation at the same rate as in other cases.

The claimants herein made a separate reference

9

under Section 18 of the Act and the Reference Court, in LA

Case No. 121 of 1994, awarded compensation at the rate of

` 12,50,000 per acre (i.e. ` 2,38,095.24 per bigha

approximately) in addition to granting other statutory

benefits and interests. It needs to be noticed that the two

sale instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110, which were the

foundation of the judgment pronounced by the Reference

Court in other cases, i.e. sale deeds dated 26th November,

1991, and 27th November,1991, had been rejected on the

ground that they were not admissible in evidence as neither

the vendor nor the vendee had been produced to prove the

sale instances in Court. The Reference Court also noticed

the contention raised on behalf of the State, i.e. these sale

instances were collusive. It will be useful to refer to the

relevant part of the judgment of the Reference Court which

reads as under:

"The respondent No.2 have (sic)

taken a special stand in his written

statement that the sale deed executed by

Sri Viresh Jain was forged and fictitious

and collusive and no reliance can be

placed on such a sale deed. He has

further argued that the judgment passed

in L.A. Case No. 386 of 1993 Smt. Trishla

Jain vs. Collector and another in such

10

circumstances cannot be made the basis

for awarding compensation in the present

case. The rtno. 2 has filed voluminous

documents in support of their case that

the sale deed executed by Sri Viresh Jain

were collusive and were made only to

create evidence of hither compensation.

He has further filed various documents,

which supports the contention of the

respondent no. 2 that Sri Dinesh Jain

and Sri Viresh Jain themselves offered

their 100 bigha of land in village

phoolsani for the purpose of Government

polytechnic. He has also filed documents

and the copy of the Selection Committee

in which Sri Manoj Kumar Jain,

Upkhand Adhikari, U.S.E.B. was a

member, Sri Manoj Kumar Jain was

examined as a witness. He was admitted

that he is the brother in law of Sri Dinesh

Jain and Sri Viresh Jain. He has also

admitted that he was member of the

selection committee which was to select

the land for Government polytechnic.

Various other documents were also filed

by the respondent no. 2 vide which the

signatures of Jinendra Kumar Jain and

Smt. Veena Kumar Jain were identified

by Sri Dinesh Jain. His sole

concentration was that the sale deed

executed by Sri Viresh Jain was collusive

and since Sri Manoj Kumar Jain was one

of the member of the selection committee

appointed for the acquisition of land for

Government Polytechnic, the information

was leaked to Sri Viresh Jain and,

therefore, they manipulated these two

sale deeds by transferring the land to

their near relations say the sister and the

son of his BUA without passing valid

consideration. The learned counsel for

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the respondent no. 2 has placed reliance

on the law laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in AIR 1951 page (sic) 16

Yashvant Deoro vs. Jai Chand Ram

Chand. It is correct that the fraudulent

motive or design is not capable of direct

proof in most of the cases. Such

intention could only be inferred. It is

worthy to point out that the two sale

deeds relied upon by the claimants

executed by Sri Viresh Jain in favour of

Sri Jinendra Kumar Jain and Smt. Veena

Kumar Jain have not been proved in

accordance with law as laid down by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in as much as

vendee or vendor of these sale deeds or

any attesting witnesses have not been

produced in evidence. Therefore, they

cannot be made the basis of awarding of

compensation in the present case. The

judgment in L.A. Case No. 386 of 1993

Smt. Trishala Jain v. Collector and

another is under appeal and the entire

matter with regard to the alleged collusive

sale deed is yet to be thrashed out.

Therefore, it is not fair and justified for

this court to comment upon these sale

deeds. For the purpose of decision of this

case it is only sufficient, if these two sale

deeds are discarded and if they are not

considered and not made the basis for

awarding compensation in these cases.

Therefore, it is held that these two sale

deeds cannot be made basis for awarding

any compensation, in the present case

and the argument of the claimants fails

in this respect."

Having held thus, the Reference Court relied upon

12

the sale instance at serial No. 108, out of 140 sale

instances, of the list produced and proved by the SLAO. As

per the sale instance at serial No. 108, a land admeasuring

0.90 acre was sold at the rate of `12,55,550.50 per acre on

29th November, 1991. Examining this document with other

evidence on record, particularly statement of DW2, the

Reference Court finally awarded compensation at the rate of

`12,50,000 per acre without applying any deduction.

The claimants, aggrieved by the above judgment of

the Reference Court dated 6th February, 2001, preferred an

appeal before the Uttaranchal High Court. The High Court,

vide its judgment dated 11th May, 2006, while referring to

the different judgments of this Court as well as of different

High Courts, opined that the Reference Court had fallen in

error of law in not applying, to a certain extent, deduction

from the market value determined by that court in

accordance with law. The High Court did not interfere with

the determination of the market value of the acquired land

but applied a deduction of 33.33% on such value and finally

awarded compensation to the claimants at the rate of

13

`8,33,334 per acre with other statutory benefits and

interests thereupon. Dissatisfied with this judgment of the

High Court reducing the compensation awarded by the

Reference Court, the claimants-Krishna Devi and others

have filed the present appeal before this Court.

Questions of Fact and Law that fall for Determination:

9. On examination of the present appeals, the

following common questions arise for consideration of this

Court:

I. Whether or not the belting system ought to have been

applied for determination of fair market value of the

acquired land?

II. What should be the just and fair market value of the

acquired land on the date of issuance of notification

under Section 4 of the Act?

III. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present

case there ought to be any deduction after determining

the fair market value of the land?

IV. What compensation and benefits are the claimants

entitled to?

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Question No. 1.

