The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Rajkumar Yadav

2026 INSC 225 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3279 OF 2026 (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.10967 OF 2024)

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

RAJKUMAR YADAV …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

N.V. ANJARIA, J.

Leave granted.

1.1. The appellants are permitted to place on record

the additional documents, as prayed for.

2. More often than not, the quality of law and order

in the society and maintenance thereof depends upon the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MINI Date: 2026.03.11 17:08:00 IST

character of the persons serving in the police force. It Reason:

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 1 of 24

becomes imperative that the recruitees in the disciplined

force should be the persons beyond reproach and men

with rectitude.

2.1. The exposition of the above narrative is required

to be applied in its four corners while examining the

challenge to judgment and order dated 20.07.2023

passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Writ

Appeal No. 297 of 2023, which is impugned in the present

appeal preferred by the appellant–the State of Madhya

Pradesh.

2.2. Learned Single Judge of the High Court

dismissed the writ petition of respondent-original

petitioner (hereinafter referred to as ‘the respondent’ as

per the present position) by judgment and order dated

09.02.2023 in which the respondent had challenged the

rejection of his candidature by the screening committee

for appointment to the post of constable (driver) in the

police force on the ground that the petitioner had criminal

antecedents.

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 2 of 24 2.3. The Division Bench of the High Court set aside

the judgment and order of learned Single Judge,

consequently set at naught order-cum-decision dated

16.06.2017, whereby the screening committee treated the

respondent to be not fit for giving employment as

constable. It further directed the competent authority of

the appellants to reconsider the case of the respondent,

for appointment to the post of constable (driver) by

treating the acquittal dated 26.09.2014 granted to the

respondent to be a clean and honourable acquittal and to

pass appropriate order within stipulated time.

2.4. The operative part of the impugned judgment

and order of the High Cout in Paragraph 11 is reproduced

herein,

‘(i) Impugned order dated 09.02.2023, passed in WP No 4212/2017 is set aside.

(ii) Impugned order dated 16.6.2017(Annexure-P/1 to the petition), passed by the respondents is quashed for having been passed without application of mind.

(iii) The respondents/competent authority is directed to reconsider the case of the appellant for appointment to the post of

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 3 of 24 constable (driver) in Police Force afresh by treating the acquittal dated 26.09.2014 to be clean and honourable and pass an appropriate speaking order in accordance with law.

(iv) The aforesaid exercise be completed within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.’

3. In the writ petition before the High Court, the

respondent herein prayed to set aside the order-cum-

decision dated 16.07.2017 of the competent authority of

the screening committee. The screening committee had

undertaken the character verification of the respondent

and after examination, treated the respondent to be

ineligible for the police service. The respondent had

applied for the post of constable (driver) in the process of

appointment of the police constables in different

categories initiated in the year 2016. He was qualified to

stand at serial No. 336 in the unreserved category. Before

joining, the respondent submitted an affidavit disclosing

the factum of criminal case against him, and enclosed

copy of the order of the acquittal.

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 4 of 24 3.1. In the year 2012, First Information Report

bearing Crime No. 33 of 2012 was registered against the

respondent and four other accused persons in respect of

the offences under Sections 363, 366, 366-A, 376(2)(f) and

Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, at

Begumganj Police Station, Raisen district. The

chargesheet came to be filed against the respondent and

the trial took place. The trial court by judgment and order

dated 26.09.2014 acquitted the respondent herein and

two other accused persons giving them benefit of doubt.

3.2. In course of the recruitment process, the

screening committee of the appellant herein undertook

the process of character verification. The respondent was

found to be not fit for the post in question on the ground

of the said criminal case against him. In the writ petition,

the respondent-petitioner contended inter alia that he was

already acquitted and that he had also disclosed the

registration of the criminal case against him. It was

submitted that in the M.P. Police Manual, there was no

provision which created any bar on the appointment of

candidate against whom a criminal case has been

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 5 of 24 registered. It was further submitted that the respondent

was selected for the post of constable (driver) and not for

discharging general duty as constable, which aspect

could not have been ignored by the employing

authorities.

3.3. The stand of the respondent in the writ petition

was that though the petitioner was acquitted in the

criminal case by the trial court, it was an acquittal by

giving benefit of doubt. It was pointed out that the

respondent was tried for the serious offences in the nature

of moral turpitude and was acquitted on technical ground,

therefore, he was not liable to be considered for the post

of police constable and therefore was not allowed to join

duty. It was stated that in view of the provision in

paragraph 53(C) of the M.P. Police Regulations, the

respondent was not fit for the post of police constable

inasmuch as his acquittal was on technical ground.

