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The State Of Rajasthan vs Kistoora Ram

Supreme Court28 July 2022Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha · B.R. Gavai

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

An extra-judicial confession is weak evidence and cannot sustain a conviction solely on its basis unless it is corroborated by independent evidence. Where the primary evidence supporting conviction consists of an alleged extra-judicial confession without corroboration, and a High Court's acquittal rests on this principle, interference with the acquittal is not warranted unless the view taken by the High Court is impossible or perverse. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is limited: a conviction based merely on uncorroborated extra-judicial confession, following established precedent that such confession requires corroboration, does not represent an impossible or perverse view susceptible to appellate interference.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2119 OF 2010

STATE OF RAJASTHAN APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS KISTOORA RAM RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. The present appeal challenges the judgment dated 15 th

September 2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature for

Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 25 of

1986, thereby acquitting the respondent­accused herein and

reversing the judgment dated 10th January 1986 passed by

the learned District and Sessions Judge, Jodhpur

(hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”) in Original

Criminal Case No.114 of 1984, thereby convicting the

respondent­accused herein under Section 302 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) and sentencing him to Signature Not Verified

undergo life imprisonment. The respondent­accused was also Digitally signed by Dr. Mukesh Nasa Date: 2022.08.08 16:23:20 IST Reason:

convicted under Section 201 of the IPC and sentenced to

1 undergo three years’ rigorous imprisonment.

2. The respondent–accused was charged for an offence

punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. It is the

prosecution case that the accused had killed his wife with a

lathi, dragged her 100 feet away from the house and set her

on fire in order to destroy the evidence.

3. The trial court, after appreciating the evidence,

convicted the respondent–accused for the offence punishable

under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to suffer life

imprisonment with a fine of Rs.100/­. The respondent­

accused was also convicted for the offence punishable under

Section 201 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo three years’

rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.100/­.

4. Being aggrieved thereby, the respondent­accused

preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court,

vide impugned judgment, allowed the appeal thereby

reversing the order of conviction and acquitted the accused

for the offences charged. Being aggrieved thereby, the State

of Rajasthan has preferred an appeal before this Court.

5. We have heard Mr. Vishal Meghwal, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant–State of Rajasthan.

6. Mr. Meghwal, learned counsel for the appellant­State

has submitted that when the trial court, upon appreciation of

2 evidence of Guman Singh (PW­4), had convicted the

respondent–accused, there was no reason for the High Court

to interfere with the same. He has submitted that the extra­

judicial confession made by the respondent–accused before

Guman Singh (PW­4) is such, which would inspire

confidence in the judicial mind. It is submitted that Guman

Singh (PW­4) was an independent witness inasmuch as he

had served in the police department and there was no reason

to disbelief his testimony. It is further submitted that Hamira

Ram (PW­7) though has been declared hostile, part of his

testimony related to extra­judicial confession is trustworthy

and the same corroborates the testimony of Guman Singh

(PW­4). He has, therefore, submitted that the impugned

judgment passed by the High Court needs to be set aside and

the judgment of the trial court needs to be confirmed.

7. We have perused the judgment of the trial court dated

10th January 1986 as well as the High Court dated 15th

September 2009.

8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal

is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the

Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to

interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are 3 possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of

acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way

of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be

warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all.

9. The High Court has elaborately discussed the evidence.

Undisputedly, Hamira Ram (PW­7) has turned hostile. The

trial court itself had disbelief the alleged recovery of the

incriminating material allegedly recovered at the instance of

the respondent–accused.

10. That only leaves with the extra­judicial confession

allegedly made by Guman Singh (PW­4). The High Court,

relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of State of

Punjab v. Bhajan Singh and Others1, so also in the case of

Gopal Sah v. State of Bihar2 has held that extra­judicial

confession was a weak piece of evidence and unless there

was some corroboration, the conviction solely on the basis of

extra­judicial confession could not be sustained. The view

taken by the High Court cannot be said to be either

impossible or perverse meriting our interference.

11. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to

interfere with the impugned judgment. We find no merit in

1 (1975) 4 SCC 472 2 (2008) 17 SCC 128

4 the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

12. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of

accordingly.

...................J. (B.R. GAVAI)

.......................................................J. (PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA)

New Delhi;

28th July, 2022.

5

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