The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Ramveer Singh

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 575 OF 2014

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

RAMVEER SINGH ….RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

1. Heard.

2. This appeal has been preferred by the State of

Madhya Pradesh1 for assailing the judgment dated

22nd June, 2010, passed by the Division Bench of the

High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior2 in

Criminal Appeal No. 465 of 2005 whereby, the High

Court accepted the appeal preferred by the accused-

respondent i.e., Ramveer Singh3 under Section 374(2)

Signature Not Verified 1 Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant-State”. Digitally signed by KANCHAN CHOUHAN Date: 2025.08.11 2 Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”. 11:53:27 IST Reason: 3 Hereinafter, referred to as “accused-respondent”.

1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734 and set

aside the judgment dated 8th July, 2005 passed by

the learned Special Judge (Atrocities) and Additional

Sessions Judge, Morena5 in Special Case No. 159 of

2003. Vide judgment of conviction and order of

sentence dated 8th July, 2005, the trial Court had

convicted the accused-respondent for the offences

punishable under Sections 449 and 302 of the Indian

Penal Code, 18606 and sentenced him to suffer

imprisonment as below: -

Sections Sentence Awarded 449 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years along with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default to undergo 3 months additional imprisonment. 302 IPC Life imprisonment along with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default to undergo 3 months additional imprisonment.

4 For short, ‘CrPC’.

5 Hereinafter, referred to as “trial Court”. 6 For short, ‘IPC’.

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3. As noted above, the High Court in appeal

reversed the judgment rendered by the trial Court

and acquitted the accused-respondent of the charges

levelled against him. The appellant-State has filed the

present appeal with special leave for assailing the

acquittal of the accused-respondent as recorded by

the High Court.

4. We have heard and considered the submissions

advanced by Shri Padmesh Mishra, learned counsel

representing the appellant-State and have gone

through the impugned judgment as well as the

judgment rendered by the trial Court and so also the

records of the case.

5. Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution is that

on 10th March, 2003, a dehati nalishi (Ex. P-7) was

recorded by ASI Janved Singh (PW-6) based on the

statement of Poona Bai (PW-10) alleging inter alia

that at about 4:00 pm, on the same day the accused-

3 respondent forced his way into their house carrying

a container having kerosene oil in it. He poured the

kerosene on the body of her grand-daughter Badami

Bai7 and set her on fire with an intention of killing

her. On seeing the attack, the witness (PW-10)

started screaming and, as a result thereof, the

accused-respondent fled away from the place of

occurrence. On hearing the fervent cries of the

informant, the neighbours and other family members

assembled in the house.

6. It was further alleged that 12 days prior to the

incident, Raju, son of the accused-respondent, had

committed rape upon the victim and the matter was

reported to the police by Ramveer Singh, son of Poona

Bai (PW-10). Bearing this grudge in his mind, the

accused-respondent had set the victim to fire. Based

7 Hereinafter, referred to as “victim” or “deceased-victim”.

4 on the said statement of Poona Bai (PW-10), an FIR8

came to be registered against the accused-

respondent at Police Station Dimni, Morena for the

offences punishable under Sections 307 and 450 of

IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,

19899.

7. The victim who was barely alive, was taken to

the District Hospital, Morena for treatment. The

prosecution claims that the dying declaration (Ex. P-

13) of victim was recorded by the Executive

Magistrate/Naib Tehsildar, Anil Singh Raghav (PW-

8)10 at the hospital. The victim succumbed to the

burn injuries at about 8:30 pm, upon which, Section

302 of IPC was added to the case.

8 Crime No. 28 of 2003. 9 For short, “SC/ST Act”.

10 Hereinafter, referred to as “Naib Tehsildar (PW-8)”.

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8. The accused-respondent was arrested, and after

investigation, a chargesheet was filed against him in

the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambah,

who committed the case to the Court of Sessions from

where it was made over to the Special Court for trial.

Charges were framed against the accused-

respondent for the offences punishable under

Sections 302 and 449 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of

SC/ST Act. He abjured his guilt and claimed trial.

The trial Court recorded the evidence of the

prosecution witnesses and questioned the accused-

respondent under Section 313 CrPC. The accused-

respondent denied the prosecution allegations and

claimed to be innocent. Upon hearing the arguments

advanced by learned Public Prosecutor and the

defence, and after evaluation of the evidence on

record, the trial Court held the accused-respondent

guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 449 6 and 302 of IPC vide judgment dated 8th July, 2005.

However, the accused-respondent was acquitted of

the charge framed under Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act.

9. It is pertinent to note that the trial Court in its

judgement, recorded pertinent findings at Para 34 to

38, doubting the presence of Poona Bai (PW-10) at

the place of incident and discarded her claim of being

an eye-witness and having seen the accused-

respondent setting the deceased-victim to fire. The

High Court affirmed the aforesaid finding of the trial

Court that Poona Bai (PW-10) did not witness the

incident.

10. Apart from the evidence of the so-called eye-

witness, Poona Bai (PW-10) who has been disbelieved

by both the Courts below, the prosecution heavily

placed reliance on the oral and written dying

declarations of the deceased-victim to show that the

prosecution succeeded in bringing home the charges.

7 The High Court, while deciding the appeal against

conviction, discussed the evidence of Naib Tehsildar

(PW-8) who admitted in his cross-examination that at

the time of tendering the dying declaration, the victim

was conscious and was able to answer the questions,

but her voice was very feeble and not clear at all.

