The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Akhilesh Jha

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No 5153 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP (C) No 4655 of 2020)

State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr .... Appellant(s)

Versus

Akhilesh Jha & Anr ....Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

1 Leave granted.

2 This appeal arises from a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh dated 5 September 2019.

3 The first respondent was posted as Superintendent of Police at Alirajpur from

June 2012 to June 2015. It has been alleged that in spite of the instructions

issued by the Inspector General of Police, Indore Zone to disband the “Gunda

squad”, the first respondent constituted, supervised and operated the squad. It

has been alleged that on 1 June 2014, individuals belonging to such a squad,

acting under the supervision of the first respondent arrested an accused who

was taken into custody after being called to the police station by the members of Signature Not Verified

the Gunda Squad. The person, who was under interrogation, died in custody on Digitally signed by Sanjay Kumar Date: 2021.09.09 16:49:20 IST Reason:

3 June 2014. A magisterial enquiry was conducted into the custodial death and

a report was submitted on 10 October 2014. The report contained observations 2

against the first respondent on his role in illegally constituting the squad.

4 Challenging the observations made by the JMFC Alirajpur, in his report dated 10

October 2014, the first respondent instituted proceedings before the High Court

of Madhya Pradesh. By its order dated 2 March 2016, the High Court expunged

some of the observations contained in the magisterial report against the first

respondent on the ground that they were in violation of the principles of natural

justice. On 21 April 2016, the High Court directed that in case any action is

initiated against the first respondent on the basis of the magisterial report, a

proper opportunity of being heard in response to the allegations should be

granted to him before drawing any adverse conclusion.

5 On 8 June 2016, a departmental enquiry was convened against the first

respondent and a charge-sheet was issued. The allegation in the charge-sheet

was that the first respondent had committed acts of indiscipline and

insubordination by not following the instructions issued by his superior officers

regarding the disbanding of the Gunda Squad. The first respondent submitted

his reply to the charge-sheet on 7 July 2016, denying the allegations levelled

against him. Soon thereafter, he moved the Central Administrative Tribunal 1 at

Jabalpur for challenging the charge-sheet which was served on him on 8 June

2016. The Tribunal, by its order dated 28 July 2016, declined to interfere with

the charge-sheet but granted an opportunity to the first respondent to initiate

appropriate proceedings, if a decision adverse to him was taken on the basis of

the reply to the charge-sheet.

6 The first respondent once again moved the Tribunal for challenging the charge-

sheet dated 8 June 2016 in OA 587 of 2017 on the ground that no decision had

been taken following his reply to the charge-sheet and that as a result of the

1 “Tribunal” 3

pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, his deputation and promotional

avenues had been adversely affected.

7 The Tribunal, by its order dated 5 January 2018, quashed the charge-sheet

issued to the first respondent. The following three grounds weighed with the

Tribunal:

(i) There was a delay of nearly two years;

(ii) The charges were ambiguous; and

(iii) The High Court had expunged the remarks in the magisterial enquiry

which was held to enquire into the custodial death.

8 The order of the Tribunal was assailed by the appellants before the High Court.

By its judgment dated 5 September 2019, the Division Bench dismissed the

petition, affirming the findings of the Tribunal.

7 We have heard Ms Ankita Chaudhary, Deputy Advocate General appearing on

behalf of the appellants and Mr Braj K Mishra, Counsel appearing on behalf of

the first respondent.

8 Assailing the judgment of the Tribunal which has been confirmed by the High

Court, Ms Ankita Chaudhary submitted that ex facie the charge-sheet and the

imputations would indicate that the finding of vagueness is unsustainable.

Counsel submitted that the gravamen of the charge-sheet is that the first

respondent, who was posted as the Superintendent of Police, Alirajpur, had

violated the administrative orders of the Inspector General of Police for

disbanding the Gunda Squads and that a person who had been interrogated by

the Squad which was constituted, operated and supervised by the first

respondent died in custody. Counsel submitted that first and foremost, the 4

expunging of the remarks in the report of the magisterial enquiry would have no

bearing on the entitlement of the State to exercise its disciplinary authority over

the first respondent. Secondly, it was urged that the Tribunal had declined to

quash the charge-sheet in the first OA which was filed by the first respondent

before the Bench at Jabalpur. Having declined to quash the charge-sheet at that

stage, it was not open to the Tribunal to quash it on a second OA on the plea that

there was a delay in completing the enquiry. Thirdly, Counsel submitted that

there was, in fact, no delay and if there was a requirement for the enquiry to be

concluded within a time schedule, such a direction could have been issued.

However, there was no justification to quash the enquiry and to obstruct the

disciplinary proceedings which have been convened by the State in exercise of

its authority over the respondent.

9 On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the first respondent that the

charge-sheet is devoid of material particulars, including the date on which the

instructions for disbanding the Gunda Squads were issued by the Inspector

General of Police as well as the specific role alleged to have been performed by

the first respondent in the circumstances leading to the alleged death of the

person who was under interrogation. Moreover, it has been submitted that the

delay, as a matter of fact, caused prejudice to the first respondent since he was

deprived of his opportunities of deputation and promotion at par with his other

batch mates. Hence, it has been urged that the delay in conducting the

disciplinary proceeding has caused serious prejudice to the first respondent.