3.4. While dismissing the writ petition and

negativing the prayer of the respondent, learned single

judge took note of paragraph 53(C) of the M.P. Police

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 6 of 24 Regulations. He further took the view that the acquittal of

the respondent in the criminal case was not a clean

acquittal, but was founded on the ground of benefit of

doubt, and when there was no clean acquittal, the

respondent was rightly refused induction into the service

in the police department. According to the Division

Bench, however, the acquittal was honourable as per

paragraph 90 and 92 of the judgment and that it was

incorrect to project the acquittal not to be the clean

acquittal.

4. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Sarthak Raizada

with learned advocate-on-record, Mr. Sarad Kumar

Singhania for the appellant-State along with other

assisting advocates, learned senior advocate Mr. Santosh

Kumar with learned advocate Mr. Rajiv R. Mishra and

other assisting advocates, at length. Both the learned

advocates made this Court travel through the record of

the case including the judgment of the trial court which

acquitted the respondent.

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 7 of 24

5. In the impugned judgment and order, the

Division Bench of the High Court has taken the view that

in light of what is observed in paragraph 90 and 92 of the

judgment of the trial court, the respondent was

honourably acquitted. While it may be true that the trial

court discussed the evidence before recording the

acquittal, there is no gainsaying that what the court held

was that the charges against the four accused including

the respondent herein were not proved beyond

reasonable doubt.

5.1. The relevant part of paragraph 90, is extracted

herein,

‘Involvement of the remaining accused except accused Dhaniram in the crime and the criminal conspiracy hatched by them is doubtful. Therefore, the other four accused are entitled to get the benefit of doubt. The charge against them is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.’

5.1.1. In the same way, the following was recorded in

paragraph 92,

‘The court concludes that the charges against the remaining accused Delan, Vishal, Rajkumar

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 8 of 24 and Mahesh are not proved beyond reasonable doubt for criminal conspiracy and kidnapping of minor girl from lawful guardianship, kidnapping of minor girl for illicit sexual intercourse and criminal conspiracy for rape under Section 363 alternative, Section 363/120B, Section 366 alternative, Section 366/120-B, Section 366-A and Section 376 (2) (c) / 120-B IPC. The above four accused are entitled to be acquitted of all the above charges.’

5.2. The concept of “honourably acquitted”, often

becomes hazy. This court on several occasions observed

that the expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquittal of

blame”, “fully acquitted” are unknown to the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the Penal Code, 1860. These

phrases are coined in the judicial pronouncements.

5.2.1. An honourable acquittal may be one where

court comes to a definitive conclusion at the end of the

trial upon full-fledged appreciation of evidence that the

accused had not committed an offence for which he was

charged. This would stand in sharp contrast against

arriving at a finding that because of some lacuna in the

prosecution case or in the leading the evidence or on

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 9 of 24 account of non-availability of credible evidence, the

offender is not convicted by giving him the benefit of

doubt. In such eventualities, the yardstick known to the

criminal jurisprudence is applied namely that the offence

has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

5.2.2. A simple example would explain the nicety of

the distinction between an honourable acquittal and the

acquittal other than honourable. In a given case, say a

person is charged for committing misappropriation of

money. After trying the accused for the offence, if the

court comes to a clear conclusion that the person has not

committed misappropriation and has not defalcated

money, it amounts to a clean chit in respect to the offence.

It is suggestive of the factum that the misappropriation

was not done. However, if the court holds that charge of

misappropriation is not proved on the account of weak

prosecution case or weak evidence and therefore it is not

possible to conclusively record finding about the

commission of offence, the acquittal which may follow in

such circumstances cannot be said to be an honourable

acquittal.

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 10 of 24 5.2.3. The acquittal founded on benefit of doubt is an

acquittal based on technical ground. Giving benefit of

doubt and thus not convicting the offender is a technical

consideration applied. The acquittal for the respondent

was governed by such criteria.

5.3. In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr.

Vs. Mehar Singh 1, this court had on occasion to consider

the question whether the candidature of the respondents

who had revealed of their involvement in a criminal case

by mentioning such fact in their application/attestation

form while applying for a post of constable in Delhi Police,

who were provisionally selected subject to verification of

their antecedents and who were subsequently

acquitted/discharged in the criminal case, could be

cancelled by the screening committee of the Delhi Police

on the ground that they were not found suitable for

appointment to the post of constable.