11. The High Court also noted that Dr. A.K. Gupta

(PW-13) who was present at the time of recording of

the alleged dying declaration (Ex. P-13) and made an

endorsement on the same to the effect that the victim

was conscious and was able to answer the questions

put to her, admitted in his testimony that he had

recorded the said endorsement after the dying

declaration had been recorded. Furthermore, both

Naib Tehsildar (PW-8) and Dr. A.K. Gupta (PW-13)

admitted in their evidence that they found it difficult

to decipher the dialect in which the injured victim

spoke. The victim was able to speak very feebly, and

8 the witness (PW-8) had to bend down in order to

grasp whatever she was trying to say.

12. The High Court doubted the dying declaration

on considering the admissions as appearing in the

evidence of Mango Bai (PW-12), who stated that when

the dying declaration was being recorded, she and

her mother-in-law i.e., Poona Bai (PW-10) were

present there and they told the concerned officer on

behalf of the victim as to how the incident had taken

place.

13. The High Court also found that the timing of

requisition issued by the Investigating Officer for

recording the dying declaration was doubtful. It was

observed that the victim had been admitted in the

hospital at 7:25 pm. Thereafter, the dehati nalishi

was recorded at the instance of Poona Bai (PW-10)

and the victim ultimately succumbed to death at 8:30

9 pm which made the entire sequence in which the

dying declaration was recorded, difficult to believe.

14. The High Court further noted that the victim

was having 100% burns and Dr. A.K. Gupta (PW-13)

admitted that the general condition of the victim was

extremely poor. It was further admitted by the Doctor

that when the dying declaration was being recorded,

neither the pulse nor the blood pressure of the victim

were measurable which convinced the High Court

that it was totally unsafe to rely on the dying

declaration.

15. The High Court also noted that so far as the

theory of oral dying declaration was concerned, the

same became questionable considering the fact that

there was no reference to any oral dying declaration

in the dehati nalishi lodged by Poona Bai (PW-10).

This omission was treated to be creating a doubt on

the prosecution case.

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16. Taking into account the overall impact of the

contradictions and inherent improbabilities

appearing in the prosecution evidence, the High

Court held that the dying declaration was not free

from doubt and hence, it would be hazardous to place

reliance on the same for convicting the accused-

respondent.

17. We are in full agreement with the aforesaid

observations and findings of the High Court and are

of the firm view that the circumstances surrounding

the recording of the dying declaration create a grave

doubt making the said evidence unworthy of

credence. On a perusal of the testimony of Dr. A.K.

Gupta (PW-13), we are convinced that the victim was

in such a precarious physical condition that it would

have been virtually impossible for her to have

narrated the story in the manner claimed by the

prosecution. It may be noted that the Doctor

11 admitted that neither the pulse nor the blood

pressure of the victim were recordable. The Naib

Tehsildar (PW-8) admitted that the victim’s voice was

barely audible when he was trying to record the dying

declaration (Ex. P-13). Thus, the very factum of

recording of the dying declaration (Ex. P-13) comes

under a grave doubt making it totally unreliable.

18. The High Court also found that the complainant

Poona Bai (PW-10) being the author of dehati nalishi

admitted that there were several persons having the

name Ramveer and hence, there was a serious doubt

as to whether accused-respondent was the same

Ramveer who had set the deceased-victim on fire and

whose name was mentioned in the dying declaration.

19. The High Court further found that as per the

evidence of Poona Bai (PW-10) even before she gave

the dehati nalishi, an earlier report had been taken

from her by the police at the village which was not

12 brought on record and had been supressed by the

prosecution.

20. Considering all these facts cumulatively, the

High Court felt it unsafe to place reliance upon the

dehati nalishi (Ex. P-7) and dying declaration (Ex. P-

13) which essentially formed the bulwark of the entire

prosecution case. Since no other evidence was led by

the prosecution to connect the accused-respondent

with the crime, the High Court went on to allow the

appeal vide judgment dated 22nd June, 2010,

thereby, acquitting him of the charges levelled.

21. We may note that the present appeal is one

against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of

judgments of this Court that in an appeal against

acquittal unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on

the face of the record and the only possible view

based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of

the accused only in such an event, should the

13 appellate Court interfere with a judgment of

acquittal. Where two views are possible i.e., one

consistent with the acquittal and the other holding

the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse

to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference

in this regard may be made to the judgments of this

Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda

Rudragoudar & Ors. v. State of Karnataka11;

H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka12 and

Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Anr.13.

22. In view of the facts and circumstances noted

above, we are convinced that the present is not a case

wherein it can be said that no view other than the

guilt of the accused-respondent is possible. The

prosecution case is full of material contradictions and

inherent improbabilities and there do not exist any

11 (2024) 8 SCC 149.

12 (2023) 9 SCC 581.

13 (2022) 3 SCC 471.

14 valid or substantial reasons to interfere with the

acquittal of the respondent as recorded by the High

Court. The impugned judgment dated 22nd June,

2010, does not suffer from any error or infirmity

warranting interference. Hence, the appeal lacks

merit, and is dismissed as such.

23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

….……………………J. (ARAVIND KUMAR)

...…………………….J. (SANDEEP MEHTA)

NEW DELHI;

JULY 30, 2025.

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