10. As already noticed, the SLAO, in all cases, while

giving its award had applied the belting system and

categorizing the land into three different categories had

awarded the compensation accordingly. However, the

Reference Court had held that the land as a whole was

similarly placed and was surrounded by developed areas

and it was to be used for one purpose, i.e. construction of

Government Polytechnic Institute, thus there was no

question of applying the belting system. Keeping in view

the documentary and oral evidence on record, the Reference

Court set aside the belting system and awarded uniform

compensation to all the claimants. This finding of the

Reference Court was upheld by the High Court in the

impugned judgments. The correctness of this concurrent

view has also not been questioned by any of the parties in

the present appeals before us. Therefore, concurrent

finding recorded by the Courts below which remained

unchallenged before this Court need not be disturbed by

this Court.

15

Question No. II

11. Now, we have to examine the most important

question arising in the present appeal as to how this Court

should determine the fair market value of the acquired land

in the given facts and circumstances. First of all, we need to

refer to the evidence that was produced by the parties in

support of their respective claims. The principal evidence

relied upon by the claimants in all these cases are the two

sale instances shown at serial Nos. 109 and 110. These

were executed by Shri Viresh Jain, in favour of Jitendra

Kumar and Smt. Veena Kumari, on 26th November, 1991

and 27th November, 1991 respectively. These lands are

situated in Khasra No. 39/2, a part of which was acquired

under the same Notification. Under these sale deeds areas

of 440.8 sq. yards and 283.3 sq. yards were sold at the rate

of ` 32,72,603.49 and ` 34,87,648.30 per acre respectively.

The claimants in different cases examined themselves to

prove these sale instances as a whole, as they are the main

witnesses and the sale instances were also executed

between themselves. It needs to be noticed that one of the

16

purchasers and the seller are the claimants in the present

appeals and the other purchaser is their close relative.

According to the claimants, they were entitled to

compensation on the basis of these two sale instances. The

claimants have also brought on record documents, viz.,

Exh.11 and Exh.12, which are the agreements signed

between Trishala Jain and one Vikram Singh Bangari,

executed on 23rd April, 1991 for the purpose of leveling of

the land in question. Shri Bangari was examined as PW 6

who submitted that he had completed the leveling work on

or before 3rd February, 1992. Further, the testimony of

PW7, according to the claimants, clearly shows that there

was urbanization all over the periphery of municipal limits

and building activities were increased even beyond the

municipal limits. Claimants have also relied upon other

evidence including the cross examination of DW 1, Ram

Singh, who admitted that these sale deeds were unlikely to

have been executed at higher rate for enhancing the rate of

compensation of the acquired land. As we have already

noticed, this witness also gave the statement that towards

the North of the acquired land, there were several quarters

17

of ITBP and there was 20 feet wide passage which ended on

the acquired land. He further stated that some shops are

located in the South of the acquired land across the road

and facilities of schools and post office are also available

near the acquired land. On the backdrop of this entire

evidence, the claimants contended that the deduction

applied by the High Court is not justified and their claim for

compensation in line with the two sale instances proved by

them on record is to be upheld. According to them, the sale

instances produced by the SLAO were far away from the

acquired land and were not relevant or comparable

instances.

12. On the other hand, the SLAO, in his award, had

considered details of 140 sale instances executed over a

period from the Revenue Estate of the same Village. Most of

these sale instances were found to be not relevant by the

Reference Court. The SLAO had relied upon the sale deed at

Serial No.43 in which the land admeasuring 0.094 acres

had been sold by a registered sale deed on 10th June, 1991

for a sum of `92,000 giving the value of the land at the rate

of `9,78,732.40 per acre, and determined the market value

18

of the land acquired at that rate. When the matter came up

before the Reference Court for consideration, in all other

references except Reference No. 121 of 1994 titled as

Chamel Singh v. Collector, Dehradun, the Reference Court

had relied upon the two sale instances produced by the

claimants and awarded compensation at the rate of `

5,12,000 per bigha which was later reduced by the High

Court to ` 4,26,667 per bigha. In the case of Chamel Singh

(supra), the Reference Court rejected these two sale

instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110 as vendor or vendee

had not been examined. It also noticed the allegation of the

State that those sale deeds were not bona fide and have

been executed only with the intention to enhance the value

of the acquired land and as such declined to rely on them in

its judgment. The Reference Court in that case also

rejected the reliance placed by SLAO upon sale deed at

serial No. 43 for determining the market value of acquired

land and instead relied upon the sale instance at serial No.

108 where the land admeasuring about 0.90 acres was sold

on 29th November, 1991 at the rate of ` 12,55,550.50 per

acre. After discussing the evidence at some detail, the

19

Reference Court awarded the compensation to the

claimants at the rate of `12,50,000 per acre without making

any deduction from such market value. In appeal the High

Court, however, applied a deduction of 33.33% and

awarded compensation to the claimants at the rate of `

8,33,334 per acre. From the above factual matrix the first

question that requires consideration of this Court is

whether the Reference Court was justified in law with

reference to the facts on record in declining to consider the

two sale instances produced by the claimants at serial Nos.

109 and 110. In other words, was it justified on part of the

Reference Court to keep them outside the zone of

consideration while determining the market value of the

acquired land?

13. Firstly, it cannot be disputed that both the seller

and the purchaser in sale instances at serial Nos. 109 and

110 are either claimants in different claim petitions or

belong to the same family. The sale deed is stated to be

executed by Sh. Viresh Jain in favour of Jitender Kumar

Jain and Smt. Veena Kumari Jain (sister of Sh. Viresh

Jain).

