The State Of Uttarakhand Law And Justice vs Sanjay Ram Tamta @ Sanju@Prem Prakash

2025 INSC 187 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.112/2014

THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND …Appellant

VERSUS

SANJAY RAM TAMTA @ SANJU@PREM PRAKASH …Respondent

JUDGMENT

K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

Death, the causation of which is a demand for

dowry is akin to murder, even if it is not homicidal, as is evident

from Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 1 read with

Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 2. However, the

Courts are warranted to be more cautious and circumspect with

respect to the allegations under Section 304B of the I.P.C since Signature Not Verified

allegations coming forth often could be motivated by the Digitally signed by NARENDRA PRASAD Date: 2025.02.11 18:08:08 IST Reason:

1 “the I.P.C.” 2 “the Evidence Act”

1 despair of an abrupt death of a daughter or sibling, at the

matrimonial home; especially when there is a history of a

marital discord which otherwise would not escalate to this

magnitude. In the present case, a young bride, hardly into six

months of marriage, was found hanging on the fateful day, by

her father and brother who reached the matrimonial home,

wherein she resides with her husband.

2. A First Information Report 3 was lodged and

the husband, the respondent-herein was arrested. Later, the

husband’s relatives i.e., his parents, grandfather and brother

were also implicated and joined as accused. The family stood

trial in which the prosecution examined nine witnesses. The

Trial Court acquitted everyone except the husband, finding that

the prosecution could not prove their presence in the separate

household in which the couple resided and there was no proof

of a proximate allegation of harassment on account of demand

of dowry which could be co-related with the death of the

deceased. The accused/respondent was convicted primarily on

the ground that the scratches on the body of the deceased

cannot be explained by reason only of the hanging, since the

body was at a distance from the walls of the room. The Court 3 “F.I.R.”

2 presumed that the scratches were the result of torture

perpetrated by the husband. The said fact proved cruelty

alleged on the unrequited demand for dowry and together, it

brought in the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence

Act, and it was the reasoning which led to the accused being

found guilty of the offence under Section 304B of the I.P.C. The

respondent was sentenced under Section 304B of the I.P.C. for

seven years Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.)

3. The High Court after examining the evidence

of the witnesses, specifically that of the brother and father

found that the financial and social status of the parties; made

improbable a demand of ₹4,00,000/- and a plot for construction

of a house and hence, the demand for dowry having led to the

death of the deceased was not proved by the prosecution.

4. We have heard Ms. Sakshi Rawat, learned

counsel appearing for the appellant-State and Ms. E.R.

Sumathy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

5. Trite is the principle that the Appellate Courts

would be slow in reversing an order of acquittal, especially

since the presumption of innocence that is always available to

the accused; as a basic principle of criminal jurisprudence,

3 stands reinforced and reaffirmed by the acquittal and unless

there are very substantive and compelling reasons to do so,

there cannot be a reversal of an order of acquittal. Unless it is

found that the findings are perverse and the only conclusion

possible from the compelling evidence is of guilt; Appellate

Courts will be slow to reverse an order of acquittal. Recently, in

Constable 907 Surender Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand4,

one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) referring to various binding precedents

of this Court succinctly laid down the principle in the following

manner in paragraph 12:

“12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

6. Bearing this principle in mind, we have

looked at the evidence led in trial. PWs 1 to 3 are the brother,

father and sister of the deceased, PW4- a neighbour, PW 5-the 4 2025 INSC 114

4 landlord of the house in which the couple were residing wherein

the death occurred and PW 6 to 9-the official witnesses; the last

of whom was the Investigating Officer (I.O.). The F.I.R., which

was registered by PW 8 on the information of the father, PW 2,

spoke of the informant having come to the matrimonial home of

the daughter, along with her sibling; PW 1. The room was

closed, but not locked and when they forced open the door and

entered, they saw the lady hanging from the neck on the fan.

They took down the body and later detected the husband, the

respondent-herein, running away, who was apprehended and

taken to the Police Station. The inquest was by PW 6-Tehsildar

and the medical examination by PW 7-Doctor.

7. That the death was suicidal was

established by the expert opinion of PW 7 who proved the

wound certificate issued by him. PW 7 referred to two sets of

injuries as indicated in the wound certificate; injury No.1; a

slanting ligature mark on both sides of the neck between the

vocal chords and chin and above the thyroid cartilage; 22 cm

long 1.8 cm wide, which was the cause of death, opined to be

‘suffocation due to hanging, prior to death’. Injury No.2 was a

mark of scratch which was 2x1 cm with redness, which injury

5 had led the Trial Court to presume that there was physical

violence perpetrated on the deceased. Immediately we have to

state that by the nature of the injury and the failure of the

prosecution to elicit any such opinion from the Doctor, the

expert witness, we find that difficult to believe.

