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The State Of Punjab Pseb (Now Punjab State Power Supply Corporation Ltd.) vs Kulwant Singh

Supreme Court3 October 2018Indira Banerjee · R. Banumathi

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where a court finds non-compliance with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the entitlement to back-wages is not automatic; instead, the court retains discretion to award back-wages in full or in part, or to award a lump sum in lieu of back-wages, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, including considerations such as the length of time elapsed since termination and the financial burden on the employer.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

1

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 10181 OF 2018 (Arising out of SLP(C)No.583 of 2017)

PSEB (NOW PUNJAB STATE POWER SUPPLY CORPORATION LTD.) & ORS. Appellant(s)

VERSUS

KULWANT SINGH Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

BANUMATHI, J.:

(1) Leave granted.

(2) The respondent-Kulwant Singh was employed as a daily-wager

helper from April 1997 to April 1998 in the construction work

with the appellant-Punjab State Power Supply Corporation

Limited. His services were terminated in the year 1998. In

the industrial dispute raised by the respondent-workman, the

Industrial Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 25-F of

the Industrial Disputes Act has not been complied with and on

that ground the order of termination was set aside by the

Industrial Tribunal and the respondent was directed to be

reinstated with continuity of service along with 40% back-

wages.

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date: 2018.10.09 17:41:17 IST Reason:

(3) In the writ petition filed by the appellant-Corporation,

the order of the Industrial Tribunal was affirmed by the Single 2

Judge including the back-wages of 40%. In further appeal, the

Division Bench of the High Court also upheld the order of the

Single Judge as well as the Industrial Tribunal holding that

there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

(4) When the matter came up for hearing before this Court on

2nd January, 2017, notice was issued limited to the question of

payment of 40% back-wages. By the same order, this Court has

directed that the respondent shall be reinstated forthwith and

be paid all back-wages from 10th March, 2015.

(5) Mr. Satinder S. Gulati, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant-Corporation, has submitted that in compliance of the

said order, the respondent has been reinstated and paid back-

wages on 10th March, 2015.

(6) Despite service of notice, the respondent has not chosen

to enter appearance. Accordingly, Mr. K. Parameshwar,

Advocate, has been appointed as amicus to assist the Court.

(7) We have heard Mr. Satinder S. Gulati, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant-Corporation and Mr. K. Parameshwar,

learned amicus, and also perused the impugned judgment and the

evidence/materials on record.

(8) In the case in hand, of course all the three fora have 3

held that the respondent would be held entitled to 40% of the

back-wages, it is well settled that whenever there was any

violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act,

payment of back-wages is not automatic (See: Rajasthan Lalit

Kala Academy v. Radhey Shyam – (2008) 13 SCC 248). In this

case, the respondent has been terminated way back in the year

1998. 40% back-wages from 2002 till 2015 for thirteen years

would mean huge financial burden upon the appellant-

Corporation. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the

case, in lieu of full quit of all claim towards 40% back-wages,

the appellant-Corporation shall pay to the respondent a lump

sum amount of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand)

within eight weeks from today.

(9) Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed.

(10) We place on record our appreciation for the valuable

assistance rendered by Mr. K. Parameshwar, learned amicus.

(11) We make it clear that the above order is passed in the

peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and the

same may not be treated as precedent.

..........................J. (R. BANUMATHI)

..........................J. (INDIRA BANERJEE) NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 3, 2018.

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