20

Veena Kumari Jain has described herself as wife of

M. Kumar who appears to be Sh. Manoj Kumar Jain, who

was examined as a witness as he was a Member of the

Selection Committee dealing with the acquisition of the land

for the purpose of construction of Government Polytechnic

Institute. In his examination he admitted that he was

brother-in-law of Sh. Viresh Jain. As a member of that

Committee he had a definite role to play in selection of the

land for that purpose. In other words, the claimants had

full knowledge of acquisition of land and as well as the

purpose for which the said land was sought to be acquired.

With respect we reiterate the view expressed by this Court

in the case of Yeshwant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand

Ramchand Kothari [(1950) 1 SCR 852] that a fraudulent

move or design is not capable of direct proof in most cases;

it can only be inferred. Under such circumstances, the

Court has to take a general view keeping in mind the facts

and circumstances of the case with particular reference to

the intent of parties, their action in furtherance thereto and

the object sought to be achieved by them.

14. It is not in dispute that these sale deeds have been

21

executed in favour of the family members or persons known

to the claimants. These are circumstances and evidence

which clearly indicate that the sale instances relied upon by

the claimants are result of collusion between these parties.

There was clear attempt on the part of the claimants to

execute sale deeds for the purpose of hiking up land price

just before acquisition to get more compensation. These

two sale instances which have been executed just about two

months prior to the issuance of the notification under

Section 4(1) stand out as transactions which are sham,

collusive, lack bona fide and have been executed with the

intention to raise the price of the land in question with the

pretence of it being actual market value. We are unable to

find any infirmity in this view of the Reference Court in LA

Case No. 121 of 1994 which has rightly been upheld by the

High Court.

15. It will be appropriate at this stage to notice that in

C.A. Nos. 7498-99 of 2005 a specific ground has been taken

by the State that the High Court erred in not considering

the application of State filed under Order XLI Rule 27 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 during pendency of First

22

Appeal Nos. 920 and 921 of 2000 to lead additional

evidence to show that the sale deeds relied upon by the

Reference Court in LA Case No. 386 of 1993 and accepted

by the High Court were collusive and the claimants had

prior knowledge of the impending acquisition proceedings.

This additional evidence is basically related to the facts

which have already been mentioned by us while discussing

the facts of C.A No. 3613 of 2008. In that application, it

was specifically stated that Smt. Veena Kumari is sister of

one of the claimants, i.e. Viresh Jain and she is wife of

Manoj Kumar Jain, who was member of the Selection

Committee aforereferred and these facts had duly been

verified from the local police station vide letter dated 11th

September, 1996. However, this application appears to

have been rejected by the High Court without recording any

appropriate reasons in support thereof. In view of the

peculiar fact that the Reference Court, in its award in L.A.

Case No. 121 of 1994 which is subject matter before us in

C.A. No. 3613 of 2008, has noticed this entire evidence in

great detail, it can hardly be contended that the application

has rightly been rejected by the High Court. In our opinion,

23

the High Court should have allowed this application

particularly when the entire evidence sought to be produced

by way of additional evidence challenged the very basis of

the judgment of the High Court. In view of these peculiar

facts we need not discuss this issue at any greater length

and according to us the facts stated in that application can

be examined by this Court as they are already part of the

judicial record in C.A. No. 3613 of 2008, which has been

listed for hearing along with other appeals and all these

appeals have been heard together.

16. Corollary to the discussion under this head is the

question that whether the Reference Court, in LA Case No.

121 of 1994, was right in law in rejecting the two sale

instances for the reason that vendor or vendee had not been

examined to prove them in Court and thus these sale

instances were inadmissible in evidence. While recording

such a finding the Reference Court had relied upon the

judgment of this Court in the case of A.P. State Road

Transport Corporation, Hyderabad v. P. Venkaiah, [(1997) 10

SCC 128]. This issue need not detain us any further as it is

no longer res integra that the judgment of this Court in the

24

above case has been overruled by a Constitution Bench of

this Court in the case of Cement Corporation of India v.

Purya, [(2004) 8 SCC 270]. Thus, in our view, these two

sale instances cannot be rejected on that ground after the

dictum of the Constitution Bench in the above case.

Though, this observation is subject to the other findings

recorded by us in this judgment.

17. A Bench of this Court in the case of Chimanlal

Hargovinddas (supra) stated that the Court while tackling

the problem of valuation of the land under acquisition

should necessarily make some general observations.

Explaining the factors, which must be etched on the mental

screen while performing such exercise, this Court

specifically held, "only genuine instances have to be taken

into consideration (sometimes instances are rigged up in

anticipation of acquisition of land)". Further, this Court in

the case of State of Haryana v. Ram Singh [(2001) 6 SCC

254], has reiterated this principle and held, "It is open to

the Court to accept the certified copy as the reliable

evidence and without examining parties to the documents.

This does not however, preclude the Court from rejecting

25

the transaction itself as being malafide or sham provided

such a challenge is already before the Court".

Question No. III

18. The law with regard to applying the principle of

deduction to the determined market value of the acquired

land is quite consistent, though, of course, the extent of

deduction has varied very widely depending on the facts

and circumstances of a given case. In other words, it is not

possible to state precisely the exact deduction which could

be made uniformly applicable to all the cases. Normally

the rule stated by this Court consistently, in its different

judgments, is that deduction is to be applied on account of

carrying out development activities like providing roads or

civic amenities such as electricity, water etc. when the land

has been acquired for construction of residential,

commercial or institutional projects. It shall also be

applied where the sale instances (exemplars) relate to

smaller pieces of land and in comparison the acquisition

relates to a large tract of land. In addition thereto,

deduction can also be applied on account of wastage of

land. This Court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer,

26

Kammarapally Village v. Nookala Rajamallu [(2003) 12 SCC

334], had also observed that it is advisable to apply some

deduction on account of exemplars of plots of smaller size

relied upon by way of evidence by the parties. This is the

normal rule stated by the Court but is not free of

exceptions.

