The State Of Arunachal Pradesh vs Mihin Laling

2025 INSC 1186 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos.11884-11888 OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.9585-9589 of 2023)

THE STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH & ANR. … APPELLANTS

Versus

MIHIN LALING & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

1. Leave granted.

2. The core controversy in the instant set of appeals concerns

the purported legal dissonance between two Statutes, both of which

inter alia provide for land acquisition by the State authorities.

While on the one hand is the Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya Frontier Tract

Jhum Land Regulation, 1947 (hereinafter, `1947 Regulations’), a

pre-independence legislation governing the acquisition of ‘Jhum’

lands in the State of Arunachal Pradesh; on the other are the

settled land laws prevailing in the rest of the country, i.e.

either the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, `1894 Act’) or Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by its SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date: 2025.10.06 19:16:02 IST successor-statue, the Right to Fair Compensation and Reason:

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement

Act, 2013 (hereinafter, `2013 Act’). 2

3. The State of Arunachal Pradesh and its Authorities are before

us in appeal against the judgment and final order dated 12.09.2022,

passed by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court (Itanagar

Bench) (hereinafter, ‘High Court’) with respect to the validity of

the compensation provided for acquisition of certain ‘Jhum’ lands,

undertaken under the provisions of the 1947 Regulations.

4. The High Court has, vide the impugned judgment, inter alia

held that the 1947 Regulations and the 2013 Act function in

distinct legislative spheres, and are therefore not repugnant to

each other under Article 254 of the Constitution. It has also

upheld the learned Single Judge’s finding that the appellant-

authorities must provide solatium and interest to the respondents

as per the scheme of the 2013 Act.

5. Before proceeding with adjudication on merits, it is apposite

to briefly explicate the facts, which are broadly admitted. The

lands of the private-respondents were notified to be acquired on

17.02.2014, in a Notification issued under Section 10 of the 1947

Regulations. Notably, these lands were sought to be acquired for

the purpose of construction of the Trans-Arunachal-Highway

(hereinafter, ‘TAH’) along the Potin–Bopi (Godak) corridor.

6. The estimates for compensation were drawn up by the concerned

Departments, and communicated to the relevant landowners.

Pertinently, no solatium or additional interest formed part of

these calculations. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents made 3

representations before the Deputy Commissioner, Lower Subansiri

District, Ziro. These representations were negatived by the

Authority, citing Section 10 of the 1947 Regulations as a provision

which merely necessitates “reasonable compensation”, and no other

statutory benefit.

7. The private-respondents thereafter approached the High Court

seeking the benefits provided under the 2013 Act’s acquisition

mechanism. However, the High Court relegated them to the statutory

remedy of appealing before the State Governor, postulated under

Section 17 of the 1947 Regulations. By order dated 14.08.2020, the

Governor was pleased to reject their appeal, holding that since the

acquisition was effected under the 1947 Regulations, there would be

no applicability of the 2013 Act.

8. Still aggrieved, the respondents again approached the High

Court assailing the Governor’s rejection. The learned Single Judge

of the High Court allowed this Writ Petition vide order dated

25.04.2022, reasoning that the State’s laws cannot be repugnant to

the Central legislation and they are, to that extent, void. Thus,

while the acquisition under the 1947 Regulations was held to be

valid, its compensation was ordered to be calculated as per the

model laid down in the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the High Court

allowed for grant of the statutory benefits as prayed for by the

respondents.

9. The State of Arunachal Pradesh and its authorities, i.e. the

appellants, challenged this finding through intra-Court appeals, 4

before a Division Bench of the High Court. As already noticed

hereinabove, the High Court has partly allowed these appeals in a

common judgment and order. The Division Bench modified the earlier

order to the extent of holding that the 1947 Regulations and the

2013 Act are not repugnant to each other in principle but rather

function in different fields. However, the Division Bench confirmed

that statutory benefits flow to the respondents from the 2013 Act

(even for acquisitions under the 1947 Regulations). Finally, the

impugned order indicates that all acquisitions completed under the

1947 Regulations may be reopened for re-determination of their

compensation as per the 1894 or the 2013 Act, as the case may be.

10. We have heard Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the

appellants and Mr. Abhimanyu Tewari, learned counsel for the

respondents, and carefully perused the material placed on record.