8. That the death was suicidal is very clear from

the expert evidence, which however would not absolve the

accused under Section 304B of the I.P.C. This Court in

Surender Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P.5 considered the

effect of Section 113B of the Evidence Act on Section 304B of

the I.P.C. It was held that Section 304B of the I.P.C. presupposes

several factors for its applicability, which are; (i) the death of a

woman caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than

under normal circumstances; (ii) such death having occurred

within seven years from the date of the marriage; (iii) soon

before her death, the woman having been subjected to cruelty

or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband

and (iv) such cruelty or harassment being in connection with

the demand of dowry. It was, categorically held that if one of

the ingredients is absent, the presumption under Section 113B

of the Evidence Act would not be available to the prosecution 5 (2009) 17 SCC 243

6 and the onus of proof would not shift to the defense.

9. In the present case, though the 1 st

informant-the father spoke of the demand of dowry of

₹4,00,000/- and a house-plot, as seen from the F.I.R, in the

Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement recorded from him no such

demand was spoken of. This omission was confronted to him,

when he was examined as PW 2 and affirmed by the I.O in his

deposition. PW 1, who was the brother of the deceased also did

not make such a statement before the police and the said

omission was marked in evidence which is confirmed by the I.O;

PW 9. In addition to this, both the said witnesses spoke of a

head injury by reason of the torture inflicted by the husband

and the relatives, on the deceased, which also was not spoken

of before the police. Both the witnesses admitted that the

parental home of the respondent-husband and the separate

home where the couple resided had a number of houses within

the vicinity. None were questioned and examined to bring out

the alleged bickerings and the physical torture asserted. PW 4,

a neighbour of the deceased, who was witness to the inquest

report, was not asked about any such quarrel on dowry having

7 existed between the couple or about the husband or his

relatives having perpetrated physical violence on the deceased

when she was alive.

10. In fact, PW’s 1 and 2 omitted also to state

under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that the nephew of PW 2 on the

earlier part of the fateful day reached the house of the

deceased, wherein he saw that the parents, sibling and father

of the accused taunting the deceased with demands of dowry

and inflicting physical violence on her. The said nephew was

never questioned by the police or offered as a witness. There

was also no oral evidence to prove the violence perpetrated on

the young bride, by the family of the accused, at their house

when she had been residing there. PW 3, the sister of the

accused though, deposed about the earlier incidents of demand

of dowry from both the accused and his parents; omitted to

state the same before the police as evident from the

suggestions made during cross-examination; which omission is

confirmed in the deposition of the I.O.

11. More important is the fact that PW 5-the

landlord of the house in which the couple resided, turned

hostile and denied any incident of the relatives coming to that

8 residence, making demands of dowry from the deceased or

even the knowledge of the husband having demanded such

dowry. The witness was declared hostile and cross-examined by

the prosecution to no avail. On the contrary, in the cross-

examination of the accused, PW 5 spoke of the adamant

attitude of the deceased who made unreasonable demands of

the accused and also refused to co-operate with the family of

the accused. He specifically spoke of a quarrel on the evening

of the fateful day, when the wife created a ruckus, threw

articles out of the house and locked the husband out. PW 5 also

spoke of having seen the husband returning after some time

and knocking on the door, which was not opened by the wife.

Later, the father of the wife came to the house pushed the door

open and walked in to see his daughter hanging.

12. On a reading of the evidence recorded at

trial, we are of the considered opinion that the demand of

dowry was not proved by the prosecution. The omissions in the

statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C.; which are deemed to be

material contradictions put to peril the prosecution story of

demand of dowry. A three judge bench of this Court on such

omissions held so in Darshan Singh vs. State of Punjab 6, in 6 (2024) 3 SCC 164

9 paragraph 31:

“31. If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements under Section 161CrPC about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused cannot be relied upon. Prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation. The evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [See : (i) Rohtash v. State of Haryana [Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589, (ii) Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra [Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657, (iii) Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur v. State of Karnataka [Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 7 SCC 422 and (iv) Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P. [Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P., (2003) 3 SCC 175]”

13. Both PWs 1 and 2 admitted in their

deposition that they had not personally witnessed any physical

violence on the wife and PW 2-the father also deposed that the

son-in-law was quite aware of his financial condition; which

would not have enabled him to raise ₹4,00,000/- or purchase a

10 plot for construction of a house. It was his specific statement

that the son-in-law and his family was apprised of this fact at

the time of marriage and they had agreed to accept his

daughter, as such. The essential ingredient of a demand of

dowry being absent under Section 304B of the I.P.C., we cannot

find the suicidal death; though, categorized as an unnatural

one, as one akin to murder inviting a punishment under Section

304B of the I.P.C.

14. We, hence, reject the appeal, confirming

the order of acquittal of the High Court; but for the different

reasons, stated herein above. Parties to bear their own costs.

15. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

………………………………………, J.

[B.R. GAVAI]

………………………………………, J.

[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 11, 2025.

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