19. Similarly, it is neither possible nor appropriate to

stricto sensu define a class of cases where the Court would

not apply any deduction. This again would be dependant

upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. The

cases where the acquired land itself is fully developed and

has all essential amenities, before acquisition, for the

purpose for which it is acquired requiring no additional

expenditure for its development, falls under the purview of

cases of `no deduction'. Furthermore, where the evidence

led by the parties is of such instances where the

compensation paid is comparable, i.e. exemplar lands have

all the features comparable to the proposed acquired land,

including that of size, is another category of cases where

principle of `no deduction' may be applied. These may be

the cases where least or no deduction could be made.

27

Such cases are exceptional and/or rare as normally the

lands which are proposed to be acquired for development

purposes would be agricultural lands and/or semi or

haphazardly developed lands at the time of issuance of

notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, which is the

relevant time to be taken into consideration for all

purposes and intents for determining the market value of

the land in question.

20. This Court in the case of Bhagwathula Samanna &

Ors v. Special Tahsildar & Land Acquisition Officer, [(1991)

4 SCC 506], stated that it is permissible to take into

account of exemplars of even small developed plots for

determining value of a large tract of land acquired, if the

latter is also fully developed with all facilities requiring little

or no further development. In the facts and circumstances

of that case the Court felt that it was not appropriate to

resort to deduction of 1/3rd value of the comparable sale

instances as development charges. The Court reiterated

the general rule that if market value of a large property is

to be fixed on the basis of a sale transaction for smaller

property, a deduction is to be made taking into

28

consideration the expenses required for development of

that larger tract and make smaller plots within that area

and held as under :

"8. In awarding compensation in

acquisition proceedings, the Court has

necessarily to determine the market value

of the land as on the date of the relevant

Notification. It is useful to consider the

value paid for similar land at the material

time under genuine transactions. The

market value envisages the price which a

willing purchaser may pay under bona

fide transfer to a willing seller. The land

value can differ depending upon the

extent and nature of the land sold. A fully

developed small plot in an important

locality may fetch a higher value than a

larger area in an undeveloped condition

and situated in a remote locality. By

comparing the price shown in the

transactions all variables have to be

taken into consideration. The transaction

in regard to smaller property cannot,

therefore, be taken as a real basis for

fixing the compensation for larger tracts

of property. In fixing the market value of

a large property on the basis of a sale

transaction for smaller property,

generally a deduction is given taking into

consideration the expenses required for

development of the larger tract to make

smaller plots within that area in order to

compare with the small plots dealt with

under the sale transaction. This principle

has been stated by this Court in Tribeni

Devi's case (supra).

11. The principle of deduction in the land

29

value covered by the comparable sale is

thus adopted in order to arrive at the

market value of the acquired land. In

applying the principle it is necessary to

consider all relevant facts. It is not the

extent of the area covered under the

acquisition, the only relevant factor. Even

in the vast area there may be land which

is fully developed having all amenities

and situated in an advantageous

position. If smaller area within the large

tract is already developed and suitable for

building purposes and have in its vicinity

roads, drainage, electricity,

communications etc. then the principle of

deduction simply for the reason that it is

part of the large tract acquired, may not

be justified.

13. The proposition that large area of

land cannot possibly fetch a price at the

same rate at which small plots are sold is

not absolute proposition and in given

circumstances it would be permissible to

take into account the price fetched by the

small plots of land. If the larger tract of

land because of advantageous position is

capable of being used for the purpose for

which the smaller plots are used and is

also situated in a developed area with

little or no requirement of further

development, the principle of deduction of

the value for purpose of comparison is

not warranted."

It is thus evident from the above enunciated principle

that the acquired land has to be more or less developed

land as its developed surrounding areas, with all amenities

30

and facilities and is fit to be used for the purpose for which

it is acquired without any further expenditure, before such

land could be considered for no deduction. Similarly the

sale instances even of smaller plots could be considered for

determining the market value of a larger chunk of land with

some deduction unless, there was comparability in

potential, utilisation, amenities and infrastructure with

hardly any distinction. On such principles each case would

have to be considered on its own merits.

21. This Court, depending on the facts and

circumstances of each given case, has taken the view that

deduction on account of expenses of development of the

sites could vary from 10% to 86.33% depending on the

nature of the land, its situation, the purpose and stage of

development. Reference can be made to the cases of K.S.

Shivadevamma v. Assistant Commissioner and Land

Acqusition Officer [(1996) 2 SCC 62], Ram Piari v. Land

Acquisition Collector, Solan [(1996) 8 SCC 338], Chimanlal

Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona

[(1988) 3 SCC 751], Hasanali Walimchand (Dead) by L` v.

31

State of Maharashtra [(1998) 2 SCC 388].

In K.S. Shivadevamma (supra), this Court held as

under:

"10. It is then contended that 53% is not

automatic but depends upon the nature

of the development and the stage of

development. We are inclined to agree

with the learned counsel that the extent

of deduction depends upon development

need in each case. Under the Building

Rules 53% of land is required to be left

out. This Court has laid as a general rule

that for laying the roads and other

amenities 33-1/3% is required to be

deducted. Where the development has

already taken place, appropriate

deduction needs to be made. In this case,

we do not find any development had

taken place as on that date. When we are

determining compensation under Section

23(1), as on the date of notification under

Section 4(1), we have to consider the

situation of the land development, if

already made, and other relevant facts as

on that date. No doubt, the land

possessed potential value, but no

development had taken place as on the

date, In view of the obligation on the part

of the owner to hand over the land to the

City Improvement Trust for roads and for

other amenities and his requirement to

expend money for laying the roads, water

supply mains, electricity etc., the

deduction of 53% and further deduction

towards development charges @ 33-

1/3%, ordered by the High Court, was

32

not illegal."