5.3.1. This Court observed that the screening

committee was within its right to cancel the candidature

1 (2013) 7 SCC 685

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 11 of 24 of a candidate even if the candidate was acquitted of the

criminal charges, by taking into account the nature of

acquittal. It was observed that persons involved in grave

cases of moral turpitude could be properly kept out of

police force even if they are acquitted or discharged.

5.3.2. Stated this Court thus,

‘It is only experienced officers of the screening committee who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police force. The screening committee will have to consider the nature and extent of such person's involvement in the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enter the police force.’ (Para 23)

5.3.3. It was emphasised that satisfactory character

antecedent has to be insisted for, when a person wishes

to join the disciplined force,

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 12 of 24 ‘The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category.’ (Para 35)

5.4. The purpose and utility of verification of a

character and antecedents to judge the suitability of a

person to the post need not be overemphasized. In Avtar

Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.2. It was observed that it

is one of the important criteria which is necessary to be

fulfilled before appointment is made and that an

incumbent should not have antecedents of such a nature

which may adjudge him unsuitable for the post.

5.4.1. It was stated,

‘The verification of antecedents is necessary to find out fitness of incumbent, in the process if a declarant is found to be of good moral character

2 (2016) 8 SCC 471

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 13 of 24 on due verification of antecedents, merely by suppression of involvement in trivial offence which was not pending on date of filling attestation form, whether he may be deprived of employment? There may be case of involving moral turpitude/serious offence in which employee has been acquitted but due to technical reasons or giving benefit of doubt.’ (Para 29)

5.5. In Union Territory, Chandigarh

Administration & Ors. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr.3, the

respondents were declared successful in the recruitment

for the post of constable in Chandigarh Police after

clearing the physical efficiency test, physical

measurement test, written test and interview. The

respondents were prosecuted in criminal trial for the

offences under Sections 323, 506 read with Section 34,

Indian Penal Code, 1860 and were acquitted by the trial

court. When the matter was referred to the screening

committee as per the recruitment guidelines, the

3 (2018) 1 SCC 797

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 14 of 24 screening committee found that the respondents were not

suitable for appointment as constables.

5.5.1. The Tribunal set aside the order of the screening

committee and directed the authorities to consider the

case of the respondents for appointment to the said post.

The High Court refused to interfere with the order of the

tribunal. This Court however did not approve the view

taken by the tribunal and the High Court and restored the

order of the screening committee.

5.5.2. The following principles came to enunciated by

this court,

(a) The acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of the candidates in respect of the post concerned. Even if a person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot always been inferred that he was falsely involved or he had no criminal antecedents.

(Para 10)

(b) Acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. Still, it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether the person is suitable for appointment to the post. (Para 13)

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 15 of 24

(c) In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.

(Para 12)

5.5.3. It was reiterated that police service requires

candidate with good character, integrity and clean

antecedents,

‘Police service requires candidates of good character, integrity and clean antecedents. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force.’ (Para 11, 13)

5.6. In Union Territory, Chandigarh

administration (supra), this Court underlined that

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 16 of 24 acquittal in criminal case is not always conclusive of the

suitability of a candidate,

‘The acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of the candidates in the post concerned. If a person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot always be inferred that he was falsely involved, or he had no criminal antecedents.’ (Para 10)

5.7. The law is also well settled that even the

departmental enquiry can proceed independent of the

acquittal in criminal case and that mere exoneration in

criminal case would not entitle an employee to be

reinstated as a necessary sequitur to the acquittal. In

Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi Vs.

Bhopal Singh Panchal4, this Court held that when the

High Court acquitted the respondent employee by giving

benefit of doubt, the bank rightly refused to reinstate him

in service on the ground that it was not an honourable

acquittal. Further, the criminal antecedents of an

employee and the nature of his acquittal is considered

4 (1994) 1 SCC 541

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 17 of 24 germane to be applied by the employer even while

determining the entitlement of pay and allowance for the

period concerned to the employee or for treating the

period of suspension on duty.

6. As is already stated, in the present case, the

respondent was charged in respect of the offences under

Sections 363, 366, 366/120B, 366A, 376(2)(c) which were

the offences in the nature of grave moral turpitude. Every

moral turpitude has its own counts and degree to become

either abhorrent and unacceptable conduct, and would

also amount to commission of offence under the law. In a

given case, moral turpitude may not result into a legally

proved guilt, and it may go unpunished for variety of

reasons. Still however, it remains a conduct against

decency, morality and norms practiced in the civil society

inviting a serious discount and disability for such person

in a given situation and given context.