10 The charge-sheet was issued to the first respondent in exercise of powers

conferred by Rule 10 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1969

on 8 June 2016. The charge-sheet which is annexed to the communication

issued by the Home Department of the State of Madhya Pradesh contains the

following charge:

5

“You have violated the Rule 03 of All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 by operating Gunda Squad illegally in the District Alirajpur and by committing indiscipline and violation of directions of the Senior Officers. The aforesaid act of yours is against the provisions of Rule 3 of All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 and the same is punishable under All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. The detailed particulars of the aforesaid charges are attached.”

11 The statement of charges has been appended to the charge-sheet. The

statement of charges indicates that the gravamen of the allegation against the

first respondent is that the Inspector General of Police, Indore Zone had issued

instructions to all Superintendents of Police that no officer working in the

District shall constitute a Gunda Squad and if such a Squad is working, then it

must be dissolved immediately. The incident leading to custodial death took

place while the individual was in the custody of Police Station Sorwa of District

Alirajpur on 3 June 2014. The statement of imputations states, thus:

“The incident of the death in the police custody happened in PS Sorwa of the District Alirajpur on 03.06.2014. The Superintendent of Police, District Alirajpur had sent Subedar K.P. Singh Tomar working as the Squad In charge to interrogate the suspect deceased Jhingla in Crime No.39/14 Section 307 IPC of the police Station Sorwa. Subedar Tomar inflicted injuries to the deceased Jhingla by assaulting him during interrogation, which led the suspect Jhingla to death. When the aforesaid incident took place, the squad in charge Subedar Tomar and other 05 policemen were suspended on 03.06.2014.

In the aforesaid incident, Subedar K.P. Singh Tomar and his all subordinate employees were appointed as the reserve force in the police control room but Shri Akhilesh Jha, the then Superintendent of Police, District Alirajpur had been using all these employees regularly as the Gunda Squad, while Shri Akhilesh Jha the then Superintendent of Police Alirajpur refused "To have constituted Gunda Squad" in Letter No. SP/Ali/Steno/736/14 dated 15.07.2014. In this regard, the clarification was sought from the then Superintendent of Police, Shri Akhilesh Jha vide letter no. IGP/E/Ka.F-29/47-45-3-A/14 dated 28.09.2014 of the office.”

12 The statement of imputations contains a reference to the Duty Register as well

as the General Diary at the material time. The list of documents annexed to the

charge-sheet refers to 21 documents on the basis of which the charges were 6

intended to be proved.

13 On the basis of the above material which has been placed on the record, it was

impossible to come to the conclusion that the charge against the first

respondent is vague or ambiguous. The charge-sheet, together with the

statement of imputations, contains a detailed elaboration of the allegations

against the first respondent and does not leave the recipient in a measure of

doubt or ambiguity over the nature of the case he is required to answer in the

disciplinary enquiry. The finding that the charge is vague is palpably in error.

The Tribunal declined to quash the charge-sheet by its initial order dated 28 July

2016. However, by a subsequent order dated 5 January 2018, it proceeded to do

exactly what it had declined to do by its previous order. The Tribunal purportedly

did so on the basis that prejudice had been caused to the first respondent by the

denial of an opportunity for deputation or for promotion as a result of the

pendency of the proceedings. The line of reasoning which weighed with the

Tribunal is plainly erroneous. The Tribunal would have been justified in directing

the expeditious conclusion of the enquiry, but instead, it proceeded to quash the

enquiry in its entirety. This, in our view, was clearly impermissible. Every delay

in conducting a disciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry

being vitiated. Whether prejudice is caused to the officer who is being enquired

into is a matter which has to be decided on the basis of the circumstances of

each case. Prejudice must be demonstrated to have been caused and cannot be

a matter of surmise. Apart from submitting that the first respondent was unable

to proceed on deputation or to seek promotion, there is no basis on which it

could be concluded that his right to defend himself stands prejudicially affected

by a delay of two years in concluding the enquiry. The High Court, therefore, in

our view, has clearly failed to properly exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by

simply affirming the judgment of the Tribunal. The judgment of the Tribunal

suffered from basic errors which go to the root of the matter and which have 7

been ignored both by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court.

14 For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned

judgment and order of the High Court dated 5 September 2019. The charge-

sheet was issued to the first respondent while he was in service, and hence the

disciplinary enquiry can proceed to its logical conclusion. The disciplinary

enquiry should be concluded expeditiously, preferably by 31 July 2022. In the

event that the first respondent is entitled to the release of any part of his retiral

dues, including gratuity, in consonance with law, necessary steps for that

purpose shall be taken within a period of two months from the date of this order.

15 Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

…………...…...….......………………........J. [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J. [Vikram Nath]

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J. [Hima Kohli]

New Delhi;

September 06, 2021

-S-

8

ITEM NO.27 Court 4 (Video Conferencing) SECTION IV-C

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).4655/2020

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 05-09-2019 in MPN No. 3854/2018 passed by the High Court of M.P. Principal Seat at Jabalpur)

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR. Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

AKHILESH JHA & ANR. Respondent(s)

(WITH IA No. 97801/2021 - CLARIFICATION/DIRECTION)

Date : 06-09-2021 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM : HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI

For Petitioner(s) Ms. Ankita Chaudhary, Dy AG Mr. Mrinal Elker Mazumdar, AOR Mr. Manish Yadav, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Braj K. Mishra, Adv. Mr. Joby P. Varghese, AOR Mr. Rajneesh Kumar Jha, Adv. Mr. Nishant Kumar Srivastava, Adv. Mr. Aby P. Varghese, Adv. Donna Xavier, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R

1 Leave granted.

2 The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

3 Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

(SANJAY KUMAR-I) (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR) AR-CUM-PS COURT MASTER

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)