Thus, a deduction of 53% was given on account of

Building Rules and a further deduction of 33.33% on

account of development charges on the fact of that case,

amounting to a total of 86.33% deduction. The above view

was reiterated in the case of Nookala Rajamallu (supra).

22. On similar lines, this Court in the case of V.

Hanumantha Reddy (Deceased) by L` v. Land Acquisition

Officer & Mandal R. Officer [(2003) 12 SCC 642], while

considering that the acquired land was adjacent to

developed land, held that neither its high potentiality nor its

proximity to a developed land can be a ground for not

deducting the development charges and that normally 1/3rd

deduction could be allowed.

23. Though in the case of Bhagwathula Samanna

(supra) referring to the peculiar facts of the case, this Court

observed that it was not necessary to make any deduction,

the consistent view taken by this Court is that normally

deduction has to be made. In the cases above mentioned

33

this Court has directed to make deduction ranging from

20% to 86.33%.

24. The learned Counsel for the claimants relied upon

the judgment of this Court in the case of Atma Singh v.

State of Haryana [(2008) 2 SCC 568], to contend that even if

exemplars of small plots are tendered in evidence, the

deduction cannot be more than 10%. He contended that

the Reference Court as well as the High Court both have

fallen in error of law in applying the deduction of 20% and

33.33% respectively. In this judgment, this Court clearly

observed that the price fetched for small plots cannot form

safe basis for valuation of large tracts of land as substantial

area is used for development of sites by providing various

facilities for which expenses are also incurred; such

amount, which normally would vary from 20% onwards

depending upon the facts of each case, should be deducted.

However, in that case the land had been acquired for setting

up a sugar factory which, for its efficient running, may also

require part of the land to be used for construction of

residential colonies for the staff working in the factory. The

sugar factory that was sought to be constructed on the

34

acquired land was to carry on its business to make profits.

The Court noticed that earlier the by-products of a sugar

factory like molasses were treated as waste and its disposal

itself was a problem. However, with the passage of time and

scientific developments, such by- products are being used

for production of Alcohol and Ethanol which added to the

profits. It was in these circumstances that Court was of the

view that it was not a case for higher deduction and

discounted only 10% from the determined market value of

the acquired land. Thus the claimants cannot derive any

advantage to contend that there should not be any

deduction in this case. Reliance by them was also placed

upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Charan Dass

v. Himachal Pradesh Housing & Urban Development

Authority [(2010) 13 SCC 398]. In that case the Court was

concerned with the question that whether deduction of

40% from the market value determined by the High Court

towards development charges was justified or not. This

Court held that where the acquired land falls in the amidst

of an already developed land with amenities of roads,

electricity etc., deduction on this account may not be

35

warranted. At the same time it also held that where all civic

and other amenities are yet to be provided to make the land

suitable for building purposes or when under the local

building regulations setting apart some portion of the lands

for sanctioning common facilities is mandatory, an

appropriate deduction may be justified. Referring to the

facts of that case, this Court permitted deduction of 30% as

development charges from the market value of the land.

25. In the present case, there is evidence on record to

show that plotting has been done only on part of the

acquired land and the land is surrounded by colonies like

ITBP etc. but, there is no evidence to show that the

acquired land itself is developed and is having all the

required facilities and amenities. It may be a case where

less deduction may be applied but certainly it is not a case

of `no deduction'. It also cannot be believed, in the absence

of specific documentary evidence, that no further

development is required on the acquired land. The

claimants, on whom the onus lies to prove inadequacy of

compensation have not even stated that whether under the

relevant laws they are expected to leave any part of their

36

land open when they are permitted to raise construction on

the land in question. Under these circumstances, we are

unable to find any infirmity in the approach of the High

Court in applying the principle of deduction. In our opinion

a deduction of 10% from the market value on account of

development charges and other possible expenditures would

be justifiable and called for in the facts and circumstances

of the present case.

Question No. IV:

Determination of Compensation

Application of principle of guesstimate for determining

the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land

acquired under the Act

26. Acquisition of land is an act falling in the purview of

eminent domain of the State. It essentially relates to the

concept of compulsory acquisition as opposed to voluntary

sale. It is trite that no person can be deprived of his

property save by authority of law in terms of Article 300A of

the Constitution of India. The provisions of the Act provide

a complete mechanism for `deprivation of property in

accordance with the law' as stated under the Act.

37

Justifiability and fairness of such compensation is subject

to judicial review within the confines of the four corners of

the Act. Once the lands are acquired under the Act, the

persons interested therein are entitled to compensation as

per the provisions of the Act. Thus, in the present case the

land in question has been acquired under the provisions of

a law which specifically provide that acquisition can only be

for a public purpose and upon payment of compensation to

the claimants in accordance with law. The compensation

payable to the claimants has to be computed in terms of

Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. The market value of the land

has to be determined at the date of the publication of the

notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, after taking into

consideration what is stated under Sections 23(1), 23(1A),

23(2) and excluding the considerations stated under Section

24 of the Act. More often than not, it is not possible to fix

the compensation with exactitude or arithmetic accuracy.

Depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, the

Court may have to take recourse to some guesswork while

determining the fair market value of the land and the

consequential amount of compensation that is required to

38

be paid to the persons interested in the acquired land.

27. `Guess' as understood in its common parlance is an

estimate without any specific information while

`calculations' are always made with reference to specific

data. `Guesstimate' is an estimate based on a mixture of

guesswork and calculations and it is a process in itself. At

the same time `guess' cannot be treated synonymous to

`conjecture'. `Guess' by itself may be a statement or result

based on unknown factors while `conjecture' is made with a

very slight amount of knowledge, which is just sufficient to

incline the scale of probability. `Guesstimate' is with higher

certainty than mere `guess' or a `conjecture' per se.