6.1. In service law jurisprudence, mere involvement

of a person in an offence or in a conduct amounting to

moral turpitude without anything else may become

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 18 of 24 relevant consideration to judge his fitness to the post and

to assess credentials for allowing such a person into the

employment.

7. The necessary conclusion from the parameters

and principles summarised above, is that whether it is a

question of recruiting a person into the service or

continuing him in service or extending an employee

some service benefit, his criminal antecedents,

involvement in criminal activity, the conduct amounting to

moral turpitude, registration of a criminal case as well as

nature of his acquittal in a criminal case are all germane

considerations to be applied. The employer who would

be acting through a screening committee to sift such

cases, has fairly a large realm of freedom to act, though

without becoming arbitrary.

7.1. The area of discretion vested with the screening

committee in this regard is wide enough to permit it to

exclude a candidate or reject him for the purpose of

giving appointment. In a given case where the facts are

stark, mere involvement of a person in an alleged offence

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 19 of 24 or in the act of moral turpitude may become sufficient

enough to apply it as debilitating factor for such candidate

to be offered employment. Antecedents of a candidate

play an important role in the decision-making process by

the screening committee. This dictum would operate with

greater rigour when it comes to the recruitment and

appointment to the disciplined force like police.

7.2. The position of law was highlighted again in the

following observations by this Court in State of Madhya

Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Parvez Khan5,

‘…it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was completely exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force.’ (Para 13)

7.2.1. It was further stated,

5 (2015) 2 SCC 591

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 20 of 24 ‘No doubt the screening committee has not been constituted in the case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, in the present case, the Superintendent of Police has gone into the matter. The Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. There is no allegation of mala fides against the person taking the said decision nor the decision is shown to be perverse or irrational.’ (Para 13)

7.3. The domain of considering the fitness and

suitability of a candidate for the purpose of taking him in

service belongs to the employer. A host of relevant

consideration would legitimately find a place in the

process of such consideration by the employer to decide

whether it is feasible and advisable to offer employment

to an aspirant. Where the employer or the screening

committee of the employer has acted to discard, exclude

or reject the candidature by applying relevant

considerations and has not acted arbitrarily or

whimsically, the courts have no role to interpose. Of

course, a demonstrably mala fide approach by the

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 21 of 24 employer would give room to the courts to exercise the

power of judicial review.

8. In Mehar Singh (supra) and in Parvez Khan

(supra), this court opined that the decision of the

screening committee must be taken as final unless as it is

shown to be mala fide. The screening committee also must

be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in it and

must examine the candidate with utmost care for the

candidate’s character.

9. But for the above limited considerations namely

arbitrariness, unreasonableness, whimsicalness or mala

fide approach, the scope of judicial review on this score is

extremely limited. The courts are not expected to

override the wisdom of the employer in judging the

suitability of a candidate and in considering the relevance

of the antecedents of the candidate and would not

substitute its own view.

9.1. Reverting back to the facts of the instant case, the

screening committee of the appellant rejected the

candidature of the respondent for the post of constable

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 22 of 24 (driver) in police force as per the decision dated

16.06.2017. What weighed with the screening committee

was that the respondent was found to be involved in the

serious offences such as kidnapping and abducting a

minor girl and raping her, which was a conduct

undoubtedly amounting to moral turpitude. The

respondent, though acquitted in the criminal case, was

exonerated only on the ground of benefit of doubt.

9.2. Learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing

the petition upholding the decision of the screening

committee. The judgment and order of learned Single

Judge of the High Court, which was eminently just and

legal, came to be reversed by the Division Bench of the

High Court for not good reason, directing that the

acquittal ought to have been treated as an honourable

acquittal and required the appellant-employer to

consider the respondent for appointment to the post. The

Division Bench of the High Court thereby intruded into the

functional realm of the screening committee and trampled

upon its discretion which was validly exercised by the

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 23 of 24 Committee to treat the respondent unsuitable to be

employed in the police force.

10. For the foregoing discussion and reason, the

impugned judgment and order dated 20.07.2023 passed

by the Division Bench of the High Court allowing Writ

Appeal No. 297 of 2023 cannot be sustained in eye of law.

The same is set aside.

11. The appeal stands allowed.

All Interlocutory Applications, as may be

pending, will not survive in view of the disposal of the

main appeal.

……..……………………………….., J.

[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]

……………………………..……….., J.

[N.V. ANJARIA]

NEW DELHI;

March 11th, 2026

SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 24 of 24