11. The present appeals turn upon the interplay between a pre-

constitutional special Regulation, namely, the 1947 Regulations,

and the 1894/2013 Acts, with particular reference to the

entitlement of claimants to solatium and interest. It is thus

appropriate at this juncture to refer to certain key provisions of

the 1947 Regulations. Firstly, we find that ‘Jhum’ lands are

defined in Section 2(b) of the 1947 Regulations, which reads to the

following effect:

“(b) “Jhum Lands” means and includes all lands which any

member or members of a village or community have

customary rights to cultivate by means of shifting

cultivation or to utilise by clearing jungle or grazing 5

livestock provided that such village or community is in a

permanent location but does not include :-

(i) any land which has been or is under process of

being terraced for the purpose of permanent or

semipermanent cultivation whether by means of

irrigation or not.

(ii) any land attached appurtenant to a dwelling house

and used for the purpose of permanent cultivation, or

(ii) any land which in the opinion of the [Deputy

Commissioner] is subject to permanent cultivation.

Explanation :- (1) any land which is otherwise Jhum land

according to the above definition shall be deemed to be so

notwithstanding the fact that a part or the whole thereof may

have been planted with fruit trees, bamboos, or tung or

reserved for growing firewood.

(2) Any village or community shall be held to be in permanent

location of it always remains within a specific area, although

part or the whole of such village or community may migrate

from time to time to different localities within that area.”

12. Since Section 2(b) refers to the ‘Customary Rights’, a brief

reference to Section 4 of the 1947 Regulations may also be relevant

for our limited discussion. That provision is reproduced below:

“4. (1) A Customary right to Jhum land shall be deemed to

be established in favour of village or a community when 6

such village or community has enjoyed the right to

cultivate or utilize such Jhum land for not less than 5

years prior to making of this Regulation.

(2) A customary right to Jhum land shall be deemed to

be established in favour of an individual

cultivator,-

(a) if he inherited the land in accordance with a

local custom;

(b) if he purchased the land prior to the making

of this Regulation and such purchase was not

contrary to local custom, or

(c) if he has purchased the land at any date

subsequent to making of this Regulation, provided

such purchase was not contrary to any local

custom or any provisions of this Regulation, or

(d) if, being a resident of permanent village, he

has brought the land under cultivation, and the

land has not been cultivated at any time within

30 years preceding his bringing the same into

cultivation:

Provided that such land is within cultivatable reach

of his own village.”

13. Finally, it is abundantly noticeable that the most contentious

provision in these appeals is Section 10 of the 1947 Regulations,

whose interpretation goes to the very essence of the dispute.

Section 10 – titled as “Acquisition for public purpose” – reads as 7

follows:

“10. The Government may acquire any Jhum land required for

a public purpose. No formal acquisition proceedings shall

be necessary but an opportunity shall be given to those

having rights in the land to show cause against such

acquisition and reasonable compensation shall be paid for

all land required under this section.

Land so acquired shall, if relinquished by the

Government at any time, be returned to the village,

community or individual from whom it was acquired on

refund, if any, of such compensation to the Government as

the latter may decide.”

14. A brief perusal of these provisions and the preamble of the

1947 Regulations indicates that they are a special law , enacted in

exercise of powers conferred under Section 92(2) of the Government

of India Act, 1935 in order to safeguard, regulate, and protect the

rights of the tribes indigenous to the Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya

Frontier Tracts over the ‘Jhum’ lands.

15. In other words, the 1947 Regulations were enacted to protect

and regulate the customary tenure of ‘Jhum’ lands in the Frontier

Tracts, recognising their distinct character and insulating them

from the general regime of land acquisition. Section 10 of the 1947

Regulations, which authorises acquisition for public purpose by the

State, dispenses with elaborate procedures, and instead stipulates

a mandatory opportunity of hearing and payment of fair and just 8

market price of the acquired land. It is evident that the framers

of the 1947 Regulations sought to ensure the security of tribal

land while equipping the State with its eminent domain authority to

requisition such land in the larger public interest.

16. Thus, there cannot possibly be any room to doubt the fact that

the 1947 Regulations do not envisage the routine procedure followed

under the 1894/2013 Acts, i.e. the issuance of Notification

proposing the acquisition; the subsequent Declaration of such

acquisition; issuance of notice(s) before passing of an award, etc.

Due to such omissions, it seems that the appellants have always

construed Section 10 to mean that the land can be acquired without

prescribing any rigid procedure, so long as there is compliance of

the expression of “reasonable compensation”, which is averred to be

transparent and non-discriminatory.

17. It is this shapeless “reasonable compensation” that has worried

the respondents, who sought applicability of the 2013 Act, a

decidedly more thorough legislation with determinative elements for

the calculation of compensation, including statutory benefits such

as solatium and additional interest.