28. The concept of `guesswork' is not unknown to

various fields of law. It has been applied in cases relating to

insurance, taxation, compensation under the Motor

Vehicles Act as well as under the Labour Laws. All that is

required from a Court is that such guesswork has to be

used with greater element of caution and within the

determinants of law declared by the Legislature or by the

Courts from time to time. In the case of Charan Dass

(supra) this Court on the use of guesswork for determining

39

compensation, has held as under:-

"10. Section 15 of the Act mandates

that in determining the amount of

compensation, the Collector shall be

guided by the provisions contained in

Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. Section 23

provides that in determining the

amount of compensation to be

awarded for the land acquired under

the Act, the Court shall, inter alia, take

into consideration the market value of

the land at the date of the publication

of the Notification under Section 4 of

the Act. The Section contains the list of

positive factors and Section 24 has a

list of negatives, vis-a-vis the land

under acquisition, to be taken into

consideration while determining the

amount of compensation. As already

noted, the first step being the

determination of the market value of

the land on the date of publication of

Notification under Sub-section (1) of

Section 4 of the Act. One of the

principles for determination of the

market value of the acquired land

would be the price that a willing

purchaser would be willing to pay if it

is sold in the open market at the time

of issue of Notification under Section 4

of the Act. But finding direct evidence

in this behalf is not an easy task and,

therefore, the Court has to take

recourse to other known methods for

arriving at the market value of the land

acquired. One of the preferred and well

accepted methods adopted for

ascertaining the market value of the

land in acquisition cases is the sale

40

transactions on or about the date of

issue of Notification under Section 4 of

the Act. But here again finding a

transaction of sale on or a few days

before the said Notification is not an

easy exercise. In the absence of such

evidence contemporaneous

transactions in respect of the lands,

which have similar advantages and

disadvantages is considered as a good

piece of evidence for determining the

market value of the acquired land. It

needs little emphasis that the

contemporaneous transactions or the

comparable sales have to be in respect

of lands which are contiguous to the

acquired land and are similar in

nature and potentiality. Again, in the

absence of sale deeds, the judgments

and awards passed in respect of

acquisition of lands, made in the same

village and/or neighbouring villages

can be accepted as valid piece of

evidence and provide a sound basis to

work out the market value of the land

after suitable adjustments with regard

to positive and negative factors

enumerated in Sections 23 and 24 of the

Act. Undoubtedly, an element of

some guess work is involved in the

entire exercise, yet the authority

charged with the duty to award

compensation is bound to make an

estimate judged by an objective

standard.

(emphasis supplied)

41

29. Even in the case of Thakur Kamta Prasad Singh

(Dead) through LRs v. State of Bihar [(1976) 3 SCC 772], this

Court had held that there is an element of guesswork

inherent in most cases involving determination of the

market value of the acquired land and observed as under:

"6. Section 23 of the Act provides that in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquisition under the Act the court shall inter alia take into consideration the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. Market value means the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller for the property having due regard to its existing condition with all its existing advantages and its potential possibilities when laid out in the most advantageous manner excluding any advantages due to the carrying out of the scheme for which the property is compulsorily acquired. In considering market value the disinclination of the vendor to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy should be disregarded. There is an element of guesswork inherent in most cases involving determination of the market value of the acquired land, but this in the very nature of things cannot be helped. The essential thing is to keep in view the relevant factors prescribed by the Act. If the judgment of the High Court reveals that it has taken into consideration the relevant factors, its assessment of the fair market value of the acquired land should not be disturbed. No such infirmity has been brought to our notice as might induce us

42

to disturb the finding of the High Court. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs."

30. Similar view was taken by another Bench of this

Court in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer v.

Karigowda [(2010) 5 SCC 708] where this Court held, "the

Court is entitled to apply some amount of reasonable

guesswork to balance the equities and fix a just and fair

market value in terms of the parameters specified under

Section 23 of the Act."

31. The observations made by this Court in a case

under the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 1975 titled as

Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Rajasthan

Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. [2007 (12) SCR 703], can be

aptly referred to at this stage wherein this Court had held

that valuation is not an exact science and some amount of

guesswork exists in valuation. Different methods for

valuation are prescribed by Valuation Rules which may be

applied by the Department but it has to be ultimately

ascertained by applying the rule of convergence, the

estimated ad valorem value of which would constitute the

43

base of the assessable value.

32. Under the Act, as settled by various judgments of

this Court, there are different methods of computation of

compensation payable to the claimants, for example it can

be based upon comparable sale instances, awards and

judgments relating to the similar or comparable lands,

method of averages, yearly yields with reference to the

revenue earned by the land etc. Whatever method of

determining the compensation is applied by the court, its

result should always be reasonable, just and fair as that is

the purpose sought to be achieved under the scheme of the

Act. For attaining that purpose, application of some

guesswork may be necessary but this principle would have

hardly any application in a case of no evidence. In other

words, where the parties have not brought on record any

evidence, then the court will not be in a position to award

compensation merely on the basis of imagination,

conjecture etc.

33. These precedents clearly demonstrate that the

Court may apply some guesswork before it could arrive at a

final determination, which is in consonance with the

44

statutory law as well as the principles stated in the judicial

pronouncements. As already noticed, the guesswork has to

be used for determination of compensation with greater

element of caution and the principle of guesstimation will

have no application to the case of `no evidence'. This

principle is only intended to bridge the gap between the

calculated compensation and the actual compensation that

the claimants may be entitled to receive as per the facts of a

given case to meet the ends of justice. It will be appropriate

for us to state certain principles controlling the application

of `guesstimate:

(a) Wherever the evidence produced by the parties is not

sufficient to determine the compensation with

exactitude, this principle can be resorted to.

(b) Discretion of the court in applying guesswork to the

facts of a given case is not unfettered but has to be

reasonable and should have a connection to the data

on record produced by the parties by way of evidence.

Further, this entire exercise has to be within the

limitations specified under Sections 23 and 24 of the

Act and cannot be made in detriment thereto.

45

34. Applying these principles to the facts of the present

case, we have to take recourse to the `principle of

guesstimation' inasmuch as it is essential for fixation of fair

market value of the land which shall be the basis for

determining the compensation payable to the claimants.

Now, we will discuss the evidence led by the parties in that

behalf.

35. All the claimants in the present appeals have

primarily relied upon the sale instances shown at serial

Nos. 109 and 110. These sale instances were not relied

upon by the SLAO while making the award and were also

rejected by the Reference Court in LA Case No.121 of 1994.

This view of the Reference Court was upheld by the High

Court vide its judgment in First Appeal Nos. 60-63 of 2001

which is subject matter of the appeal before this Court in

C.A. No. 3613 of 2008. We have already noticed that as per

these sale instances the value of the land comes to a rate of

` 32,72,603 and ` 34,87,648 per acre respectively. While

accepting the concurrent view of the Reference Court and

the High Court subject matter of CA No. 3613 of 2008, we

46

have already held that these sale instances are liable to be

ignored and have rightly been ignored by the Courts below.

Besides the fact that these sale deeds are executed between

the members of the family, the claimants had full

knowledge of the Government's intention to acquire these

lands, for the purpose specified, even prior to issuance of

notification under Section 4(1) of the Act through Mr. M.K.

Jain. These are reasons enough to doubt the consideration

paid in these sale deeds.

36. The SLAO, in his Award, has taken note of 140 sale

instances immediately preceding the issuance of

Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The Reference

Court, in LA Case No. 121 of 1994, specifically recorded

that the highest value reflected in these 140 sale instances

is ` 12,55,550.50 per acre, except in sale instances at serial

Nos. 109 and 110 produced by the claimants. It is

interesting to note that the claimants did not produce any

other evidence except these two sale instances which had

been executed between the members of the family and

contained unreasonably high price of the land. There is

tremendous gap between the prices of the land fetched in all

47

other sale deeds on one hand, the highest being `

12,55,550.50 per acre and that in sale deeds executed by

the claimants between themselves on the other hand which

is ` 34,87,648 per acre, for sales effected within a span of 2-

3 days for similarly situated lands in the same village. It

certainly arouses suspicion in the mind of the Court as to

the intention behind execution of these sale deeds. Ex facie

they appear to have been executed to hike up the price of

the land just before the issuance of Notification under

Section 4(1) of the Act. If considered from the point of view

of a reasonable man, all these circumstances clearly fall

beyond the ambit of coincidence and appear to have been

`managed' to achieve the end of receiving higher

compensation. In light of these facts and the reasons

already recorded, we have no hesitation in holding that the

sale instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110 produced by the

claimants are liable to be ignored for the purposes of

fixation of market value of the acquired land as these

transactions are sham and lack bona fide.

37. The SLAO, in his award had relied upon sale

instance shown at serial No. 43 and had therefore

48

determined the market value of the land at the rate of `

9,78,723.40 per acre (i.e. ` 1,86,423.50 per bigha

approximately). The compensation awarded on the basis of

the above market value and by applying belting system was

not accepted by the Reference Court. The Reference Court

in LA Case No. 121 of 1994, instead relied upon sale deed at

serial No. 108 where the land was sold at the rate of `

12,55,550.50 per acre on 29th November, 1991, i.e. even

subsequent to the sale instances relied upon by the

claimants. The Reference Court had therefore awarded

compensation at the rate of ` 12,50,000 per acre which was

reduced by the High Court to `8 ,33,334 after applying a

deduction of 33.33%.

38. The Reference Court, in LA Case Nos. 386 of 1993,

had determined the market value of the land at a rate of `

6,40,000 per bigha (i.e. ` 33,60,000 per acre approximately)

and after applying a deduction of 20% awarded

compensation at the rate of ` 5,12,000 per bigha. This was

reduced further by the High Court by increasing the

deduction from 20% to 33.33% and therefore awarding a

49

sum of ` 4,26,667 per bigha (i.e. ` 22,40,001.80 per acre) as

compensation. The two exhibits produced by the claimants

were the sole basis for awarding compensation to the

claimants in this line of cases. These exhibits offend the

very essence of the parameters stated under Section 23 of

the Act as defined by this Court in the case of Ram Singh

(supra). Thus, the view taken by the Reference Court and

the High Court, which is subject matter of C.A. No. 3613 of

2008, rejecting these instances as collusive and sham is

liable to be sustained.

39. The judgment of the Reference Court and that of the

High Court in these cases, accepting the sale instances

under serial Nos. 109 and 110, cannot be sustained in law

and is liable to be set aside. However, as it appears from

the record the earlier judgments of the Division Benches of

the High Court in First Appeal Nos. 920-921 of 2001, dated

20th July, 2005, and in First Appeal Nos. 918-919 of 2001,

dated 09th March, 2006 were not brought to the notice of

the Division Bench of the High Court which pronounced the

judgments in First Appeal Nos. 60-63 of 2001, dated 11th

May, 2006.