18. The controversy, therefore, revolves primarily around the

manner and the procedure that may be required to be followed by the

State Government while acquiring the ‘Jhum’ lands. The High Court,

vide the impugned judgment, has firstly referred to various

constitutional provisions in order to hold that the land could be

acquired only under provisions of the 1894/2013 Act(s) and that

Section 10 of the 1947 Regulations is merely an enabling provision 9

under which ‘Jhum’ lands can be acquired.

19. We find considerable force in this approach of the High Court.

The phrase “reasonable compensation” is an open-textured

expression, designed to confer flexibility. It cannot be read as

permitting compensation which is merely notional or arbitrary. In

constitutional jurisprudence, reasonableness of compensation must

align with the guarantees of Article 14 and Article 300A. The right

to property, though no longer fundamental, is nonetheless a

constitutional right which cannot be divested save by authority of

law, and such deprivation must meet tests of fairness and non-

arbitrariness.

20. In this backdrop, subsequent legislative developments furnish

an important guide. The 2013 Act — enacted to replace the 1894 law

— represents the considered will of Parliament as to what

constitutes just recompense when property is taken for public

purpose. It mandates not only market value but also ‘solatium’ and

‘interest’, recognising that compulsory acquisition imposes a

special burden upon the landholder.

21. While the 1947 Regulations may provide an alternate procedural

framework for the North-Eastern Frontier Tracts, they cannot be

interpreted in isolation from this broader evolution of law. To

construe “reasonable compensation” narrowly, ignoring ‘solatium’

and ‘interest’, would be to perpetuate inequality: two landholders

losing their property for identical projects — one under the 2013

Act, another under the 1947 Regulations — would stand on palpably 10

different footings, without rational justification. Such a

construction would not withstand scrutiny under Article 14.

22. In this sense, we are in agreement with the High Court that

“reasonable compensation” in Section 10 must be harmonised with the

prevailing legislative standards of the time, and that solatium and

interest are not alien imports but integral components of fairness.

This interpretive technique properly reflects the principle that

subordinate or special legislation must be read in the light of

constitutional values and later general enactments, particularly

where the language is sufficiently elastic.

23. At the same time, we are conscious of the limits of judicial

intervention. The High Court, in its impugned judgment, permitted

reopening of all concluded acquisitions under the 1947 Regulations

for reassessment of compensation. Such an approach, in our

considered opinion, may travel beyond the permissible bounds.

Finality of administrative action cannot be lightly unsettled; to

do so would not only destabilise public projects but also create

fiscal uncertainty. Balance must therefore be struck by ensuring

that pending and future acquisitions are aligned with the standards

of the 2013 Act, while leaving untouched those transactions where

compensation has been finally determined and accepted.

24. Before we part with these appeals, it merits mentioning that

the controversy before us has since been laid to rest by

legislative intervention. The Balipara/Tirap/Sadiya Frontier Tract

Jhum Land Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2024, namely, Act No. 11 of 11

2024 (which has come into force in the State of Arunachal Pradesh

with effect from 07.08.2024) has introduced a proviso to Section 10

explicitly stipulating that compensation under the 1947 Regulations

shall not be less than that computed under the law of land

acquisition in force at the relevant time. This amendment confirms,

in statutory form, the interpretive conclusion reached by the High

Court and supplemented by us. However, as a matter of legislative

policy, it operates prospectively and cannot, by itself, justify

disturbing concluded acquisitions.

25. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct that the

respondents shall also be entitled to solatium as well as interest

in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act.

26. The appellants shall ensure that any arrears towards solatium

and interest, wherever not yet paid, are released to the landowners

of the subject-acquisition within a period of three months from

today.

27. It is further clarified that the obligation of the State to pay

‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ shall be without prejudice to its right

to recover the same from the ultimate beneficiaries of the

acquisition, in accordance with law.

28. In respect of concluded acquisitions where compensation has

been finally determined, accepted and disbursed, no reopening shall

be permissible. The impugned judgment of the High Court is

therefore set aside, to that extent. However, in all matters which

remain pending either before the competent authority or before a 12

Court/Tribunal, the compensation shall be recomputed to include

solatium and interest as above.

29. The directions contained in our interim order dated 03.07.2023

regarding the deposit of amounts with the Deputy Commissioner shall

be given full effect. In the event such deposits represent solatium

and interest payable to the true landowners, the same together with

the accrued interest in the Fixed Deposit shall be disbursed to the

claimants without delay.

30. With these directions, the appeals are allowed in part. The

judgment of the High Court stands modified to the extent indicated

above.

31. All pending interlocutory applications stand disposed of.

.........................J. (SURYA KANT)

.........................J. (JOYMALYA BAGCHI)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 16, 2025.

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