50

40. Now, after we have rejected the sale instances at

serial Nos. 109 and 110, we have to consider what

compensation the claimants are entitled to receive in

accordance with other evidence on record. The sale instance

shown at serial No. 108 is certainly an exemplar which can

be taken into consideration. This is a sale deed executed on

29th November, 1991 where a land admeasuring 0.90 acres

has been sold at a rate of ` 12,55,550.50 per acre. As far

as the location and potential of this land is concerned, we

may refer straightaway to the award of the Reference Court,

in LA Case No. 121 of 1994, where it referred to the

statement of PW1, Sh. Gyan Swarup, stating that the land

which was subject matter of this sale deed is situated at a

distance of 1= furlong of the acquired land in the same

village. It is the case of the claimants in all these appeals

that the acquired land is surrounded by developed areas

like ITBP Colony on the North and there was a 20 feet wide

passage ending on the acquired land. Facilities of post

office, electricity, hospital, schools etc. were available in

those colonies which are very close to the acquired land.

The Reference Courts, in their respective awards, have also

51

noticed that heavy construction activity was going on

nearby Shimla Road and the value of this land is

continuously rising.

41. Another relevant piece of evidence with reference to

potential and location of the land is the statement of PW-4

Girdhari Lal Arora, noticed in the judgment of the Reference

Court in L.A. Case No. 386 if 1993, who is an Architect by

profession. He claims to have visited the site and made

plans to divide the land in question into plots after making

provision for civic amenities, children park etc. In these

circumstances, it is difficult to doubt that the land in

question has substantial potential and is located adjacent

to developed areas. He further stated, "In the year 1992 the

value of the land around, the acquired land was ` six to

6.50 lacs per bigha and thereafter there had been a slump

in the prices of the land". Statement of this witness has to

be given its due value as nothing controversial appears to

have come in evidence in his cross-examination. According

to this witness, there has been a decreasing trend in the

value of the land in that area. The declaration under

Section 6 was issued in April, 1992 itself at a time when the

52

prices had started falling.

42. The cumulative effect of the documentary and oral

evidence on record is that it is a case of acquisition of land

which is situated on a reasonably good location surrounded

by developed areas having civic amenities and facilities and

further development activity was going on in nearby areas.

It was also submitted by the claimants that plotting has

already been done on the acquired land and some plots of

land have been sold immediately prior to the issuance of the

Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. It is evident that

the land acquired had the potential of being developed for

residential or institutional purposes and as already noticed,

the same was acquired for construction of a Government

Polytechnic Institute. Therefore, it is a case where the

Court should apply minimal deduction which will meet the

ends of justice and would help in determining just and fair

compensation for the land in question. We are of the

considered view that 10% deduction from the market value

of the acquired land would meet the ends of justice.

43. It is not in dispute before us that sale instance at

serial No. 108 falls in the Revenue Estate of the same

53

Village and as recorded by the Reference Court, in LA Case

No. 121 of 1994, it is situated at a distance of 1= furlong

from the acquired land. The acquired land belonging to the

claimants forms part of Khasra No.39/2 while, in the same

Reveue Estate, the sale instance at serial No. 108 is part of

Khasra No. 410. Thus a sale deed related to a land in such

proximity of time and distance cannot be said to be

incomparable sale instance, i.e. it has to be taken as a

comparable sale instance. Though it relates to the sale of a

smaller plot of land but is certainly bigger than the land

sold by the claimants between themselves. Its location and

potential, if not identical in absolute terms, is certainly

comparable for the purposes of determining market value of

the land in question. It is a well established principle that

the value of sale of small pieces of land can be taken into

consideration for determining even the value of a large tract

of land but with a rider that the Court while taking such

instances into consideration has to make some deduction

keeping in view other attendant circumstances and facts of

that particular case. We have already held that keeping in

view the surrounding developed areas and location and

54

potential of the land it will meet the ends of justice if 10%

deduction is made from the estimated market value of the

acquired land.

44. The comparable sale instance under serial No. 108

depicted the fair value of land in that area at the time of

issuance of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act which

is ` 12,55,550.50 per acre. The time gap between this sale

instance and issuance of said Notification is merely two

months which would hardly call for any increase in the said

value but to balance the equities between the parties we

would round off the figure to ` 13,00,000 per acre. By

applying the principle of guesstimate, thus, we determine

the market value of the acquired land at ` 13,00,000 per

acre as on the date of the issuance of the Notification under

Section 4(1) of the Act. Deducting 10% therefrom, it would

come to ` 11,70,000 per acre which will be the

compensation payable to the claimants with statutory

benefits and interests thereupon in accordance with law.

45. Ergo, for the reasons aforerecorded, we pass the

55

following orders in the appeals, subject matter of the

present judgment :

(i) The Civil Appeal No. 3613 of 2008, the appeal

preferred by the claimants Krishna Devi and Others, is

partially accepted and the judgment of the High Court

impugned in this appeal is modified to the extent that the

claimants would be entitled to receive compensation at the

rate of ` 11,70,000 per acre with interests and other

statutory benefits permissible under the law.

(ii) Civil Appeal Nos. 7498-7499 of 2005 preferred by

the State of Uttaranchal are partially accepted and the

compensation payable to the claimants is reduced from `

22,40,001.80 per acre to ` 11,70,000 per acre. The

claimants would be entitled to interest and all statutory

benefits permissible under the law.

(iii) Civil Appeal No. 1122 of 2011 preferred by the State

of Uttaranchal is partially accepted and the compensation

56

payable to the claimants is reduced from ` 22,40,001.80 per

acre to ` 11,70,000 per acre. The claimants would be

entitled to interest and all statutory benefits permissible

under the law.

(iv) Civil appeal Nos. 7496-7497 of 2005 preferred by

the other claimants are dismissed without any order as to

costs.

................................................J.

(Asok Kumar Ganguly)

................................................J.

(Swatanter Kumar)

New Delhi

May 5, 2011